The Foreign Service Journal, December 2016

28 DECEMBER 2016 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL The Soviet Union fell in 1991 without any of the events that have generally accompanied imperial collapse in the past— military defeat, foreign invasion, internal revolution and the like. It came, moreover, only a short time after the country appeared to be at the pinnacle of international power and prestige. Recall nuclear arms agreements that many inter- preted as signaling Moscow’s achievement of strategic parity with its American rival and the expansion of Soviet power during the 1970s into areas far beyond traditional areas of influence. Moscow’s confidence led Foreign Minister Gromyko to say in 1972 that “no international problem of significance anywhere can be resolved without Soviet participation.” In reality, the USSR was a superpower only in the military sense. Its armed might rested on a sclerotic political system and an inefficient economy, barely half the size of its Ameri- can rival. When Mikhail Gorbachev took office in 1985 after the deaths of three aging leaders over the previous three years, he had had the wisdom to understand the need for reform and the courage to begin it. But Gorbachev had no plan, and he dithered when the reforms he unleashed threatened to go beyond the “socialist alternative” to which he remained com- mitted until the end. A Twilight of Pro-American Enthusiasm The August 1991 coup marked the end of Gorbachev and the USSR, even though both managed to hang on for a few more twilight months. Those fortunate enough to be present remember the climate of euphoria that engulfed Moscow after the coup. People persuaded themselves that life would soon change for the better. The country had been through tough times but had emerged with hope from the crisis of the coup and the long nightmare of communism. Russia would remain a superpower, but it would join the other members of the world community as a “normal” coun- try. Democracy was on everybody’s lips. People believed that with the Communist Party swept away it would be easy to graft the institutions of democratic governance onto the Russian body politic. Russians, after all, were a well-educated and tal- ented people. Soon Moscow would take its proper place with New York, London and other world centers. An outpouring of positive feelings toward the United States accompanied the post-coup euphoria. It was assumed that Russia and the United States would remain the world’s two leading nations but now as friends and partners, not rivals. To walk into a Russian office and be introduced as an American diplomat was to be greeted by smiles, enthusiastic handshakes and often a warm embrace. Looking back, this brief window of pro-American enthusi- asm was probably unsustainable, and even at the time there were signs of strain. Over the winter of 1991-1992, as basic supplies dwindled in Moscow, the U.S. airlifted emergency humanitarian aid. On one occasion, my son and I helped unload a massive C-5A cargo aircraft and accompanied a con- voy of food and medicines to a Moscow hospital. As the mate- rial was unloaded and a number of empty boxes turned up, the hospital director flew into a rage, accusing us of stealing some of the supplies and staging a show. Back at the embassy the air attaché told me that empty boxes were used to distribute the load in a balanced fashion through- out the aircraft. The next day when I called the director to explain the situation he expressed gratitude for the U.S. assistance, but added that he also hoped we understood just how difficult it was for a Russian to be in the position of accepting aid from the United States, however well-intentioned. Twenty-five years later Putin has constructed a narrative of Western perfidy that is the foundation of his appeal to the Russian people. In reality, plenty of mistakes were made in Moscow and abroad. Almost everyone involved in Russia after the Soviet col- lapse—Russians, as well as foreigners—underestimated the extent of the political, economic and social difficulties that needed to be overcome. To some extent, this was a conse- quence of the structure of the Soviet system itself, where basic information was either lacking or falsified. No one really understood, for example, how large and intractable the mas- sive Soviet military industrial complex was—or how difficult, and in many cases impossible, it would be to find ways to restructure it into more productive uses. Looking back, this brief window of pro-American enthusiasm was probably unsustainable, and even at the time there were signs of strain.