The Foreign Service Journal, December 2020

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | DECEMBER 2020 59 Wearing Two Hats Following the departure for personal reasons of Amb. Jackovich’s successor in December 1996, I served as both U.S. special envoy for the Bosnian Federation and Embassy Sara- jevo chargé d’affaires until September 1997. Separating the two functions was a challenge at times. As Federation special envoy I mostly freelanced, based on the situation on the ground. What instructions I did receive were mostly informal—phone conversations with John Kornblum, drop-in visits fromDick Holbrooke and his team and quick trips to Vienna to confer with U.S. Ambassador Swanee Hunt. My mandate was to engage with a wide range of Bosniak and Croat government, religious, cultural, educational andmedia figures and seek ways to strengthen the stability and effectiveness of the Bosniak-Croat Federation (“entity”) within B&H. I had nomandate to deal with the Serbs in their separate entity, Republika Srpska. As embassy chargé, on the other hand, I received instruc- tions through normal State Department channels. My respon- sibilities covered U.S. diplomatic operations throughout the entire country—the Federation, Republika Srpska and Brcko District—including monitoring compliance with Dayton provisions at the state, entity and municipal levels. This was a complex effort that focused on the three “constituent peoples” of Bosnia, as defined by Dayton: Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. In addition to the citizens of B&H, my team and I engaged with a broad range of international players, including the Office of the High Representative, OSCE, E.U., NATO, the U.N. Stabiliza- tion Force (SFOR, the successor to IFOR) and the media. I made it a point to visit OHR headquarters frequently, both to exchange information and, where possible, to coordinate our efforts and avoid misunderstandings. The Dayton Agreement had specified that “in view of the complexities,” a “High Representa- tive” be designated to facilitate implementation of the settlement. Carl Bildt was the natural choice. He had become prime minister of Sweden in 1991 at the age of 42, and in 1994 the European Union appointed him E.U. Special Envoy to the Former Yugo- slavia. Bildt brought to the job an air of quiet authority, a subtle and probing intellect, an encyclopedic knowledge of world and European history, and a thorough understanding of the issues and personalities in B&H and the region. In early 1996, along with a small and dedicated international staff, he began OHR operations inside a former bank building in the heart of Sarajevo. (It is no coincidence that the flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina is blue and yellow, like the flag of Sweden: it was designed by Carl Bildt.) In response to the U.N.’s failure to keep the peace in B&H and prevent genocide at Srebrenica, Dick Holbrooke took steps to minimize the organization’s role. The High Representative received formal political guidance not from the U.N. but from an 11-member steering board of the Peace Implementation Coun- cil, consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, the presidency of the European Union, the European Commission and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, represented by Turkey. Informal consulta- tions between the High Representative and individual states also took place on a regular basis. This arrangement gave Bildt and his successors unusual flexibility and autonomy. OHR’s mandate and priorities often differed frommine. OHR focused on the multiple challenges of “state-building” throughout B&H in all its dimensions—political, economic and social. By con- trast, my role as special envoy was limited to the Bosniak-Croat Federation. As embassy chargé d’affaires, I would sometimes have to carry the bad news to Bildt that Washington disagreed with the High Rep’s position on one or another issue. Tribes and Tribalism Newcomers to the Balkans are invariably struck by the pow- erful influence of “national”—i.e., tribal—identity. The Slavic languages make a clear distinction between liudi (people) and narodi (peoples). At Dayton, American and European negotiators dealt with this individual-versus-tribe tension by designating the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs as the three “constituent peoples” of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The underlying hope was that with the passage of time, passions would eventually subside, and human relations could return to something approximating the Yugoslav era, with its interethnic marriages and highly successful 1984 Winter Olympic Games. It would not be easy. As Federation special envoy I mostly freelanced, based on the situation on the ground. … My mandate was to engage with a wide range of Bosniak and Croat government, religious, cultural, educational and media figures.