Foreign Service Journal

JANUARY 1967
60 CENTS

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THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION is composed of active and retired personnel who are or have been serving at home or abroad under the authority of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended. It groups together people who have a common responsibility for the implementation of foreign policy. It seeks to encourage the development of a career service of maximum effectiveness, and to advance the welfare of its members.

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departments

Marriages

BRANAMAN-HALLA. Jacqueline C. Branaman was married to FSRO Philip J. Halla, on November 26, in the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York.

BURKE-KIDDER. Megan K. Burke was married to Michael R. Kidder, son of Ambassador and Mrs. Randolph A. Kidder, on November 25, in Potomac, Maryland.

HUDSON-SMITH. Mrs. Virginia Ludlow Hudson was married to Donald W. Smith, FSO-retired, on November 25, in the Chevy Chase Methodist Church, Chevy Chase, Maryland.

LAYTON-BUCHSBAUM. Roxanne B. Layton was married to FSO Norman R. Buchsbaum, on January 1, in Pikesville, Maryland.

MITCHELL-BOUGHTON. Priscilla Ellen Mitchell was married to FSO James Herbert Boughton, on October 22, in Washington. Mrs. Boughton served in the Foreign Service, with the Peace Corps and is presently with AID. Mr. Boughton is a Foreign Service officer in the Department of State.

SMITH-KING. Josephine M. Smith was married to Spencer M. King, on November 19, at St. David Episcopal Church, Washington. Mr. King is Deputy Inspector General, Department of State.

WEST-HARRIS. Mrs. Mary Mateer West was married to Reed Harris, USIA, on December 27, in West Chester, Pennsylvania.

Births

LUSKEY. A daughter, Ann Keating, born to Mr. and Mrs. E. Joseph Luskey, on November 26, in Washington. Mrs. Luskey is the former Charlotte K. Kidder.

Deaths

DAVIS. Benjamin H. Davis of the office of the legal adviser, Department of State, died on November 28, in Washington. Mr. Davis joined the Department of State in 1950.

DOOLITTLE. Hooker A. Doolittle, FSO-retired, died on November 28, in Tangier. Mr. Doolittle entered the Foreign Service in 1917 and his first post was Tiflis. In 1921 he organized the evacuation of American citizens from Russia. He later served at Madras, Marseilles, Bilbao, Ontario, Tangier, Rabat, Seville, Cairo, Tunis and Lahore. He was appointed United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for Indonesia with the personal rank of minister. Mr. Doolittle retired in 1950 to live in Tangier where he served as a member of the Legislative Assembly for the International Zone of Morocco until it was dissolved in 1956.

DUNN. Dr. William Edward Dunn, retired political and economic expert on Latin American affairs, died on November 18, in Dallas. Dr. Dunn served at Lima, Buenos Aires, Guatemala City, Bogota and Santiago and as political adviser on Latin America on the U.S. delegation to the UN before leaving the Department in 1950.

HORNBECK. Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, former Ambassador to the Netherlands, died on December 10, in Washington. Dr. Hornbeck served in the Army in World War I, then on the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris. He entered the Department of State in 1921, served as chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs from 1928 to 1937 and until 1944 was an adviser on political relations. He was appointed chief of the US Mission to the Netherlands in 1944 and later became Ambassador. He retired in 1947.

MESSERSMITH. Mrs. Marion Lee Mustard Messersmith, widow of Ambassador George M. Messersmith, died on November 16, in Mexico City.

NEW AFSA OFFICERS

FOY KOHLER's career proves that it is still possible to specialize and yet remain a generalist in the Foreign Service. While he can clearly be called a Soviet expert, he has also served in a wide variety of substantive and geographical positions. His 35-year career, which led him most recently to appointment as Deputy Under Secretary of State, has included such varied positions as advisor to the United States member of the UNRRA Council (1944), Secretary-General of the Allied Mission to Observe Greek Elections (1946), Director, Office of International Broadcasting (Voice of America) (1949-52), member of an International Cooperation Administration evaluation team (1956-58), Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (1959-1962), and Head of Berlin Task Force. His service abroad has included assignments in Bucharest, Athens, Cairo, Ankara, and culminated in the four-plus years just completed as Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

As the Secretary said during the swearing-in ceremony on November 29, Foy Kohler is the kind of person you like to find beside you in the diplomatic foxholes. His service in laying the groundwork for Greek war relief and of the Allied Mission to Observe Greek Elections immediately after the war, in directing the Berlin Task Force during the crisis there, and in presiding over the Embassy in Moscow during the Cuba missile crisis and the war in Vietnam bear testmony to the Secretary's description.

As his many friends can testify, Foy Kohler has maintained an active interest in the Foreign Service and the Foreign Service Association throughout his career. During the war, while on an earlier tour in the Department, he served on the Board of the Association and is very much looking forward to his work there again.

OUTERBRIDGE HORSEY was born in New York City in 1910. He was educated at Buckley School in New York; Downside School in England; Cambridge University (B.A.) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (S.B.). He worked for the New Deal in Washington from 1934 to 1936; and in engineering for one year. He entered the Foreign Service in 1938 and served in Naples, Budapest, Belgrade, Lisbon and Madrid. From 1945 to 1948 he was Spanish-Portuguese Desk Officer,

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The JOURNAL also welcomes letters to the editor. Pseudonyms may be used only if the original letter includes the writer's correct name. All letters are subject to condensation.

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and was then assigned to the Embassy in Rome. He returned to the Department in 1956 for three years, being Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs for the last year, and State Department Member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States and Canada. In 1956 he was assigned as Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission at Tokyo and, after two and one-half years, went to Rome in the same capacity. He served as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia from 1963 to August 1966 and is now assigned to the Board of Examiners of the Foreign Service.

He married Mary Hamilton Lee of Baltimore and they have four children.

AFSA'S NEW BOARD MEMBER

HERMAN POLLACK was born in New York City on October 22, 1919. He is a graduate of the City College of New York and holds a Master's degree from George Washington University. In 1940-41, Mr. Pollack was a Fellow in the Department of Government at CCNY.

Mr. Pollack began his Government service career in 1941 with the Office of Price Administration where he served in a variety of assignments in the personnel field. Following a period of service in the US Army, Mr. Pollack served briefly with the War Shipping Administration and the Foreign Economic Administration.

Since October 1946, Mr. Pollack has served with the Department of State. Among the posts he has held with the Department are: Deputy Executive Director and Acting Executive Director, Bureau of European Affairs; Executive Assistant, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration; Director of the Management Staff; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Personnel. He attended the National War College in 1963-64 and was appointed Deputy Director, Office of International Scientific Affairs on September 13, 1964, and Acting Director on January 1, 1965.

PHOTOGRAPHS AND ILLUSTRATIONS FOR JANUARY

Robert Sivard, USIA, "Russian Bakery," cover.

Peter Nicastro, FRPS, photograph of Ambassador Horsey, page 2.

Szpilki (Warsaw), cartoon, page 19.

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), cartoon, page 20.

Library of Congress, illustrations, pages 27, 28 and 30.

Xenia Barnes, photographs, pages 39 and 40.

S. I. Nadler, "Life and Love in the Foreign Service," page 37. Photograph of Ambassador and Mrs. John D. Jernegan at the fica market in Oran, taken by USIS.

Major Thomas J. Hogan, photograph "Teltow Canal," page 43.

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WITH OUR CONTRIBUTORS

XENIA BARNES is the wife of FSO N. Spencer Barnes, who was chargé d'affaires of the American Legation in Budapest in October of 1956. Born in Russia, Mrs. Barnes left after the Revolution and lived in Paris for several years. Mr. Barnes' assignments have taken them to Moscow, Tehran, Berlin, Budapest, Geneva, and Tel Aviv. They have also traveled extensively in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Mrs. Barnes' photographs have appeared frequently in the JOURNAL and three of the illustrations with her article are from her camera.

THOMAS B. LARSON, author of "A Diplomat in 16th Century Moscow," began picking up books about early travelers to Russian when he served at the Embassy in Moscow in 1950-61. After many years in the Department and Foreign Service he retired in 1966 to return to academic life. He is now a Senior Fellow in the Russian Institute and Lecturer in Public Law and Government at Columbia University.

JOHN H. HEDLEY's special interest in Soviet European policy dates from an Army tour of duty in Berlin, where he was an editor of the Berlin OBSERVER, weekly newspaper of the Berlin Command. Since then he has earned a Ph.D. at the University of Missouri and has taught there and at the University of Tulsa as assistant professor of political science. Now on leave of absence, Dr. Hedley is doing research in the Washington area, a result of which is the article on "Problems and Prospects of Russia's Rapprochement with France," page 18.

CHRIS ARGYRIS is Chairman of the Department of Industrial Administration at Yale University. His educational file lists a B.A. in Psychology, M.A. in Economics and Ph.D. in Organizational Behavior. His wide experience in organizational problems includes service as a consultant to NSF, the Ford Foundation, HEW, the Department of State and other government agencies. He is a member of the Advisory Group to the Secretary of State on Foreign Affairs Programing (the Hitch Group).

Dr. Argyris' study, on page 41 of this issue, is a condensation of a preliminary report written for the Department of State. It is an outgrowth of his experience as a consultant in the Department's Action for Organizational Development Program (ACORD). The author has written extensively on the subject of organizational effectiveness. His latest books are "Integrating the Individual and the Organization" (Wiley, 1964) and "Organization and Innovation" (Richard Irwin, 1965).

ROBERT SIVARD of USIA is the JOURNAL's cover artist for January. The Russian bakery scene was painted when Mr. Sivard was in Moscow negotiating for the 1959 exposition there, which resulted in the "kitchen conversation." Sivard's paintings are well known in this country and overseas, through exhibits at the Midtown Galleries, New York, and various other galleries, and articles and reproductions in TIME, HORIZON and other publications. The JOURNAL has also featured Mr. Sivard's work from time to time in black and white. Mr. Sivard, now art director for USIA with the special objective of improving the graphic output of the Agency, will have a one-man exhibit at the Philadelphia Art Alliance beginning February 22.

DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, whose diagnosis of future developments on the planet are given in précis form in this issue, has devoted his whole career to world politics with emphasis on the evolution of the world of the Soviets. He was born in Poland in 1928, came to the United States in 1938 and became an American citizen in 1958. At the present time he is a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, on leave from Columbia University.

INDEX TO ADVERTISERS—JANUARY, 1967

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New Members Swell AFSA Ranks

OVER 1300 NEW MEMBERS joined AFSA in the fall membership drive just concluded. The gain of over twenty percent in organization strength was directly due to personal canvassing of potential candidates by AFSA members around the world.

Roughly three-quarters of the new members are stationed abroad, according to preliminary analysis of the returns. AFSA drives in most contries were handled by membership committees, with additional aid coming from constituent posts. Because of this widespread network, the listing of membership chairmen below covers only a portion of those who contributed time and effort to the campaign.

In Washington, a large group of AFSA members in the Department, AID, USIA, ACDA and the Peace Corps encouraged new memberships by personal talks with potential candidates. Those listed below were assisted by other AFSA members whose names did not filter back to the membership committee.

Space does not permit a complete description of how the membership drive was mounted in various locations, but some of the flavor of the campaign can be seen from these reports from a few campaign chairmen abroad. Richard L. Jackson from Mogadiscio sent in 58 new applications, and relayed the interest of new members in the benefits of AFSA membership. By sending in 20 applications from Asunción, William B. deGrace noted that almost every officer in the Foreign Service and USIS there is now a member, though the drive in AID was not quite as successful.

Sofia personnel reacted so rapidly that there was no time for a drive, reported Hans N. Tuch; all eligible were either members already or joined when the drive was first announced. By signing up 14 new members in Tegucigalpa, Edward C. Brooks, Jr. used up his supply of application forms and requested more. Andrew J. Mair at Kabul, with the help of Robert W. Wiley of AID, picked up 51 new members, more than doubling membership in Afghanistan. From Buenos Aires, Donald C. Leidel reported 23 new applications, plus a plan for continuing efforts to encourage new personnel to join the association.

AFSA records show the following heading drives in the field:

AFGHANISTAN, Kabul: Andrew J. Mair

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25 YEARS AGO

JANUARY, 1942 IN THE JOURNAL

by HENRY B. DAY

Supplement

Two more accounts of Pearl Harbor Day have come in. The Honorable James K. Penfield, our Ambassador to Iceland, was at that time in charge of a Consulate in Godthaab, Greenland, which he had opened in the summer of 1940. His story follows:

> Sunday, December 7, 1941, was a typical winter day in Greenland. A houseguest, the Swedish engineer who ran the cryolite mine in South Greenland, had been scheduled to sail on the last boat of the season the day before. As usual on such occasions, the omnipresent and often omnipotent wind had stopped all work in the harbor and the sailing had been postponed. So we spent the day walking around Godthaab, or more accurately, pushing our way around against the wind, visiting and having coffee with friends.
>
> Between 6:00 and 7:00 we returned to the Consulate with a couple of other guests for dinner and while I was organizing the cocktails my Swedish houseguest sat down at the radio and started twisting the dial. Suddenly I heard an explosion of mixed English, Danish and Swedish. I finally made out the words ". . . bombed Honolulu this morning."
>
> After the first shock of amazement had worn off, my three guests, a Swede and two Danes, shook my hand, formally but with great warmth and feeling, and wished my country well. Dinner was somewhat delayed while we remained glued to the radio. But several hours of effort netted us not much more news than the bare statement that Honolulu and Pearl Harbor had been bombed.
>
> Later that night I accompanied my guest on the half hour slog to the harbor and saw him safely aboard his ship for an early departure the next day. On the walk home with the wind at my back, I attempted to put my thoughts together and before I went to bed made some notes which I have just unearthed.

It is necessary to compress his notes into a digest:

> My first reaction was a tremendous feeling of relief that the die had finally been cast, "now we can really take off the gloves and not have to grin and bear it when we are shouldered into the gutter. . . . It looks like a dramatic national hara-kiri . . . but the trouble is that the more sensible ones will probably get back in the saddle in a few days and then it'll be a long war. . . . The Russians just might try a winter push into Manchuria. . . . I imagine the Japs will go into Siam and then take Burma, which would probably be no great task and would give them the oil they presumably need. From Siam and Indochina they could lay siege to the Philippines and then next year try to crack the Singapore nut."

The Historical Adviser of the State Department has a flag which Brigadier General F. P. Munson, U.S.A. (ret'd), sent in. In December 1941 he was Assistant Military Attaché in Peiping. As a Japanese language expert he had been left behind when the other Americans in his office were sent to Hong Kong and Chungking. His story about the flag is this:

> At about 0600 on the 8th of December, I was taken by Japanese military automobile to the US Marine compound

Volumes For Scholarships

AAFSW

THE sixth annual used-book sale for the benefit of the American Foreign Service Scholarship Fund and organized by the Association of American Foreign Service Women was held this year in the State Department on October 24, 25, and 26. It was bigger and better than ever, and cleared approximately $11,000.

