The Foreign Service Journal, December 2011

30 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 1 1 leaders viewed the USSR as a communist empire, not a Russian empire. Without strong Russian political support for preservation of the Soviet Union, it was difficult to see how Gorbachev could continue his reforms and keep the country together. Embassy Moscow’s political counselor, Raymond Smith, drafted the July 1990 warning message, with the subject line: “Looking into the Abyss: The Possible Col- lapse of the Soviet Union and What We Should Be Doing About It” (for an excerpt, see p. 37). Smith has used this and other cables fromEmbassy Moscow, now declassified, as examples in his valuable new book on the art of politi- cal reporting, The Craft of Political Analysis for Diplomats , 2011. We were never told directly what, if any, impact the “Abyss” message had on thinking in Washington, but I noted that the CIA circulated it. The last thing we wanted, then or later, was a formal agency determination that a break-up of the Soviet Union was possible or likely. Such finding would inevitably have leaked, possibly precipitat- ing a successful hard-line coup against Gorbachev. There would have been a widespread assumption that we not only desired, but had engineered the Soviet collapse. In fact, while the U.S. government was steadfast in its support for the restoration of independence of the three Baltic countries, it was convinced that American interests, and those of the Soviet peoples themselves, would be bet- ter served by the sort of voluntary federation Gorbachev was trying to create than by the sudden independence of all union republics. In the fall of 1990, Gorbachev made what seemed a sharp turn to the “right.” (At the time, hardline commu- nists were considered the “right wing,” a reversal of the usual left-right paradigm.) He reshuffled his cabinet to in- clude ministers reputed to support repression, and eco- nomic reform stalled even as the economy continued to deteriorate. There appeared to be preparations for a crackdown in the Baltics. In December 1990, Shevard- nadze suddenly resigned, declaring: “A dictatorship is coming.” On the Brink The embassy was confronted with several questions: Had Gorbachev altered his reformist agenda? If not, could he manage to keep power and resume his reforms? Would he fend off efforts to remove him by acceding to demands to use force? Or, could his recent behavior be a feint to the right with a left hook to follow? An attack on the television tower in Vilnius in January 1991 left the questions open. Gorbachev immediately de- nied that he had authorized it, but he did nothing to pun- ish those who perpetrated the outrage. A few days later, when I met with him privately to deliver a message from President Bush, he asked me to explain to “my friend George” that he had not changed his objectives, but that the country was on the brink of a civil war. As president, Gorbachev continued to do everything to avoid one, and that would require him to tack with the wind at times. And then he added that no matter what de- cisions Pres. Bush might make— the U.S. had threatened to terminate some cooperative programs if violence con- tinued in the Baltic area—he would faithfully carry out all his previous agreements. It was already apparent to the embassy that the KGB was feeding Gorbachev distorted and sometimes totally fabricated reports about conditions in the USSR. In 1989 and 1990 he had been convinced that the independence movements in the Baltic countries represented small mi- norities, while it was obvious to us that they had over- whelming support. By 1991, we could see that the KGB was fabricating “evidence” that Boris Yeltsin and the dem- ocratic leaders were planning to seize power “unconstitu- tionally.” Absurd as such claims were, Gorbachev seems to have taken them seriously. When specific false reports came to our attention and we informed him that they were base- less, Gorbachev would believe us rather than the KGB. Unfortunately, however, most of these reports did not come to our attention. Events in the spring and summer of 1991 moved with kaleidoscopic rapidity and complexity. In April, there were attempts to remove Gorbachev as general secretary of the Communist Party, but he managed to repulse them. Cable News Network at one point reported that he had resigned as CPSU general secretary. When Secretary Baker tele- phoned me directly for clarification, I was able to quickly correct the false information, because the embassy’s polit- ical section had sources within the closed meeting. Negotiations between Gorbachev and republic leaders would make some apparent progress, then stall. The KGB chairman, prime minister and minister of defense all thought Gorbachev was conceding too much to the re- publics, but key republic leaders became more and more demanding. Underneath it all a de facto independence of F OCUS