The Foreign Service Journal, December 2010

ening the International Atomic En- ergy Agency safeguards system through universalization of the Ad- ditional Protocol, which enhances the agency’s ability to detect clan- destine nuclear activities. The doc- ument also directs parties to ensure that the IAEA has “all political, technical and financial support” needed to meet its responsibilities for NPT safeguards. The plan’s steps to advance disarmament include a commitment by all treaty parties to pursue policies nec- essary to establish the conditions for a nuclear-weapon- free world and to take concrete steps in that direction. Regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the doc- ument encourages all states in a position to do so to make additional contributions to the Peaceful Uses Initiative announced by Sec. Clinton and calls for further discus- sion of multilateral approaches to the nuclear-fuel cycle. It also endorses a regional conference in 2012 to dis- cuss issues relevant to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. As with many other parts of the action plan, this unprecedented ele- ment reflects the serious, long-term engagement of par- ties (e.g., the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the European Union, and Egypt and other states in the region) in advancing the aims of the 1995 NPT RevCon’s Middle East Resolution. For its part, the United States has long supported cre- ation of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. But we have consistently maintained that such a zone can only be achieved in the context of a comprehensive and durable peace in the region, and by full compliance by all regional states with their arms control and nonprolif- eration obligations. To be effective, therefore, the pro- posed conference must include all states in the Middle East and other relevant countries, and have a broad agenda that encompasses regional security issues. For the United States, the RevCon was not an end in itself, but rather an important opportunity to reinvigo- rate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and advance its objectives. Work on the Prague agenda, including U.S. efforts to strengthen each of the NPT’s pillars, must continue through sustained U.S. leadership, and active and constructive participation by parties, in bilateral and multilateral fora. The Way Forward The 2010 NPT RevCon Action Plan is widely recognized as a sig- nificant international agreement that will reinforce the nonprolifera- tion regime and strengthen the foundations for further disarma- ment. The three main U.S. objec- tives moving forward will continue to be: strengthening IAEA safe- guards, addressing noncompliance with the treaty’s nonproliferation obligations, and forging arrangements to accommodate expanded interest in civil nuclear power that do not increase the risk of prolifera- tion. To act on Pres. Obama’s call to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system and increase the agency’s resources and authorities in general, the Obama administration has undertaken a comprehensive review of the IAEA safe- guards system. The United States has begun to imple- ment the review’s findings by pursuing a strategy of engagement with states that have not yet concluded an additional protocol and by pursuing more robust use of the IAEA’s existing authorities. Efforts to strengthen safeguards will fall short if some states are permitted to violate their international legal ob- ligations in pursuit of a nuclear weapons capacity. The United States continues to call for full compliance with the NPT’s nonproliferation obligations by all parties, and will continue to pursue compliance through multilateral mechanisms, particularly the United Nations Security Council. (This includes the very difficult cases of Iran and North Korea.) All countries with a stake in a robust and credible Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty must join this effort, and work together to convince violators to re- turn to full compliance. Closely related to the problem of noncompliance is the concern that a party that has violated its NPT obliga- tions might seek to withdraw from the treaty as a way to escape punishment for such violations. While a small number of RevCon delegations prevented consensus on actions to combat abuse of the treaty’s withdrawal provi- sions, the debate in New York made clear that many par- ties believe we must address this issue in a collective manner. Many, including the United States, recognize that a party that withdraws from the NPT without reme- dying existing noncompliance must be held accountable 30 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 1 0 F O C U S A key element of U.S. preparations for the RevCon was intensive diplomacy, both bilateral and multilateral.