This figure, more than 50 percent larger than that earned last year, represents the triumphant conclusion of months of work by scores of AAFSW members under the energetic chairmanship of Mrs. Robert Woodward and Mrs. H. G. Torbert, Jr. These ladies had a full dozen committees working under them collecting books, stamps, records, posters and paintings; sorting, pricing, packing and storing all the donations; finally hauling, arranging, and displaying them for sale and, of course, actually selling them. Each of these steps took an enormous amount of time and effort. (And the brain sometimes wearied under the strain: a book about the Holy Roman Empire was found in the Religion section. "Gulliver's Travels" turned up, of course, in the Travel section.)

At the sale there were sections specializing in books on History, Political Science, Travel, Religion, Foreign Languages, Fiction, Children's books, Collector's items. There were stamps and records, paintings and posters. There were also desks where distinguished authors autographed copies of their own (new) books, some of them hot off the press.

No one knows how many books were handled. There were more than 900 heavy cartons of them, containing certainly well over 25,000 volumes. There were more than 1,000 posters, hundreds of prints and paintings, plus tons of foreign stamps.

All sections of the fair carned more money than ever before, but the stamp, poster and art sections made particularly large gains over previous years. The stamp section, which was new last year and made about $100, earned more than $1,000 this year. The posters also brought in over $1,000, and the art section nearly the same.

When the doors were closed and the last customers departed, bent under their loads of books ("all you can carry for a dollar" during the last hours of the sale), the remaining books were given away. Most went to Mrs. Kathryn Lumley, supervising director of the Reading Clinic of the District of Columbia schools, for use in her work. The books left on Religion were given to an especially helpful State Department janitor, who had expressed an interest in them for his church.

The AAFSW wishes to thank all its many helpers, not only the women volunteers, but their husbands and children and friends who pushed and hauled and carried donations throughout the year. One strong twelve year old worked all day for four days before and during the sale, and refused any pay for his help. The State Department General Services Division also was most helpful in providing work and storage space and in helping with the arrangements for the sale. ■

in the Embassy to interpret the Japanese demand for the surrender of the Marine garrison. The conversation took place between Colonel Ikegami (IJA) and Colonel William Ashurst (USMC). In order to give the Marines as much time as possible, we got Colonel Ikegami to agree that Japanese troops would not enter the Embassy and Marine Guard Compounds until 1300 that date.

At the end of this conference I was taken by Japanese automobile to the Military Attaché office, and I noticed that of course the gateman had as usual raised the flag. The Japanese had placed a machine gun manned by a corporal and two privates directly in front of our office gate.

At 1300 the US flags were lowered from the flagpoles in the Embassy and Marine Guard compounds, but I had no intention of lowering our flag until 1700, which was the standard time. During the afternoon the Japanese soldiers pointed to our flag and I could hear them discussing among themselves why it had not been lowered, but they made no attempt to enter the wooden gate to the office. At 1700 I went out in the compound and saluted while the gateman lowered the flag which he then gave to me. This ceremony was witnessed by Mr. H. B. Howard, a State Department Foreign Service Language Officer.

Later in the war, after returning on the *Gripsholm,* Munson was assigned with the rank of Colonel to the South Pacific Command and served as Admiral Halsey's Chief of Intelligence. Now he lives in Washington and works on projects of the Special Operations Research Office of American University.

The Golden Years

Those who are in or near retirement will perhaps be interested in the book "Foreign Retirement Edens" by Martha Ligon Smith (Naylor Publishing Co., San Antonio). Martha Smith is the wife of Jule B. Smith, FSO-retired, whose Foreign Service began in 1930. They served in Bucnos Aires, Prague, Warsaw, Copenhagen, Barcelona, Managua, London, and Budapest. After retiring, the Smiths lived in the Canary Islands, Mallorca, and Mexico. They are now in Fort Worth, Texas. In her book, which was scheduled to appear in December, Mrs. Smith sought to paint a realistic picture of problems of retiring and living abroad and to influence people to ascertain conditions in the towns they like before they decide where to live.

Mrs. Smith underwent surgery early in 1964 for a slowed-down heart. Doctors implanted an electrical device with wires that send impulses to the heart to keep the beat normal. When the batteries run down they will have to be replaced in another operation. Meanwhile she is revising another book she has written about her experiences abroad.

Among seniors who reminisce at California gatherings are the Honorable Louis G. Dreyfus, who began as a Consular Assistant in 1910, Samuel Sokobin, Student Interpreter, 1914, and Arthur C. Frost, Consul, Class 8, 1915. Arthur Frost recalls that the salary of the first two positions was $1,000 with the prospect of slow promotions up to $1,800, after which they might wither on the vine unless by rare skill, luck or Senatorial favor they became principal officers. One Richard Westacott in London stayed at $1,800 until in the fulness of time he died at his post.

Arthur Frost recalls a story of two visits of Lord Halifax to a town in Canada. The first was before World War II. He told a delegation he did not think Hitler would push the button. The second was after the war. A member of a delegation seeing him off at the station bore down on him with reminders of his prediction. As the train pulled out, Halifax looked the man over impishly, brightened and cried back, "But I did say there was a button."

Joseph Wiedenmayer, writing from the Alexander Graham Bell Association for the Deaf, Inc., in Washington, D. C.,

where he is Special Assistant, suggests to the JOURNAL that it publish briefs on the second careers of Foreign Service personnel now earning salaries in new occupations. This column would like to report activities of such retired people who are not of a retiring disposition. The Association where Wiedenmayer works was founded in 1890 to promote the teaching of speech and lip-reading to the deaf.

A daughter, Jacqueline, was born on January 14, 1942, at Guatemala, to Mr. and Mrs. Philip Raine. Jacqueline finished at the University of California with a Political Science Major, then took her Teacher's Certificate, and is now teaching in San Leandro, California. She visited her parents this summer in Rio de Janeiro, where her father is Deputy Chief of Mission with personal rank of Minister. She also visited her old Alma Mater there, the Escola Americana.

ELEGY TO DULLES

Flags dip at Paris and San Pedro Sula
And the evening sky flashes then in heat-lightning.
The funeral-goers gone, the flags or staffs invisible
Until again sun lights the Monument, the hills and buildings and day-busy offices.
The world spins fast into the future.

Songbirds sang in Paris trees
And you learned world's rationale and root,
On Chaos' eve, while random fortunes
Philistine or evil
Crucified or starving
Turned nations bloody red.

Crossing the country from Kampala now
In a dark continent,
Or threading one's way on foreign bus-lines
In strange cities,
Or leisurely looking at atlas maps,
Reality strikes: the world is round
And somehow ideas, like Indians to America,
Go round the world and come out here or there
Declaiming desert language to cold mountains;
That is, like the squat strangers
Who scourged the Rhone on ponies
Killed half the valley peasants
Died themselves of influenza
And mixed in the mire of fathers and fairy-tales.

Am deity tellurian, and tell
By a mockingbird who sings in May at one a.m.
That all these unknown quantities
Of spring, invention and flight
Portend new grief in Kolyma,
Increasing struggle at Luanda,
New nuances of wise doctors at Lausanne

While you lie deep and rest, past pain,
And summers, dreamers blaze and burn.

—P.S.B.

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

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JOHN H. HEDLEY

Problems And Prospects Of

RUSSO-FRENCH rapprochement heightens speculation about an entente between the two powers that would profoundly alter the character of Europe. However remote the likelihood that this is about to occur, events now unfolding presage the most dramatic period in the Continent's postwar history. Despite the divisive effect produced by President de Gaulle's moves in NATO and the euphoria in Franco-Soviet relations created by his tour of the USSR, Moscow is doing little more than probing at this stage of the drama. The Russians are weighing risks rather than rejoicing at prospects. They view de Gaulle's initiative with cautious approval, but are aware that it sets off a process of maneuver and discussion which scarcely has begun and which can have a variety of outcomes, not all of them favorable to Moscow. The dialogue with Paris is well under way, however, and portends as it progresses a fundamental re-examination in many capitals of the broad and increasingly contentious question of European security. Moscow is testing the possibilities of movement with France, but is keeping a watchful eye on Washington and Bonn, for it is there rather than in Paris that the denouement will appear.

Russian rapprochement with France under de Gaulle is a comparatively recent development, and remains more a matter of form than of substance. It has proceeded rapidly, however, since Franco-Soviet relations reached low ebb in 1963, the year in which Paris signed the Franco-German Treaty and refused to sign the Moscow Treaty limiting nuclear testing. Early in 1964, improved relations between Moscow and Paris were set in motion by a series of high-level visits that began with a trip to Russia by France's finance minister. He was well received in Moscow and his trip there was followed in rapid succession by visits to France by Soviet officials including Presidium member Nicolav Podgorny and Nikita Khrushchev's son-in-law, Aleksey Adzhubei. A growing interest in France became evident in the Soviet press, which praised French policies on the United Nations, the proposed NATO multilateral force and the Oder-Neisse frontier. Russia sent warm greetings to de Gaulle on the 20th anniversary of the liberation of Paris and the 40th anniversary of the establishment of Franco-Soviet diplomatic relations. In the autumn of 1964, the USSR and France signed a long-term trade agreement for 1965-69 which provided for a 45 percent increase in trade.

The trend toward rapprochement was given impetus early in 1965 by Franco-Soviet agreement to work together on the SECAM color television system, an undertaking described as symbolic of new opportunities for practical cooperation between European countries. Russian commentators, heartened by the deterioration of Franco-German relations, spoke optimistically of Franco-Soviet rapport. Moscow demonstrated its desire to raise the level of its dialogue with de Gaulle by raising the level of its diplomatic representation in Paris with the appointment of Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin as Ambassador to France. The Soviets spared no opportunity to stress the similarity of French and Soviet views on major international issues. Despite the absence of any substantial developments in relations between the two powers, the atmosphere surrounding their growing contacts was filled with expressions of cordiality. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Paris at France's invitation, and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, on his visit to the USSR in the fall of 1965, was received by his hosts with unusual warmth.

The far-reaching implications of Franco-Soviet rapprochement were given a new dimension this year by de Gaulle's long-rumored decision to withdraw from NATO military commands and to renegotiate bilateral accords on American military facilities in France. The Soviet reaction thus far is characterized by continuing efforts to court France and to foster the belief that better Franco-Russian relations can enhance the prospect of new security arrangements for all Europe. Soviet propaganda refers repeatedly to the "realism" in French foreign policy and to the "inevitable" break-up of NATO in view of the "unrealistic" basis on which the alliance is founded—the "myth" of a threat from the East to which "only the Bonn revanchists" continue to cling.

De Gaulle's initiative undoubtedly pleases Moscow with its immediate effect of highlighting disagreements within the Western Alliance. It costs the Soviets nothing to encourage de Gaulle to believe that cooperation with Russia can vindicate his grand design for a Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals," free from United States hegemony and the threat of war. It costs them nothing to revive the well-worn idea of a European security conference as a means of testing and exploiting the effect of his divisive role in the West. It is another matter, however, to find in de Gaulle's moves the prospect of fulfilling Moscow's long-term strategic objectives in Europe. Soviet interests obviously are much broader than the establishment of a bilateral relationship with France, and Moscow has no illusion that essential problems of European security—the German question in particular—can be settled without the United States.

Russia's Rapprochement With France

The practical results produced to date by the much-heralded Franco-Soviet harmony are not of major consequence. Their bilateral cooperation in the fields of science and space, although publicly touted by each partner, essentially is atmospheric in nature. And it is to just such available areas of agreement that Franco-Soviet cooperation has been confined. They provide dramatic effect, as do the pomp and ceremony of state visits. But the impression of progress in the dialogue is more the creation of the participants than the result of actual movement together on substantial matters. Thus far they have glossed over their differences in order to benefit from the portent of their rapport. But while each side understandably is reluctant to move too rapidly toward the moment of truth, the obstructions in the path of entente cannot be obscured indefinitely.

Ironically, that which is most likely to preclude a Franco-Soviet pact that would upset the equilibrium of postwar power arrangements in Europe is at the same time the prime mover of their rapprochement: fear of a Europe under German domination. There is no other attitude that is shared more fully by Moscow and Paris. There would be no other *raison d'être* for a full-fledged alliance between them. Yet thus far they have evaded the fundamental issue of how best to bring their rapprochement to bear on the status of Germany. The full consequences of their coming together can be felt only if the two powers can act jointly on this question and bring others with them. It is precisely on this point, however, that the prospect of entente is most precarious and that rapprochement with Paris is most risky for Moscow.

The handwriting on the wall of NATO headquarters in France. Szpilki (Warsaw), March 27 1966.

Assuming that neither France nor Russia harbors any illusions about the other, it is clear to each that their present policies on Germany, while similar in motivation and strategic objective, are, in important respects, tactically divergent. Both accept the Oder-Neisse rivers as the permanent boundary between East Germany and Poland. Both firmly oppose West German access to nuclear weapons, and fear a strong bilateral alliance between Washington and Bonn. But Moscow, in its praise for de Gaulle's position on the border question, conveniently has played down the fact that he continues to link final settlement of it with German reunification. Moscow maintains the oft-repeated doctrine that reunification is a matter to be left to the "two German states," while well aware that de Gaulle refuses to recognize East Germany as a state. And while de Gaulle envisions an eventual elimination of the postwar divisions of Europe, the Soviets stand by the status quo.

In its public comment on French trouble-making in NATO, Russia has reacted favorably but has refrained from direct, unequivocal approval. It is no secret to the Soviets that the French initiative is an inconclusive development in terms of possible Soviet gains, and they have indicated as much. *Izvestia,* for example, has described de Gaulle's demands as "modest," and noted that France has not raised the question of disbanding NATO or of withdrawing from the alliance.

The limits within which de Gaulle will conduct his maneuvering are not known. This adds to the host of uncertainties that must be considered as the Kremlin contemplates the long-term benefits to be derived from his initiative. The Soviets cannot help but be concerned about the far-reaching consequences for them that can result from close association with de Gaulle. Thus Russia cannot regard his move against NATO as an unmixed blessing, for it may result in a reduction of American influence to an undesirable degree. Although Moscow long has made

the "Bonn-Washington axis" its *bête noire,* to some extent it welcomes the ties between the two capitals as a restraint on West German "revanchism." Despite their fears that the West German tail will somehow wag the American dog, the Soviets are not likely to look with equanimity upon a total disintegration of NATO and an end to the American role in Europe. They may hope that American disenchantment with European entanglements in time may make attractive to Washington a *modus vivendi* more in keeping with Soviet interests. But in any event, Moscow's long-term strategic interests depend to a significant degree on its relations with the United States.

