THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | NOVEMBER 2024 25 2. In agreement with Moscow, “solving” the historic German problem (which began in the 1860s) through unified Germany’s membership in NATO; 3. Removing states in Central Europe (leading causes of two world wars and a cold war) from the geopolitical chessboard (welcoming all in Partnership for Peace and offering full NATO membership for some); 4. Forging a close relationship with what is now the European Union (work still incomplete); and 5. Securing a place for Ukraine in the West (NATO-Ukraine Charter). The most consequential element for the future of European and trans-Atlantic security was recognition by the United States and some allies that Russia will inevitably again become a great power, whether as help or hindrance. They saw the need to help Russia have a “soft landing” and, if possible, join a “Europe whole and free” (George H.W. Bush, Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, May 1989). The West also sought to avoid what happened with Germany when the 1919 Versailles Treaty imposed the so-called War-Guilt Clause (Article 231), which Adolf Hitler used to stoke German revanchism. Well before this year, initially hopeful efforts to include Russia in some form of mutually beneficial European security structure (notably the NATO-Russia Founding Act) had failed. Perhaps Vladimir Putin always wanted to reconstitute the Soviet Union; even if so, he was aided by U.S. neocons who, beginning in the late 1990s, wrote off Russia as a potential major power and did what Russia’s leaders had cautioned against: to “surround it”— at least on its European side—with new NATO allies. Under U.S. pressure, in 2008 NATO declared that “Ukraine and Georgia will become NATO members.” That meant a commitment for them to join, even though Allies thought the invitation would not take effect until much later. Then, in January 2014, senior State Department officials promoted a change of government in Kyiv. These provocative steps clearly crossed a Russian “red line,” just as any comparable declarations by the Kremlin would have been viewed by NATO. Still, neither Western action could justify Russia’s aggression in 2014 and 2022. From the Western perspective, NATO is objectively not aggressive, while membership is a psychological boon to countries that had so recently been vassals of Soviet power and communism. But viewed from the standpoint of classic strategic analysis, encroachment of many new NATO members near and even on Russia’s frontier would likely be seen by Moscow in terms similar to those that Washington saw in 1960 when the USSR allied with Castro’s Cuba. As the most serious mechanism for mustering Western military capacities, NATO became the natural coordinator of aid to Ukraine. Also, led by the United States, NATO has become crucial to reestablishing and reinforcing deterrence of any Russian ambitions beyond Ukraine. Thus, NATO’s increases in military power during the last decade are part of a potentially long-term containment of Russian power, with an added benefit for the Alliance: They are helping to convince the United States (especially Congress) that other Allies are “pulling their weight”—a decades-long U.S. theme. At the same time, NATO has also provided the United States with major benefits, unquantifiable but nonetheless real, through invaluable influence in Europe for both U.S. public and private sectors. This has been true since the 1948 Marshall Plan, which helped rebuild shattered European nations but also benefited the United States politically and economically. These benefits will continue so long as the United States remains a European power—likely for the indefinite future. The Alliance would almost surely have played an important role in holding the two sides of the Atlantic together without the current war in Ukraine. NATO has fostered and preserved democratic forms of government west of Russia, though a few Allies are backsliders and are shamed for it; promoted largely cooperative and mutually beneficial trans-Atlantic economic relations; stimulated some allied support for security elsewhere in the world; and helped promote a cast of mind that members of NATO are part of the same civilization. Other institutions are important, notably the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but NATO provides a blanket of confidence, beginning with security, and is a spur toward cooperation over discord. Finally, even following an end to the Ukraine war, America’s leadership and commitment in dealing with Russia’s future will still be crucial. That will also require a NATO that continues to be strong and effective. Thus, like le Dieu, if NATO did not now exist, il faudrait l’inventer. Fortunately, it did not go out of business in 1991. n Robert E. Hunter served as U.S. ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 1998. Among many other positions in trans-Atlantic relations, he also served as lead o cial for West European and then Middle East a airs at the National Security Council (1977-1981) and as foreign policy adviser to Senator Edward Kennedy (1973-1977). Ambassador Hunter is currently a member of the American Academy of Diplomacy’s Executive Committee.
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