The Foreign Service Journal, December 2007

W e still refer to one sub- component of the political cone as “pol-mil” — as if, by putting “political” first, we indicate its primacy over the military. Civilian control of the military has always been a byword of democracies, as we never tire of lecturing military officer corps from around the world. Yet a look at our current military-diplomatic rela- tionship should give us pause. Speaking at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., on Sept. 12, General David Patraeus hailed Ambassador Ryan Crocker as “my great diplomatic wingman.” The term’s Air Force origins denote a trusty sidekick, hovering slightly behind “Top Gun.” Granted, Iraq is a unique situa- tion; thankfully, most U.S. ambas- sadors do not have four-star generals commanding troops in a war zone in their countries of assignment. But the overall attitude toward diplomacy within our national security structure typified by this quote is still troubling. We are used to a defense attaché and perhaps a military assistance officer as part of the embassy country team, where the ambassador is in charge. But increasingly, Foreign Service officers find themselves in subordinate relationships to the military, especially as the “expedi- tionary” model is expanded. Combat- ant commanders have long had Foreign Service political advisers and, more recently, also operate Joint Interagency Cooperation Groups, with representatives from foreign affairs and other agencies. Now POLADs are present at subordinate commands and in the offices of service chiefs. And AFRICOM, the newest geographic command, expects to use diplomatic and development experts for a third of its headquarters complement. Going Through the Motions Without a doubt, the U.S. military values diplomatic expertise. But the relationship can be one of checking boxes, not of acting on civilian expertise. Carl von Clausewitz’s dic- tum, “war is merely the continuation of politics by other means,” has become a staple of military culture, so war-game planners frequently write scenarios with just a nod to diplomatic niceties before cutting to: “Diplomacy has failed; send in the military.” If the post-9/11 era really is to be characterized by long, global wars, we must be particularly wary of the dangers of focusing obsessively on notions like expeditionary diplomacy, to the exclusion of our core com- petency. War zones are military turf, and in that kind of expeditionary environment, the “pol” will always be wingman to the “mil.” Even in such FSO billets as Provincial Recon- struction Team leader, what is the nature of authority when the PRT is embedded in a larger military unit? Recall that in the Red Army, the political commissar could contravene decisions taken by military profes- sionals. Happily, there are no signs of that on our side, nor would we want the tail to wag the dog in that manner. But why should the world’s leading democracy accept an increasing mili- tarization of its diplomatic engage- ment with the world? Though the expeditionary diplo- mat/soldier amalgam may appeal to writers like Robert Kaplan, it pre- supposes that Iraq and Afghanistan are not one-off circumstances. If expeditionary (as opposed to what — desk-bound?) is to be the new ideal, where (and what) is the next expedi- tion? David Jones pointed out several fallacies behind the headlong rush to jettison traditional diplomacy in his Speaking Out column in the July- August 2006 FSJ (“Run, Lemmings, Run”). Exposed one-officer posts, with a company of security contractor outriders, to perform “transforma- tional diplomacy” — is that the new paradigm? How does that help the U.S. deal with the rest of the world? Washington on the Rhine When I attended National Defense University (1998-1999), I was part of a student body comprised largely of colonels and senior civilians. But I was conscious of who was missing. Where were the rising GS-14s of the Treasury Department, who might one day deal with America’s increasing Expeditionary Sidekicks? The Military-Diplomatic Dynamic B Y G ERALD L OFTUS D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 7 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 15 S PEAKING O UT Why should the world’s leading democracy accept an increasing militarization of its diplomatic engagement with the world?