The Foreign Service Journal, December 2012

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | DECEMBER 2012 11 as I have done here. Then check your bank balance every two weeks and be happy you are gainfully employed, as there are many not as fortunate in today’s economy. I am grateful for all I’ve seen during the last 30 years, and for the people I’ve had a chance to meet along the way. Enjoy life, for you cannot change the system. Richard E. McCormick Assistant General Services Officer U.S. Mission Iraq The “3Ds” Revisited In the face of growing instability, ter- rorism and assorted other international crises that threaten American interests and global security, a new U.S. strategic concept was introduced in 2004 that aimed to bring together the key elements of national power to prevent, mitigate or overcome these threats. Known as the “3Ds” (defense, diplo- macy and development), the strategy envisioned unified planning, coordina- tion and implementation of responses to crises among co-equal partners: namely, the Department of Defense, Department of State and the Agency for International Development. From 2003 to 2010, I worked for DOD, USAID and State developing and imple- menting mechanisms to enhance inter- agency coordination for crisis response, so I have seen the 3Ds up close. While the 3D strategy continues to be referred to as the operational mode for U.S. crisis plan- ning, equality among the partners is far from a reality. DOD, whose global presence is far-reaching and growing, has assumed an ever-greater role in diploma- cy and development and is perceived by many as the visible face of U.S. foreign policy abroad. The Defense Department’s expanded mission is not just due to a larger budget ($670 billion vs. $51 billion for State and USAID combined in Fiscal Year 2012) or personnel base (1.2 million vs. 15,000 for State and USAID). It also stems from a decades-long perception among some in Congress and the executive branch that the military is better able to respond to crises. If the 3D strategy is to succeed, there needs to be a better balance between our military and civilian agency partners— not only in terms of budgets, but in their respective roles in defining U.S. crisis- response measures and outcomes. John Champagne USAID FSO, retired South Hadley, Mass. Remembering Reginald Bartholomew Reginald Bartholomew, who died of cancer in August in New York City, was a break-the-mold diplomat. “Reg” (one doubts he was ever addressed as “Regi- nald,” at least not since his christening) was one of his generation’s most talented diplomats. Although he was not a come-up- from-the-ranks FSO, Bartholomew held multiple ambassadorships, directed the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, and served as under secretary for arms control and international security affairs. He was particularly noted for negotiating basing agreements and devising mecha- nisms for arms control. If there was a tough diplomatic problem, he was likely to be on the short list to handle it. A consummate political survivor, Bar- tholomew endured through Presidents Carter, Reagan and Bush 41, leaving State following Bill Clinton’s election. Key to his longevity was a powerful men- tor, Larry Eagleburger, who held senior State positions and eventually became