The Foreign Service Journal, December 2008

reaction to the incredible array of duties dropped into the laps of U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghani- stan in the absence of civilian counterparts and funding. And there’s no dispute about the need to do better at stabilizing global hot spots. The essential problem, however, is not simply resources for nationbuilding, cri- sis response, “surge capacity” or any other challenge, no matter how compelling. Rather, it is a fundamental weakness in America’s steady-state capacity for interna- tional affairs in general — its ongoing interactions with the world beyond our borders — caused by inadequate numbers of Foreign Service and other civilian foreign affairs personnel. The connection between the discussion of civilian capacity and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan points to another challenge. Governmental reform efforts of the type needed are usually precipitated and driven by a threat to the nation. While the civilian capacity shortfall arguably constitutes a danger to the country, it is not the kind of threat that makes policymakers lose sleep or spurs constituents to complain to their member of Congress. Yet the inability to keep up with events, trends and attitudes in the world hinders our ability to influence those events and attitudes, and makes it more likely that our crisis response capabilities will be need- ed. Moreover, the issue represents not just a danger, but a lost opportunity to help build a strong global sense of common cause. Getting a Finger on the Global Pulse Despite talk of transformational diplomacy and glob- al repositioning, under the current configuration of the Foreign Service there are nearly 200 cities in the world with populations exceeding one million that lack any official American presence. Moreover, where our pres- ence is strong — in foreign capitals — it is also sequestered behind fortified embassy walls. For a global power, the United States does not really seem to have its finger on the global pulse. The premise of Secretary Rice’s transformational diplomacy initiative is to engage the world more deeply, more consistently and more constantly. This cannot be achieved with “vir- tual presence posts,” but only by having representatives on the ground who interact with locals. Today, in developing countries in particular, such interactions are much more likely to come via the British Council, the Goethe Institute, the Alliance Francaise, one of China’s mushrooming Confucius Institutes or the private sector. Contact almost certain- ly is not through an American Center, most of which long ago stopped hosting events or serving as lending libraries. In contrast, Beijing plans to build 1,000 Confucius Institutes worldwide by 2020. The slipping American relationship with average people — the students and academics who rely on resources like the American Center — parallels a fall- off of elite relationships by a Foreign Service barely able to maintain interactions at the highest level. In Pakistan, for example, the resignation of President Pervez Musharraf illustrates the trap into which the U.S. has fallen again and again: namely, channeling too much of its relationship with another country through an individual leader. In the end, Musharraf’s unpopu- larity fed America’s unpopularity — and vice versa — leaving Washington with the task of rebuilding its rela- tions with a pivotal country. Maintaining a broader set of links to different lead- ers, including key members of civil society and the polit- ical opposition, is certainly more labor-intensive than cultivating a foreign nation’s leadership. But in a fast- changing world, the U.S. can only succeed by having deeper, multilevel relations with other nations. A National Responsibility The lion’s share of the burden to address these issues will fall on the new president’s shoulders, but Capitol Hill must also step up. In recent efforts to adapt U.S. foreign policy to the challenge of fragile states, Congress has struggled to find an appropriate role. At best it has acted mainly as an observer, ceding most responsibility for the condition of U.S. capabilities to the executive branch. At worst it has been an obstacle, with a narrow vision of what it takes to be effective in the world, causing it to look askance at any capability development that isn’t tied to concrete counterterror- ism missions or pet development projects. Perhaps because of the way Congress operates — in a deliberative, reactive manner, focused on the election cycle — it is difficult to tackle the problem of fragile states and too easy to pass the buck. However, only Congress has the ability to provide the authorities and funding that will improve the U.S. government’s long- term ability to plan and execute policies to advance the nation’s strategic international goals and to react effec- F O C U S 32 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 8