Rapprochement with de Gaulle quickly can become counter-productive for Moscow if Bonn is the beneficiary of France's growing isolation in the West. Both Russia and France wish to keep the genie of German nationalism in the bottle. Both wish somehow to isolate West Germany. But it is not at all clear that their present rapport can accomplish this to the satisfaction of each partner. Moscow may conclude that NATO was moribund anyway, that de Gaulle already has played his best cards, and that if he tries to go farther he may so isolate France that he will lose the ability to exert influence on Germany and in the Western Alliance. The Soviets may then find that it is Germany and not France that gains room to maneuver. The breakdown of NATO military integration brought about by de Gaulle may open the door to a further buildup of West Germany, including the increased nuclear role that Russia fears most of all. The very fact that Moscow still is playing the game with de Gaulle is the best evidence that the Soviets as yet see no inexorable developments of this kind. But they know they are playing a dangerous game, and that the outcome is far from certain.

Basic stand on foreign policy. Ludas Matyi (Budapest), July 14, 1966.

Moscow probably views the prospects for maneuver opened by French interest in rapprochement, however, as a vindication of its policy of drawing distinctions among NATO members. In accord with its premise that the capitalist alliance is rent by fundamental contradictions, it may look for other NATO states to follow the French moves. An alliance beset by dissension and thus less able to serve the individual interests of its members is likely to lose much of its appeal. Countries such as Greece and Turkey, for example, dissatisfied over NATO's inability to contribute effectively to a solution of the Cyprus problem, might be encouraged to detach themselves. Scandinavian tendencies toward a more neutral position could be accelerated. Russia and France might generate a general interest in the establishment of better relations between East and West Europe through bilateral economic arrangements and all-European talks. The result could be an erosion of the West German position against contacts with East Germany and increased acceptance of the latter as a sovereign entity. Moreover, Moscow may look for the strains in NATO soon to carry over into the tripartite machinery for German policy and make it increasingly difficult for the Western Big Three to coordinate their positions. In the long term, tripartite disunity could render even more remote the chances for German reunification in the framework of four-power responsibility. The combination of these developments in turn might foster within West Germany tendencies toward neutralization and accommodation with the Soviets and even the East Germans.

The nebulous Soviet proposal for a pan-European security conference, put forward at the 23rd Communist Party Congress and reiterated on several occasions since then, probably is a device designed to put de Gaulle to a test and to take a sounding on the effect of his moves in West Europe. It is calculated, in effect, to call his hand, and to determine more clearly both the terms on which he wishes to proceed and how far he is willing to go. At the same time, it is aimed at evoking a reaction from other West European capitals that will indicate the degree to which sentiment may be developing in favor of action outside NATO. By emphasizing its contention that the postwar integration of the West European countries and the influence of the United States on their policies has neither solved Europe's problems nor brought it security, Moscow hopes to elicit a favorable response to the idea of discussing alternative solutions. It may find that the time is not ripe for pressing the proposal in a more definitive form. But even at this early stage, the expressed willingness of the Soviet Union to come to such a conference serves to encourage existing differences in the Western Alliance and the growing belief that the USSR no longer has aggressive designs on West Europe.

Moscow can count on West German resistance to a European security conference, and can point to Bonn's "militarist and revanchist" policies as the rock on which the proposal foundered. The Soviet Union, therefore, can portray itself as respectable and responsive, and suggest that improved and profitable relations with it are possible. It can contrast this image with the one it endeavors to create for West Germany as the only power on the

(*Continued on page* 50)

CHRIS ARGYRIS

Do You Recognize Yourself?

During 1965 I attended three Airlie House management conferences held for Department of State personnel. They included eight Career Ministers, 32 Class I Foreign Service Officers and two Class II FSOs. Seven Reserve officers and three non-career Ambassadors completed the group. The purpose of the conference was to help the participants enhance their competence in dealing with people and managing systems (such as embassies, regional bureaus, functional departments).

During the discussions, the men diagnosed with earnestness and commitment their personal limitations as leaders of people, as well as the problems of the State Department as an organization. The richness of the problems diagnosed and insights developed defies description in a short report. The following is an attempt to bring together some of the major findings as I interpreted them. In order to minimize the inherent limitations in reporting and analyzing such a complex experience, I followed several simple rules. I remained as close as I could to data that was on tape and to which I could refer for illustrations. Only those problems that were validated by the majority of the members have been included. The quotations that describe the problem are taken from several sessions so that they do not represent the views of only one group. Needless to say, I alone should be held responsible for the limitations of this report, since it is my view and analysis of the proceedings.

The skeptical reader might wonder if the data are not distorted because the Foreign Service officers tried to give us those data which they thought would fit within the biases of the faculty. Such a view seriously overlooks the initial resistance of the majority of the officers who openly questioned the value of discussing management problems.

The more comfortable the men became in this new area of examining their behavior and their organization, the higher became their standards of what they would accept as valid. Nothing was left unchallenged.

I hope that the full report, of which this article is a condensation, will provide the basis for the development of further action recommendations from within the Foreign Service. Although it is true that I present a diagnosis of a human social system that seems self-maintaining and somewhat closed, I am very optimistic about action steps that can be taken (and some already have been taken) to bring about effective change, and have appended some recommendations that seem appropriate to me.

Nor do I mean to leave the impression of being condemning, especially of the Foreign Service Corps. I have come to respect deeply the professional competence, personal commitment, and constructive intent of the overwhelming number of Foreign Service personnel with whom I interacted. Indeed, I believe that a major source of strength for the State Department is the Foreign Service Corps. The best evidence for this is in the deep and incisive analysis that the participants helped to develop about their organization.

Introduction

SECRETARY RUSK has told his Business Advisory Council that one of his biggest problems is getting people to accept and enlarge their responsibility. Foreign Service officers have spoken to the writer of their fear of being engulfed by "the system" and simultaneously their resignation about changing it. They questioned the selection and promotion processes, yet when asked to provide a viable alternative, they were unable to do so.

Why does the State Department have such difficulties at the moment when it is being asked to enlarge its administrative responsibilities? Historically, the answers have been diagnosed to be poor organizational structure, ineffective personnel and educational policies. The Herter Study, to cite a most recent and respected example, makes specific proposals for changes in the State Department's organizational structure, the staffing of the Foreign Service Corps, and the education of its members. All these are important suggestions. In my opinion, however, they are destined, at best, to have mediocre success; at worst, failure. If anything, they will probably succeed in increasing the Foreign Service community's fear of another reorganization, their uncertainty of its usefulness, and their feelings of helplessness in preventing it from occurring again. The difficulty does not lie in the recommendations; all of them are relevant and important. The difficulty resides in the fact that the organization will not be able to integrate these recommendations effectively unless the interpersonal milieu is altered.

Why do I make such a gloomy prediction? Because the *living system* of the State Department in general, and of the Foreign Service in particular, is so constructed that it predisposes the State Department to administrative ineffectiveness.

What is the living system of an organization? Briefly, it is the way people actually behave, the way they actually think and feel, the way they actually deal with each other. The living system represents how things are, not only how they

Dr. Argyris, organizational behavior expert, says, "The system . . . tends to reinforce those who have decided to withdraw, play it safe, not make waves . . ."

ought to be. It includes all the relevant behavior that can be observed as people administer each other's efforts in order to achieve the goals of the organization.

The Norms of the Living System of the Foreign Service

Every living system has a set of norms created and maintained by the members. The norms act to make behavior understandable to, and manageable by, the members of the system. Norms may be likened to streets in a community. Once a street is created it acts to coerce people to drive on it rather than on the sidewalk.

Although norms tend to be experienced by the members as coercive, understanding them does not mean that we can explain all the possible behavior. All one can say when one has identified the norms is that he has increased his probability of explanation somewhat beyond chance.

The norms described below were included only when the majority of the individuals agreed that they existed. The criterion for existence was that they had seen people's, their own or others, behavior guided by the norms.

A. *Withdrawal from interpersonal difficulties and conflict*

The first norm cited was the tendency to withdraw from open discussion of interpersonal difficulties and conflict. This withdrawal eventually included *substantive* issues that might, if discussed forthrightly, create conflict or interpersonal embarrassment.

A: If I sense that I am not getting through, if the other person has his hearing aid shut off, I find myself feeling irritated. Then, I quickly sober down and begin to calculate how I can get through. I find out his weaknesses by talking with others. I may seek a third party who might be held in higher esteem and who might get my message across to him. I may hold off until I can have a particular meeting held in which he has to listen.

B: Let me cut you off and add when I use that I usually see to it that the right people are invited so that the weight of unanimity of opinion hits him . . .

C: Yes, but I've been on the receiving end of such meetings and could sense they were loaded so I mistrusted what was going on. I therefore asked more time to study the issue.

D: Come on, now, do all of you mean to say that you wouldn't confront the man directly?

E: Well, if he is a very close friend, I wouldn't mind . . .

B: Like hell! Let's admit it—we rarely even confront our very close friends if we think they're turning us off.

B. *Minimum interpersonal openness, leveling and trust*

The second norm may be characterized as *not* being open about *interpersonal problems or substantive issues that can be threatening to people, especially superiors and peers.* The low degree of openness over long periods of time can make it difficult for people to know how much faith to place in what others are saying.

A: If I were to be very honest, I think that one reason I have succeeded is that I have learned *not* to be open; *not* to be candid. Do the powers that be realize what you fellows (turning to the staff) are implying—that we should strive to be more open? That's like asking us to commit organizational suicide.

B: I agree with A. I have experienced situations where I sensed the superior was not leveling. I figured that he was trying to set up either a psychological situation which would predispose me to his point of view, or he was trying to set up a situation where only one conclusion was possible.

C: And what did you say?

B: Not a darn thing—I let him continue.

D: The superior may be doing it unconsciously.

B: In the situations that I recall, it was conscious.

D: How did you know?

B: He was flustered.

C. *Mistrust of Other's Aggressiveness and Fighting*

The third characteristic that dominated the living system was that the appropriate reaction to aggressive fighting or openly competitive behavior was to distrust it and to withdraw from active confrontation.

For example, if someone becomes angry during a meeting, the appropriate behavior is either to pardon him openly (and covertly condemn him); or to see his aggressiveness as an act, a ploy, a conscious role-playing to frighten the others. Unfortunately, such a response tends to make the man who became angry even angrier. This may cause further withdrawal and disbelief, by the majority, of the validity of the individual's aggressiveness. This, in turn, frustrates even more the man who in the first place became hostile.

As these ways of reacting became evident, the men reported that they soon learned to mistrust their own and others' politeness, manifested under stress. After all, if their own politeness was a facade, then maybe this was true of the others.

A: I tend to distrust people who enjoy selling and fighting. I can remember several cases which we lost because they were using these tactics. We resented it.

B: What did you do?
A: Nothing. What can you say—you resent competing and fighting? You know their answer would be, "Well, that's the trouble with you State Department types."
C: This is an interesting issue. X's basic technique is to needle and challenge us so that we can respond. How do we feel about it? Personally, if I may be blunt, I don't like it. I think he is showing a weakness.
D: How can he show strength?
C: By remaining cool, calm and objective.

D. *Withdrawal from Aggressiveness and Fighting*

As one might expect from the discussion above, a norm also exists suggesting that the appropriate response to aggressiveness is to withdraw and to judge the individual negatively but not to tell him. One can imagine the impact of such a response when and if the man who has done the withdrawing is some day in the position of filling out a performance review.

A: I'm one of these fellows that go at things hammer and tongs. I tell you, there's nothing more upsetting than suddenly realizing that the guys I have badgered have no response—just silence.
B: So for you, our silence hurts.
A: It hurts deep.

The Values of the Foreign Service About Effective Human Relationships

All human beings hold certain values about what are and are not effective human relationships. These values are internalized commands which tend to have a strong coercive effect on the way individuals choose to behave. Values are usually learned in early life. The inter-relationship between values and system norms tends to be very high because individuals tend to choose consciously (and unconsciously) those professions and those systems whose norms are congruent with their values.

A. *The substantive side of the organization is paramount*

The most important behavior is related to the substantive activity of the Foreign Service. The management of people and physical resources, the building of a viable management system, are second-class activities.

Important as management may be, it should never be our objective; management, at best, is a tool of substance and should always be subservient to substance.

B. *To be rational is to be effective; to be emotional is to be ineffective*

The second norm emphasized by the respondents is that human beings are most effective when they are rational. They are least effective when they become emotional or permit others to do so.

I must confess to one type of inhibition that I do feel keenly. I do feel inhibited in talking and dealing with personal relationships that involve people's feelings.

People should keep personalities out of their work.

In another context:

When Foreign Service personnel were asked:	*The majority responded—variously:*
1. When disagreement erupts into personal antagonisms, what is the best thing for a leader to do?	1. "Get them back to the facts." "Keep personalities out of the discussion." "Call off the meeting."
2. How they would deal with a briefing officer who goes into irrelevancies.	2. "I would carefully stop him," or "I would diplomatically change the subject."
3. If two responsible officers were polarized on an issue and felt very strongly about it, what should their superior do?	3. "I would have a cooling-off period." "See if I could deal with each a third party to arbitrate and make a decision."
4. If a superior held a position with which the subordinate did not agree, what should the subordinate do?	4. "Be careful about openly disagreeing." "Don't make waves."
5. If an individual is having difficulty because of his behavior as a leader, what should his superior do?	5. Carefully, cautiously, try to point it out. If he does not change, either tell him he must change or remove him; and note it on the man's record.

C. *Effective leaders direct, oversee, control the efforts of their subordinates*

Data to illustrate the third norm was more difficult to obtain. However, when we examined carefully the examples the respondents gave to illustrate their leadership style, it became apparent that they dominated and controlled people much more than they helped people to grow and take responsibility.

When Foreign Service personnel were asked to describe:	*The majority responded:*
1. An effective leader during a problem-solving meeting.	1. One who controls the meeting; keeps it on the track, controls the pace, etc.
2. One of the primary tasks of the leader.	2. To define clearly for the subordinate his goals, objectives, and scope of responsibility.
3. Subordinate's needs.	3. Strong leadership.

It may interest the reader to know that these same values seem to be characteristic of professional people in general and are not peculiar to the Foreign Service.

The Consequences of the Norms and Values

I should like to indicate below how the norms of the Foreign Service officers interact to create certain characteristics within the living system of the State Department that can have significant effects upon the effectiveness of Foreign Service activities, substantive and administrative.

I. *Interpersonal Styles in Confronting Conflict or Threatening Issues*

One way to examine interpersonal styles is to describe two ideal types of behavior (not individuals) whose components are an opposite ends of the continua. These ideal types are analytical categories that have been found useful in studying executives and professional people. Clearly no individual should be pigeon-holed either as a Type A or Type B.

Type A Behavior	*Type B Behavior*
1. Retreating from his own and others' aggressiveness or hostility.	1. Being aggressive with self and others. Competing with others.
2. Refraining from open expression of positive or negative feelings.	2. Refraining from open expression of positive feelings but willingly expressing negative feelings.
3. Refraining from encouraging others to tell him about his personal impact on them.	3. To refrain from asking for information about own impact, but gives such information to others if asked.
4. Emphasizing primarily the substantive, not the administrative activities.	4. Emphasizing both substantive and administrative activities.

