The Foreign Service Journal, December 2011

24 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 1 1 The End of Linkage A second idea, the concept of “linkage,” characterized the pre- Reagan approach to our relationship with the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration inherited the result of the application of this idea. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter was surprised, distressed and an- gered. In reaction, he shut down everything from partici- pation by U.S. athletes in the Moscow Olympics to negotiations on arms control—even the annual visit of For- eign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Washington, D.C., prior to the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. As I took office, my friend West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt counseled me: “George, the situation is dangerous; there is no human contact.” To put it another way, linkage had been vastly overdone. President Reagan understood that linkage could work against the right out- come. Linkage could encourage the Soviets to do some- thing bad just so they could agree to give it up in order to get something else they wanted. And if the Soviets did something good, linkage put pressure on us to go along with something else they were doing wrong. Above all, Ronald Reagan was determined to pursue freedom and make an effort to reduce nuclear armaments no matter what else was going on. We confronted this issue dramatically in September 1983, when the Soviets shot down a Korean airliner. The Boeing 747, with its unique profile, was carrying 269 pas- sengers and crew. We obtained and released a recording of the fighter pilot’s ground controller authorizing him to fire. Of course, we and the rest of the world were outraged. But rather than cut ties, as his predecessor had done, and over the objections of a great many members of his administration, Pres. Reagan authorized me to go ahead with a scheduled meeting with ForeignMinister Gromyko. The talk at the meeting was harsh and blunt, and, at one point, Gromyko started to leave but then came back. Our longtime interpreter told me that it was the most difficult and tumultuous meeting he had ever observed. I thought it was good for Gromyko to hear directly how appalled we were, like people throughout the world. Even more important, and, once again, over many ob- jections, Pres. Reagan sent our arms control negotiators back to Geneva to continue their quest for an agreement. Meeting with your counterpart is not evidence of weak- ness. The important point is what you say. The Dimensions of Strength We in the West also understood the importance of strength and its many dimensions. Free societies and free economies, with some help from the Marshall Plan, produced prosperity. These suc- cesses, in turn, produced confidence. The achievements could be made known through organizations such as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, along with the British Broadcasting Corporation and Voice of America. Strength has many dimensions, including, of course, military capability. The North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tion was formed and held together despite many difficult moments. Who can forget the Berlin Airlift and the res- olute Berliners, as we in the NATO countries stood with them? I believe the turning point was the deployment of Per- shing missiles in Germany in late 1983. That deployment did not come easily, even though it was the implementa- tion of a long-known NATO agreement. The runup to de- ployment was accompanied by a drumbeat of threats from the Soviet Union. War, they implied, was in the offing. Those threats from the Soviet Union had an effect on the West. The 1983 nuclear freeze protest in New York City’s Central Park still stands as one of the largest public demonstrations in American history, while massive and re- peated demonstrations took place throughout the United Kingdom. Protesters filled the streets. Some politicians went wobbly, but NATO remained co- hesive. If that deployment had not gone forward, the out- come of the Cold War might well have been different. But the strength we put on display was never used. What preceded the deployment was intense diplomacy with the Soviets, and a continuing and even more intense consultative process among our allies. In the end, that process made the deployment possible and the deploy- ment — a magnificent display of the strength, determina- tion and cohesion of NATO — in turn made possible the diplomacy that followed and, in the end, tore down that wall. By containing the Soviets — by making it clear that we would not permit them to isolate Berlin — NATO es- tablished the conditions in which brave people through- out the Warsaw Pact countries could bring the Cold War to a peaceful end. F OCUS Meeting with your counterpart is not evidence of weakness. The important point is what you say.