The Foreign Service Journal, December 2018

14 DECEMBER 2018 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Staffing Crisis at State has Consequences T he Oct. 30 Bloomberg Editorial Board column, “An Unmanned State Depart- ment Can’t Solve Crises,” weighed in on the Trump administration’s failure to nominate ambassadors and other critical public servants to important overseas posts. After the slaying of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey, the board noted, the U.S. ambassadors to Turkey and Saudi Arabia could have pressed their con- tacts in those countries for answers—but “almost two years after taking office, Presi- dent Donald Trump has yet to nominate ambassadors for Turkey and Saudi Arabia.” The article points out that more than 40 ambassadorships—including to such critical partners as Australia, Jordan and Mexico—are currently empty. Just 18 of the 28 assistant secretary–level positions at State have been filled, “none with an active career professional.” Of the 702 positions throughout the federal government that require Senate confirmation, only 380 have been filled, and 135 don’t even have a nominee wait- ing in the wings. “Whether they’re working in foreign affairs or environmental protection, nonpartisan career public servants help keep government effective, transpar- ent and free of corruption,” the editorial concluded. “Not recognizing this, Trump is decimating the government’s manage- rial capacity, aggravating turnover, and making it harder to recruit the best and brightest to public service.” Bloomberg did give credit to Sec- retary of State Mike Pompeo for lifting the hiring freeze and pushing for more nominations, but said he would be more effective if he “tapped career ranks for more senior positions, punished those who are still conducting political witch hunts and invested in his workforce.” This Year in Jerusalem S even decades ago this year, the United States was the first government to rec- ognize the state of Israel, acting just hours after its founding. However, President Harry Truman’s administration made clear that its recognition did not imply any endorsement of Israel’s claim on Jerusa- lem. That, Truman and nearly all his suc- cessors have asserted, is to be resolved by negotiation between the parties involved. In 1995 an overwhelming majority in both houses of Congress passed the Jeru- salem Embassy Act, which recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, called for it to remain an undivided city and set aside funds to relocate the U.S. embassy there by May 1999. The legislation also allowed the president to invoke a six-month waiver of the application of the law, and reissue the waiver every six months, on “national security” grounds. The waiver was repeatedly renewed by Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama. Then, on Dec. 6, 2017, President Donald Trump declared that “Jerusalem is indisputably the capital of Israel,” and announced his intention to move the U.S. embassy there. T he modern Ambassador shares with the military commander abroad and the American business representative the disadvantages of living and pursuing his calling in an era of almost instantaneous communication. Almost anywhere he may be stationed he is at the end of a telephone line which will not be markedly affected by distance even though it may have spanned an ocean to reach him. Nor will his colleagues in Washington be deterred from picking up that little black instru- ment by the thought that they are about to make a long-distance call of several thousand miles at a cost which would horrify them if it appeared on their own personal bills. In addition, the Ambassador is the recipient of vast numbers of official telegrams every day, which in most cases can be gotten to him in ten or fifteen minutes if necessary. These often tell him in minutest detail how to conduct whatever negotiations are before him. Nearly always they will include a text of agree- ment from which the Ambassador must not deviate by so much as a comma without the explicit permission of the Department of State. How many agree- ments have failed because an Ambassador did not have authority to make immediate minor modifications on his own authority may never be known, but any number of frustrated envoys must have thought longingly of the days when Benjamin Franklin in Paris often had to wait three or four months for any instructions at all, and could use his own discretion in the meantime. —John D. Jernegan, from his article of the same title in the December 1968 FSJ. 50 Years Ago The Future of an Ambassador in a Supersonic Age