The Foreign Service Journal, December 2016

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | DECEMBER 2016 23 have no meaningful role. The Common European Home would be common to every European state except Russia. Any state might seek membership in NATO, unless that state was Russia. The United States kept telling Russia that none of this harmed Russian interests; Russia kept replying that, yes, it does harm our interests. At the turn of the century, what were those interests? Rus- sia’s international behavior and the statements of its lead- ership suggest to me the following: first, not to have a potentially hostile mili- tary alliance on its borders; second, not to be isolated politically and economically from the most important European institutions; and, third, to have a meaningful say on developments in the region, and particularly on the orientation of the newly independent countries that had been part of its empire. If the United States, Brit- ain or France espoused such interests, it is not likely that they would be viewed as inherently predatory. Are we to conclude, then, that in Russian hands such interests are predatory because Russia itself is inherently predatory? A claim like that cannot withstand scrutiny. It is phobic. It is also not very smart. Historically, treating regimes as inherently predatory (e.g., the regimes of Napoleon, Hitler and Mussolini) has been more likely to produce stability than treating countries as inherently predatory (e.g., Germany after World War I). Interpreting Interests So, is it appropriate, then, to consider the Putin regime inherently predatory? A number of foreign policy analysts who are not Russophobes, or do not want to be seen as such, do trace the problem not to the country but to the regime govern- ing it. Proponents of the predatory Putin regime thesis point to the Russian invasions of Georgia and Crimea, its support of separatists in eastern Ukraine and its support of the Assad regime in Syria as evidence of an intent to recreate, insofar as possible, the geography and international influence of the Soviet Union. Their policy prescription for the United States is to contain this expansionism by replacing the Russian influ- ence or presence with a U.S. influence or presence. In my view, there are serious problems with this interpreta- tion of Russian intentions and the policy approach that flows from it. First, it does not stand up well to critical examination. Second, its zero-sum view of the U.S.-Russian relationship assumes that a mutually beneficial resolution of conflicting interests is all but impossible. The Putin regime has been more assertive, particularly during the past several years, in advancing Russia’s interests than was the Yeltsin regime throughout the 1990s, but it inherited a relationship with the West that its predeces- sors also considered deeply flawed. Despite continuing differences over issues such as NATO expansion, the new regime’s relationship with the United States reached a high point after 9/11, when Putin appeared to believe that a Russian-American alliance against international terror- ism could be forged. The two countries shared an interest. They were then and remain today the two developed, non-Islamic states that have suffered the greatest losses from terrorism. This embryonic alliance was useful to Washington when it invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban regime. It began to fray when the United States invaded Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power. When the United States moved to place anti-ballistic missile systems in Eastern Europe and NATO, and the European Union moved to develop closer relationships with Georgia and Ukraine, the Russian regime fundamentally reassessed the prospects for relationships with the West that would respect its concerns and interests. Hardball International Politics With regard to Georgia and Ukraine, the Putin regime has made no secret of its view that it is a fundamental Russian interest that these countries not become NATO members under any conditions, and that they become European Union members only under conditions acceptable to Russia. To assert that Russia has no right to such interests is beside the point. Trying to tell other countries what their fundamental interests are is generally a futile exercise. To argue that the assertion of such interests is prima facie evidence of predatory The policy challenge for both the West and Russia was to manage that period of disillusionment so that it would lead to a more mature and well-grounded relationship.