The Foreign Service Journal, December 2014

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | DECEMBER 2014 29 current timetable for withdrawing its forces—a timeline set to satisfy U.S. political concerns, without an evaluation of the e ects on the ground—we can change everyone’s strategic calculus. Shifting from a timeline-based approach to a conditions- based approach would also have a huge positive economic impact, giving those making investment and assistance deci- sions greater con dence in the country’s future. 2. Revise our approach to assisting the Afghan Security Forces to ensure that they acquire and maintain the kinds of capabilities they need today and into the future. is will require us to address the dangerous weaknesses in air power, intelligence, logistics and institutional and leader- ship development built into our current plans. For example, the Afghan Air Force needs xed-wing transport and close air support aircraft, as well as transport and attack helicopters. For the decade or so it will take to develop these capabilities, or until the Taliban insurgency ends, we should continue to help provide those assets. Afghanistan also needs a continuation of the robust intel- ligence support that has made our military e orts so e ective. I visited the country this fall as we pulled down the tremen- dously capable aerostats that protected Kabul and most major population centers. ese and other technical capabilities were huge multipliers for the Afghans’ excellent human intel- ligence, and played a major role in ensuring that the Taliban did not disrupt the elections. With these capabilities gone, Taliban attacks will become more lethal and have greater reach into Afghan cities. is is already happening. But with a minor adjustment of our force levels, we could give Afghans time to acquire the necessary expertise to operate these systems themselves—something they are eager to do. Weaknesses in logistics, institutional development and Afghanistan also needs a continuation of the robust intelligence support that has made our military e‡orts so e‡ective.