The Foreign Service Journal, December 2016

50 DECEMBER 2016 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL cryptographic keying material to operate the NRRC securely. This would lead to one of the most bizarre experiences of my career. Hand-delivering a top secret cryptographic key to Soviet personnel was something I had seen in James Bond and other spy thrillers, but never imagined doing myself. Yet those were our instructions. Still—remembering my former U.S. military training and the “Evil Empire” mantra from my first Moscow assignment (1983-1985), as well as the “Year of the Spy” only five years prior—the commu- nist bogey-man haunted us. Microwave beams aimed at CPU and my living quarters, “spy dust” on my car’s steer- ing wheel and KGB-bugged embassy typewriters made the NRRC crypto protocol feel traitorous, until we were assured by the highest levels that it was to prevent nuclear war. And so in late 1989 I found myself accompanying a senior NRRC delegate from the White House on a special mission. Down iron stairways, through echoing corridors of reinforced concrete and manned by armed Soviet soldiers, we made our way deep inside an underground Soviet nuclear command bunker. In my hand was an NRRC protocol document from the U.S. president. As a Soviet general and two staff aides approached, I knew this was more than routine diplomacy. It was a once-in-a-lifetime national security task, with implica- tions for the entire planet. VIP Visits and “Oval Office-Style” Tutoring From 1989 to 1991, the embassy hosted high-level visits from virtually every Cabinet agency of the U.S. government, with Secretary of State James Baker visiting Moscow almost monthly. One of the most unusual and demanding visits was that of Pres. Bush’s chief of staff, John Sununu. Following the Soviet Parlia- ment’s election of Gorbachev to the newly created position of President of the Soviet Union (in addition to General Secretary of the Communist Party), Gorbachev expressed interest in creating an Amer- ican-style “Oval Office.” Pres. Bush dispatched Sununu to assist. Although reports varied on the effectiveness of Sununu’s Kremlin tutoring, the five-day visit required close coordination with the White House. I can recall the expression of shock by our resident secure telephone officer (communications electronic officer–tele- phone, CEO/T) when Washington advised that Sununu would need private and continuous telephone connectivity to the White House—directly from Red Square. Saying no was not an option. While the arcane technical solution employed to Moscow’s CPU was responsible for secret communications involving history-making strategy— seven days a week, 24 hours a day.