The Foreign Service Journal, December 2005

60 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 5 Close Does Count Cyprus: The Search for a Solution David Hannay, I.B. Taurus, 2005, $45, hardcover, 256 pages. R EVIEWED BY D ANIEL J. L AWTON Is it possible — contrary to the old adage that “close only counts in horse- shoes and hand grenades” — that coming close to solving a longstanding international conflict counts in the world of diplomacy? Lord David Han- nay, who served as the British Special Representative for Cyprus from 1996 to 2003, argues that it does in his com- prehensive insider’s view of the most recent round of United Nations-led Cyprus negotiations. More promising than any of the many previous inter- national efforts to resolve the conflict since U.N. peacekeepers were origi- nally deployed to the island 41 years ago, last year these sustained efforts nevertheless also ended in failure. Judging from this account, no one can accuse Hannay of unfairly favor- ing either the Greek Cypriots or the Turkish Cypriots — he criticizes both sides liberally. In particular, he chron- icles the opportunities missed by their aging leaders, Greek Cypriot Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot Rauf Denktash. And with clinical, hyper- rational precision, Hannay dissects the emotion-laden issues and bargain- ing positions dividing the two sides, diagnosing their preference for zero- sum and “blame game” negotiating. The substantive issues are many: How would a reunited Cyprus be gov- erned without leading to the secession of the Turkish Cypriots or to domina- tion by the Greek Cypriots, 80 per- cent of the island’s population? How would both communities, the Guar- antor Powers (Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom) and the United Nations ensure the security of Cyp- rus? How would the line between the two populations be adjusted to better reflect their relative sizes? How would the property claims of the many persons displaced by the Turkish intervention of 1974 and post-independence intercommunal strife be settled? And how would the Turkish Cypriots’ demand for interna- tional recognition/sovereignty prior to negotiating a settlement be handled? If these difficult questions were not daunting enough, a number of influential, overlapping relationships in the region forced negotiators to play what Hannay aptly calls “three- dimensional chess.” Hannay docu- ments in detail how relations between Greece and Turkey, Greece and the recognized government of Cyprus, and Turkey and the unrecognized government of northern Cyprus, as well as domestic politics throughout the region, all complicated an already complex issue. Cyprus’ bid to join the European Union, coupled with Turkey’s own aspirations to start E.U. accession negotiations, however, provided sig- nificant new incentives and an action- forcing timetable for all sides. Would Cyprus join the E.U. in 2004 as a divided or reunited island? And to what extent would Turkey use its influence in northern Cyprus to help advance its own E.U. aspirations? Hannay’s chronological narrative provides ample case study material for conflict-resolution theorists and practitioners. Cyprus’ mediators tried it all: confidence-building measures and track-two diplomacy, indirect proximity talks off-island, and mediat- ed face-to-face talks on the island. Years of patient preparatory work by United Nations Special Repre- sentative Alvaro de Soto culminated in Secretary General Kofi Annan pre- senting in swift succession three detailed, non-binding U.N. settle- ment proposals, known informally as Annan I, II and III. But the constellations over Cyprus — again — did not align. Just prior to Cyprus’ signing the treaty of accession to the E.U. (as a divided island) in B OOKS Judging from this account, no one can accuse Hannay of unfairly favoring either the Greek Cypriots or the Turkish Cypriots — he criticizes both sides liberally. u