The Foreign Service Journal, December 2009

D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 9 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 45 ity to make the case that: 1) U.S. ratification will, on bal- ance, improve national security and advance progress to- ward entry into force; 2) technical advances in test ban monitoring make the treaty effectively verifiable; and 3) sci- entific and technical advances ensure the ability of U.S. weapons labs to maintain an effective arsenal without fur- ther test explosions. As George Shultz said on April 17, his fellow Republicans “might have been right voting against [the CTBT] some years ago, but they would be right voting for it now, based on these new facts.” The Security Benefits For decades, nuclear testing has propelled the arms race. Since the beginning of the nuclear age, eight coun- tries have conducted 2,052 test explosions. The U.S. ac- counts for half of that total with 1,030 tests. A verifiable global ban on nuclear testing is a vital step toward ending this dangerous competition. Given that it is highly unlikely that the United States will ever conduct another nuclear explosive test, it is in the U.S. interest to do all it can to en- sure that other nations are not free to do so. Limiting Other States’ Capabilities. From a technical perspective, a ban on nuclear test explosions makes it harder for nations already possessing nuclear weapons — like China, India, Pakistan and Russia— to field new, more sophisticated nuclear warheads. Except for Russia, which already has an arsenal that is as large and sophisticated as that of the United States, testing could facilitate significant advances in the capabilities of other states. In China’s case, a new round of test explosions would allow it to miniatur- ize warhead designs and put multiple warheads on its rel- atively small arsenal of strategic ballistic missiles—allowing it to rapidly increase its nuclear strike capability. Likewise, without nuclear weapon test explosions, na- tions like Iran would not be able to “proof test” the more advanced, smaller warhead designs needed to deliver such weapons using ballistic missiles. Given Tehran’s advancing uranium enrichment and missile capabilities, it is impor- tant to establish additional barriers against a sophisticated Iranian nuclear weapons capability in the years ahead. Strengthening the Nonproliferation Bargain. Tangible progress toward U.S. ratification of the CTBT is also vital to restoring U.S. global leadership and strengthening in- ternational support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the bedrock of all efforts to stop the spread of nu- clear weapons. In 1995, the U.S. and the other nuclear powers promised to deliver on the CTBT in exchange for the indefinite extension of the NPT — a good deal that must be honored. U.S. progress toward reconsideration and ratification of the CTBT before the May 2010 NPT Review Conference will be essential to achieving agree- ment on new measures to strengthen global nonprolifera- tion rules. The importance of the CTBT was reinforced on Sept. 24, when the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1887. That wide-ranging resolution on non- proliferation, disarmament and nuclear materiel security calls on all states to refrain from nuclear testing and to rat- ify the CTBT to enable entry into force at an early date. Accelerating Entry into Force. Some Senate opponents of the CTBT argue that U.S. ratification matters little be- cause other key holdout states will not follow our lead. On the contrary, U.S. ratification will prompt other holdouts to follow suit. In June, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda declared: “We share [Pres. Obama’s] vision of a world in which nuclear weapons have been eradicated. We trust that he will succeed in getting the CTBT ratified — and we promise that when that happens, Indonesia will im- mediately follow suit.” The prospect of U.S. ratification has already begun to spur new thinking in India. In an Aug. 30 interview in The Hindu , National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan was asked if India would join the CTBT if others did so. He said: “I think we need to now have a full-fledged discussion on the CTBT. We’ll cross that hurdle when we come to it.” Ratification of the CTBT by the remaining holdout states would also significantly contribute to regional secu- rity. Ratification by Israel, Egypt and Iran would reduce nuclear weapons-related security concerns and bring those states further into the nuclear nonproliferationmainstream. Action by Israel to ratify could put pressure on other states in the region to do so. Iranian ratification would help reduce concerns that its nuclear program could be used to develop and deploy de- liverable nuclear warheads. Conversely, continued failure to ratify the CTBT raises further questions about the nature of Tehran’s sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities and could increase support for tougher measures to comply with Se- curity Council and international safeguards requirements. Detecting and Deterring Clandestine Testing The U.S. capability to detect and deter possible clan- destine nuclear testing by other states will be significantly F O C U S