The Foreign Service Journal, December 2007

all times and in every possible way, but it very seldom is. In fact, it is often ignored, and frequently under- cut. Those who have served as chiefs of mission are perhaps most familiar with the problem. Solid backing from State in a difference of opinion with another agency’s representative, for example, cannot be depended upon. Messages from the department on the subject, often distributed to other agencies, sometimes dismiss legitimate concerns in an offhand manner. Similarly, cables addressed to chiefs of mission, often prepared by individuals not in the proxi- mate chain of command, do not always convey the impression that the COM’s authorities or views are of particular importance. If State does not treat chiefs of mission as personal representatives of the president, especially in open communications, it cannot expect oth- ers to do so — or respect their authority in the intera- gency process. Consider for a moment the self-evident and highly instructive answers to two questions. If the COM’s authorities were given to the senior military officer, would there be a discernible change in the manner in which the recipients would attempt to carry them out? And would DOD not make every possible effort to ele- vate its status, expand its role and make maximum use of its newfound authority? Many years ago, I learned that a regional bureau assis- tant secretary, a former political-appointee COM, had written all his chiefs of mission (with copies to other agencies) instructing them that they worked for and took their orders directly from him. I was unsuccessful in get- ting him and the department to understand that the let- ter greatly weakened his role, as well as State’s, by under- cutting the COM’s direct link to the president. This brings up an important related point. The embassies with the heaviest concentration of agencies and activities are often, logically, in the larger, more strategically important countries. If it is located in a pleasant place, the embassy is frequently headed by a political appointee who, despite other abilities and accomplishments, knows very little about who does what, how the system works, or what its procedures, problems and mechanisms are. The result is a further diminution of the primordially important role given to COMs, and the reasons why it was given in the first place: to improve coordination of our policies and programs abroad. Some Corrective Measures • The small, somewhat marginal- ized Office of COM Authority, cur- rently in the Bureau of Administra- tion, should be expanded, made a part of, and report to the under secretary for political affairs, with a major role in following issues related to post management as they arise. • State personnel, especially but not exclusively in regional bureaus, should be fully briefed on the impor- tance of supporting the direct relationship between the COM and the president. • A compilation of documents on COM authority should be in the hands of every regional assistant and deputy assistant secretary, as well as office directors, their deputies and desk officers, and should be used as a mea- suring stick on all instructions to COMs, from whatever office or agency. • State reps assigned to DOD training facilities should make extensive presentations on this important topic. Military personnel have little trouble understanding a chain of command. • FSI should include an explanatory presentation on the role of the COM in all of its interagency training pro- grams. • All entering Civil Service and Foreign Service employees should receive briefings on the subject and its importance in the effective performance of the depart- ment’s responsibilities. • Chiefs of mission or the Secretary of State, depend- ing on the circumstances, should equip every chargé d’af- faires with a letter delegating the maximum possible derived authority for the interimmanagement of the post. This very basic procedure has never been instituted. • COMs, in particular those who are non-career, should receive extensive, detailed and specific instruction on their mandated authorities and responsibilities, as well as a reality check on their limitations. Taking these and related steps will improve and facil- itate the ability of chiefs of mission to achieve national objectives. Without them, the ongoing erosion of State’s management of our foreign relations will likely acceler- ate. F O C U S 32 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 7 Chiefs of mission work directly for the president, because the president says they do.