The Foreign Service Journal, December 2008

Terrorism and Islam The “war on terrorism” led by our armed forces has been the organizing principle of U.S. Middle East policy since 9/11. But terrorism and violence are symptoms of conflicts that can ultimately be mitigated only by under- standing their causes and applying diplomatic, economic and other tools. Military force is usually a blunt and counterproductive weapon, since it tends to kill civilians and breed more terrorists and anti-American animus. While many terrorists have been caught or killed since 2001, terrorism has expanded in the Middle East and elsewhere (although the U.S. has prevented new attacks at home through better intelligence and security). The next president should give higher priority to traditional counterterrorismmethods —diplomacy, intelligence and law enforcement — and expand efforts to deal with root causes. Military force should be used sparingly. The emotive phrase “war on terrorism” has a strong patriotic resonance, but it creates strategic confusion and should be dropped. The militarization of counterterrorism and the war in Iraq, along with the deaths of thousands of Muslim civil- ians, have helped extremists promote the myth of pri- mordial conflict between the West and Islam. Our chronic use of the ambiguous phrase “Islamic terrorism” offends Muslims and compounds the problem. Although public support for al-Qaida has waned, it is still danger- ous. Barack Obama’s administration will also need better public diplomacy to show that America wants mutually respectful relations with Islam and partnership against common criminal enemies. An urgent part of this new strategy is a clear repudia- tion of torture and other abusive detainment policies that violate the rule of law and civilized standards. These dis- graceful practices — born of panic, cynicism about American values and gross ignorance about effective interrogation techniques — have devastated our image in the Middle East and elsewhere, crippled our counterter- rorism efforts and dishonored our Constitution. The Israeli-Palestinian Impasse Peace between Israel and Palestine will not by itself bring stability to the region. But perceptions run deep there that the U.S. has become part of the problem by protecting Israeli policies of occupation and settlement and ignoring Palestinian demands for justice and sover- eignty. No other U.S. policy has caused more Arab and Muslim anger, weakening our ability to win cooperation with Arab governments on other regional problems. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations have urged Israel and Palestine to negotiate bilaterally on the core issues of settlements, borders, Jerusalem, refugees and security. This approach failed during the Oslo years. There is no sign that the bilateral talks President Bush launched in Annapolis last year, after seven years of neg- lect, will agree on anything more than general principles. Indeed, it is now clear that peace cannot be achieved bilaterally, given the huge power imbalance between the parties and their divided, dysfunctional internal politics. On both sides, radicals who cling to a zero-sum concept of “victory” block the way to peace. In Israel, an en- trenched settler lobby opposes a workable territorial compromise. Palestinian policy has been paralyzed by a bitter split, which the U.S. has encouraged, between the pragmatic but feeble Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and a militant, rejectionist Hamas in Gaza. The consequences of this impasse are stark and dan- gerous. Settlements, in which about 500,000 Israelis now live, are already close to creating a de facto single, Israeli- controlled state, in which Palestinians will soon be a sub- ject majority. This threatens Israel and the entire region with a permanent, violent rebellion by Palestinians who demand liberation. It also corrupts Israel’s Jewish, demo- cratic values. Without renewed hope for statehood, Palestinians may abandon their two-state goal and wait for demography to overwhelm Israel. Unless our enduring alliance with Israel is coupled with diplomatic leadership designed to change self- destructive Israeli and Palestinian policies and bring peace, the conflict will become a permanent millstone around our neck, impeding our ability to pursue our other interests and relations in the region. In particular, it opens the door to the specter of a nuclear Iran, pitted against a nuclear Israel. Given these high stakes and the failure of previous peace “processes,” strong new American leadership will be needed to help rescue Israel and Palestine from a dis- aster. At an early stage, Washington should announce a compelling American vision of peace that would meet the core interests of both sides. Mediation by a senior U.S. envoy, not just exhortation, should follow. In addition, Palestinian internal reconciliation is essential to peace, and must be part of a new U.S. policy. F O C U S D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 23