The Foreign Service Journal, December 2009

40 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 9 seeing). Space-based or other re- mote intelligence collection is the only way to try to discover whether prohibited activities are taking place at other times and locations. As a general rule, the more intru- sive the monitoring measures are, the more difficult they are to negoti- ate and the more costly they are to operate. Verifiers are well aware that negotiators are not eagerly awaiting the opportunity to try to get nations like North Korea to agree to intrusive measures. At the same time, they also appreciate the fact that any verification regime must be able to stand up the scrutiny of Congress and the American public. Assessing the Effectiveness of Verification There is no such thing as a 100-percent verifiable agree- ment. But one can usually determine that an agreement is unverifiable by considering the following three questions: • Do the existing capabilities of the United States and its allies to detect and confirm prohibited activities exceed the ability of potential violators to thwart verification? • Does the treaty meet our verification needs given the compliance record of the other parties, the consequences of violations, and the impact of the treaty on the U.S.? • Are there sufficient remedies that can be taken in a timely fashion to reverse the damage caused by violations? If the answers to all three questions are affirmative, then it is fair to say that an agreement is “effectively verifiable.” The quest for certitude can sometimes fuel misguided efforts to negotiate some sort of inspection or transparency regime that gives the illusion of meaningful action. I call this “feel-good verification.” The risk in this is that the ex- istence of an on-site inspection regime, even one that has virtually no probability of detecting noncompliance, will mislead observers into believing that the verification prob- lemhas been solved and the threat the agreement was sup- posed to eliminate has been removed. If we believe (falsely) that a threat has been eliminated or reduced, we are unlikely to develop and apply other tools that might genuinely reduce the threat. And the inability to detect noncompliance may generate an incentive to cheat — thereby exacerbating the threat rather than reducing it. It is worth noting that when the president submits a treaty to the Senate for advice and consent, the package must include a formal assessment of verification. This doc- ument is prepared by the assistant secretary for verification and com- pliance and signed by the Secretary of State, per Section 306 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Congress will likely also receive a monitoring assessment produced by the intelligence community that was requested by the Senate. If the administration’s as- sessment is not rigorous and straightforward, that will have serious consequences. Accordingly, if effective verification is not attainable, it is best to say so. The United States can pursue the agreement anyway, if it is judged to be in our in- terest. Determining Compliance The U.S. is the only nation that conducts a formal as- sessment of other nations’ compliance with their arms con- trol obligations. Given the European Union’s requirement that member-states prohibit trade with nations in violation of their obligations, we may see such assessments from some E.U. states in the future. It would be safe to say, though, that even we wouldn’t do these assessments had Congress not mandated them in Section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. In preparing the assessments, the Verification, Compli- ance and Implementation Bureau reviews all available in- telligence or other relevant information. A statement of the issue is provided, along with a list of the treaty obliga- tions in question and descriptions of possibly noncompliant actions or programs. The compliance analysis then weighs the actions against the obligations to reach a compliance finding. Often the data or obligations are unclear, in which case the finding will have a caveat such as “likely violation,” or “highly probable violation.” These assessments not only inform policymakers in the executive and legislative branches of possible serious threats, but may provide some early warning of a failure to deter actions inconsistent with our security. They can also help inform our expectations and standards for any future agreements with a particular nation or group of nations. Simply put, U.S. verification requirements will ordinar- ily be far more relaxed in an arms control agreement with the United Kingdom than with North Korea. Unfortu- nately, particularly in a multilateral negotiation, there is usu- ally a demand that agreements and their verification F O C U S On-site inspections can be critical when satellite observation is unlikely to detect noncompliance.