The Foreign Service Journal, December 2021

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | DECEMBER 2021 103 Reagan’s advisers believed that the eventual devolution of the USSR would take at least 60 years; thus, the demise of the USSR was not an objective. ning of an “open” dialogue with Moscow. (The two sides continued to engage in quiet diplomacy in the form of “umbrella talks” on arms control.) Reagan’s sweeping reelection victory in November brought greater Soviet readiness to begin arms control talks. Chernenko’s death the following March ushered in Mikhail Gorbachev, who was already familiar to many in the West. Initially, as Miles recounts, Gorbachev’s only motivation for dialogue was to find a way to compete more effectively with the West. After early attempts to redefine the playing field with classic Soviet wedge- driving and pushing so-called “universal human values,” however, Gorbachev agreed to meet with Reagan in Geneva in November 1985. Miles observes that the White House viewed Geneva as little more than another forum for Cold War competi- tion, but by this time Gorbachev appeared open to a more tangible objective. The Soviet leader had four “guide- lines,” as Miles calls them: do not deviate from the Soviet arms control position (i.e., opposition to the SDI); maintain solidarity with freedom fighters world- wide; do not provoke Reagan; and learn how to live together by finding a common language. Gorbachev hoped to begin to improve U.S.-Soviet relations, even if only in atmospherics. In Miles’ view, although Geneva brought no concrete progress, it created optimism about the future, even if that future was about continued competition as rivals, as well as partners. In his conclusion, Miles argues that the White House’s two-track strategy of “peace through strength” and quiet diplomacy proved successful and that “Hippocratic diplomacy” (first do no harm) and the rejection of violence made the biggest dif- ference in implementing that strategy. The balance of power shifted between 1980 and 1985, giving advantage to engagement in the diplomatic domain as diplomacy shifted from covert to overt. Simon Miles’ book not only fills the vacant space in the library for a sharply focused, comprehensively researched discourse on the beginning of the end of the Cold War; it also helps to fill the greater and lesser gaps for those of us who, directly or indirectly, had parts in this complicated but fascinating chapter in U.S.-Soviet relations. n Edward Salazar is a retired Foreign Service officer, a “Soviet hand” who served as a Soviet foreign affairs analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (1984-1986), on the Soviet desk (1986-1989) and the Ukraine desk (1992-1995), and at Embassy Moscow (1989- 1992, 1998-2000 and 2003-2005). A frequent lecturer on Soviet and Russian affairs, he also contributed to National Geographic ’s well-received television production, “The 80s: The Decade That Made Us.” Since retiring, he has lived and worked as a consultant, lecturer and educator in London and Budapest, and currently resides in Ottawa.