The Foreign Service Journal, December 2012

28 DECEMBER 2012 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL vations in technology also affect diplomatic practice. If the Internet has made the world more interconnected and given us new ways to communicate, for example, it is also likely to have an impact on embassy design. Some federal agencies may no longer need to operate out of embassies abroad if what they do can be handled from Washington via the Internet. So there are many ways in which planning for the future of these facilities hinges on planning that spans the State Department. There is also a need to strengthen ties between users and builders. A small step toward bridging that gap would be to add a representative of the Foreign Service to the OBO advisory panel, as in its original 1954 incarnation. The Limits of Physical Security Recent attacks on U.S. facilities in Cairo, Sanaa and Benghazi prompt questions about overall security and diplomatic discre- tion. But instead of leading to calls for more physical security, they suggest a need for more intelligence and other sorts of security that cannot be built of brick or stone. Those attacks should not impede the new program. Rather they underscore the importance of “being there,” and the value of design flexibility to match changing circumstances. They also argue for more focus on rehabilitation of older structures at all locations. Existing buildings rarely meet new standards, yet it is impossible to replace them all. And these latest incidents remind us that blast-resistant construction and setback requirements are designed to minimize damage from bombs, not mob attacks. It is certainly possible to add to local guard forces, provide them with better equipment and training, augment military coverage for diplomatic posts, and increase secu- rity upgrades. But Congress is not really inter- ested in paying for such measures, judging by how it has cut the State Department budget over the past two years, and calls from key leaders for further reductions. Twenty-five years ago, it made good sense to introduce some standardization because embassies share so many features and complex systems, but the one-size-fits-all fortress approach was not appropriate for symbolically significant facilities that needed to be right-sized to locale and purpose. Moreover, suggestions that workplaces could be made “secure” by the application of robust construction standards fail to acknowledge the reality that diplo- mats, like Ambassador Chris Stevens, killed in the Sept. 11 attack in Benghazi, have to travel about to do their jobs well, embassy personnel have to shop and eat and sleep outside of most embassy confines—and host governments vary widely in their willingness and ability to protect foreign missions from attack. To what extent will our foreign policy maintain its com- mitment to diplomacy as a way of furthering America’s global interests? To what extent are we willing to acknowledge that diplomacy is not risk-free? Answers to these questions will shape our embassy architecture. As Nicholas Burns, former U.S. ambassador and under sec- retary of State for political affairs, points out: “While security is critical, we cannot let it rule everything we do or else we might as well just close up shop in many parts of the world.” Pulling out of danger zones may be a real option to many, but it is unaccept- able to most. Instead, seeking a “rational balance” should be our goal, Burns says. For the Design Excellence program to realize its potential, there will have to be a shared commitment to enhancing Amer- ica’s foreign presence, maintaining engagement—and finding that balance. n To what extent are we willing to acknowledge that diplomacy is not risk-free? Recent attacks on U.S. facilities in Sanaa (shown above), Cairo and Benghazi raise questions about overall security and diplomatic discretion. Mohammed Huwais, AFP/Getty Images