The Foreign Service Journal, December 2010

D E C E M B E R 2 0 1 0 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 37 without clear guidance on what, if any, reduction in American carbon emissions it could accept. The carbon emission reduction commitments in the protocol were negotiated in Kyoto among the rep- resentatives of the developed coun- tries. Those commitments, which varied from country to country, were made more on the basis of po- litical bargaining than on an evalu- ation of what would be required to deal effectively with the threat of global warming. Nor was the question of whether all of the countries undertaking those commit- ments would, in fact, be able to meet them taken into ac- count. The European Union, for example, could offset likely shortfalls by some member states with anticipated over- compliance by others in order to meet an overall E.U. goal for carbon emission reductions. In the case of Russia, its post-Soviet economic collapse in the 1990s had already re- duced carbon emissions to a point where overcompliance with targeted reductions from the 1990 base year was as- sured. But countries like the United States and Canada, which had substantially increased their carbon output since 1990, had little or no prospect of achieving their tar- geted emission reductions under the agreement. The protocol also contained no specific commitments by developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emis- sions. Six months before the meeting, in July 1997, the U.S. Senate had put down a marker in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, passed by a vote of 95 to 0, that any agree- ment without such commitments by developing countries would be unacceptable. Therefore, it was clear from the time the deal was struck in Kyoto that there was virtually no chance that the United States would ratify the proto- col and become a party to it. Global Warming and the Montreal Model The negotiators of the Montreal Protocol, like those now seeking agreement on how to meet the challenge of global warming, faced formidable difficulties in dealing with a problem whose effects, while perhaps tolerable in the short run, were likely to be catastrophic over the long term in a “business as usual” scenario. Moreover, as with climate change, they had to deal with skepticism about the science involved. In fact, at the time that the Mon- treal Protocol was initially negoti- ated, the evidence for human- caused depletion of the strato- spheric ozone layer was less com- pelling than the current case for global warming. Clearly, climate change negotia- tors face a more complex and far- reaching challenge. The phase-out of CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances and related infrastruc- ture involved major industries such as refrigeration, elec- tronics, firefighting and aerosols, including medical inhalants, and cost billions of dollars. But dealing with global warming will require fundamentally restructuring our carbon-based societies and taking steps that will af- fect virtually every aspect of economic activity. Notwithstanding this significant difference, however, there are important similarities between the two chal- lenges, and climate change negotiators would be well ad- vised to reflect on the Montreal Protocol and the lessons that can be learned from its negotiation. In that regard, it is encouraging that the Obama ad- ministration moved early to name a capable and experi- enced chief negotiator, Todd Stern. He will need to ensure that the United States enters future climate change negotiations with a clear negotiating strategy that has adequate support domestically. It usually does not work for a U.S. administration to lead the development of domestic policy through international negotiations, as was tried in the case of the Kyoto Protocol. As with the Montreal Protocol, we need to reach an agreement on climate change that creates a process that will over time move us to a desired result. Only 24 coun- tries and the European Commission signed the Montreal Protocol in September 1987. These signatories did in- clude nearly all the developed countries, which accounted for the vast majority of the global production of CFCs. However, they did not initially include many of the de- veloping countries with rapidly emerging economies, such as India and China. In addition, the provisions of the Montreal Protocol for reducing the production and use of ozone-depleting chemicals, as negotiated in 1987, did not go nearly far enough. It was only after returning to the table repeatedly over the following decade to revise those terms that the parties were able to do what was necessary to arrest the de- F O C U S Our delegation arrived in Kyoto without clear guidance on what, if any, reduction in U.S. carbon emissions it could accept.