5. Accepting dependence upon others, especially under conditions of risk-taking.	5. Resisting strongly being dependent on others.
6. Expressing loyalty by being sensitive to the limits and desires of others. A loyal member should not openly hurt others even in the interests of the organization.	6. Expressing loyalty by being committed to organizational goals. A loyal member can hurt others in the interests of the organization.

A useful way to use these categories is to ask ourselves if people lived in a world whose norms included withdrawal from interpersonal difficulties and conflict, minimum interpersonal openness and trust, mistrust of one's own aggressiveness, and aggressiveness of others, what kind of behavior would tend to be rewarded in the system?. Are there any hypotheses that we can develop as to whether type A or type B behavior will tend to be preferred?

Most of the respondents reported that behavior approximating the characteristics of type A was more adaptive and effective within the Foreign Service's living system, although there was much evidence of individual differences. Also reported were several important conditions under which behavior tended to vary. For example, the respondents suggested that the younger the individual; the further away from Washington; the smaller the embassy (up to a certain point); and then the more informal the embassy, the less the tendency to view type A behavior as competent behavior.

At the moment, the only systematic data available are the comments of the faculty of the conferences and the quantitative analyses of the tapes. The faculty members are unanimous, so far, that the State Department conferences are the most difficult to unfreeze, i.e., to help the participants to learn to be more open, to take risks, and to help others to do the same. They cite as reasons for this difficulty the participants' relatively strong discomfort in talking about interpersonal issues and feelings, in confronting problems openly, in being aware of themselves, in their willingness to be dependent upon the faculty, and in their strong tendency to intellectualize.

If we compare the quantitative results of the analyses made of the tapes taken from three State Department conferences with similar tape analyses from fifty other conferences, we find that the State Department conferences were the most difficult to unfreeze. However, once unfrozen, the members of the best ones tended to move very fast in becoming more open, expressing feelings and taking risks. For example, in the graphs below, A represents a typical industrial top executive group that has learned an above average amount during the conference. Graph B represents the learning curve of the best State Department group scored to date.



Many of the Foreign Service officers believed that type A behavior was more effective in diplomatic relationships. Indeed, many wondered, if one could show a preponderance of type A behavior, whether it was not due to the fact that such behavior was required in diplomacy. This is an interesting point and merits systematic research. To my knowledge there exists no objective anthropological description of how the Foreign Service personnel actually do behave when in a dialogue of diplomacy. Nor are there any studies suggesting that the behavior that may be effective with representatives of foreign countries is the most effective in the management of American Foreign Service personnel.

There are two reasons why I question the belief that type A behavior is the only type that necessarily tends to go together with effective diplomatic activity. First, in the small groups there were some ambassadors who preferred behavior that tended toward the type B ends of the continua. These men were considered to be very effective by their peers and their superiors. Thus type B behavior may be functional to diplomacy. Second, if one analyzes the interesting monograph full of illustrations by mission chiefs of what worked for them to solve important problems ["This Worked for Me . . . ," US Department of State, 1964] one will find some illustrations of type B behavior although the strategy most frequently recommended under stress or in ambiguous situations was type A.

One final point about styles of interpersonal relationships. Since the administrative process tends to be viewed as a second-class process, those in administration tend to feel like second-rate citizens. My observations which require much more systematic research) is that the administrative side tends to be composed of many people who indeed are doing second-class (and in some cases second-rate) work. These people and these jobs tend to be at the lower levels. At the upper levels of the administrative hierarchy there are many dedicated, highly competent, intensely professional individuals. They are committed to making the State Department a more flexible, viable system. However, they feel frustrated, and at times hurt and rejected, because of the second-rate status accorded to them and their function by the majority of the Foreign Service personnel. Under these conditions, it may be that a more B type of interpersonal style is necessary to survive and to get the work done. Thus it may be that, if an empirical study were made, one would find in the top administrative area more behavior approximating the B ends of the continua. It may also be interesting to note that all the political appointees tended to prefer an interpersonal style that approximated more of B than A.

II. *Success and Failure in the Living System*

If we examine the norms and the interpersonal styles we see that there is a remarkably close fit between the former and interpersonal style A. From other behavioral science research we can predict in general that those who prefer type A interpersonal style will tend to feel that they are valued, rewarded and protected by the system. A's will tend to feel that some of the deepest aspects of their selves are confirmed by the system. They will also tend to feel interpersonally competent in the system.

The feelings of being interpersonally competent, valued, rewarded and confirmed will tend to lead those who prefer type A behavior to feel a high degree of (a) personal effectiveness in dealing with people, (b) commitment to the living system of the Foreign Service, and (c) cohesiveness with other Type A's in the Foreign Service.

Turning to the minority who preferred interpersonal style B, the opposite is true. They do not tend to feel that their preferred style is valued, rewarded, protected, or confirmed. They do not tend to feel, interpersonally speaking, very competent. Understandably, they report that they feel little effectiveness in dealing with many Foreign Service officers, as well as little commitment and cohesiveness with the living system. Many feel alien to the norms of the system.

Most Type B's are aware that they cannot adapt by becoming openly hostile toward the norms and the system. This

could mean professional suicide, since most of the rewards and promotions are controlled by Foreign Service personnel who prefer Type A behavior. Consequently, most adapt (1) by seeking to join those departments where there are many others who prefer Type B, (2) by developing contacts outside the Foreign Service Corps but within the State Department, or in agencies outside the State Department, where they can freely be critical of the norms of their sytem, and (3) by striving to change the administrative and personnel policies and practices that, to date, favor the existing norms.

But none of these adaptive activities is adequate. Most of their everyday dealings are with members of the Foreign Service Corps. They cannot run away from them. Moreover, striving to change policies and practices could place them in a negative light in the eyes of the majority of the Foreign Service personnel. This, in turn, causes them to be seen by the majority of the Foreign Service personnel as unpredictable, somewhat unstable, and perhaps a little immature. The B's sense these evaluations and dislike them for two reasons. One, they do not feel they will succeed if they are perceived in this negative light. Two, if they face reality, they will have to admit that they *are* behaving in unstable, unpredictable ways and that under stress they *are* unable to control their behavior. They realize that this violates the norms of effective behavior within the system, as well as their view of effective action.

The pressure to protect the system can easily become so strong that the Type A's unpremeditatedly (and probably unconsciously) look for, seek out, reward and encourage Foreign Service personnel who do not violate the existing norms. Such a reaction can be seen by outsiders as the Foreign Service developing its own inbred club. Since the open discussion of such emotion-laden issues tends to violate the norms of the system, these issues will not be dealt with *openly*.

III. *Unawareness of discomfort with feelings and of one's personal impact upon others.*

In a world where feelings tend to be suppressed, where openness and emotionality are guarded, and where controlled emotionality is rewarded, it is not surprising to find that many of the respondents tended to be blind to their own degree of discomfort with feelings and interpersonal issues as well as their impact upon their subordinates. For example, in the excerpts below, the men explored how uncomfortable they were with the expression of feelings:

A. I felt that in a little sense—B felt more of a sense of personal embarrassment in talking about himself. I wonder, did you feel this way, B?
B. No.
C. No?
B. No.
D. How do others feel about A's views?
E. Well, I think all of us are uncomfortable to a degree, but I think you B are more uncomfortable than the rest of us . . .
B. Then I certainly haven't been communicating!
E. Or you have—but not the messages you wish.
A. I must confess that part of the reason for raising this question is the fear, I guess, that the lesson also applies to me. How can B successfully lead a large group if he causes the kinds of reactions he does here and if he is that unaware of them? How can others relate effectively to him? And if they do not, how can he or I get the best out of our people?
E. This is a good point because I know I would never confront anyone with feelings that I had about him, especially during a meeting.
D. How can trust be built up among people?

IV. *Unintended Consequences of Withdrawal: Guilt and Lack of Self Confidence.*

During the discussions the men became aware that withdrawal from confrontation may be safe organizationally speaking, but psychologically it could have unintended effects. Individuals with the intellectual integrity of the overwhelming majority of these participants are unable to deny to themselves that they withdraw. They may be able to rationalize this withdrawal as the "mature" or "effective" thing to do. But this rationalization cannot remain as an effective defense, especially if the adversaries continue to pressure through more fighting and aggressiveness. Soon the individuals who withdraw have to face themselves. As the men below state, the result for them was a lowering of their self-trust, self-confidence, and in some cases an increasing feeling of personal failure and guilt.

A. This business of withdrawal has impacts that we haven't discussed yet. Take the situation I described yesterday. I was angry. I didn't like what I saw. I felt that the new policy would really harm the Foreign Service. I wanted to fight; I discussed it with my wife; yet I could not bring myself to do this. So I ended up with a feeling of total inadequacy on my part. I not only mistrusted Mr. , I mistrusted myself.
B. I know the problem you are talking about. I withheld information recently because of my too strong sense of hierarchy. Now I realize this is a great mistake. Not communicating ends up giving me a sense of personal failure.
C. It has the same effect on me. It lowers my own acceptance of myself.
D. Someone said recently, "You can affront FS officers and they take it diplomatically."

V. *The system may become all-powerful, beyond the control of its members.*

In a living system dominated by a low interpersonal openness, leveling, trust, confrontation; a high withdrawal, mistrust of aggressive, fighting behavior; and a blindness to the superior's negative impact on his subordinates, it is not too difficult for the system to seem beyond the control of the participants.

A. This system is a jungle. There is nothing more cruel than to bring a man back after 15 or 20 years and throw him in this jungle. We ought to teach him how to fight jungle warfare.
B. In my experience, no one is willing to teach you. Maybe the best way to learn is to be thrown in. You think you've understood the system and suddenly you find you haven't. You try to hit it, change it, yell at it, but it seems to go on, undisturbed and largely untouched.

It is understandable why people soon come to write careful and innocuous memos, "round the sharp corners off the telegrams," "learn not to make waves," "minimize risk-taking," "fear taking responsibility," "play the game," and be careful to never become a bum and always remain a hero.

If one feels so strongly about an issue that he cannot suppress the differences in views, one safe strategy is to polarize the issue and thus delay, as long as possible, the day when it has to be solved (because people are uncomfortable in dealing with emotionally-loaded situations). As long as the decision is delayed, no confrontation will occur. And no decision is made. The longer this lack of confrontation continues, the less each side will be ready to compromise

The situation is even more difficult when we recall that the norms of the culture tend to coerce superiors to appoint impartial arbitrators, who are presumed to be objective, to solve the difficult issues. Thus the protagonists get their irresponsibility and dependence upon their superior confirmed and rewarded.

We have a powerful circular loop, a process within the Foreign Service culture that tends to encourage the partici-

pants to minimize interpersonal threat by minimizing risk-taking, being open and being forthright, as well as minimizing their feelings of responsibility and their willingness to confront conflict openly. This, in turn, tends to reinforce those who have decided to withdraw, play it safe, not make waves, and to do so both in their behavior and in their writing. Under these conditions people soon learn the survival quotient of "checking with everyone," of developing policies that upset no one.

Under these conditions the promotion process will tend to be mistrusted. The mistrust will tend to exist within the subordinate and the superior. Each will wonder if the other is leveling, if the superior is judging the subordinate accurately, if the superior is evaluating people primarily in ways to defend himself. For example:

A: One of the things I find difficult to trust is efficiency ratings. I know, in making them out, I have been careful. Part of the problem is that I don't know how my comments will be used.

B: On top of this is a new problem made painfully clear this week. So many of our ratings are defenses of our own styles.

C: I can tell you I fear the efficiency rating process. I think back that I've had two superiors who prided themselves as being consultative in their approach. I guessed that both said something about me that they felt I might not like. Since both talked about participation, I decided to ask them openly to discuss it. One refused and the second gave the report as he walked out of the Embassy. Neither one of them had the guts to sit down with me in a face-to-face confrontation.

D: I don't think efficiency ratings *per se* are bad. It is the way they are used that destroys trust.

Another consequence of the above is that group meetings come to be less effective. Participants play it safe. The range of ideas before the meeting is by no means reflected in what goes on in the meetings. Also, commitments are made in the meetings which are diplomatically renounced after the meetings. Diplomatic maneuvering is frequent, especially outside of meetings. Indeed, decisions are really made in small meetings outside of the group. The major purpose for the total group meeting is usually to inform people, and to pour "holy water" over decisions already made.

This misuse of the group reduces the members' confidence in its effectiveness and increases their defensive maneuverings and dependence on their superior. Each member of a department focuses more on protecting his department than on making effective decisions. Indeed, men can make reputations as being skillful, articulate, in-fighting Foreign Service officers who know how to present their case so that their group rarely loses a bureaucratic struggle. The criterion for success is now more in terms of bureaucratic politics than the merits of the case. These decision-making difficulties and sluggishness become especially noticeable when different functional groups must work together to solve a particular problem.

I want to emphasize the point made at the outset. This analysis is only partial. It focuses primarily on the causes of problems and says very little about the sources of strengths, especially the professional competence and the personal commitment of the participants. The State Department is not about to collapse, thanks to the excellence of its people.

However, I do not want to gloss over the implications of the analysis. The State Department as an organization may not collapse, but it has, in my opinion, the seeds for its own rigidity, sluggishness, and pathology. I have no precise measure of how deeply the State Department is strangled by the forces described above. I feel confident that the stranglehold is not so strong as to make change impossible. I also feel confident that, whatever the state of affairs is found to be today, things will get worse rather than better unless positive steps are taken.

I believe the Foreign Service personnel are capable of, indeed are desirous of, facing reality and turning their organization about so that it can build upon the capacities of its members and achieve its mission with greater effectiveness.

Recommendations

I began the report with the Secretary's concern that individuals within the State Department were apparently not willing to assume and, when appropriate, enlarge their responsibility. I hope I have shown that these people may have ample reason to hesitate to assume or enlarge their responsibility. Many who have the desire and the competence to take risks and enlarge their responsibility may not do so because they are embedded in a living system that does not tend to reward such behavior. Until the living system is altered it is premature to blame these difficulties upon the individual members. If the living system is altered so that it does reward risk taking and initiative, and if individuals still hesitate to behave in these ways, then we would begin to have evidence that this problem is primarily one of individuals who fear taking initiative and not the system suppressing their initiative.

Recommendation I: A long-range program should be defined with the target being to change the living system of the State Department.

Recommendation II: The first stage of the change program should focus on the behavior and leadership style of the most senior participants within the Department of State.

Recommendation III: Simultaneously with the involvement of the top, similar change activities should be initiated in any sub-part which shows signs of being ready to change.

Recommendation IV: The processes of organizational change and development that are created should require the same behavior and attitudes as those we wish to inculcate into the system.

Recommendation V: As the organizational development activities produce a higher level of leadership skills and begin to reduce the system's defenses in the area of interpersonal relations, the participants should be helped to begin to re-examine some of the formal policies and activities of the State Department that presently may act as inhibitors to organizational effectiveness. The re-examination should be conducted under the direction of line executives with the help of inside or outside consultants.

Recommendation VI: The similarities and interdependences between administration and substance need to be made more explicit and more widely accepted.

