The Foreign Service Journal, December 2010

As noted above, the treaty’s pream- ble acknowledges that there is an offense-defense interrelationship and says that current strategic de- fensive arms do not threaten the vi- ability and effectiveness of strategic offensive arms (satisfying the Amer- icans), while noting that the rela- tionship will become more impor- tant as strategic offensive arms are reduced (satisfying the Russians). These statements are obviously true, but have raised concerns among conservatives who advocate un- constrained ABM systems. The same can be said of the unilateral statements re- lated to the ABM issue each side issued. These impose no legal obligation on either side and merely reflect long- standing positions, but have been viewed with alarm by some on Capitol Hill. Thus the ABM can has been kicked down the road, but it must be dealt with, probably sooner rather than later, in future negotiations. Other issues not dealt with in New START, but loom- ing ahead on the road to deeper reductions include tacti- cal nuclear weapons; monitoring non-deployed nuclear warheads, including their dismantlement and the dispo- sition of their fissile material; the much more intrusive verification measures that will be needed at low levels; how deterrence (including extended deterrence) will op- erate at low levels; and when and how to involve other nu- clear powers in negotiations. These are all fascinating issues being studied in the U.S. government, think-tanks and universities, but clearly beyond the scope of this brief discussion. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty U.S. ratification and entry into force of the Compre- hensive Test Ban Treaty is a high priority for the Obama administration, but the agreement is waiting its turn in the queue while the focus is on New START. Badly de- feated in the Senate in 1999, the CTBT remains contro- versial. One traditional concern regarding the CTBT is verifi- cation. While the treaty authorizes highly intrusive chal- lenge inspections, opponents have zeroed in on evasion techniques and the utility of very small tests that might escape detection. Led by the U.S., the world has spent roughly $1 bil- lion constructing an elaborate International Monitoring System, consisting of 337 facilities in about 90 countries, to address this issue. Four technologies are employed— seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound — with data analyzed by experts at the CTBT Organization in Vienna. The system is about 80-percent completed and is already proving to work considerably better than expected, detecting small North Korean tests in 2006 and 2009. Another traditional concern is the viability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear explosive test- ing. A number of authoritative studies have concluded that the stockpile can be kept safe and reliable, provided that there is adequate support for stockpile maintenance and that sufficient scientific and engineering expertise is retained. The NPR strongly supports warhead life exten- sion programs and modernization of the relevant infra- structure and significant budgetary increases are being provided by the administration. A more recent issue concerns whether the absence of a definition of a “nuclear explosion” in the treaty is a prob- lem. Both U.S. and Russian negotiators have insisted that there is no misunderstanding regarding the basic legal ob- ligation, but debate continues. Light should be shed on all these issues by an authoritative study being prepared by the National Academy of Sciences. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty currently has 182 signatories, of which 153 have ratified, including 35 of the 44 states whose ratification is required for entry into force. With virtually the entire world, including all the other members of NATO, urging U.S. ratification, failure to do so would be a major setback to the U.S. agenda, both for arms control and nonproliferation. Promoting Nonproliferation Preventing nuclear proliferation is a major goal of the Obama administration, as has been true for all U.S. ad- ministrations. The hope was that a more respectful and flexible approach to both Iran and North Korea, coupled with a more ambitious arms control agenda generally, would pay dividends in nonproliferation. It is still too early to render a judgment, but results to date, at least so far as Iran and North Korea are con- cerned, have been disappointing. This has led to “I told you so” criticisms from advocates of the more muscular Badly defeated in the Senate in 1999, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty remains controversial. 42 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 1 0 F O C U S