The Foreign Service Journal, December 2009

D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 9 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 47 low-energy yield from a self-sustained chain reaction) to be a “permitted” activity under the treaty. But as the Russian government made clear when it ratified the CTBT in 2000: “Qualitative modernization of nuclear weapons is only pos- sible through full-scale and hydronuclear tests with the emission of fissile energy, the carrying out of which directly contradicts the CTBT.” In other words, it is undeniable that the treaty establishes a “zero-yield” prohibition on nu- clear test explosions. Effective Stockpile Stewardship Contrary to myth, maintaining the reliability of proven U.S. nuclear warhead designs does not depend on a pro- gram of nuclear test explosions. Instead, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has been — and can continue to be —maintained through non-nuclear tests and evaluations, combined with the replacement or remanufacture of key components to previous design specifications. Since 1994, each warhead type in the U.S. nuclear arsenal has been determined to be safe and reliable through a rigorous certification process in- stituted following the end of U.S. nuclear testing. For more than 15 years, a nationwide infrastructure of nuclear weapons research, evaluation and manufacturing sites and laboratories has been maintained and enhanced for this purpose under the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The United States spends more than $6 billion annually on this program, which includes nuclear weapons surveillance and maintenance, non-nuclear and subcritical nuclear ex- periments, sophisticated supercomputer modeling and life- extension programs for the existing warhead types. The 2002 National Academy of Science panel, which in- cluded three former nuclear weapons lab directors, found that the current Stockpile Stewardship Program provides the technical capabilities necessary to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of the existing seven types of nu- clear warheads in the stockpile— “provided that adequate resources are made available ... and are properly focused on this task.” According to the NAS panel, age-related de- fects mainly related to non-nuclear components can be ex- pected, “but nuclear testing is not needed to discover these problems and is not likely to be needed to address them.” Indeed, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has been — and can continue to be—maintained with high confidence through non-nuclear tests and evaluations and, as necessary, the re- manufacture of key components to previous design speci- fications. Independent technical experts have determined that the United States can maintain its existing arsenal through a conservative program of warhead refurbishment rather than through new design “replacement” warheads. Though the U.S. nuclear arsenal is aging, more is known today about such weapons than ever before, and confi- dence in our ability to maintain the warheads is increasing at a faster rate than the uncertainties. For example, in 2006 the Department of Energy announced that studies by the Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laborato- ries show that the plutoniumprimaries, or pits, of most U.S. nuclear weapons “will haveminimum lifetimes of at least 85 years” — about twice as long as previous official estimates. In recent years, the weapons labs have begun to increase the reliability of existing warheads by adding more boost gas to increase the explosive energy of the primary stage of the weapon well above the minimum needed to ignite the secondary, or main, stage. Contrary to the concerns of some CTBT skeptics, the cessation of nuclear explosive testing has not caused the laboratories to lose technical competence. Rather, signifi- cant advances have been achieved as researchers are able to study the physics underlying weapon performance in greater depth, undistracted by the demands of a nuclear weapons test explosion program. Senate approval of the CTBT would strengthen bipar- tisan support for effective stockpile stewardship efforts to ensure that as long as the United States has nuclear weapons, they will remain safe and reliable without the re- sumption of nuclear testing. It will also ensure that should Washington ever decide to exercise the treaty’s “supreme national interest” withdrawal clause, the United States will have the competence to resume testing. For a Safe World Leaving the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty unratified would increase uncertainty and reduce U.S. se- curity. While it might be possible to sustain the unilateral moratoria undertaken by the major nuclear states for sev- eral more years, uncertainties and the risk of a resumption of testing will only grow over time. Moreover, concerns about clandestine nuclear testing might arise that could not be resolved in the absence of inspections provided for under the treaty. The choice is clear: A world without nuclear testing is a safer world. The United States stands to lose nothing and would gain an important constraint on the nuclear weapons capabilities of others that could pose a threat to America’s security. The time for the CTBT is now. ■ F O C U S