The Foreign Service Journal, December 2011

48 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 1 1 from fruits and vegetables to imported TVs, children’s shoes, winter coats, used cars, kittens and the occasional semiautomatic weapon. These markets were a Disneyland for economic reporting, as they showed where buyer, seller and society met. Many post-Soviet biznesmeny (businessmen) flew to Turkey to buy up thousands of dollars worth of products, and then had to negotiate their shipment past greedy host- country customs officials. Good economic reporting also gave a sharper picture of the available income of the pop- ulation, and what they were spending it on. On the darker side, because of their ability to generate cash quickly, crim- inal elements often owned and managed the markets, pro- viding a further reporting dimension. Value-Added Economic Reporting This cascade of reporting material was often used to vividly explain larger internal and external dimensions of the post-Soviet economy. White House-level engagement often produced short-fuse requests for information to “feed the beast.” But as many of us know, reporting is only as good as your consumers’ views on the given subject. In a humorous case where analyst and policy consumer did not see eye to eye, then-Vice President Al Gore emphatically disagreed with an intelligence community assessment on high-level corruption, carefully marking “Horse(manure)!” on the margins to ensure clear and timely feedback. Probably the best example of the value-added role of economic reporting from this period is seen in U.S. efforts to develop an East-West energy bridge. Traditional, face- to-face discussions, combined with a strong communica- tions network throughout the region, significantly advanced American interests. Intensive shuttle diplomacy from Washington developed long-term relationships to build trust on key matters such as oil and gas development, pipeline options and large-scale investment. Perceived as honest brokers, American officials would often facilitate Cabinet-level communications between various NIS gov- ernments that for domestic political reasons could not or would not do so directly. This effort not only informed the policy process in Washington and European capitals, but also provided prac- tical advice to American firms in the NIS. Especially in the energy sector, American companies would maintain a dis- creet dialogue with U.S. missions on insights into key deci- sion-makers, political rivalries and the like. The private sector would also look to ambassadors and mission officials for advice on host-government officials to work with (or stay away from), the larger economic picture and regional pol- itics. The FSO’s Comparative Advantage As we take stock of economic developments in the for- mer Soviet Union 20 years later, it is easy to forget the tough times that a vast majority of the population suffered. The glitz of Moscow’s Tverskaia Street today and the rise of Kazakhstan’s new capital on the blustery Central Asian steppe illustrate the new wealth that some in these coun- tries so conspicuously consume. While one can argue that the region’s oil wealth drives much of its economic success, it is also clear that U.S. and international economic policy engagement helped bring many (but hardly all) of the So- viet successor states into global trade institutions. Long before “expeditionary” and “transformational” diplomacy became buzzwords, Foreign Service officers were working shoulder-to-shoulder with decision-makers in the NIS to advocate American perspectives on the global economy while pressing for policy reforms and commer- cial deals that later became the shoots of a (sometimes) free market. With the notable exception of Turkmenistan, all are now members of or observers to the WTO. Major en- ergy routes link several countries to export markets, creat- ing wealth in their home countries while feeding the global appetite for hydrocarbons. International institutional in- vestors now seek out sovereign wealth funds established by several ex-Soviet states. Today’s reporting challenges are many. To quote Amer- ican scholar Warren Bennis: “We have more information now than we can use, and less knowledge and under- standing than we need.” With the terabytes of informa- tion now at our fingertips, the unending stream of e-mail taskers fromWashington and front-office memo demands, it is easy to forget that the best reporting still comes from direct human interaction. To have an effect on the policy process in Washington, talking with and understanding host-country decision-makers, as well as “Ivan Six-Pack,” is the true comparative advantage all Foreign Service offi- cers provide. One can easily discern the depth and texture of report- ing that “presses the flesh” and probes key opinion makers on an issue compared to “reporting from the cubicle” that uses Internet translations of local press articles. As the So- viet successor states turn 20 and become young adults, such understanding will be in even greater demand. ■ F OCUS