The Foreign Service Journal, December 2008

• Public diplomacy programs, especially exchanges, should be expanded significantly, at a cost that will total $455.2 million annually by FY 2014; and • Authority over selected security assistance programs, totaling $785 million annually, should be moved in stages from the Department of Defense to the Department of State, with much of the implementation remaining at Defense. In areas where combat operations contin- ue, authority would stay with Defense for the duration of those operations. OVERVIEW — THE PROBLEM Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the diplomatic capac- ity of the United States has been hollowed out. A com- bination of reduced personnel, program cuts and sharply increased responsibilities has put maximum pressure on the capacity of agencies responsible for the missions of core diplomacy, public diplomacy, foreign assistance, and stabilization and reconstruction budgeted under Func- tion 150 of the federal budget. During the 1990s — as the “peace dividend” was cashed — overseas staffing for these functions was sig- nificantly reduced in the context of the roughly 30-per- cent real-dollar reduction in U.S. international affairs spending. In addition, the implosions of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia resulted in the need to staff 20 new embassies in the new countries created as a result, and to expand staff based in other Eastern European nations without an overall increase in department per- sonnel. Because State had to absorb these increases, the overseas staffing deficit in the State Department had approached 20 percent by Sept. 11, 2001, with a larger gap within USAID. Secretary of State Powell’s Diplomatic Readiness Initiative created more than 1,000 new State Depart- ment diplomatic positions between 2001 and 2004, bol- stering core diplomatic staffing to above that of post–Cold War levels. These increases, however, were quickly absorbed by the diplomatic surges in Iraq, Afghanistan and neighboring countries. Since the DRI ended in 2004, staffing increases at State have been concentrated in consular affairs and diplomatic security. Core diplomatic staff- ing deficits have, in effect, re- turned to 2000 levels. The cur- rent realities are as follows: • As of 2008, State faces a per- sonnel shortfall of about 2,400 relating to enduring core diplo- matic work, emerging policy challenges, public diplomacy and critical training needs. Persistent staffing gaps at hardship posts continue to impede important policy pursuits. Staffing de- mands related to Iraq and Afghanistan translate not only into needs for resident personnel, but for significant numbers of short-term staff diverted temporarily from other jobs, to the detriment of other important work. For example, all State political and USAID field positions in the Afghan provinces are vacant an average of two months a year due to the inability of organizations to cover scheduled absences. • Training lags because of personnel shortages. A well-trained work force is extremely difficult when every additional training assignment could leave an operational job unfilled. A 2006 report by the Government Accountability Office found that 29 percent of language- designated positions at embassies and consulates were not filled with language-proficient staff. There is an even greater shortfall in functional training, particularly in pro- gram management skills. • In public diplomacy, reduced budgets and staff devoted to explaining America abroad after the end of the Cold War contributed to a decline in understanding of and respect for the United States in many parts of the world. Increased resources, including larger numbers of skilled personnel, are required in this area. For example, for almost a decade public diplomacy missed opportuni- ties to develop a vigorous global Internet programming capability to reach millions due to insufficient funding and a lack of trained career personnel, particularly in pro- gram management skills. • USAID currently has 2,200 personnel who adminis- ter more than $8 billion annually in development and other assistance (excluding cash grants), following cumu- lative staffing reductions of nearly 40 percent during the F O C U S D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 55 State faces a personnel shortfall of about 2,400 relating to enduring core diplomatic work, emerging policy challenges, public diplomacy and critical training needs.