The Foreign Service Journal, November 2021

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | NOVEMBER 2021 75 ing democratic society, human rights, freedom from oppres- sion and economic prosper- ity. The concession of values inevitably yields a much deeper negative consequence than the perceived immediate gains. Finally, this is not a war, a competition or a rivalry that America can “win” in the tra- ditional sense. History shows that declaring victory in a competition that one can never truly win achieves only short-term gain, proving detrimental over time. If U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region is solely driven by the need to “win,” then we have chosen a path that assures defeat. Three Additional Domains for Partnership-Building In light of the challenges China poses to the United States today, the conversation tends to concentrate overmuch on the military component of partnerships. Military capabilities represent an indispensable factor in the trans-Pacific equation; however, a partnership is much more than security assistance or military spending. To build cohesive partnerships that effectively balance the challenges posed by China to the liberal world order, the United States should, at a minimum, address three additional domains. Energy. First, as the world rallies around the need to respond to the real challenges of climate change, the United States must focus on energy sector development with part- ner countries. Governments and international providers are putting in place strategies to lead away from carbon-based fuels. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure development strategy, brings the promise of energy, but often with significant costs to a country’s autonomy and indepen- dence. The United States is well positioned to be a leader in the energy development field, and the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development are already leading international energy initiatives. The United States can bring to bear a holistic government approach to partnership-building that capitalizes on the expertise of the Development Finance Cooperation, Export-Import Bank, Department of Energy, and so on. Partners should establish a focused agenda to cover energy sector diversification, private-sector investment, sus- tainable energy development and energy security. The Japan-U.S. Strategic Energy Partnership (JUSEP) is a model of effective collaboration in this area. A joint effort com- mitted to growing sustainable and secure energy markets across the globe, this interagency program facilitates close coordination between the development and finance arms of each government to offer workable solutions to countries in need. Most recently, under the umbrella of JUSEP, new levels of cooperation in lique- fied natural gas (LNG) and renewable energy development in Vietnam have been achieved. These efforts are in line with the ongoing commitment from both countries to collaborate on developing the energy sector of the lower Mekong River. The digital economy. Second, although the United States recognizes the digital economy is growing rapidly around the world, it should employ a tailored approach to partnership- building in this domain. China today represents more than 40 percent of the global digital and e-commerce transactions and continues to expand its share. Beijing expends significant effort and treasure in extending its digital influence through key positions on international governance boards, fast-paced roll- out of 5G infrastructure and technology, and initiatives under the umbrella of the Digital Silk Road. China employs extreme cross-border data flow restrictions, and valid international concerns exist over fair competition and access to intellectual property rights for companies operating in the Chinese sector or through Digital Silk Road projects. As in the energy sector, it is important to recognize that countries are at different stages of digital sophistication. It is imperative for the United States to work with partners to advo- cate an open and transparent digital economy in developed In October 2019, PetroVietnam Gas began construction on the Thi Vai LNG terminal, Vietnam’s first large-scale liquefied natural gas facility and an important strategic step toward energy security in Vietnam. The facility is projected to come online in late 2022. FROMTHAILANDCONSTRUCTIONNEWS

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