The Foreign Service Journal, December 2006

settlements and all of Jerusalem, and that the Palestinians would accept a shrunken quasi-state. But the Palestinians expected evacuation of all settlements, full sovereignty within the 1949 armistice line and a capital in East Jerusalem. The Oslo process also failed because of deep political divisions on both sides that deprived Arafat and Rabin — and later Peres and Barak — of strong negotiat- ing mandates. The lack of an agreed destination and internal disunity helped extremists on both sides wreck the process. Israel aggressively expanded settlements; suicide bombings by radical Islamists violated the Palestinians’ promise to halt violence; and the IDF imposed repressive new policies in the name of security. The result was a devastating loss of mutual confidence in peace. It was naïve to expect that Israelis and Palestinians could make peace by themselves, given the huge dispari- ty of power between them, without strong, even-handed U.S. mediation. Yet the U.S. withheld vigorous mediation and policy proposals of its own until December 2000, when Clinton offered his “parameters.” But it was too late. Nor was the U.S. an honest broker. As Aaron Miller, the deputy U.S. negotiator, acknowledged in 2005: “Far too often, we functioned ... as Israel’s lawyer.” America’s Failure Why has America, notwithstanding its great power, been unable to summon the diplomatic leadership and even-handedness needed to help resolve this conflict? For years, it has been widely believed, although seldom discussed in public, that an “Israel lobby” has discouraged U.S. policies that could make peace and protect American interests. The now-famous essay on this lobby in the March 2006 issue of the London Review of Books by Professors John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt — who, quoting Salon , describe it as the “elephant in the living room” — has provoked shrill criticism, including charges of anti-Semitism. But it has also opened up useful public debate. It is no secret to U.S. officials, legislators and the media that well-funded, dedicated groups like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee have often succeeded in discouraging official or media criticism of Israel and the adoption of U.S. policies at odds with Israel’s. These groups often do so by conflating criticism of Israeli policy with hostility to Israel and Zionism, stifling debate and strengthening the conviction that any criticism of Israeli policy is politically dangerous, if not suicidal. The passionate efforts of some American Jewish groups to protect Israel from criticism reflect genuine fears, based on Jewish history, that even well-meaning criticism, if it becomes widespread, might bring latent anti-Semitism out of the woodwork and weaken American support that Israel needs. Mention of the lobby also evokes memories of old anti-Semitic canards about “Jewish power.” Others fer- vently reject any criticism of Israeli policy because it threatens their belief system that idealizes Israel as some- thing exceptional and above criticism. But the Israel lobby is hardly the only reason for America’s lopsided alliance with Israel. Many Americans feel a strong affinity for Israel because of the Bible, the “Judeo-Christian” cultural tradition and remorse over the Holocaust. There is also a powerful fundamentalist Chris- tian lobby that views Israel as the prophetic vehicle for the second coming of Christ. These forces are strong, espe- cially in the absence of historic American connections with, and much suspicion and ignorance toward, Arabs and Muslims. Some conservatives argue that Israel is a strategic mil- itary ally, although the case for this was never strong and faded after the Cold War. Also, some Americans reject the view that terrorism against Israel is a response, ugly but predictable, to the prolonged denial of Palestinian self-determination, and believe America must stand uncritically with Israel in a “war on terrorism.” Contrary to conventional wisdom, the United States, if it wished, could break the current impasse and help Israelis and Palestinians make peace, notwithstanding the obstacles that have crippled policy in the past. The sub- stance of a comprehensive peace plan is already clear. In over 20 years of unofficial and official negotiations before 2001, Israeli and Palestinian experts found mutually acceptable answers to almost all final-status issues. (There is less consensus on Jerusalem and refugees, though solu- tions for these issues are not beyond reach.) The essence of an overall solution is found in the still- born Clinton parameters of late 2000, the Taba talks of January 2001 and the citizen-led Geneva Accords of 2003. In short, a workable plan would include an end to most settlements, with some border changes and land swaps, two capitals in Jerusalem, security and economic arrange- ments, and a resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue (albeit one that is mostly symbolic). Moreover, repeated polls suggest that majorities on F O C U S 24 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 6