The Foreign Service Journal, December 2007

only vitiate the intent of the letter and the law; it would eliminate the direct linkage to the president that is the single, sine qua non basis for COM authority. The stronger and more publicly emphasized that connection, the stronger the Secretary of State’s role. Yet an understanding of this basic fact is neither as widespread nor accepted as it should be, even within the State Department. In any event, it is relatively easy to announce, but very difficult to impose, one agency’s authority over others. The National Security Act of 1947 is an illustration. It gave the director of the Central Intelligence Agency control over the intelligence budgets of all other agencies. A potentially important concept, it was doomed to fail. Attempts to amend the rigid, hierarchical rules of organizational behavior by plac- ing relatively equal agencies in a permanent superior-subordinate relationship are unlikely to suc- ceed. It is for this reason that considerable effort has been expended in the White House and on Capitol Hill to make it clear that chiefs of mission work directly for the president. Yet State has consistently made insuf- ficient use of that exceptional leverage. Where State Fails Giving the Secretary of State control of the only chan- nel for instructions to COMs provides the department with the means for a significant impact on the imple- mentation of policies, across the board. The role of the COM should logically be strengthened and supported at F O C U S D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 7 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 31 Without meaningful direction by a higher authority in the field, U.S. foreign policy risks being hamstrung at best, and counterproductive at worst.