The Foreign Service Journal, December 2014

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | DECEMBER 2014 21 domestic revenue, plagued by corruption, a icted by criminal elements involved in opium and smuggling, and struggling to execute basic functions of government.” Fighting continues in 18 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, and the key province of Helmand, a center for opium production and trade (which the United Nations reports is at record levels), is particularly vulnerable. Much of the Afghan middle class, which has grown over the past decade as a direct consequence of the large foreign presence, could abandon the country in short order should the security environment deteriorate further. Such an exodus would rob the Ghani administration of the cash, resources and talent vital to creating a stable Afghanistan. ough the challenges are signi cant, as spelled out in the following pages, it is critical that the United States not walk away, as it did in 1989. e security and future stability of Afghanistan and the region will depend on Washington’s thoughtful engagement over the long term. Postcards for sale in downtown Kabul in 2012 depicting former leaders and resistance fighters, many of whom died violent deaths and have polarizing legacies today. Casey Garret Johnson Parallels Between 1989 and 2014 When Moscow ended its military occupation of Afghani- stan 25 years ago, the ensuing drawdown of Western engage- ment was abrupt and essentially total. U.S. arms and other resources that had owed to the mujahedeen, principally via Pakistani channels, ceased within months—as did U.S. interest in the political and economic fate of the country. Happily, the impending departure from Afghanistan of the International Security Assistance Force, comprised of troops from the United States and NATO, will be more gradual, and far less dramatic. e presence of 9,800 U.S. troops for at least two years, and pledges of signi cant international nancial support for 2015 and beyond, contrast sharply with the virtual abandon- ment of Afghanistan in 1989. Strong Western political engagement and diplomatic support will be critical in preventing, or at least delaying, a collapse of the Kabul government and staying the meddling hand of Pakistan and other foreign powers. is approach appears similar to the Soviet e ort to sustain the regime of President Mohammad Najibullah in Kabul in the wake of its troop withdrawal. Moscow continued to render signi cant nancial, military and diplomatic support, enabling him to cling to power for more than two years. Najibullah was eventually ousted in 1992 as a result of direct and indirect military pressure from Pakistan, combined with harassment from the mujahedeen, all underwritten nancially by Saudi Arabia and other Arab sources. Afghanistan then su ered through several years of multisided civil war among mujahedeen-a liated parties and chaos before the Taliban, again with support and direction from Islamabad, seized control of Kabul and most of the country in 1994. Several key warlords, including Abdul Rashid Dostum, a pow- erful Uzbek, were able to hold o the Pakistani-backed Taliban onslaught in the north. ese largely non-Pashtun ethnic ele- ments played a critical role in the successful U.S. assault on the Taliban in late 2001, and were rewarded with key positions in the successor government organized under the aegis of the Decem- ber 2001 Bonn Conference. Trouble at the Top Delegates to that 2001 convention chose Hamid Karzai, a Durrani Pashtun from the Kandahar area, to lead an interim administration. Six months later, a national conference (loya jirga) of Afghan tribal leaders named him president. ough brilliant, Karzai turned out to be a poor choice to lead his country on several counts. First, though he was a deputy in a mujahedeen group, he had no combat experience