The Foreign Service Journal, December 2006

from Israel’s standpoint an internationally mandated cease- fire was not needed in Gaza, and in any case probably would not work even as well as in Lebanon because of the ideological positions of the Hamas government. Broadly speaking, it was not at all clear whether a war fought by Israel in Lebanon to restore its deterrent profile actually did so. This could have negative repercussions for the way Palestinian militants view Israel. The most obvi- ous example is the failure of Resolution 1701 to return Israel’s two abducted soldiers from Lebanon; this hardly boded well for a resolution of the hostage affair in Gaza on terms congenial to Israel. More important was the warn- ing by senior Israeli security officials that Hamas would now redouble its efforts to obtain a rocket arsenal similar to that deployed so effectively by Hezbollah in Lebanon. This put the focus on Egypt, which has undertaken to stop arms smuggling into Gaza from the Sinai Peninsula. Yet Palestinian militants in Gaza were also aware that Israel could do far more damage to the Gazan infrastruc- ture than it had actually done. They expressed apprehen- sion lest Israel “take out its frustrations” from its latest Lebanon experience by stepping up its attacks on Gaza, where the humanitarian situation was disastrous. All this appeared to have raised hope for forming some sort of unity or technocratic government in the Palestinian Authority that might conceivably restore lines of commu- nication between the PA and Israel and the West. Cause for Optimism? Optimists hoped that a successful prisoner exchange deal with Hamas would pave the way for a Palestinian unity government that increased stability and moderation, maintained a ceasefire and ushered in a peace process. But this was hardly a necessary chain of events. Equally, if not more, likely, stalemate and anarchy in Palestine could generate new military and terrorist escalation or the col- lapse of the Palestinian Authority — eventualities that would benefit neither Palestinians nor Israelis. Some on the Israeli left and in the Arab world called for the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference to be reconvened, or some other multilateral process invoked, as a means of using the outcome of this war to leverage a renewed polit- ical process. But Madrid followed an American-led mili- tary triumph that ostensibly ushered in a regional Pax Americana, which in turn helped generate a peace process. In contrast, the United States’ involvement in Iraq was not seen as bringing stability to the region, and the Lebanon conflict ended without a decisive victory for either side. Certainly no new American initiative appeared likely until after the November 2006 midterm elections. Even then, Washington’s heavy commitments regarding Iraq and Iran, and the Bush administration’s reluctance to engage intensively in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, appear to preclude a major U.S. move. On the other hand, the United Nations, the European Union and the moderate Arab states all appeared to be increasingly resolved to try to do something after Lebanon on the Palestinian front as well. The March 2002 Arab League peace plan was revived and Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan all evinced a desire to facilitate movement on the Israeli-Palestinian front as a means of leveraging better Arab-Western-Israeli coordination against the looming Iranian threat that many believe fostered Hezbollah’s performance in Lebanon. The United States, part of the Middle East Quartet (along with the European Union, Russia and the UnitedNations), supported this general direction. Israel appears to be increasingly comfortable with such initiatives, and to prefer an international presence on its borders with troublesome Islamist neighbors to renewing its military occupation — an option now rejected out of hand by the Israeli public. Until recently, few in Israel would have wished for an enhanced UNIFIL in Lebanon. Two years ago, few would have imagined that Egypt and the E.U. would play their current constructive role in Gaza. Strong doubts about the efficacy of occupying enemy territory and a growing readiness to accept inter- national intervention are two very dramatic recent strate- gic departures for Israel. Exploring the Issues Bitterlemons explored these issues week after week throughout the conflict and beyond. Thus, in discussing regional ramifications of the conflict, Professor Asher Susser of Tel Aviv University wrote on July 24 that “the weakening of the Arab state has raised the profile and rel- evance of primordial, sectarian and religious identities, coupled with the rise of non-state actors throughout the region. The likes of Osama bin Laden, Abu Misab al- Zarqawi and his successors, and Hezbollah and Hamas, the latter now in some mode of control of the non-state of Palestine, have created a unique brand of chaotic state- lessness.” Professor George Giacaman of the Palestinian Insti- F O C U S 30 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 6