The Foreign Service Journal, December 2016

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | DECEMBER 2016 43 barrage of “feel good” TV program- ming—where, as one pundit put it, “prosperity is a state of mind”—is having an effect. Economic and other statistics indicate a real decline in the standard of living. The neo-Russians, for their part, don’t trust their televisions. They are uneasy. Another Levada poll in July revealed that 42 percent of 500 senior managers of domestic and foreign companies working in Russia want to emigrate. Meanwhile, the number of foreign specialists coming into Rus- sia has declined dramatically, with information agency Ros Business Consulting reporting a 57-percent drop in work permits issued for “highly qualified” European executives in 2015 compared to 2013. What’s to Be Done? Dissecting the deception is the best hope for reaching the Russian mind, Yurevich says: “Our government wants the people to equate love for the motherland with love for the state. But the motherland is not the state: it is the people, the soil, the culture. The West should understand this and leverage it in each commu- nication; differentiate every time there is a comment or criticism of the state. Don’t say ‘The Russians annexed Crimea.’ Say ‘The Russian government…’” Mikhailovich remains calm, pours another cup of tea and points out that Russia’s relationship with the West must be looked at as an interaction between different civilizations. “We are just at the initial stage of getting acquainted. There are pain points in the process: high expectations on both sides. Those who have faith and a long-term strategy—in diplomatic, business and personal relations—are the ones who will succeed. Besides, don’t forget: it’s a pendulum. It swings back and forth.” Mikhailovich’s thesis that 75 percent of the people need authoritarian rule explains President Vladimir Putin’s huge popu- larity. It is noteworthy that despite the herd mentality fostered by television and exemplified by gangs of rowdy soccer fans, Mikhailovich has such faith. He is convinced that if a brawling Russian were to break away from the mob and face his foreign counterpart as an individual, his façade of nationalism and bra- vado would quickly fall and the humility of his Russian soul would emerge…probably. Keeping in mind the more subtle elements of history and culture will help to facilitate understanding. ARTHURBONDAR Tatyana, a 38-year-old professional, was born in the Urals, lived for many years in Moscow, but has since moved to Italy to escape the superficial materialistic suyta (fuss) that she says has possessed the capital city. She chose family as a metaphor for understanding mindsets. “Putin’s Russia is only 16 years old: a teenager—a boy, I think, with all the associated testosterone, insecurity and potential for development. The United States is the baffled, self-absorbed middle-aged parent, occasionally trying to find a common language. Then we have Grandma Europe: over- indulgent, a bit clueless, but applying wisdom to her relation- ships.” Counting on Kolya And finally, there is Cousin Kolya. In his mid-60s, Kolya lives in a village 150 miles north of Moscow. A professional fireman in the Soviet era, in the early 1990s he made his first trip to Poland to buy cheap Western housewares for resale back home. He built a business, bought a log cabin on a small plot of land and put his son through college. Now he and his wife focus on their vegetable garden, chickens and honey bees. As stoic as the farmer with the pitchfork in Grant Wood’s “American Gothic,” Kolya survives and thrives on self-reliance, faith in a higher power and a quasi-Tolstoyan philosophy of distrusting the state. Unlike Lev Nikolayevich, he enjoys meat and moonshine…in moderation. Like most Russians, a healthy respect for fate permeates his ideology. “Do most Russians think differently now?” I ask him. Kolya doesn’t hesitate. “No.” “But what about you?” “I had my own personal perestroika . Many people haven’t.” n People enjoying Mayakovskaya Square in Moscow in February, after its renovation.