The Foreign Service Journal, December 2008

Improved U.S.-Iranian relations will also require an end to threats against Israel and Tehran’s manipulation of the Israeli-Palestinian issue for political reasons. However, this is unlikely in the absence of a credible peace process under U.S. leadership. New Policies Toward Syria and Lebanon The next administration also needs to open a fresh page on relations with Syria and Lebanon. Current U.S. efforts to sanction and isolate Damascus for its interfer- ence and suspected assassinations in Lebanon, support for Hezbollah and harboring of Hamas and other radical Palestinians are going nowhere and are self-defeating. The Bush administration has already toned down its antipathy to the Assad regime and its earlier opposition to negotiations by Israel, our close ally, with Syria over with- drawal from the Golan Heights and a peace accord. Turkey is now the go-between in these talks, and France is seeking a role. But Washington’s full support and par- ticipation will be needed for Syria and Israel to make peace. This would be an historic achievement for all sides. A new policy of renewed U.S. engagement with Damascus and support for peace talks with Israel would require an end to Syrian support for Hamas and Hezbollah extremism. It should also involve an end to Syria’s meddling in Lebanon — while recognizing its interests there — as well as a Syrian relationship with Iran that is not hostile to U.S. interests. In Lebanon, the U.S. has failed to strengthen the mod- erate March 14 Movement’s leadership against Hezbollah by treating the latter as simply as a terrorist organization, rather than an important political player in Lebanon. Washington’s encouragement of Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah (which Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice hailed as the necessary “birth pangs of a New Middle East”) was a new low point for U.S. credibility in the region. Lebanon, with diplomatic help from Qatar, has since gone its own way with an internal compromise that enhances Hezbollah’s influence. Our experiences in Iraq and Lebanon show the pitfalls F O C U S D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 25