The Foreign Service Journal, December 2008

no danger of an intra-European war. As the old saying goes, keeping the Americans in NATO not only kept the Russians out but also the Germans down. Another critical advantage of postwar Europe’s close ties to the U.S. was the ability to share in the global Pax Americana, where raw materials were freely available and markets relatively open for trade. While protecting its own worldwide interests, the U.S. has undoubtedly also protected the broad global interests of its European allies. The unprecedented prosperity of the postwar era has blessed the European Union no less than America. Given this long and productive history, it is not sur- prising that so many people have come to see NATO as an end in itself. It certainly does embody a great deal of American diplomatic capital. But as with any such insti- tution, there is the danger that it may grow dysfunctional in the face of major historic changes. In the reverential climate that habitually surrounds NATO, it may be difficult to generate a genuinely fresh look at the Alliance’s relationships and structures. But certainly there has been no lack of trying. No one can say that NATO itself has not reacted vigorously to its new geopolitical situation. Two Big Ideas Two big ideas have dominated NATO’s effort to rede- fine itself. One is to extend the membership into Soviet Russia’s former sphere of influence. The other has been to develop into a Euro-American global intervention force. Enlarging NATO was doubtless inevitable. After all, Stalin had extended Russian hegemony well beyond its traditional sphere. No one, for example, could reason- ably object to reclaiming such traditional Central European states as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Hungary, or even to expanding NATO to reformed Balkan states. But adding the Baltic states and attempt- ing to add Ukraine and Georgia appeared to supplant Russian influence in regions thought, since czarist times, almost to be part of Russia herself. Ostensibly, the rationale was not only to stabilize the democratic institutions of these close neighbors but also to protect them against a renewal of Russian hegemony. The danger of such guarantees, as Georgia has demon- strated, is that they effectively lessen the real security of the countries that receive them. Extending NATO’s mil- itary ties into Moscow’s own neighborhood arouses Russian fears of encirclement and makes aggressive acts more likely. Given the overwhelming asymmetries of power, the independence of these Russian neighbors depends less on America’s promises than on Moscow’s belief that they are easier to deal with if formally independent and, in any event, are no threat to Russia’s own security inter- ests. Accordingly, joining what is widely seen as a bla- tantly anti-Russian alliance hardly seems an effective way to court Moscow’s good will. And once that is lost, Russia will inevitably seek to limit its neighbors’ sover- eignty — and NATO will probably not be able to do much about it. NATO’s second big new idea is aptly embodied in the catch phrase “out of area or out of business.” In this pre- scription, NATO presents itself as a “toolbox” of European military resources organized for joint, world- wide exercises with the Americans. Small countries eagerly provide small contingents to curry favor in the hope of reinforcing Washington’s pledges of support against the Russians. Bigger countries also join, hoping that they can gain real influence over U.S. foreign policy. Recent experience has diminished these expectations. Georgia, for example, sent nearly 4,000 troops to Iraq. Even the British must wonder how much control over American policy their loyalty has bought them. Moreover, as a device for preserving the Alliance, the toolbox strategy is disturbing. It seems to suggest that to preserve NATO, Washington should adopt a foreign pol- icy of frequent global interventions. NATO thus trans- forms itself from a defensive European alliance into an instrument for American intrusions around the world. As such, it should be regarded with suspicion by Americans leery of a foreign policy of global meddling. This observation raises a critical issue: Since the Soviet demise, does NATO really serve the national interest of the United States? Asking that question pulls us away from the prevailing preservationist approach to a less sentimental, geopolitical stance. What are America’s fundamental interests in Europe and how can they best be protected? Does today’s NATO serve those interests? Is it the right structure for organizing our participation in post-Soviet Europe? Does it tie us more closely to our natural allies or does it create extra friction with and among those allies? Does it create enemies we don’t need to have? Does it prevent a more appropriate structure from arising? F O C U S D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 43