The Foreign Service Journal, December 2011

58 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 1 1 continue to be based in the region. Moscow has endorsed an agree- ment that would allow for en- hanced autonomy for Transdnies- ter within Moldova and a continu- ing Russian military presence in the region, but Moldova has resis- ted. Separatist leaders reject any return to Moldova and oppose the expansion of the peace process, known as the “5+2 format” (group- ing representatives from Moldova, Transdniester, the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine as primary brokers and the European Union and United States as observers). In the case of secessionists in Georgia and Moldova, the United States and its European partners have con- sistently supported a solution that maintains the territo- rial integrity of the two states. Washington has sought to bolster the two states economically and diplomatically, and has expanded military contacts with both, as well. Still, some experts maintain that the United States and its partners should do more to cultivate contacts with the unrecognized states. Charles King, an expert on the frozen conflicts who teaches international affairs at Georgetown University, faults the international com- munity for ignoring the legitimacy of the separatists’ claims. “Twenty years ago the secessionists won militar- ily, and that’s a basic point we forget,” says King. “When we look at problems of secession, we overly romanticize the claims of groups we are predisposed to view posi- tively and demonize those we view negatively.” ‘Black Holes’ and Instability Lacking international recognition aside from Russia, these poor, would-be states have developed reputations as havens for smuggling, corruption and trafficking in everything from drugs to people. Georgian Foreign Minister Gregory Vashadze, addressing a disarmament conference in Geneva earlier this year, repeated Tbilisi’s accusation that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are “black holes” for illegal arms smuggling. He cited eight nuclear smuggling attempts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and faulted the Russian military presence in both republics for impeding inspections. Russia’s envoy, Victor Vasiliev, responded that all smuggling incidents took place on ter- ritory Georgia controls. Moldova makes similar claims about Transdniester, backed up by international observers. Nadia Diuk of the National Endowment for Democracy, which works with civil society groups in the enclave, told a congressional panel in July that the region is a “haven for arms trading and illicit business inter- ests. The authoritarian regime of Igor Smirnov continues to stifle in- dependent media and persecute civil groups.” Ethnic-Armenian dominated Nagorno-Karabakh, too, is tarred with the “black hole” label by authorities in Azerbaijan. Deputy Prime Minister Ali Hasanov told Turkish reporters in July that Armenia was using Nagorno-Karabakh for drug plantations and as a transit route from Afghanistan, as well. Hasanov also echoed Baku’s concerns that, rather than being on the cusp of agreement, Armenia and Azerbaijan are enmeshed in a deepening crisis. Some outside experts worry about parallels between Baku and the situation in Georgia prior to its 2008 war, in which the post-Rose Revolution President Mikhail Saakashvili enjoyed populist support that emboldened him to press to end secessionist problems. “[There’s a] modernization of the military and a con- ceptual belief that through oil and gas money Azerbaijan will create a military that could grab back Karabakh from the Armenians,” King says. Other regional specialists do not expect imminent conflict. Thomas De Waal, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote in a July 28 online piece for Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib- erty that Azerbaijani officials are signaling time is on their side. “They believe the Caucasus arms race is bankrupting Armenia and that in a few years’ time, the Armenian side will be much weaker and more inclined to compromise over the status of Karabakh,” he wrote. Most experts agree, however, that the frozen conflicts have impeded economic growth for most of the states di- rectly involved. Aside from Azerbaijan, which is riding an oil boom, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova have lagged in development due to a variety of factors, including budg- ets strained by care for refugees and arms spending, and trade routes constrained by the unresolved wars. Even F OCUS The Obama administration’s “reset” with Russia has smoothed over rough bilateral spots, but the two sides are still at odds over Georgia.