The Foreign Service Journal, December 2008

There is a good chance that over time Israelis and Palestinians, and ultimately their leaders, would respond positively to such American leadership. Today, both groups are traumatized and have virtually abandoned hope for peace. Yet polls show that prag- matic majorities on both sides want a two-state accord and would accept big compromises in final- status solutions, whose outlines are now well known. Here at home, a strong, compassionate approach to peace supporting both Israel and Palestine would mobilize domestic support, including from American Jews, and confirm that the president, not the “Israel lobby,” makes policy in Washington. Getting Out of Iraq Bowing to the Maliki government, weary American opinion and the need for an agreement by Dec. 31 to replace the United Nations mandate for U.S. forces in Iraq, the Bush administration has signed a draft agree- ment, subject to parliamentary approval, calling for the departure of U.S. forces in 2011. In doing so, the admin- istration seems to have abandoned its entirely unrealistic plans for permanent military bases in Iraq. As of November, there was growing opposition to the draft agreement from Iraqi factions who want an earlier U.S. withdrawal or fear the text could enable our forces to stay after 2011. The logic for an early withdrawal is powerful, and not just because Iraqis resent the continued presence of for- eign troops. The “surge” was supposed to buy time for a long-awaited political reconciliation. While security has improved, Sunni-Shiite and intra-Shiite relations are still tenuous, and there is no consensus on the nature of the Iraqi state and how Iraqis can coexist and share their oil wealth. It is now clear that a prolonged American troop presence discourages political reconciliation, which only Iraqis can accomplish; and without that, there will be no security. While the threat of renewed civil war and breakdown of Iraq’s fledgling institutions cannot be ignored, the next administration should give higher priority to other U.S. goals in the region besides an illusory “victory” in Iraq. In measuring national interests, the Obama administration should focus on reducing the huge cost of the war to our troubled domes- tic fabric, including the monthly drain of $10 billion and the mas- sive toll on our overextended arm- ed forces and their families. Engaging Iran Forging a new relationship with Iran and heading off its nuclear threat should be major goals of a new Middle East strate- gy. The crisis in U.S.-Iranian rela- tions weighs heavily on our interests in resolving the con- flicts in Israel and Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington and Tehran have strong mutual interests in promoting regional security, ensuring stable supplies of energy, and stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan. The current standoff prevents exploration of a mutually beneficial new relationship and the kind of “grand bar- gain” that Iran offered in 2003, but the U.S. ignored. It is time to drop failed threats and sanctions intended to force Iran to accept preconditions for direct negotiations, and to move to unconditional bilateral talks. A constructive relationship with Tehran is hardly assured, of course. But without this and other regional cooperation, stabilization in Iraq after the U.S. withdraws will be even harder. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni dictatorship and U.S. sponsorship of a political framework that favors Iraq’s Shiite majority have already given Iran major influence there and changed the region- al balance of power. But Tehran understands it cannot control even a Shiite-led Arab Iraq, and it shares our inter- est in avoiding chaos there. U.S. policy should accept legitimate Iranian interests in Iraq and the region, and enlist Tehran’s support for stability there. On the nuclear issue, it may not be too late to influence Iranian plans for uranium enrichment with major incen- tives coupled with a new relationship with the U.S. and the West. Even if Iran cannot be dissuaded from enrichment, a capability it is permitted for peaceful uses under its Non- Proliferation Treaty obligations, a transparent regime of international inspection and accountability and mutually peaceful nuclear cooperation might work in the alterna- tive. F O C U S 24 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 8 Our current alienation from the Arab and Muslim worlds because of failed policies has created a diplomatic vacuum that regional states have tried to fill.