THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | DECEMBER 2024 19 Such training, along with courses focused on diversity and ethics, seems to have become mainly a box-checking exercise. The short courses for DCMs and ambassadors are simply not enough to develop seasoned leaders, not to mention the absence of required management training for all first-time section chiefs. Too often in embassies the blind are leading the blind. Why? Well, now we get to the nub of the problem: Foreign Service culture. Changing the Culture Many reports point to Foreign Service culture as a problem, but I’ve seen none that suggest what should be done about it. Too many officers, anxious to rise rapidly up the ladder, skip “tedious” intermediary home and foreign assignments. They focus on Washington networking over acquiring deep foreign area and management experience that take years in the field to develop. For the ambitious officer, training and overseas assignments can be seen as obstacles rather than skill-building requirements for promotions. In my own career, I purposefully sought a progression of increasingly senior desk and embassy jobs in a conscious effort to learn all aspects of the Foreign Service, from desk officer to office director to deputy assistant secretary in Washington, D.C., and from consulate reporting officer to embassy section chief, DCM, and ambassador at various posts overseas. The department did not require this progression, but it certainly made me a better, more effective officer and enriched my career. Unfortunately, it seems the Foreign Service is largely dominated at the highest ranks by those who, having spent a tour or two at embassies early on in their careers, got on the Washington fast track that catapulted them from executive assistant to senior positions, including rewards of ambassadorships, without having acquired intermediary hands-on experiences at embassies or desks. While some of these officers made the leap because of extraordinary abilities, others appear to have benefited from their network of relationships within the political levels of the department and the executive branch, setting unfortunate examples that many ambitious officers seek to follow in pursuit of what they consider career success. Too often, it seems to me, the department makes exceptions to the rules governing the Foreign Service, enabling and even encouraging this counterproductive culture. And, perhaps most discouragingly, those who benefited from this culture often become Foreign Service mandarins, exerting tremendous influence from their perches on the seventh floor. I do not see the culture of the Foreign Service changing if these officers continue to dominate. Looking back, I see in my own career the great value of service in Washington, D.C., as a necessity for understanding and working with and within the Washington policymaking and political world, but that experience served to complement rather than substitute for an extensive range of overseas assignments. To build a truly effective Foreign Service, emphasis should be placed on ensuring officers spend the bulk of their careers abroad, learning and practicing the diplomatic trade, rather than in domestic assignments where they can lose—or never effectively attain—that unique perspective FSOs can and should provide policymakers. Restoring Discipline The rules and regulations governing our Service, as established by the Rogers Act and subsequent reforms, do not need much change. The traditional “eight-year rule”—which states that an officer cannot be domestically assigned for more than eight consecutive years— provides a framework for a balanced career encompassing both overseas and D.C.-based assignments, while established performance standards set requirements for acceptable work. What is needed is stricter enforcement of existing rules regarding Foreign Service recruitment, training, and service. I used to think the Director General would have the ultimate authority to enforce the rules, but it appears that this authority, if it ever existed, has eroded, leaving an office that first and foremost takes its orders from the seventh floor rather than defending and maintaining the integrity of the Service as a professional, nonpolitical institution. I do not fault the courageous people who have held that unenviable position, but they need clear, independent authority to govern the Service without political influence or the influence of senior FSOs holding seventh-floor positions. I find it rather ironic that some senior seventh-floor FSOs have called for reforms after leaving office but were apparently unable to implement reforms while they occupied positions of authority and influence in the department. Of course, to be fair, reform is always easier said than done, especially when reform itself is not among the highest priorities of the department’s senior political leadership. Frankly, I do not believe the Foreign Service bureaucracy can reform itself on its own. By their very nature, bureaucracies are averse to change; they are the institutional keepers of the prevailing culture. Change usually must come from
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