Recommendation VII: The State Department's internal capacity in the new areas of behavioral-science-based knowledge should be increased immediately.

Recommendation VIII: A long-range research program should be developed, exploring the possible value of the behavioral disciplines to the conduct of diplomacy.

Let me repeat that these problems, to which my recommendations are addressed, are not unique to the State Department. The encouraging trends, however, are (1) that top executives are interested in reducing these problems in the interests of long-range organizational health, and (2) that knowledge is being generated that can be of immediate and long-range assistance in this challenge. ■

The full text of Chris Argyris' report, "Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness Within the Department of State" and his "Recommendations" for organizational change, will be published on January 21, 1967, by the Center for International Systems Research (O/CISR) of the Department of State. A limited number of copies will be available upon request by writing to: Jene Lyon, O/CISR, Room 800—SA-11, Department of State, Washington, D. C. 20520.

THOMAS B. LARSON

A Diplomat in 16th Century Moscow

As Sigismund von Herberstein approached Moscow on horseback in April, 1517, he met an advance party sent out by the Great Prince of Moscow, Vasily the Third, son of Ivan the Great and father of Ivan the Terrible. A diplomatic contest immediately occurred. Russian protocol required that a foreign envoy should descend from his horse first as a sign of honor to the Moscow prince. This Herberstein refused to do. He was the envoy of Maximilian the First of Austria, the Holy Roman Emperor. As the representative of an Emperor heading a realm which, at least in theory, was far more extensive than that of Muscovy, he was determined not to yield precedence to a man sent by a mere grand-duke, or Great Prince. The official rationale was reinforced in Herberstein's mind by a notorious self-esteem which made congenial the defense of Maximilian's prerogatives. Self-esteem was obvious in a man who could write that "nothing comforts me more than my awareness of being right."

Each on horseback, Herberstein and the Russian representative Khludenev, sent by Vasily, stalled for a time, waiting for the other to yield. Though only 31 years old, Herberstein was a skilled diplomat who was not to be bested easily in a contest of this kind. Feigning a move to dismount, Herberstein quickly resumed his position in the saddle. The Russian had reacted to Herberstein's false move and dismounted. Then, before he could get back in the saddle, Herberstein had dismounted. The Emperor's honor was saved.

At least this is the story Herberstein told, and there is no Russian version of the encounter. Diplomats, to judge from their on-the-spot reports or later memoirs, never come off second-best in contests of wit or will. Ordinary mortals frequently think of the crushing retort or the perfect *mot* on the way home from the party, but the annals of diplomacy record no envoy acknowledging that he was caught without a word—or off his horse.

Herberstein's insistence on priority for Maximilian stemmed largely from a refusal of the outside world to accept the Moscow ruler as a true emperor (caesar or tsar). In fact, the title of Tsar had been assumed for the first time in Russia by Vasily's father, Ivan the Great. Sparingly used by both father and son, it remained for Ivan the Fourth (the Terrible, or, more accurately, Fearsome) to be crowned as Tsar.

The elevation of the ruler's title mirrored the spread of Moscow's ruler over other Russian towns, the famous gathering together of the "Russian lands." However accustomed we are today to Moscow's dominance over "Russia," it has always seemed somewhat puzzling that Moscow came to be the power-center of the Russian state. When Moscow was first mentioned by a chronicler in the 12th century it was nothing but a dusty village, completely overshadowed by better established places such as Novgorod and Vladimir. Muscovy cleverly used the period of Tatar domination to advance its power, and when the so-called Tatar "yoke" was lifted the rulers of Moscow gradually extended their sway in all directions, by negotiation and by force. The process went far with Ivan the Third, of whom Herberstein wrote that he could increase his empire while sleeping. In his reign Novgorod, Tver and Pskov were brought under Moscow's control. Vasily himself added Smolensk on the western flank. It remained for Ivan Grozny to bring the Volga region (Kazan) under Muscovite rule.

Sigismund von Herberstein in Russian vestments given to him on the occasion of his second visit as Ambassador (from a contemporary drawing).

Herberstein's two trips to Moscow, in 1517 and 1526, reflected the quickening of interest that other states, particularly in central and western Europe, began to take in things Russian. Trade expansion played a certain part in this, especially as far as English-Russian relations were concerned. But Herberstein's missions related much more to strategic considerations. This was a period when power-relations were changing rapidly. The Ottoman Turks were pressing into Southeastern Europe, and Maximilian sought to strengthen his ties with Russia as a counter to this pressure. This was in the heyday of Martin Luther, whose growing defiance of Rome engaged both princely and popular support among the northern Germans, thus threatening the role both of Vienna and of Rome. Herberstein himself a few years later (1521) took part in the famous confrontation with Luther at the Diet of Worms, where he was impressed by the crowds that Luther drew. Moscow was becoming stronger. With the decline of Tatar pressure, the Muscovite rulers could push against the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom to the West. While the latter was linked by Roman Catholic ties to Rome and Vienna, Maximilian as Holy Roman Emperor wanted to thwart Polish ambitions to gain control of Hungary, which Maximilian sought for himself.

Maximilian sent Herberstein to sound out both the Polish and Russian rulers about some specific projects. The Hapsburg method of diplomacy focused on marriage contracts, and Maximilian proposed that the Polish King (Sigismund) marry Maximilian's granddaughter and thus be tied to the Holy Roman Empire. To counter the Ottoman thrust Maximilian sought to bring about a truce between the warring Russians and Poles on the basis of their common Christianity, minimizing the difference between the Roman and Orthodox variants.

Originally Maximilian chose the Bishop of Leibach to head the Russian mission with Herberstein as second in command. The wise bishop, however, displayed a positively overwhelming lack of enthusiasm for the journey, and Sigismund von Herberstein eventually replaced him. The Bishop could hardly be blamed. Diplomatically the assignment was difficult if not impossible, as Herberstein was to learn. As to safety and comfort, the prospect was equally unappealing. The traveler to Russia had to face a long overland journey following a route with primitive facilities in a region of severe climate. Security was poor, because the traveler had to thread his way over a countryside where he might be held up by armed bandits if not by warring Poles and Russians.

Travel by sled and skis in Russia (from the German publication, MOSKOVIY, by Herberstein, 1557).

Few envoys organizing for a trip to Russia prepare themselves as seriously as Herberstein did to understand what he was to see and hear. Sigismund von Herberstein had certain advantages. He began life (August 23, 1486) in an Austrian province where a Slavonic language was spoken, though his own family spoke German. He studied this Slavonic language, Wendish or Lusatian, when he went to school at Lomsbach. At the advanced age of eleven his father sent him to school in Vienna, where he entered the university two years later and became a Bachelor of Arts at 16. (For the period this was not so unusual.) Herberstein reported that at the period many students were ashamed of the B.A., but that he was happy to receive the degree. The studious boy responded to the intellectual challenge of the University, which, after a period of stagnation, was flourishing under Maximilian's encouragement. It had 7,000 students, attracted not only from Austria but also from Italy, Holland, Germany and Switzerland. These students were stimulated to independent study in a period when thought was being freed from theological domination, when the classical world was being studied intensively, and when knowledge of the world was being advanced by many explorations. Christopher Columbus had made his first voyage to "America" when Herberstein was six years old.

Favored by a good family position to get this schooling and to make subsequent use of it, Herberstein gravitated toward Maximilian's court. The Emperor used him in military campaigns against the Hungarians and Venetians, but also sent him on a whole series of diplomatic missions, before and after the expeditions to Moscow. In 1516 Herberstein, having become a Knight, went to Denmark on a particularly delicate and uncomfortable task. He was to dress down the Danish King Christian II for his cruel treatment of his wife Isabella, a granddaughter of Maximilian, and break up an affair that Christian was having with another woman. When the Russian mission was formed Herberstein was a logical candidate, in view of his language capability and his proved service to Maximilian, about whom Herberstein once said that he would go with him to Heaven or to Hell.

The Herberstein group left Augsburg in December, 1516, with a Moscow "courier" accompanying the party as far as Grodno. While in Moravia one of Herberstein's companions died, and Herberstein asked Vienna for instructions as to whether or not he should continue to Moscow. The reply was in the tradition of those which cause diplomats to develop incurable ulcers. The Imperial Counsellors said that, with Maximilian absent, they did not know what Herberstein's previous instructions had been, and hence could give him no advice on changes. Herberstein decided to go on.

At Vilna he was warmly received by the Polish King Sigismund. There also Herberstein met some shackled Russian prisoners-of-war, who, in return for 20 gold pieces, gave him advice on the best route to Moscow. They suggested the "middle" route by way of Polotsk, and Herberstein took this route to Novgorod, which he reached just before Palm Sunday. On various pretexts the Novgorodians delayed him for a week while they awaited instructions from Moscow. Finally the party was allowed to leave and, after the

horseback encounter with Khludenev, came into the city of Moscow on April 18, four months after the departure from Austria.

There was, of course, no permanent Embassy residence in Moscow. Resident ambassadors at this period were common only in Italy. The Russians had no permanent missions until the end of the 17th century, though conduct of foreign relations began to be "bureaucratized" in the middle of the 16th century when a Bureau of Ambassadors was instituted by the Tsar. Herberstein's boss, Maximilian, became interested in having resident envoys, because he liked to make innovations and establish new institutions. He was chronically short of money and frequently changed allies, however, two factors which made resident missions difficult.

The Russians assigned Herberstein a residence on the property of Prince Peter Ryapolovsky, and as custom required supplied him with food and drink. Herberstein almost immediately offended his hosts by complaining about the food, and sought to buy fresh fish rather than eat the frozen fish which was provided. As hosts the Russians also expected to have someone present at all of Herberstein's private conversations during his stay in the capital. The practice of eavesdropping was thus early in vogue. While suspicious of all foreigners, the Russians were especially careful of Herberstein, who had just come across battle lines from talks with the enemy Poles. Perhaps to guard against Russian intrusiveness Herberstein did much of his business while walking, a habit astounding to the Russians.

The envoy did little to allay Russian suspicions. Possibly at this time he already had the idea of writing a book on Russia, which was to take form some years later. Herberstein brought along maps of the country, heightening Russian distrust of his motives, and immediately began intensive questioning regarding geographical, economic, legal, and ethnic matters. Later he admitted that it was something of an error to start this questioning on the first day he arrived in Moscow.

Vasily received the envoy on the third day after he reached Moscow. At the welcoming dinner in an *izba* within the Kremlin the envoy from Maximilian made a speech before the elaborate feast began. He celebrated the virtues of peace, which was for the glory of God and the good of Christendom, and reminded Vasily of the benefits that the Russians derived from peace and the evils resulting from war. With slight editing the speeches on the occasion could probably be inserted into the proceedings of a 20th century disarmament conference. Vasily no doubt took this with a grain of salt, not only because Maximilian used force as expedient but also in view of the fact that Moscow's power had grown by use of force as well as other tactics. Noble sentiments aside, the negotiation of a truce had to settle the more pertinent questions of whom it would benefit, what terms it would include, and how long it should last.

A question of greater priority soon arose: For whom was Herberstein speaking? The truce proposed was between the Russians and the Poles, but Heberstein represented neither. The next day when Herberstein continued the discussions with the *boyars* it became clear that the Russians would not negotiate a truce unless Polish representatives were present to make it binding, or as binding as such truces were expected to be. Herberstein tried without success to deflect the Russian demand to bring Polish representatives. He suggested a meeting at the border, but this also was rejected. Finally, he agreed to postpone the parleys until the Poles came, and on April 27 sent his nephew to Poland to request envoys.

Summer came and wore on before the Poles finally arrived. It was then too late, because King Sigismund had begun a new military operation against the Russians. In addition, the over-confident King demanded as a condition of truce the return of Smolensk, earlier captured by Vasily's forces, but the Russians refused.

The diplomatic mission was clearly a failure, as Herberstein confessed. He was dismissed by Vasily on November 19, presented with gifts, and left Moscow three days later on the long return journey.

Herberstein's second journey—nine years later—was commissioned by a new principal, for Maximilian died in 1519. Charles V became Holy Roman Emperor, but Herberstein remained in the service of the Austrian house, now headed by the Archduke Ferdinand, a grandson of Maximilian. Again Herberstein was appointed Number Two on the mission, serving as Ferdinand's representative while the Emperor named as his envoy and chief of mission Count Nugaroli. The two envoys and their party left for Moscow on January 12, 1526, with the same old objective in view, to try to bring about a truce between the Poles and the Russians. Again Russians returning to Moscow went along. This time Nugaroli and Herberstein were given instructions that modern diplomats might envy, i.e., they were entrusted with unlimited power for all cases not covered by their instructions.

As on the trip of a decade earlier, the envoys sought out the Polish King en route to Moscow, but this time the reception was cold. The King was suspicious of their objectives and of the presence of Russians in the party. After making them cool their heels for a while, King Sigismund finally saw the envoys, but asked brutally: "What have your masters to do with the Muscovite, is he their neighbor, or even friend, that they trouble themselves so much about him?" As a further evidence of his displeasure the King did not provide hospitality for the Count and Herberstein, though later he sent money to pay for their "hotel" bill. Herberstein was not lacking in a certain kind of gall, and reminded the King that he owed him payment for his services of nine years earlier in arranging the King's marriage to Maximilian's granddaughter. The King paid, as Herberstein put it, "in good Hungarian gold, like an honest king."

The party left Cracow on February 14 to go to Lublin and then Brest, where the group ran into a fierce snow storm which forced them to improvise a shelter by upturning their sledges. This winter was especially cold in Eastern Europe, so cold, Herberstein later wrote, that bears invaded homes in search of food. The group was stopped near Smolensk by Russians who stalled for time while awaiting Moscow's go-ahead signal. When Herberstein started to leave before permission arrived, his Russian caterer asked why he was venturing into a foreign country without its ruler's consent. He replied: "I am not accustomed to live in the woods like the wild beasts, but under shelter and among men. The ambassadors of your sovereign have passed through my master's kingdom at their own pleasure, let the same privilege be granted to me." This was not the end of delays, however, for the party was held for ten days, each day the Russians promising a start on the next. Herberstein had such difficulty with his Russian caterer, who forbade peasants to sell him food, that he threatened to complain to Vasily and to make the caterer "shorter by a head."

When all the obstacles were overcome the party from Vienna on April 26 finally reached Moscow, where crowds gathered to see the foreign delegates. Similar crowds assembled a few days later when Count Nugaroli and Herberstein were escorted to see the Great Prince. Herberstein saw in the crowds the work of an organizing hand, the Prince seeking simultaneously to impress the envoys with the power of the Prince and to impress the Russian people with the fact that foreign princes sent embassies. Herberstein noted that at Vasily's reception of them on May 1 there was a wash basin and towel placed near the throne. This was supposedly so that the Russian orthodox ruler could wash himself after touching the hands of impure Roman Catholic envoys. He also remarked that whenever Vasily spoke of the Pope he referred to him as the "Doctor."

