The Foreign Service Journal, December 2005

mujahedeen (freedom fighters) then taking on our enemy, the Red Army. But there was a steep price to pay for Islamabad’s cooperation: it demand- ed we supply sophisticated weapons to the Pakistan army, as well. We agreed, essentially setting U.S. policy for the next decade. In effect, the CIA and Pentagon subcontracted with the Pakistan army to deliver U.S. weapons to Afghan fighters. The Pakistanis, not we, chose which militias and warlords would get the arms, and a chief consideration was the desire to have a friendly (read Pashtun) government on their bor- der. Neither we nor they were inter- ested in the hearts, minds or welfare of the Afghans, let alone the complex issues of the region. Riyadh, which considered com- munism abhorrent, also took an active role in supporting the Afghan resistance, writing checks to various groups. (Reportedly, they matched U.S. congressional appropriations one for one.) In addition, the Saudis saw an opening to fund madrassas (religious schools) for indoctrinating Pakistani youth in Wahhabism, an austere and belligerent interpreta- tion of the Quran based on the ideas of an 18th-century reformer, Ibn al- Wahhab, who celebrated martyrdom and viewed violence as “a means of purifying a corrupt world.” Wahha- bis believe that those who do not agree with their interpretation of the Quran — even other Muslims — are heathens and enemies, and are pre- pared to wage holy war against them. What gave special power to the Saudi brand of fundamentalism is the fact that they control the holiest Islamic sites, Mecca and Medina, and have the oil money to push their ideas throughout the Islamic world. Thus, by the early 1980s, there were some 8,000 religiously-affiliated edu- cational institutions, and thousands more unofficial schools, throughout Pakistan. Soon the madrassas were providing a steady stream of recruits eager to fight the infidels in Afghan- istan, not only from Pakistan but Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. There were four main Saudi chan- nels for assistance to Afghan militias and the Pakistani Army during the 1980s: the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Directorate of Intelli- gence, the Foreign Ministry and pri- vate charities. Their combined sup- port amounted to hundreds of mil- lions of dollars each year. As a result, Afghan fighters were swimming in cash; militia commanders routinely received $25,000 or more as a monthly retainer. This was a huge sum when one considers annual per capita income for the nation as a whole was, and is, measured in the hundreds of dollars. Despite this support, the Reagan administration that came to power in 1981 was skeptical that the ragtag mujahedeen could defeat the Red Army, one of the most powerful fight- ing forces in the world. At first, the U.S. was careful to provide only weapons that could not be traced back to this country, worried that the Soviet Union might retaliate by invading Pakistan. But as the “freedom fight- ers” gained strength (and victories), we threw caution to the winds. The latest U.S. weapons, valued at more 54 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 5 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was just one of the momentous, interconnected events of 1979.