The Foreign Service Journal, December 2007

reduced the refugee flow to Pakistan and encouraged the withdrawal of Soviet forces, leading to the ultimate collapse of the PDPA regime. What Happened Unfortunately, this auspicious start to the post-Soviet era would not per- sist. The humanitarian and develop- ment program peaked in the early 1990s. Momentum for the financial, operational and strategic retrench- ment of the O/AID/Rep program began with the withdrawal of Soviet forces in February 1989. Several par- allel tracks of events followed in short order. • Administratively, O/AID/Rep was “regularized,” dealing less with the ISI and more with Pakistani civil authori- ties. In 1992, programs were running on money still in the pipeline. Later the mission was folded into USAID/ Pakistan. This move was understand- able in light of scarce operating expen- se funds, but it signaled a lack of U.S. long-term commitment to Afghani- stan. • Soviet aid to the PDPA continued briefly, but frontal assaults on Jalala- bad and Khost failed. The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 ended external support for the PDPA. • With the Soviets gone, Pakistan’s ambitions in Afghanistan, muted dur- ing the Soviet occupation, were again advanced by proxies. Pakistan created an Afghan Interim Government, com- plete with ministries of health and education. O/AID/Rep officers tried to treat the AIG as if it were a normal host-country government in 1991. But it was a bare recasting of the seven Pakistani-registered political parties. While it might have been regarded at the time as part of a necessary transi- tion to the establishment of a broad- based Afghan regime in Kabul, it quickly proved to be an unsuccessful precursor. • In April 1992, the mujahedeen captured Kabul and forced Najibul- lah, the PDPA leader at the time, to take refuge in the United Nations compound. The PDPA regime came to an end. • Instead of facilitating a peaceful transition fromPeshawar to Kabul, the AIG fractured. Power-sharing and control of Kabul were the first bones of contention. Then savage fighting broke out among the seven parties of the Pakistani resistance alliance and with those outside it. What Might Have Been The resulting civil war period and the rise of the Taliban have been well analyzed and, in any case, lie beyond the scope of this article. Frommy per- spective, however, it seems that per- sonnel from State’s Bureau of Diplo- matic Security were allowed to serve as a screen for a policy of U.S. disengage- ment from Afghanistan. DS’s concern was that the situation in Kabul was insecure and dangerous, as indeed it was. DS argued that Embassy Kabul, whose skeletal staff had been evacuat- ed in 1989, should not be reopened. Senior policymakers concurred, noting that overall strategic aims had been achieved with the Soviet with- drawal and that Afghanistan was now of peripheral interest. A one-dimen- sional security view conveniently stood for overall policy. Afghans date America’s abandon- ment of them from April 1992. This withdrawal occurred despite the fact that officers from the State Depart- ment and O/AID/Rep, and probably the CIA, were prepared to open the embassy on a skeletal basis and serve there voluntarily. These officers were knowledgeable about and accepted by the Afghan actors — and had safely carried out their activities amidst the turmoil of Peshawar, Quetta and the border for nearly nine years. How much future bloodshed, Afghan and American, might have been prevented had they been allowed to try? 50 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 7 4800 Wisconsin Ave. N.W. 202-537-3000 www.MartensVolvo.com Call for program details and additional specials. Contact Dana Martens at 202-885-5312 or email DMartens@MartensCars.com for more information. The New 2008 C-30 Now Available at Diplomatic Pricing! STARTING AT $ 19,995