Vasily the Third

As the objective on this trip was the same as on that of 1517, negotiation of a truce, so the scenario followed that of the earlier visit. Again the Poles were absent, again the Russians refused to talk truce without envoys from the enemy side. Finally, however, the Poles arrived, and the success of the mission was somewhat greater, since on November 5 a truce was arranged, limited to six years. The summer was spent with Herberstein satisfying his curiosity about Russian affairs, and it was only on November 11 that the envoys were dismissed by Vasily to return home in the dead of winter. The departing guests were laden, in the custom of the time, with many gifts, great numbers of furs including sable, ermine, white bearskins and hundreds of cheaper furs. The party included a delegation of Russians being sent to witness the crowning of Herberstein's principal as King of the Bohemians, an event in which Herberstein took part at Prague, where he arrived on February 13, 1527 and reported to Ferdinand.

Like many ambassadors to Russia of more recent times, Herberstein wrote an account of Russian affairs. The original account was written in Latin and published in Vienna in 1549 under the title *Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii*. Not being cursed with modesty, Herberstein prefaced his work with a comment that "these notes upon Russia have been dictated by me far more from a desire to investigate and elucidate the truth, than for the sake of talking." In fact the book was one of the most important sources on 16th century Russian life. It responded to a demand for more information on the power rising in the East, and became a kind of 16th century bestseller. It was published elsewhere both in Latin and in translation in the following years. Herberstein himself prepared a German version, which was not a translation of the Latin text, and this was published in Vienna in 1557. In the 16th century alone there were thirteen editions published of the Herberstein "notes," and all told some 35-40 editions appeared. The Library of Congress has several examples of these 16th century editions, and the Department of State Library a copy of the only English edition, which appeared in 1851-52 in the series on exploration of the Hakluyt Society. This edition quotes on its title page two lines from George Turberville's "Poems on Russia," written while Turberville was in Moscow in 1568 as a Secretary in the British mission headed by Queen Elizabeth's Ambassador, Thomas Randolph. Turberville's advice was positive:

> "Friend . . ., if thou list to know the Russies well,
> To Sigismundus booke repayre, who all the truth can tell."

The Russians themselves showed great interest at a later time in Herberstein's *Notes*, because the envoy recorded material, particularly a judicial code instituted by Ivan the Great, which disappeared from knowledge in Russia (the code was rediscovered in a Russian version in the early 19th century). The first Russian translation of the book was done for the Russian Academy of Sciences in 1748. The translator had a real passion for secrecy: He requested the Academy to keep the book in a "secure place" because of the "many secrets contained in it," this request coming two centuries after Herberstein's book was well known in Europe. Several subsequent translations appeared in the 18th and 19th centuries, including one ordered by Catherine the Great. The account was used by Karamzin and other Russian historians. Perhaps the greatest of Russian historians, Klyuchevsky, paid Herberstein great respect in his book entitled "Foreigners' Accounts of the Moscow State," although he noted that Herberstein accepted as gospel hoary legends that had been passed down from early times, such as that the Russian women wanted their husbands to beat them.

Most of the "Notes Upon Russia" (as the Hakluyt volume is titled) concern geography in a broad sense, centering on a description of the various regions of Russia, the people inhabiting them, the rivers which flow through, the flora and fauna. One Russian translator of Herberstein claimed that he "created the geography of Eastern Europe." Certainly no one prior to that time had collected in one place so much information on the area. Or misinformation. The Austrian author was bound to the ruling ideas of his age, and this is reflected in the book. Following the Ptolemaic geography of the day, Herberstein placed the boundary of Europe and Asia at the Don River, rather than at the Ural Mountains, as later convention has decided. The Don was, according to Herberstein, 80 miles in length! As to Moscow, Herberstein claimed that "if it is not located in Asia, it is at the outermost limits of Europe where it touches Asia extensively." An even stranger error is that Herberstein located Novgorod some 120 miles *South*west of Moscow.

Herberstein's depiction of Moscow in the early 1500's is probably accurate, and he commissioned drawings for his editions graphically showing how Moscow looked. There were 41,500 houses, mostly of wood, in a city which was broad and spacious but dirty. The Moscow Kremlin had already been rebuilt, not for the last time, in brick.

Religious customs of the Russian Orthodox particularly interested Herberstein, who had been asked by Ferdinand on the second trip to inquire specially into church affairs. Herberstein went at this assignment with methodical detail, from a description of a Russian church service he attended on August 15, 1517 (he was rebuked for doing the sign of the cross wrong), to reporting at length the rules of conduct laid down by the Church, in the replies of a Novgorod Bishop to questions put by a certain Cyril.

(*Continued on page* 47)

An account of an exchange program of the 1930's

Doi San in Soviet Russia

VYACHESLAV P. ARTEMIEV
(Translated by Dabney Chapman)

I. Preparation for the Reception of a Foreign Guest

UNTIL the year 1934 there was stationed in Moscow a crack cavalry formation, called "The First Stalin Detached Special Cavalry Brigade."

The Stalin Cavalry Brigade was one of a very small number of privileged units in the Soviet Army. It served constantly as an exhibit for the foreign military attachés and was an ornament of Moscow's annual military parades on Red Square.

As for the selection of officers and men for the brigade, and the quality of the horses and uniforms and other forms of supply, nothing better could have been wished for. There was no comparison whatever between the situation of this brigade and that of other units of the Soviet army. In a word it really was a model "demonstration" brigade, kept simply for the benefit of foreigners, as is the case with many things which are done in the Soviet Union to impress the western world.

The brigade was commanded by Nikolai Ivanovich Tochenov, who was subsequently accused of participation in the plot of Marshal Tukachevsky and was shot, as were a number of other officers from his brigade, in 1937 as an "enemy of the people." The brigade was re-formed, deprived of the name "Stalin" and transferred from Moscow.

While the winter headquarters of the brigade were in Moscow, its summer encampment was some forty miles from the metropolis, near the railway station Kubinka.

Quite unexpectedly—it was in June of 1933—the commander of the 63rd regiment of the Stalin Brigade summoned all his officers to his headquarters and astonished them with a most unusual piece of information. A Japanese officer was to arrive at the regiment and remain for a full year to study the military training of Soviet cavalry. To appreciate the shock effect of this announcement, one must keep in mind the attitude toward foreigners and all things foreign which then prevailed in the Soviet Union. Already at that time, Soviet propaganda inculcated the population with an extreme animosity toward foreigners and toward capitalist states, circulating all sorts of fairytales about them, accusing them of all manner of mortal sins against "the world's one and only socialist workers' state—the USSR." Moreover, any sort of association whatever of Soviet people with foreigners was forbidden and strictly prosecuted. Even those who simply had relatives or acquaintances abroad, and especially if they corresponded with them, were under the secret observation of the organs of state security of the NKVD. Such people were counted among the politically unreliable. In other words, they were "second-class Soviet citizens." And now of a sudden—a Japanese officer to be attached to a Soviet military unit for a full year. This news astonished everyone and excited great interest.

The arrival of the Japanese was expected any day and the order was given to raise the regiment from its first-rate condition to "super first-rate" in the shortest possible time.

Feverish preparations for the reception of the foreign guest were begun. The camp roads were cleaned up, the stables were scrubbed until they shone and intensive drill sessions were conducted for officers and men, to perfect the posture and the march-step patterned after the example of Frederick the Great and that Russian emperor so famous for his exaggerated close-order drill, Paul I.

A few days later, new uniforms, certainly not provided for in the annual budget, were delivered to the regiment. Even the food was improved, well before the arrival of the Japanese guest.

Special instructions were given the officers of the regiment by high-ranking leaders who came out from Moscow. These evoked considerable interest. Instruction was given on various questions which, generally speaking, amounted to the following:

—In associating with the Japanese officer it was forbidden to touch upon politics or enter into arguments or discussions. If the Japanese officer should himself broach a political question, he was to be answered in the same vein in which the matter was treated in the Soviet press.

—It was forbidden to show interest (at the same time revealing one's ignorance) in the way of life, manners and customs of Japan. No interest was to be expressed in the material well-being of the Japanese population, the standard of living, prices and the like. It was feared that that might create in the mind of the Japanese the impression that Soviet officers were ignorant even of such generally known matters. In any case the Japanese would not tell the truth, but would describe everything concerning his capitalist state in an exclusively favorable light.

—Should the Japanese show an interest in questions of habits, material well-being, living conditions, and in general the way of life of Soviet officers and other toilers of the USSR, it would not do to complain of difficulties, to speak of shortcomings and limitations. The Japanese would probably not understand that in order to create a mighty socialist state in a condition of capitalist encirclement, it was necessary to sacrifice private interests to national interests, and that limitations in the style of Soviet life were not indications of the poverty of our country, but reflected rather growing pains attendant on the steady increase of our strength.

—It was categorically forbidden to introduce the Japanese officer to wives or other members of the Soviet officers' families.

—As for the training of the Soviet army, it was permitted to speak on this subject only within the framework of official programs and "unclassified" military regulations.

—In general, one was to avoid conversation and any sort of association whatever with the Japanese officer. In a pinch, it was recommended that his questions be answered, but crisply, laconically and courteously. In no case was it permitted to touch upon the question of the Japanese emperor.

—Should the Japanese attempt to strike up a conversation, one was to try to dodge it by pleading the pressures of duty.

—It was categorically forbidden to accept an invitation to call on the Japanese, not to mention inviting him to call. Should the Japanese extend an invitation to visit his personal quarters, one was to decline, pleading duty, sickness of wife or child, desire to attend the theater that evening, etc.

—One was to avoid taking advantage of the courtesies and favors of the Japanese officer. Gifts were not to be accepted, not even a glass of vodka. Even a proffered cigarette was to be refused.

—Officers were under no circumstances to smoke "machorka" in the presence of the Japanese. "Machorka" was the coarse tobacco which together with newspaper constituted the crude roll-your-own used for the most part even by the officers.

—An order to shave not less frequently than once every two days was announced, and the white detachable collars on the tunics were to be changed every day.

Table manners were taught, too, at these sessions—how to use the implements and other elementary things, which, strange though it may seem, were new and unknown to the Soviet officers.

The officers, in their turn, conducted similar instructive sessions for the enlisted men in their units. This went on for several days. At the same time, the political apparatus conducted for both officers and men its special political sessions, which were directed toward an inculcation of the idea that the Japanese officer was a representative of a bourgeois-capitalist state hostile to the Soviet Union and that despite his modest rank, he was an experienced and skilled officer of the Japanese intelligence who would stop at nothing to obtain the secret information pertaining to the Soviet army which he required.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this was that it was necessary to adopt toward the Japanese officer a posture of caution, suspicion, and concealed hostility, constantly keeping up one's guard. One should be proud, not deferring to the specious advantages of the Japanese and not fawning on him.

All officers were ordered to submit a detailed report to the Commissar of their unit as soon as possible after any conversation with the Japanese.

It is interesting to note some other measures that were taken. For example, the chief of the special section for state security at brigade headquarters and his representatives in the regiments were, in connection with the arrival of the Japanese, renamed "propaganda instructors" and it was forbidden to call them anything else.

It was necessary to designate one officer as full-time escort officer for the Japanese during the entire length of his stay. This fell to the lot of the young "politruk" Popov. He was ordered to introduce himself as a platoon leader and to remove from his sleeves the red star which at that time distinguished the political officers. Popov like everybody else was ordered to forget that he had ever been a "politruk."

Then came the problem of preparing an apartment for the Japanese officer. In one of the villages closest to the camp, some three miles from the regiment, the very finest house was selected and its occupants moved out. The interior of the peasant "izba" was completely done over. A new floor was laid and painted with oil paint, the doors and window frames were painted, the log walls of the "izba" were faced with a veneer of wood and covered with wallpaper, a small dynamo was set up and electric lighting provided, a telephone line was run in and a telephone installed. Furniture was brought from Moscow. In a Soviet village, even in the vicinity of Moscow, this was unheard-of luxury: electricity, telephone, painted floors, doors and window-frames, overstuffed furniture, etc.; a most unusual phenomenon.

Officers living in the village were ordered to move to other villages or to the camp itself.

Last but by no means least, a young and very beautiful girl arrived at the home of the Japanese officer and set about tidying up his future apartment. She had been designated full-time servant for the Japanese.

So passed two or three anxious weeks in preparation for the arrival of the foreign guest.

And then one fine day, the commander of the First Squadron was summoned by his commander to regimental staff-headquarters. In the office, in addition to the regimental commander, were an unfamiliar general, the former "politruk" Popov and a Japanese officer in full parade uniform including saber. The regimental commander introduced the commander of the squadron to the Japanese. The Japanese rose—small, well-proportioned, neat—politely bowed with the smile so characteristic of Asians, extended his hand, and introduced himself: "Captain Doi of the Imperial Japanese Army. . . ."

II. Captain Doi in the Regiment

Captain Doi expressed a desire to spend the first three months in one of the squadrons (in response to this request he was offered the First Squadron); when the three months were up he wished to get acquainted with other squadrons of the regiment and with the work of the staff.

Officers and men observed Captain Doi with great interest and curiosity. Everything about him delighted them: the fine quality cloth of his khaki-colored uniform, the tunic vented at the sides, the golden shoulder-boards crosswise to the shoulders, the superbly tailored breeches with suede at the calf, fancy rear-elevated boots, kid-gloves which he never put on, but always carried in his hand. His light-weight, toy-like saber in its nickel-plated scabbard, from which he was never separated, was regarded with ironic wonder. Everyone was enchanted by his elegant manners and his peculiarly Asian politeness, courtesy and obligingness toward all, including even the enlisted men. The Japanese immediately evoked a profound and favorable impression all around. He was treated with decided respect and was involuntarily imitated, frequently with comical results.

In the regiment everyone called him *"Captain Doi San,"* not understanding that the Japanese "San" meant "mister" and that such a doubling-up of titles was not strictly permissible, though it sounded well to the Russian ear.

The special instructions and warnings in regard to associating with the Japanese were observed strictly and without exception. If Captain Doi approached a group of officers talking among themselves, they immediately broke up and went their various ways. In the officers' mess, where Captain Doi took his meals, no one occupied the tables next to his, and they remained vacant until his departure. A sort of unnatural silence always prevailed in the presence of the Japanese guest, people became taciturn, somber, always in a hurry to get somewhere, even when they had, in fact, nothing to do. Officers' wives who were visiting the camp, upon catching sight of Captain Doi from afar, would turn aside to avoid a meeting.

Every morning Popov rode out to the village where Captain Doi lived and they rode in to the regiment together. Popov accompanied him everywhere, never parting from him for a moment and inventing all sorts of excuses to parry Doi's attempts to visit such places as he was not supposed to visit. He not only closely observed Captain Doi, but also those officers and men who came into contact with him and conversed with him. Popov was required to submit in writing a daily report on the activities and conversations of the Japanese officer, including of course his own conversations with Doi.

Officers who had chance encounters with the Japanese, in order to let nothing escape, however seemingly insignificant, made notes in little notebooks during the day, and, straining their memories to recall all details, wrote their reports in the evenings.

