The Foreign Service Journal, December 2009

44 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 9 In September 1996, the United States was the first na- tion to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which “prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion” and establishes a global monitor- ing network and the option of short-notice, on-site inspec- tions to detect and deter cheating. To date, 182 countries have signed the treaty and 150 of them have ratified it, in- cluding three of the original five nuclear weapon states: France, Russia and the United Kingdom. In the U.S., however, the Senate’s 51-48 vote against the CTBT in October 1999, followed by the George W. Bush administration’s opposition to the treaty, stalled ratification. While Washington had already been observing a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing since 1992, opponents were concerned that the U.S. would not be able to maintain the safety and reliability of its nuclear arsenal without ongoing testing. They also doubted that national and international verification capabilities would be rigorous enough to detect low-yield nuclear explosions. And, finally, they did not be- lieve that the treaty offered meaningful political or military benefits. Today, however, 10 years after the first Senate vote, the prospects for U.S. ratification aremuch improved. Scientific and technical advances during the past decade that address the main concerns of opponents have led to a reconsidera- tion of the issue by a growing array of Republican andDem- ocratic national security figures. President Barack Obama has pledged to make ratification of the treaty a priority, and the benefits of doing so are significant. Although there is now no technical need—nor is there any political support — for a renewal of U.S. nuclear test- ing, ratification of the CTBT is vital to reducing the risk that other nations might conduct nuclear tests that could im- prove their nuclear capabilities. In addition to the U.S., eight other states — China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan —must ratify the CTBT to trigger its formal entry into force. Ratification will not only improve our ability to detect and deter clandestine nu- clear testing; it will enable us to credibly prod these nations to join, as well. Time to Take Another Look In the past several years, bipartisan support for ratifica- tion of the CTBT has grown. In 2007, former Secretaries of State George Shultz andHenry Kissinger, along with for- mer Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn, called on the Senate to initiate a bipartisan process “to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.” President George H.W. Bush’s national security adviser, Gen. Brent Scowcroft, and former National Nuclear Secu- rity Administrator Linton Brooks have also recently en- dorsed U.S. ratification of the treaty. During the 2008 presidential campaign, Senator John McCain, R-Ariz., promised to “continue America’s current moratorium on testing” and to “[take] another look at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” Candidate Barack Obama pledged to “reach out to the Senate to secure the ratification of the CTBT at the earliest practical date and then launch a diplomatic effort to bring onboard other states whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force.” In his April 5 speech in Prague, President Obama de- clared that his administration “will immediately and ag- gressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” As Gary Samore, special assistant to the president and White House coordinator for arms control and WMD, told the Arms Control Association annual meeting in May, the administration is “moving very delib- erately in terms of doing the necessary technical and intel- ligence work to look at the important questions of verification, questions of American stockpile stewardship.” Samore believes that the current pace could allow for re- consideration of the treaty by mid-2010. The task will be very difficult, but is within reach. The Democrats’ 60-seat majority in the Senate is far larger than the 45-seat minority they held in 1999. But to succeed, the president and his team must follow through on the pledge to make the CTBT a high priority and win the support of a group of approximately 10 skeptical senators. While the final outcome will depend on the politics of the moment, it will also hinge on the administration’s abil- F O C U S Daryl G. Kimball has served as executive director of the Arms Control Association since 2001. He previously served as security programs director for Physicians for So- cial Responsibility (1989-1997), where he helped lobby for the U.S. nuclear test moratorium legislation of 1992 and negotiation of a zero-yield comprehensive test ban treaty. Kimball was also executive director of the Coalition to Re- duce Nuclear Dangers (1997-2001), where he led a group of nongovernmental organizations in their efforts to win support for U.S. CTBT ratification.