The Foreign Service Journal, December 2009

D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 9 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 31 launch tubes on strategic ballistic missile submarines could be seen by satellite), and heavy bombers. SALT included another innova- tion in bilateral arms control: It es- tablished a bilateral consultative body that would meet periodically to discuss and resolve questions re- lating to implementation and com- pliance. Subsequent nuclear treat- ies also established consultative bodies. The 1987 INF and 1991 START treaties represented major breakthroughs on several fronts. First, they actu- ally reduced — and in the case of the INF Treaty, elimi- nated — important categories of nuclear forces. In the case of the INF Treaty, the entire inventory (deployed and non-deployed) of ground-launched missiles belong- ing to the United States and the Soviet Union with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers were eliminated, as were their launchers. Moreover, the INF Treaty included provisions for the first-ever on-site inspections of missile bases, the first- ever negotiated (and directly observed) missile and launcher eliminations, and the first-ever continuous pres- ence of nationals of one country to observe activities at a facility in the other country that was involved in the pro- duction of missiles. The inspections and continuous pres- ence helped both countries develop confidence that the other was complying with the treaty. Just as importantly, this system created a new foundation of trust and under- standing among the civil societies of both countries as they opened their arms to welcome inspectors from the other country. The START Treaty, which was negotiated before the fall of the Soviet Union but entered into force on Dec. 5, 1994, built on the success of the INF Treaty. Its goals, however, were tempered by a strong appreciation that while it was possible to eliminate whole classes of inter- mediate and shorter-range nuclear forces, longer-range strategic offensive nuclear weapons still were required to deter nuclear attack and ensure national security and the security of friends and allies. START required real reductions. It set an aggregate limit of 1,600 on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles — deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bomb- ers — that each side could have; a limit of 6,000 on the total number of nuclear warheads attributed to deployed systems and sublimits on the number of war- heads that could be deployed on the various types of ballistic mis- siles (4,900 total, with sublimits of 1,540 warheads on so-called heavy ICBMs and 1,100 on mobile ICBMs). It also required a 50-per- cent reduction, to 154, in heavy ICBMs (SS-18 missiles), a reduc- tion that applied only to the former Soviet Union since only it possessed these powerful missiles. When START was signed, the U.S. had 2,246 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and the Soviet Union had 2,500; the U.S. had 10,563 attributable warheads and the Soviet Union had 10,271; and the U.S. had 8,210 attributable warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs and the Soviet Union had 9,416. START contained an even more comprehensive set of definitions and confidence-building measures than the INF Treaty; called for an even more extensive array of on-site inspections; created new on-site inspection ap- proaches to permit both sides not only to “see” the num- ber of deployed missiles, air-launched cruise missiles and heavy bombers, but also to verify that the number of nu- clear warheads was no more than the number attributed to a particular type of ICBM, SLBM and heavy bomber; and required an extensive exchange of technical infor- mation to help verify that the firepower of the strategic forces of each side stayed within agreed limits. This array of provisions served three purposes. It lim- ited the growth in capabilities, ensured that the United States could not only trust but also verify actions under the treaty, and facilitated predictability in U.S. relation- ships with the new states of the former Soviet Union (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus), where nu- clear weapons and nuclear weapons facilities were still located. In 1992, after the fall of the Soviet Union, those three nations agreed to transfer the nuclear warheads on their territories to Russia, and later joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. The Moscow Treaty, which entered into force on June 1, 2003, is a treaty between only the United States and Russia. It reduced the levels of strategic nuclear war- heads below those established in START. Reflecting the fact that Washington and Moscow no longer perceived each other as enemies, and the correspondingly higher F O C U S A 2009 START Follow-on Treaty would be the fifth arms control agreement between Washington and Moscow.