Captain Doi spoke Russian very badly, articulating his words slowly, constructing his sentences with difficulty and pronouncing words improperly. However, a truly astonishing progress in the mastery of the Russian tongue was soon noticeable.

Literally only two or three weeks after his arrival at the regiment, he spoke almost fluently, and after a little while only his accent and his appearance revealed his non-Russian origin.

Soon after his arrival, Captain Doi was asked where he had learned Russian. He answered that he had begun his studies just seven weeks before leaving Japan and that he was counting on supplementing his knowledge of the language through use. It was soon apparent to all that "Doi San" was in fact absolutely fluent in Russian. This circumstance caused trouble for a number of people. In reply to an order from above, several occasions when, reckoning with Doi's ignorance of the language, people had discussed in his presence things he was not to know about, were recalled and written up.

Captain Doi for his part was not long able to maintain the role he had assumed, and, remarkably enough, he even dropped the pretense of continuing to study the language.

Speaking about himself, Captain Doi said that he was a line officer and the commander of a cavalry squadron. When he attended the regiment's training-sessions he was frequently invited to fire a rifle, pistol or machine-gun, to ride the obstacle-course or show his skill at slashing wands with the saber. He invariably declined, offering by way of explanation his ignorance of Soviet weaponry or that he simply didn't feel like it—"Maybe next time." He was finally forced to take up a pistol, and once someone even brought a Japanese rifle to the firing range. Good-natured pressure in a bantering manner eventually obligated him not only to shoot, but to undertake to ride the obstacle-course and slash the wands. All of his attempts to avoid such a test were in vain, and he simply had to demonstrate his "skill."

He was a bad shot and was quite incapable of wand-slashing or overcoming the obstacle-course. At the first jump he almost fell out of the saddle and only managed to save himself by seizing the horse's neck, while his seat in the saddle eloquently revealed that the whole of his horsemanship consisted in the ability to sit, and that somewhat unsteadily. It was obvious to everyone that the Japanese was not the line officer he had claimed to be . . .

A few weeks after his arrival at the regiment, Captain Doi appeared with the insignia of a major. In a happy and exalted mood, he shared with everyone the news of his promotion. The day before, the Japanese military attaché had summoned him to Moscow, informed him of the promotion, congratulated him and presented him with the shoulderboards of a major. From that day forth everyone called him "Major Doi San," persisting in the redundant addition of "San."

In honor of his promotion, Major Doi decided to arrange a banquet at his home in the village, and to invite the Japanese military attaché together with his ranking colleagues. He wished to invite as well all of the officers of the regiment. The banquet was to be the coming Saturday. Everything necessary for the banquet: waiters, foods, tableware, wines, etc., he ordered from the first-class restaurant of the hotel "National," one of the hotels set aside for foreigners. All these things were to be brought from Moscow to the home of Major Doi in the little village near the railway station Kubinka.

Doi San announced his intention to the commander of the regiment, who was thus placed in a very difficult situation—totally unforeseen and extraordinary in the conditions of the Soviet army. Not only was the very idea unusual, but the degree of luxury with which the occasion was to be celebrated in the presence of the Japanese military attaché, with all the regimental officers participating, was simply unheard-of. The regimental commander avoided a direct reply to the invitation. However, he expressed thanks both for himself personally and on behalf of his officers. This seemed to him a matter of no small importance, and so immediately after receiving the invitation, the regimental commander and his commissar rode over to the brigade commander's to report the conversation with the Japanese.

Having heard the report, the brigade commander attached no less importance to the matter. Right away, he called in the commanders of the political section and for state security, and together they began to discuss the invitation. But from whatever angle they regarded the question, they found it impossible to take all responsibility on themselves without informing higher authority and were unwilling to either accept or reject the invitation without concurrence from above. It was impossible to discuss the matter with Moscow on the telephone, as it was too serious a business to be discussed in the clear. A personal report was necessary.

Without delay, the brigade commander and his ranking officers left by car for Moscow: the commander himself to the troop commander of the district, the chief of the political section to the political district staff headquarters, and the commander of the brigade's special section to the NKVD headquarters.

They returned on the evening of the same day, and at once all the regimental commanders, commissars, and regimental representatives of the special section were called together. At this meeting it was ordered that everything possible be done to persuade the Japanese to abandon his undertaking. First of all, one should plead the heavy burden of instruction at the camp and the lack of time for such amusements. He should be advised to postpone the celebration of his promotion until autumn, when summer training was ended and the brigade would return to Moscow. In case he should refuse to be dissuaded and insist on carrying out his plan, then there would be no choice but to agree to attend the banquet, but only on condition that not all of the officers of the regiment be invited. Major Doi should be advised to invite a small group consisting of the senior officers: the brigade commander, the commissar and chief of the political section, the chief of staff of the brigade and the "senior propaganda instructor," as the chief of the special section (NKVD) was called for the benefit of the Japanese. All regimental commanders and their commissars, chiefs of staff and "propaganda instructors" might also be invited. All those present were cautioned to prepare themselves for the banquet and were given strict instructions as to their personal conduct.

Returning to the regiment, the regimental commander, upon meeting Major Doi, said nothing about the decision taken and when Major Doi himself brought up the subject of the banquet, the commander pretended to have forgotten all about it and began to talk about how busy all the officers were, and advised that the banquet be postponed until October. Major Doi would not hear of this and began to insist, saying that a postponement was out of the question, as the Japanese military attaché and his colleagues were already invited. After a great deal of arguing back and forth, a plan conforming to the instructions of the brigade commander was "agreed upon." Doi San keenly regretted that the subordinate officers of "his" regiment would be absent, and stated that if he were to accept that, then he must categorically insist that by way of exception and as his personal guest should be included also the commander of the First Squadron, to which Major Doi was attached. The regimental commander made no further comment . . .

The banquet took place. From Moscow arrived the Japanese military attaché with three of his fellow-officers. Soviet guests were limited to those designated in Moscow. The banquet proceeded noisily and merrily. The initial tension quickly vanished after the first toasts; the guests were in a free and relaxed mood. At the height of the revelry "bruderschaft" was drunk and toasts were proposed to the health of Comrade Stalin and that of the Japanese emperor. Not until the small hours of the morning did the banquet break up . . .

The commander of the First Squadron, however, did not attend the banquet. He had been ordered to take sick and not report for duty. He lay in bed in his tent and beside him on a small table were several vials of medicine and boxes with various powders. Major Doi called on "the patient" and expressed to him his regret and genuine sympathy.

The following day, despite the fact that it was Sunday, a group of high-ranking officers from Moscow arrived at brigade headquarters. They sent for everyone who had been present at the banquet, talked separately for a long time with each one and prepared a written protocol of the questions and answers.

Major Doi was absent for three days—he was in Moscow. Both the brigade commander and the commander of the regiment stalked about grim-visaged and morose, and woe betided the officers in whose units the slightest irregularity was to be found.

III. Major Doi Acquaints Himself With the Methods of Military Instruction

It was all over, as you might say, with military instruction in the regiment and particularly in the First Squadron. It was considered impossible to instruct the squadron in the presence of the Japanese. It was necessary to demonstrate achievements rather than to instruct. The Japanese arrived at the squadron every day between 6 and 8 in the morning and rode away after the evening activities, not infrequently even later, after the strenuous working day of the regiment was ended, taps blown and the troops gone to sleep.

In order to demonstrate to the Japanese the squadron's successes in military achievement, such means as the following were used: Well before the squadron executed an exercise, the terrain was reconnoitered, the location of "the enemy's" ambushes established, all conceivable obstacles spotted, in short, everything that should have been unexpected and unanticipated was predetermined. Both officers and men knew perfectly well in advance where and what they would meet during such exercises and what action they were to take.

The squadron with the Japanese rode out to the exercises and everything went off smooth as silk, which enraptured Doi San.

During practice firing, if the Japanese were present, the results were always excellent. This was arranged by the simple expedient of instructing the soldiers sent out as markers to report better results than were actually achieved. When the Japanese was present the results were never reported as other than "very good" or "excellent." If the firing practice was 35 to 40 percent "very good" or better, under Major Doi's observation the percentage rose to 75-80 percent "excellent."

Once the following incident occurred. The squadron was doing physical training, and the Japanese was present. Through an oversight there was a soldier in one platoon who was not at all athletic. He was not able to perform the most routine exercises, such as the chin-up. He approached the bar, jumped up and seized it and then hung there helplessly, contorting his body and waving his legs. The squadron commander was beside himself. The platoon commander, holding his anger in check with difficulty, anticipating unpleasant consequences, tried to help the hapless fellow, but in vain. After one last attempt to accomplish on the bar that which he had never been able to do, the soldier lost his grip, and sprawled on the ground. The platoon commander could no longer contain himself and swore loudly. The soldiers could scarcely keep from laughing. Getting all flustered and confused, the unfortunate soldier stood before his platoon commander, adjusting his shirt and scratching himself.

Major Doi felt sorry for the fellow. He strode up to him and said, in a tone of sympathy and encouragement, "Never mind, don't feel bad, you'll soon get the hang of it," and, taking out his cigarette case, offered the soldier a cigarette. The soldier in his confusion took a cigarette and accepted a light from Doi's proffered lighter as well.

The platoon commander was prepared to have the earth swallow him up. The squadron commander, restraining his indignation, smiled a stiff and unnatural smile, while Popov, no longer able to contain himself, stepped aside, pulled out his handkerchief as if to wipe his face and laughed into it convulsively. The soldiers looked enviously at the "failure," smoking his Japanese cigarette.

Despite the apparent insignificance of this episode, there were consequences. No sooner had the physical training hour ended than the squadron commander was summoned to headquarters to the commissar's office. There he found the regimental commander as well. Having related his account of the incident, the squadron commander was subjected to a long and unpleasant conversation. How was such an oversight—letting a soldier like that into a formation under observation by the Japanese—possible.

Political conclusions were drawn from the incident—"There is a living example—the Japanese doesn't present cigarettes to the outstanding performers in our military exercises, but he is happy when he discovers a rotten apple."

Notwithstanding this incident, Major Doi received at first a very favorable impression of the training in the squadron and in the entire regiment. He expressed himself in enthusiastic terms when he spoke of training, discipline, and order in the Soviet army. Subsequently, however, as a result of a number of unfortunate unanticipated occurrences in the presence of the Japanese, the scales fell from his eyes and he changed his favorable estimate.

Because of the presence of Major Doi, there constantly prevailed in the regiment a state of nervous tension. The normal course of military instruction was disrupted, the study schedules could not be fulfilled, everything was done for the sake of demonstration only and everyone was preoccupied not with the training of the regiment, but with the setting of stages.

Summer training was drawing to a close. Firing for record and extensive field problems together with other branches of service had begun, in preparation for the big autumn maneuvers.

Doi San really got around; he was always appearing where he was least expected. Majoi Doi began more and more to assert himself vis-a-vis his escort officer Popov and there was simply no holding him back. More than once he expressed his dissatisfaction at being deliberately prevented from informing himself about the things in which he was interested, and once he quite openly and laughingly said to Popov: "What are you trying to hide from me in your regiment?" Frequently there took place incidents which put the regiment in a bad light.

Once the regiment was firing for record in shifts of twenty-four men at a time. The results were indicated by soldiers stationed in covered positions along the line of targets. A telephone line had been run out to the targets. and when the signal was given for a shift to cease firing, the

(*Continued on page* 48)

EDITORIALS

WHAT THE SLIDES REVEALED

In 1965 a trained scientific observer put a smear of Foreign Service officers on several slides and watched them through a figurative microscope. His clinical conclusions appear in a lead article. They are not particularly complimentary. Indeed, they challenge the Foreign Service officer's most cherished illusions of himself. They have angered many who served as his guinea pigs and others who simply do not agree with the style or substance of the study. It is a controversial piece of work; but it should be read by every officer who cares to study what characteristics of mind and habit appear to be endemic, or at least emphasized, in our professional culture.

Dr. Chris Argyris is a distinguished and talented student of human behavior. He has a towering reputation in his academic field and was recently selected by Yale University to head its Department of Industrial Administration. His techniques have been tested widely across our nation and overseas for many years in industry, private groups and government. This is no kooky novelty. It is a serious, carefully worked out approach to the problem of helping executives to deal with each other and with their subordinates and, to some extent, with themselves.

The officers mentioned in the opening paragraph of the article were gathered in groups of 14 to 20 on three separate occasions at Airlie House in Virginia. In this seclusion from office and family calls, they found themselves in an unfamiliar vacuum, without agenda, titles, or the other artificial supports to existence in a bureaucratic life. During the week, in the presence of a "trainer" who refused to give any leadership in the usual sense, the participants developed the theme of their relationships with others, sometimes to unexpected degrees of tension. Not unnaturally, life in the Foreign Service was a central subject in the conversations.

There was absolutely no evaluation of the official files of any individual. The purpose of the training was to increase an officer's own powers to deal with himself and his colleagues. However, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration encouraged Dr. Argyris to draw up impersonal conclusions in regard to the Foreign Service animal as he saw it. This, of course, had to extend into observations of the "living system" in which the animal exists. We are confident that our readers will have reactions to this provocative study. We hope that they will also have sufficient enthusiasm for their views to submit them to the JOURNAL for constructive furtherance of discussion on this important subject. ■

TOWARD A STRONGER ASSOCIATION

It is fitting to open the New Year with a reference to our membership. As a general musters his force before he contemplates an action, so the Foreign Service Association must know its strength if it is to be active and productive.

We are approximately 8,000 strong. This includes active and associate members from all areas of the government involved in foreign affairs and from among those who have retired from such activities. Members are found in the FSO Corps, the Staff, Reserve and Civil Service and even in the regular military establishment. Those on active duty are serving in State, AID, USIA, the Peace Corps, the White House, ACDA, Commerce, Labor, Treasury, CIA and other Agencies. Those who have retired live across our land and overseas. Subscribers to the JOURNAL, beyond the membership, include most American universities, many friends of the Association, and even an address in Moscow.

The membership drive of 1966 was a real success. Many new members were recruited through the inquiries and encouragement of Association volunteer workers in posts abroad and throughout the Department, USIA and AID. Our grateful thanks are extended to those men and women of all ranks and agencies who gave their time and energy to the task of strengthening the Association.

For the membership is the strength of the Association. *The Association must be conscious of the needs and concerns of its broad range of members if it is not to fade into a sort of effete gentility which serves neither the membership nor the Administration.*

On the other hand, the usefulness of the Association cannot be measured solely in terms of the material benefits which may accrue to a new member. The Chairman of the Association last year received a letter from an FSO during the membership campaign. The officer wrote that he would not join the Association unless he received a promotion. From the senselessness of his comment, we may assume that he will never be able to become a member. Another officer refused to join because she had not received a scholarship from the Association when she was in graduate school. *The thought of joining in order to change the policies had quite eluded her. Some junior officers* would not join because, they said, the Association is not interested in their concerns. As they were not members they obviously *had no way of knowing that the* JOURNAL *was the only publication to offer its pages to a group of junior officers critical of current personnel policies.*

The Association cannot progress if large numbers of potential members stand aside. Every added member means added strength—financially, of course—but most importantly in terms of brains and energy. It is a sad fact that many who take pride in their profession do not vote in the elections of their professional Association and do not participate in efforts to strengthen professional skills, improve working conditions, assist our children and protect our widows and retired personnel.

