The Foreign Service Journal, December 2006

people” is how Truman characterized the show). He then offers revealing and some- times amusing chapters on the exhibit of American modern art in Berlin in 1951; the cancelled Sport in Art show in the mid-1950s; and the display of American paintings at the Brussels World’s Fair in 1958 and at the American National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959. He ends with a chapter dissecting the disastrous U.S. participation in the Venice Biennale of 1970 (“the naïve, know-nothing exhi- bition of the American pavilion is, quite simply, humiliating,” wrote one U.S. critic), which was handled by the Smithsonian and effectively marked the end — in Krenn’s view — of offi- cial U.S. support for the promotion of American art abroad. (USIA, he notes, had already decided to get out of the arts business.) While he acknowledges that the U.S. enjoyed some kudos for its over- seas exhibits among foreign audi- ences, Krenn concludes his book on a pessimistic note: “In the end, the international art program provided neither an ideological ‘fallout shelter’ for American propagandists, nor an avenue for speaking to the ‘human spirit’ so desired by American art lovers.” Given how well written and researched Krenn’s subtle study is, it is hard — but not particularly com- forting — to disagree with his less than cheerful conclusion, and to understand better why “arts diploma- cy” plays such a minor part in our for- eign policy today. John Brown, a former Foreign Service officer who practiced public diploma- cy for more than 20 years, now com- piles the Public Diplomacy Press and Blog Review (http://www.uscpublic diplomacy.org/pdpr) for the Univer- sity of Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy. Staving Off Disaster At the Borderline of Armageddon: How American Presidents Managed the Atomic Bomb James E. Goodby, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006, $24.95, paperback, 240 pages. R EVIEWED BY H ARRY C. B LANEY III There are few more important sub- jects than how to deal with nuclear weapons in an age of conflict. Much can be said of the many issues and crises our nation has faced over the last half century, but few rival the con- sequences of badly managing the so- called “balance of terror” which, despite the end of the Cold War, remains a calamitous threat. At the Borderline of Armageddon: How American Presidents Managed the Atomic Bomb provides both a his- torical perspective and careful analysis of how America dealt with the nuclear challenge over the last six decades. It also provides an insider’s view of this critical time and gives the reader a ringside seat into the process by which various U.S. decisionmakers not only handled the nuclear weapons crisis of the moment, but also addressed long- term challenges in a fast-changing security landscape. Retired FSO James Goodby is bal- anced in most of his judgments and perceptive in understanding what was at stake and the role of key players. He describes such milestones as President Eisenhower’s early order on the use of nuclear weapons, Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban Missile crisis and ratification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Goodby also analyzes Johnson’s decision to build and fund multiple warheads, the Nixon/Ford era’s nuclear arms control efforts (with special emphasis on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), Jimmy Car- ter’s response to the Euromissile de- bate and other nonproliferation deci- sions, and Reagan’s “Star Wars” deci- sion and Reykjavik negotiations. He also discusses arms control policy un- der both Bush presidencies and Pres. Clinton. Though Goodby does not hesitate to criticize certain decisions as myopic, he generally regards past administra- tions as wiser than more recent ones in grappling with national and global security. One place where this review- er differs with that assessment is the credit Goodby gives Reagan, both for ending the Cold War and for setting a positive course in nuclear arms con- trol. Given the impact of Reagan’s “Star Wars” decisions and his adminis- tration’s general hostility to arms con- trol, many of us have a somewhat less generous interpretation of the Reagan record. One of the most telling sections of the book is the chapter on the current administration. Goodby cogently out- lines the significant changes that Bush and his team ushered in with major departures in key policies that under- mined America’s role and capacity to gain the support of our allies. He explores the main challenges of this period, which have included the essential destruction of the ABM treaty, the doctrine of pre-emptive war, the Iraq debacle (including the misuse of intelligence regarding Iraq’s non-existent weapons of mass destruc- tion), and the North Korean stale- mate. Here is his stark perspective: “The Bush administration’s foreign policy is based on a conviction that the defense of American interests is best served by retaining the freedom to act, unfettered by other obligations. ... Temporary coalitions, rather than entangling alliances, are seen as the best way to achieve American aims. ... 78 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 6 B O O K S

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