The Foreign Service Journal, December 2010

40 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 1 0 Suppliers Group and others. The Obama administration has also re- sumed participation in the work of preparing the onsite inspection regime for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in Vienna, fromwhich the Bush administration had withdrawn U.S. participation. The Nuclear Posture Review The Nuclear Posture Review is a major interagency assessment of U.S. nuclear weapons policies that is conducted about every 10 years. (The pre- vious one, which was issued only in a classified version, was conducted in 2002.) The 2010 NPR, in which the White House played a major role, shows some continuity with the past, but also makes some important and inter- esting changes to U.S. policy as it relates to arms control. It places a high priority on combating nuclear prolifera- tion and nuclear terrorism, and reduces the role of nu- clear weapons in U.S. policy. The document declares that the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack. It does not identify that as its sole role, however, as many arms control advocates had urged, although it holds out the possibility that this could become the case in the future. It also makes clear that Washington will only use nuclear weapons to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies and its partners. The NPR also strengthens U.S. Negative Security As- surances — pledges by the five Nuclear Non-Prolifera- tion Treaty nuclear-weapon states that they will not use or threaten to use such weapons against the non–nuclear weapon states except under specified circumstances. Note, however, that except for China, the other members of the P-5 have backed away from the pledges they had made in connection with the 1995 NPT Review Confer- ence and the indefinite extension of the NPT itself. The new policy is that the U.S. will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non–nuclear weapon states that are parties to the NPT and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations. The review does not state who is to make such a compliance decision, but long- standing U.S. policy calls for individual states to make that determination. The START I Treaty expired on Dec. 5, 2009, making a successor agreement essential, since neither the U.S. nor Russia was in favor of an exten- sion. Negotiating teams led by Assis- tant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller and Ambassador Anatoly Antonov worked very hard in Geneva, but were not able to finish in time to avoid a gap in the legal regime and therefore in no- tifications and onsite inspections. They did, however, produce what is being called the New START Treaty, which was signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in Prague on April 8, 2010. This was the logical next step after START I and is an essential component of overall international security. New START Treaty The treaty carries over many of the concepts, defini- tions and inspection procedures from START I. It reflects the more cooperative and transparent relationship that exists now between the United States and the Russian Federation. A major goal of the U.S. was greater flexibil- ity, while the Russians were seeking a less burdensome verification regime. Both these goals were accomplished, along with some simplifications that both sides wanted. New START returns to the idea that constraints on nu- clear weapons should be effectively verifiable and reduc- tions irreversible — principles that the Bush admini- stration largely abandoned. It is also intended to replace the 2002 Moscow Treaty, sometimes known as SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty), which had been scheduled to be in force until Dec. 31, 2012. The treaty calls for modest, but significant, reductions in both deployed warheads and launchers. There are three primary ceilings: • 700 deployed Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Mis- siles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments; • 1,550 warheads on these deployed systems; and • 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped for nu- clear armaments. The purpose of the 800 limit is to provide some flexi- bility for both sides without undermining the 700 and 1,550 ceilings. Thus, up to 100 ICBM and SLBM launch- ers and heavy bombers may be retained without missiles or warheads, without being counted in the 700 limit. Such systems, which were not tallied by the U.S. under F O C U S One should not expect instant results on these complex issues, some of which have been with us for decades.