The Foreign Service Journal, December 2016

40 DECEMBER 2016 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL gree and your historical ties to the inner circle. Though it was never much of a meritocracy, the political and industrial leaders of the USSR were from a far broader geographic base and had a far more restrictive code of conduct. Meanwhile, the average Russian now believes that Mikhail Gorbachev was an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency. How else to explain the events that led to the end of a country as powerful as the USSR? Relative Political Freedom Has Its Benefits But there are also developments feeding an authentic sense of pride. With the cult of the individual taking hold, Ayn Rand’s objectivist philosophy is no longer seen as an anti-lesson but rather as a model with a growing fan base. In typical Russian fashion, this cuts both ways. While some pursue goals, many are returning to the involuntary mindfulness of the USSR—living one day at a time, with no grand ambitions. This time it’s not the result of blissful state-sponsored ignorance, but reignited uncer- tainty about the future. Despite the pendulum’s swing toward conservatism, includ- ing current draconian laws and official morality, many Russians are comparatively more liberal in their thinking about gender today than in the Soviet period. Several major cities have at least one underground gay club, which survives thanks to a national “don’t ask, don’t tell” mentality. And while in the USSR the only steering wheel behind which you could find a woman was that of a tractor or trolley bus, female automobile driv- ers are now a common sight on the road. Political freedom is also a relative concept. One friend illustrates how people here per- ceive democracy using the joke about a couple celebrating their 50th wedding anniversary. “How did you do it?” a guest at the celebra- tion asks the husband. “Simple,” he says. “When we got married she toldme she never wants to have a disagreement, and proposed we divide our authority. I make all the big decisions; she makes all the small ones.” “And how did that work out?” the guest asks. “Great,” he says. “It turns out there has never been the need to make a big decision.” Indeed, with the electorate cajoled into showing up at the polls, voting irregularities and a barely nascent concept of conflict of interest, the democratic landscape resembles that of the late 19th-century United States—which is significant progress over the Soviet period. “Now, activists are running for office,” says long-serving State Department Kremlinologist Igor Belousovitch. “They are visible in the press, they are grudgingly recognized by the authorities. ... Who would have thought in the days [of the USSR] that oppo- nents of the regime would be running for office and even joining legislative bodies?” Freedom of worship, at least for mainstream religions, is another new concept that Homo rusicus has in his quiver to help compensate for his losses. The millennium anniversary of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1988, under the tolerant watch of the glasnost (openness) campaign, gave a kickstart to the rebirth of that religion. Now more than 70 percent of the population openly associates itself with orthodoxy, and the genuinely faith- ful can be found at all levels of society. Looking Outwards In the late 1980s, when not patrolling the subway station in search of the almighty dollar, Sasha the fartsovchik would collect and play games with fantiki —the colorful wrappers of imported chewing gum. During the era of glasnost and U.S.-Soviet peace- making between President Ronald Reagan and General Secre- New creative art space with book shops, studios, galleries and educational centers at the Red October factory (former chocolate factory) in the center of Moscow, February 2016. ARTHURBONDAR