The Foreign Service Journal, December 2011

T he State Department’s Office ofMedical Services has been working steadily to improve its handling of mental health issues, includingworkplace and trauma-induced stress dis- orders and substance abuse problems. AFSA has been kept apprised of newprograms and improvements, and consulted as they aredeveloped. We are very favorably impressedbyboth the qualityandthe intent behindthese increasinglyexcellentprograms and urge employees who feel they need help to seek it. AFSAhasbeenaskedtohelpspreadthewordwithintheForeign Service that using theseprogramswill not affect employees’ secu- rityclearances. Whilewe consider that theprobable consequences of seeking needed treatment are better than those of not seeking it — and strongly recommend that those who need help take advantage of these outstanding programs — we cannot confi- dentlyassert that a security clearancewill not be affected. Nobody can. The governmentwide guidelines quoted in theForeignAffairs Manual containauniquemechanismthat, usedproperly, should prevent anunreliable or improper factor from leading to a secu- rity clearance revocation. They require thatmandatoryquestions be asked about every factor considered, that all available infor- mationbeweighedand that informationused inadecision is reli- able and proper. However, AFSA continues to see and hear of cases indicating that this “whole person analysis” is not always conductedor isbasedonhighlyquestionable information, includ- ingcases involvingPost-TraumaticStressDisorder symptoms and substance abuse. For years,AFSAhas recommendedtheadoptionof basicman- agement controls that would indicate whether “adverse action” decisions by theBureauofDiplomatic Security’s clearance office compliedwithState’sownFAMregulations andgovernmentwide procedures. These controls couldservenot onlyas reference tools for attorneysworkingon the cases of the employees involved, but would also allow the department—andAFSA—to certify that issues like PTSD treatment were not leading to clearance revo- cations. To our knowledge, such controls have not been implement- ed. Without procedures inplace to ensure compliancewith reg- ulations, adverse action security clearance adjudications are, for all intents andpurposes, unregulated. Currently, there isnomech- anisminplace toensure thatmental healthtreatment, or anyother prohibited factor, will not improperly form the sole basis for a security clearance revocation at State. In the absenceofmanagement controls todemonstrate com- pliance with its own rules and promises, the department relies on the memory of the adjudicators, and points to a September 2006Officeof the InspectorGeneral Review(ISP-I-06-43). That reviewlookedonlyat closed files alreadymassagedby lawyers and purged of notes, at theoretical timelines, and at whether or not rules were actually on the books. It ignored every lead provided by AFSA, and did not involve any of the procedures described by the basic governmentwide recommendations for quality con- trol in security clearance cases. An investigation into the conduct of that inspection by the President's Council on Integrity & Efficiency—which investigates claims ofwrongdoingby inspec- tors general — ended with the untimely departure of the State Department inspector general who ordered it. AFSAwould like to see the following controls implemented: • DS/PSS should use the same standard used by theOffice of PersonnelManagement and other agencies to verify the reliabil- ity of informationused in a clearance determination. That stan- dardrequires that anyallegationbe supportedbyat least onepiece of evidence that a reasonable person would consider plausible, and that information which does not pass a “reasonable person test” not be used as the basis for a revocation. • DS/PSS should use a formor template to demonstrate that thewhole-personevaluationdescribedabovewasperformed. This would list the required questions, indicate which information in DS’sfileswasappliedtothosequestions,andsummarizetheanswer to each question. Where an initial investigation did not obtain information needed to address all of the mandatory whole-per- son questions, additional investigation or interviews for the sole purpose of answering those questions should be performed. Documenting a whole-person review would make the basis of any decision clearer and more verifiable. • The FAMshould include theQualityControl mechanisms described ingovernment-widedirectives andusedbyother agen- cies. • There should be a clarification of procedures in the FAM, tomake all involved understand that the purpose of the exercise is a fair and complete evaluation, notmerely a successful adverse outcome. All of these suggestions are basedongovernmentwide guide- lines and are used by other agencies that conduct security clear- ance adjudications. Implementing them would go a long way towards enablingAFSA(or anyone) tosaywithcertainty that rules are being followed, and whether employees who need help can get that help without fear of losing their livelihood. Outstanding Medical Programs, But Still No Guarantee of Safety V.P. VOICE: STATE BY DANIEL HIRSCH DE C EMB E R 2 0 1 1 / F OR E I GN S E R V I C E J OU R N A L 65 A F S A N E W S Views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the AFSA State VP.