The Foreign Service Journal, December 2005

2003, Denktash rejected Annan III. One year later, with pro-settlement/ pro-E.U. opinion sweeping northern Cyprus, the U.N. managed to per- suade both sides to put Annan III to separate referenda. While the Turk- ish Cypriots overwhelmingly approv- ed of the U.N. secretary general’s plan (despite lingering opposition from Denktash), Clerides’ presidential suc- cessor and the Greek Cypriots round- ly rejected it (despite the retired Clerides’ endorsement). Even though these conflict-resolu- tion efforts did not succeed, Hannay rightly underscores some of the ancil- lary benefits of conflict management, such as the dramatic relaxation of restrictions on crossing the U.N. buffer zone. In addition, potentially destabilizing military exercises on Cyprus were canceled and the E.U. promised (though it has not yet fully delivered) trade and greater aid to northern Cyprus. Moreover, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots appear increasingly aware that the division of Cyprus remains a stark anomaly and anachro- nism in a Europe transformed, whole, free and at peace. Eschewing both self-doubt and self-pity, Hannay argues persuasively that a Cyprus solution, although not imminent, is still possible, particularly if Turkey’s E.U. prospects and Greece- Turkey rapprochement prosper. The strategic and moral imperatives to reach a just and lasting settlement are still valid. Annan III, which continues to enjoys broad international support, remains the most compelling alterna- tive to no solution. The constellations can someday align over Cyprus. Daniel J. Lawton, a Foreign Service officer since 1990, was the senior Cyprus desk officer from 1999 to 2001. He is currently a political offi- cer in Copenhagen. This review reflects the author’s personal views only. Spy vs. Spies Denial and Deception: An Insider’s View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11 Melissa Mahle, Nation Books, 2005, $26.00, hardcover, 403 pages. R EVIEWED BY D AVID T. J ONES Denial and Deception: An Insider’s View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11 comes on the market as part of a trio of “insider” stories addressing the current CIA. The other titles are A Spy’s Journey : A CIA Memoir by Floyd L. Paseman and Blowing My Cover: My Life as a CIA Spy by Lind- say Moran (which could be subtitled Sex and the Single CIA Agent ). In a personal comment regarding the lat- ter, Melissa Mahle pre-empts ques- tions by saying that she is “not that one.” But she does admit encounter- ing what she presumed would be career-limiting, if not career-ending, circumstances at the Central Intelli- gence Agency — circumstances she suggests would make a great story, but one which under security regulations she is not permitted to disclose. That caveat is relevant and substantial, as it makes it impossible for a reader to determine whether there is an addi- tional agenda beyond what is pre- sented. Nevertheless, this is not another breathless “tell-all” by the disgrun- tled. Instead, Mahle has provided a serious — if arguably protracted, at over 400 pages — review of the agency and its problems over the past two decades, from William Casey through George Tenet. She succeeds in filling a niche between the baseline books of the post-World War II gen- eration — e.g., Sherman Kent’s The CIA and the Craft of Intelligence — and the exposés that in recent years seem to have been the only material extant on the agency’s activities. Chapter by chapter, and director by director, Mahle walks us through the history of the modern CIA. She describes the agency’s effort to re- invent itself in the post-Cold War era, even as force reductions changed the CIA mantra from “global presence” to “global reach;” that is, attempting to cover emergencies in places with no CIA station through hasty TDY efforts to revive old contacts and develop new ones. Mahle spent much of this period as a field opera- tive, but she also provides compre- hensive detail of the agency’s internal turmoil and its struggles with the executive branch and Congress. She provides engaging capsule summaries of each director, itemizing their strengths and weaknesses and the outcomes of the agency’s struggles both with external operational cata- strophes (e.g., Iran-Contra, Somalia, the hunt for Osama bin Laden) and a series of internal security disasters, of which Aldrich Ames was only the most public. Mahle’s judgments lead inexorably to the conclusion that the CIA is still groping to find effective ways to man- age its new challenges in global ter- rorism following 9/11 and enhance internal personnel security. Develop- ing capable analysts is a lengthy process, requiring career-long educa- tion — for which the new Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis (opened in 2000) is just the begin- ning. As for beefing up internal secu- rity, she suggests that draconian poly- graph techniques stemming from the D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 61 B O O K S u