The Foreign Service Journal, December 2006

Program participants would post a sizable bond and pay an administra- tive fee to help keep the program rev- enue-neutral (aside from startup costs). Selected participants would be given the right to work in the U.S. for a limited time (perhaps 10 years). The bond would be returned upon the participant’s relinquishing of legal residency in the U.S. Each year, par- ticipants would contribute to their existing bond to further boost devel- opment in their home country and progressively increase their incentive to return home. Participants could extend their stay here for a limited time by paying a higher annual bond supplement. The size of the bond and the annual supplement could be adjusted periodically on a country-by- country basis to be high enough to ensure that most participants would return home. At the same time, these bonds would remain comparable to the cost of illegal entry to attract a large number of applicants, perhaps two to three times the actual number of annual participants. During the participant’s time in the program, the bond would be invested in a secure U.S. fund or, possibly, in financial institutions in the partici- pant’s country of origin, with interest used to finance development grants and loans. Participants who return would be given preferential access to the aid program if this would help cre- ate jobs. Those who fail to return home at the end of their work permit would forfeit their bonds and bond supplements, which would then be directed toward development in their country. Exceptions would only be made in case of the death of the participant. If participants gain legal permanent res- idence in the U.S. via other means, such as marriage, they would still lose at least a portion of the bond for vio- lating their unconditional pact to return. In any case, programmatic “failure” —when a participant did not return —would plant seeds for future success in reducing immigration pressures. Funds generated would be used to create jobs and promote growth in the country of origin via pro- jects in job training, Internet connec- tivity, trade capacity building, cooper- ative sales organizations, microfinance and rural development programs. USAID would likely administer the program. The best method for selecting par- ticipants would be a simple lottery with a low entry fee, a system that would play well into the psyche of the intending illegal immigrant. Foreign Service officers who have seen many a hopeful, hapless face in a visa line know that many intending illegal immigrants are just waiting for that one lucky break and may delay illegal entry attempts in the hopes of win- ning the lottery the next year. Thus, the deterrence effect on illegal immi- gration would extend beyond actual program participants. A Pilot Program: The Dominican Republic The need to define the project so as to be able to evaluate results in depth suggests that the project should be confined to a single country, preferably one that is a significant source of illegal immigration to the U.S. Because Latinos are the major source of illegal immigration, it would make sense if the pilot country was Latin American. But which? Mexico is too big and politically sensitive. El Salvador, Gua- temala and Honduras are next in line in producing illegal immigrants, but it would be difficult to choose one over the other two. The natural choice would be the next-largest Latin Ameri- can source of illegal immigration, a country that stands apart but has much in common with the rest of Hispanic America: the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic is a siz- able source of illegal immigration. In 2000, what was then the Immigration and Naturalization Service estimated there were nearly 100,000 illegal Dominican immigrants in the United States. And the number is growing. Each year, the Coast Guard interdicts between 2,000 and 5,000 Dominicans attempting illegal entry into Puerto Rico through the treacherous waters of the Mona Channel (hundreds more die trying). However, many thousands more each year succeed in entering the U.S. illegally. Thus, for a pilot program for the Dominican Republic, let us assume the following figures: • 10,000 program participants per year (a reasonable figure in a country of nearly nine million persons that received nearly 20,000 green card visas in 2005); • A $5,000-10,000 bond on each person (vs. smuggling fees of $1,000- $6,000 from the Dominican Repub- lic); • An annual bond supplement of $1,000; • A 5-percent rate of return (a con- servative guess given that the Thrift Savings Plan currently offers a 10-year average return of 7.2 percent); and, • An administrative fee of $500- $1,000 per participant to cover costs. With these assumptions, a pro- gram in the Dominican Republic could generate $5.5 million in first- year interest alone, an increase of 23 percent over current FY 2006 assis- tance levels of $24.2 million. Ten years into the program, as more bonds earn interest, the additional assistance available would reach $55 million per year, or $88 million per year assuming a “worst case” 30-percent overstay/ bond forfeiture rate, or an increase in foreign assistance ranging from 127 to 263 percent. These estimates are just examples; a considerable amount of tinkering D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 17 S P E A K I N G O U T