The Foreign Service Journal, December 2010

36 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 1 0 During that prenegotiation pe- riod, he had a constructive dialogue with the affected domestic indus- tries, Congress, environmental non- governmental organizations and his foreign counterparts. For example, with strong support from the Envi- ronmental Protection Agency, Bene- dick used an offsite workshop in Leesburg, Va., to help persuade skeptical representatives of con- cerned industries that the threat to the ozone layer was real and gain their acceptance of pursuing an international agreement to deal with it. Because the preparation was so thorough, the United States entered international talks on the Montreal Proto- col with a coherent, well-thought-out negotiating strategy that had significant support among domestic stakehold- ers. U.S. negotiators also had substantial support in Con- gress. Then-Senators Al Gore, D-Tenn., and Tim Wirth, D-Colo., were among the leaders urging action to pre- serve the ozone layer. Perhaps the greatest strength of the Montreal Protocol has been its built-in flexibility in accommodating new in- formation. The parties established panels on science, en- vironment, technology and economics, and committed themselves to periodically reconsider the operative pro- visions of the agreement, taking into account the findings of those panels. A synthesis report incorporating the findings of these panels formed the basis of the negotiation of the adjust- ments and amendments to the protocol that were adopted at the London Conference of the Parties in June 1990. That report summarized a peer-reviewed process that in- volved the work of more than 500 scientists and other ex- perts. At the London COP the parties also established the Montreal Protocol Fund to assist developing countries in transitioning away from CFCs and other ozone-depleting chemicals. The fund, which operates under the guidance of an executive committee established by the parties, re- ceived pledges totaling $2.1 billion during the period 1991 to 2005. The parties met every couple of years over the follow- ing decade and added more chemicals, including methyl chloroform and carbon tetrachloride, to the list of con- trolled substances. In addition, the time for bringing down the produc- tion and use of the controlled sub- stances was substantially shortened, and the total reduction was in- creased to a full phase-out. This “review and revise” process has been an essential element in achieving the goal of saving the ozone layer. Another critical factor in the suc- cess of the protocol was the fact that, from the outset, all countries that were parties to the agreement made commitments to reduce the production and use of ozone-depleting sub- stances. The developing countries were given an addi- tional 10 years to meet those commitments, but there was no invidious distinction between countries making volun- tary pledges and those making mandatory commitments. This created a negotiating climate in which the threat to the ozone layer was seen as a challenge to all, requiring every party to contribute to resolving the problem. The negotiators of the Montreal Protocol faced the same argument from developing countries that climate change negotiators now encounter. Why shouldn’t de- veloping countries have the same opportunities to develop using CFCs or carbon-emitting fuels that developed countries had enjoyed? Shouldn’t developed countries, who caused the problem, pay the cost of the transition to a more sustainable development path? The establishment of the Montreal Protocol Fund and the provision of a longer timeframe for meeting their commitments were essential elements in responding to this argument and overcoming the reluctance of developing countries, such as China and India, to become parties to the agreement. The Kyoto Protocol Negotiation of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was handled differently, with much less satisfac- tory results. The chief U.S. negotiator, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs Stuart Eizenstat, was not named until a couple of months before the meeting in Kyoto. This left no time for ade- quate interagency preparation for the meeting or for suf- ficient consultation with domestic stakeholders or with Congress. Thus, the U.S. delegation arrived in Kyoto F O C U S Thorough preparation for Montreal enabled the U.S. to craft a coherent negotiating strategy with significant support among domestic stakeholders.