The Foreign Service Journal, December 2016

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | DECEMBER 2016 75 concept of Eurasianism, the subject of Clover’s book. Eurasianism’s starting point is Halford Mackinder’s 1904 geopolitical theorem: “Who rules East Europe com- mands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island [the Eurasian continent]; Who rules the World Island commands the World.” Mixing it with a healthy dose of conser- vative Russian nationalism produces an ideology that celebrates Russian imperialism and implacable opposition to Western political and social values. Clover traces the development and evolution of Eurasian ideology, while simultaneously pointing out that its central tenets have been discredited intellectually since their establishment in the 1920s and that its proponents often weave dark conspiracy theories into their geopolitics. Clover’s occasion- ally too-detailed narrative painstakingly relates the life stories and intellectual struggles of largely forgotten thinkers such as Prince Nikolay Trubetskoy and Lev Gumilev, a tragic figure who suf- fered two stints in the gulag, lived long enough to see the USSR’s demise and ended his life pining for its restoration. Alexander Dugin, who embodies many of the Putin regime’s most salient characteristics, is Clover’s chief protag- onist. A former dissident poet/essayist, Dugin latched onto the ideas of Euro- pean fascists as the USSR disintegrated, blended them with Russia’s Eurasianist thinking and worked for years—with little success—to harness the growing popularity of Russian nationalism to achieve political influence. Paradoxically, while preaching an arch-conservative philosophy, Dugin is thoroughly post-modern. He gleefully deconstructs his own arguments and Russia’s simulation of politics, as well as the ideas advanced by Western opponents, leav- ing Clover unsure whether Dugin is a sincere chauvin- ist or just a spin doctor with an unusually elaborate and colorful backstory. As for Dugin’s direct influence on Putin and his government, Clover is skeptical, though he dutifully sifts through the gossip and uncovers instances when Putin appears to have incorporated Dugin’s utterances into his speeches. Dugin’s most significant impact on Russia was probably in the 1990s, when he took advantage of the ideologically shell-shocked Russian military estab- lishment and was named a regular lecturer at the officers’ academy, where his book, Foundations of Geopolitics , was to become required reading. Like others who wanted to preserve the USSR, Dugin recognized that one of the many failures of the 1991 putsch was its absence of a communications strategy or ideology. Eurasianism, he reasoned, was the post-communist justification for the continued existence of the Soviet Union. Following his 2012 return to the presidency, Vladimir Putin stepped up his vilification of the West and made reasserting Russia’s “zone of privileged interests” in neighboring countries a top priority. Dugin appeared regularly on television and was an outspoken advo- cate of Russia taking even more Ukrai- nian territory by force. But when these more radical positions fell out of favor in the Kremlin, Dugin’s media profile diminished, suggesting the Kremlin trots him and his ideas out when useful but is not following his strategic play- book on a daily basis. Clover has spotlighted the interplay between Eurasianist philosophy and Putin’s Russia; but, as he would acknowledge, more research is required to explain how the ideologies of Russian nationalism and imperial nostalgia influence today’s Russian government. Both books remind us that “Russia is an idea-centric country” (Ostrovsky’s phrase), in which jour- nalists, “political technologists” and public intellectuals play an outsized role in determining the country’s fate. Ostrovsky’s work will be a mainstay for describing and explaining the last several decades of Russian history and is grace- fully written to appeal to all interested readers. Because Clover’s book is denser and dissects ideas (and some conspiracy theories) in greater detail, its audience may not extend beyond the communities of Russia geeks and specialists in Euro- pean nationalism. The lessons of the 1990s in Russia remain salient: Clover’s central point is that even the brain-waves of cranks often change history. And Ostrovsky reminds us that core Enlightenment values cannot flourish without an elite that is willing to set aside its immediate interests to build institutions and habits that will safeguard them. n FSO Eric Green is director of the Russia Office in State’s Bureau of European Affairs and previously served as political counselor in Moscow. He joined the Foreign Service in 1990 and has also served in the Philippines, Ukraine, Northern Ireland, Turkey and Ice- land. He is a member of the Foreign Service Journal Editorial Board. The views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of State.