The fact is, the Association can do no more than its membership permits. The effort to include all potential members must continue. We, therefore, call upon the officers of the Association to maintain a network of "representatives" in each post abroad and in each major office here to foster the recruitment of the widest possible range of active and associate members. ■

WASHINGTON LETTER

by LOREN CARROLL

We are richer by one Christmas past.
—Rudyard Kipling

ONCE again we survived it. Christmas, of course. Perhaps it was just a Christmas like any other but to some observers the whole season seemed to develop some peculiar symptoms. For one thing the hoopla got under way earlier this year. Even before Thanksgiving Santa Clauses were popping up in banks. Why banks rush the season even before department stores is a mystery that the banks and Santa Clauses refuse to clear up.

By December 1 the shops were jammed. How can some people devote almost a month to Christmas shopping? Where do they find the money to buy mountains of gifts? How can one person possess so many friends that it takes one whole month to find appropriate gifts for them? The day after Christmas and for days after that the shops were still jammed. People were taking things back. This is an increasingly popular sport.

Restaurants, too, plunged early into the Christmas mood. Thanksgiving was scarcely over when in the piped-in music system "Adestc Fideles" and "Hark, the Herald Angels Sing" began to edge out "La Paloma" and "Lo Hear the Gentle Lark." The restaurateurs were astute in running in the religious note: "Hark, the Herald Angels Sing," etc. stimulated the repeat orders for martinis.

The religious note was also triumphant in the Christmas card business. The best seller in Washington was the Memling Madonna which the JOURNAL used as a cover for the December 1965 issue. The WASHINGTONIAN magazine used the same picture for its December 1966 cover and the Post Office used it for a special five-cent Christmas stamp.

The season brought out a strange religious symptom at Yale. A small group of students calling itself "The God Squad" dedicated itself to converting Jewish students to Christianity. Pure waste of breath. These *goyim* types should learn that of all peoples on earth the Jews are the most adept at resisting the blandishments of alien creeds.

Weatherwise—to fall in with a popular but deplorable word—winter came early to Washington. Snow started to fall even before the last leaves had fallen from the red oaks and maples. People began to worry that the 1965-1966 winter's snow level of 28.4 inches might be exceeded. So far the snowfall has remained reasonably moderate.

Some 750,000 Civil Service "retirees" were in a festive mood because they got a rise of 3.9 per cent in their annuities. Earlier some 552,000 military "retirees" got a rise of 3.7 per cent. This came about because the annuities of both these groups are tied to the Consumer Price Index which means that they are adjusted whenever living costs mount by as much as three per cent and remain at that level for 90 days.

But what about Foreign Service retirees? Not so lucky. You read in the December Washington Letter that the rules mentioned above do not apply to the Foreign Service. Congress adjourned without passing the Fulbright bill and a new start will have to be made next year. Ah well, let us not begrudge others their good luck! Or, as Anna Russell says, "Let's don't be chauvinistic!"

The holiday season inspired the "stoolies" in Elizabeth, New Jersey, to demand higher stipends from the police. "Stoolies," in case your education was neglected, are stool-pigeons or informers. The City Council allotted $1,000 to the police and the police said it was inadequate. Well, the stoolies had Christmas shopping to do like anyone else.

Just in time for Christmas shopping came a sensational book by Sigmund Freud, "A Psychological Study of Thomas Woodrow Wilson." Wilson, in Freud's "diagnosis," was a tragically warped man and the origin of his trouble was "a passionate love of his father." Freud never knew Wilson but based his "analysis" on information supplied by William C. Bullitt, former ambassador to Russia. A rash procedure this! How would you like to feel that some psychiatrist you never laid eyes on would, years after your death, transform you into a cretin? Anyway, publication of this book will do Freud's reputation no good.

If this weren't enough, Truman Capote celebrated the festive season by giving a party for 540 "people I like" in the Plaza Hotel ballroom in New York. This was the greatest wing-ding since Messalina hired the Coliseum or at least since Elsa Maxwell packed them into the Palazzo Alesiano in Venice. One odd feature of the party was the fact that nearly all Mr. Capote's favorites were celebrities. Everyone mentioned by the newspapers has appeared in headlines countless times. In view of the fact that the effect of the party was to set up a new aristocracy the coverage of the historic event all through the press was reprehensible. Newspapers mentioned a few names, apparently at random, dwelt on great distances people had traveled to get to the party and on the masks and dresses worn by the women guests. Not one had the perspicacity to print a *complete list* of the guests. This is precisely what we need if we are going to recognize the élite, the nobs, toffs, big wigs and swells, hoi sunetoi, le gratin, la crème de la crème of our era.

A pocket-sized booklet would also be useful. "No matter how you blow yourself up, Throckmorton, you do not impress me. I cannot find your name in *The Official List.*"

Another feature of the Christmas season was the extraordinary peevishness manifested by so many recipients of gifts. Here are a few of the objects that aroused not gratitude but disgruntlement:

A bowl of guppies.

A ceramic cigarette lighter in the shape of a woman's torso.

A bugging device designed to be installed clandestinely in a friend's telephone. When the snooper dialed the friend's number he could hear anything being said in a radius of 60 feet of the telephone. (The telephone bell would not ring.)

Volume I of an encyclopedia sold in a supermarket. The recipient opined that an education that runs only from A to Baily's Beads is much too limited.

An unpainted dog house. (The recipient loathes painting and has no dog.)

"Survivor Kits." (These contain such objects as cheese, the mixings for martinis and golf balls.)

A BB gun (received by an elderly woman).

A year's subscription to a religious magazine (received by a non-religious type).

Two dozen narcissus bulbs (received when the ground was frozen).

An electric tooth brush. The recipient threw it into the trash basket

saying, "I don't intend to get an electric shock every time I brush my teeth."

The Christmas rush did, however, bring happiness to two groups—shoplifters and itchy-fingered employees. It was estimated that shoplifters throughout the nation made off with $26 million dollars worth of merchandise and food during the holiday season. Shoplifting is increasing by leaps and bounds: self-service makes detection more and more difficult. The December thefts committed by dishonest employees were estimated at $32 million dollars.

Well, it's all over. If you are sure you put the snow tires on, let us all now subside.

Bright Occasion

The noonday meeting at which John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, received a Rockefeller Public Service Award for "Foreign Affairs or International Operations" turned into an impressive ceremony. There was a message from President Johnson and a speech by the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry H. Fowler, "Excellence in the National Public Service," which was not only appropriate to the occasion but valuable per se. In conferring the award on Mr. Leddy, Dr. Robert Goheen, the president of Princeton University, commented on the value and variety of Mr. Leddy's public service.

Random postscript—a few decades ago, ceremonies of this sort were held in cheerless hotel ballroooms—dark brown walls matched by brown curtains and carpets, gilt chairs—that effectively lowered the spirits. The Rockefeller Awards ceremony was held in the Washington Hilton and the dashing decor all by itself created a festal atmosphere.

Peaks on Parnassus

What is the most beautiful line in all world literature? Here is another candidate:

Was klagt ihr? . . .
Mein Kerker ausgeht, und die frohe Seele sich
Aus Engelsflügeln schwingt zur ew'gen Freiheit.

Schiller: Maria Stuart. In Schiller's drama, Mary Queen of Scots utters these words on her way to the Scaffold.

(Why do you weep? . . .
My prison opens and my joyous soul
On angel wings soars to everlasting liberty.)

Award

Little did we think the Award would ever go to a mob of rioting convicts! Certainly the Washington Letter could never approve of rioting whether in prison, at the rector's garden party or at one of Mrs. Mesta's wing-dings. But consider the provocation at the Essex County Penitentiary at Caldwell, New Jersey. Three times a week, said the convicts, the dessert consisted of flavored gelatine, rice pudding or bread pudding. Imagine! The convicts threw spoons and trays and yowled like coyotes. But even tame, docile types would probably have done worse. Against the grain, we give the award collectively to the 200 prisoners who rebelled against those three unworthy products of Anglo-Saxon cookery — flavored gelatine, rice pudding and bread pudding.

News of the Cocktail Circuit

A New York restaurant whose prices are not cheap has resolutely turned its back on all those dashing martinis it used to produce: giant size, king size, man's size, party type. It now presents, in the phrase of a former inmate: "the safe and sane sobriety model." He supplied the recipe: "fill up the glass with ice and pour a little gin and vermouth into the interstices."

622 Was the Index of Success

The Department achieved another crashing success with its latest National Foreign Policy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters held on December 1 and 2. This one drew 622 editors and radio speakers from 41 states and Puerto Rico. Speakers were Secretary Rusk, Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, William S. Gaud, Administrator, Agency for International Development, Jack Vaughn, Director, Peace Corps, William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Charles Frankel, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational Cultural Affairs and Richard W. Reuter, Special Assistant to the Secretary (Food for Peace Program).

The general briefings in the West Auditorium were followed by a series of concurrent round tables on specific topics. The visitors were allowed to take their pick among these. One round-table was transformed into a laboratory session: those who opted for a briefing on the Foreign Service Institute were taken by bus to the Institute where Ambassador George V. Allen and his staff provided the visitors with a tour of the building including the language training facilities. Running one of the conferences is an arduous chore requiring long preparation by people skilled in this kind of operation. The principal glory went to R. G. Cleveland, to John W. Piercey and June Robinson.

Life and Love in the Foreign Service

S. I. Nadler

"I admit it would make a highly original planter, Mary, but in the Residence, no!"

XENIA BARNES

21 Days in Budapest

THE autumn day in Budapest was clear and sunny. The wide Danube reflected the blue of the sky and the distant hills were all lilac and green. My husband and I were lunching at the residence of the Egyptian Minister, in a house on top of St. Gellert Hill, where an old fortress dominates Buda.

The meal was delicious and ample. So were the wines, and champagne. After luncheon we sipped sweet oriental coffee and chatted.

"Tell us our fortunes in the coffee grounds," said the hostess, smiling, to the young wife of an Egyptian Secretary.

She was looking into my cup. It was very black at the bottom. "I see so much trouble ahead, so much unrest; nothing bad will happen to you, but around you. . . ."

At three-thirty that afternoon we left the Egyptians. It was the last social event for a long time, the eve of the tragic days of October.

It started with peaceful student demonstrations early in the afternoon of October 23rd—students demanding freedom, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, freedom of the press, free trips to Western countries, a free University. And it led to a war-shattered city and thousands of dead.

Cardinal Josef Mindszenty



I was on the streets that day from the minute I left the luncheon until late in the evening. I saw thousands of students, workers, children marching, singing the National Hymn. I was on Parliament Square at 6 p.m. where the crowd was becoming more frenzied and the atmosphere more sinister. Night was coming on. The lights went out and the vast square was plunged into darkness. By evening completely uncontrolled masses were marching toward the Stalin monument. A bronze figure, 27 feet high, it stood erect and heavy on the site of an old church.

Steel cables were tied around the figure's neck, the other ends attached to trucks. They pulled. Stalin jerked a bit forward but regained his pedestal. "Don't be stiff-necked; come on, come on! One step back, two steps forward," said another worker, laughing and shaking his fist. "When you got to go, you got to go!"

They tried again and again. Stalin slowly tilted forward, and with a terrible crash came down.

It was late when I drove with my husband to the Radio Station. The shooting had already started there. This was my last outdoor activity for a long time.

During the first four days my husband and the rest of the American staff spent 24 hours in the Legation, but families remained at home. The bridges across the Danube were closed much of the time; most of us lived in Buda, but the Legation was in Pest. How impossibly long those few days seemed to me, waiting, waiting and waiting, hoping the telephone would ring, wandering from one room to another, followed by our poodle, wondering if the shelling and the machine guns would ever stop. Our servants remained with us, and this was a certain comfort.

On the 28th my husband summoned all the wives and children to join their husbands, and we moved to our Legation building. It was an eight story corner house on Szabadsag-ter, which means Liberty Square. There we started a new life. There were enough mattresses in the storerooms of the Legation, and some brought bedding for children from home. First the children—eighteen of them—had to be taken care of, then the grown-ups, then the dogs: a beautiful Weimaraner; a tiny white doggy, very self-contented and calm; a golden Viszla puppy, all motion and mischief; and our poodle, scared to death of the shooting. The children and mothers were given the third floor, the

chancery. The oldest child was eight, the youngest six months.

For a few days mothers did wonders, gathering children together, reading to them, playing games. We had about 20 pounds of fresh meat in our commissary in the building, a couple of cases of canned and some powdered milk; so we had enough to eat.

We had a small coffee shop in the basement of the Legation, approximately 8 by 15 feet, a frigidaire and an old two-burner gas stove. Three windows faced a small courtyard. There was no way to get to the shop except by walking through this open court. How we did run across it during the worst days of the shelling, how we walked our dogs there, how the Legation generators—stored there under the tin roof—saved us during the blackouts!

This small, stone courtyard was to become the only walking ground for Cardinal Mindszenty. He would stroll for half an hour, twice a day, a coat thrown over his shoulders in winter, taking off his cap in rain or snow. While going down the stairs he would often say to the officer accompanying him, with a faint smile: "Where are we going to go tonight?" But all that came later.

On the 31st the children began to wonder about a Halloween party. Could they be disappointed? "No!" the mothers decided. Their agile imaginations contrived costumes which may have shocked the orthodox witches aloft but delighted the boisterous youngsters. Grown-ups celebrated, too, by having highballs after an elaborate dinner—tomato soup and Spam on dark, stale bread.

We had hoped the worst was over. The Soviet tanks began to withdraw. My husband thought we could go back to our homes. We did go back, but only for 24 hours. Our hopes were shattered by alarming news on All Saints' Day. Soviet tanks were surrounding Budapest, drawing nearer and nearer to the capital, girding the city in their steel pincers.

Gun emplacements

It was a grey and cold morning on November 2nd. All mothers and children and those wives who preferred to leave were departing in convoy for Vienna. Not much was said between them and the few of us who remained. "Goodbye, don't worry," and car after car drove slowly from our Legation. I remember how this convoy was stopped only a few miles short of freedom, close to the Austrain border. How it was turned back and retraced its steps to Budapest, arriving at almost midnight. And how next morning it started out all over again, was held for two days at the same place—eight adults and eleven children—but finally reached Vienna safely. By this time our newly appointed Minister, Tom Wailes, had arrived. His car was among the last to get through from Vienna, on November second.

It was strangely quiet in the Legation after the children left. Only five wives remained—three Foreign Service and two Military. And it was calm, unusually calm, in town on that fateful eve of the 4th of November.

At 5 a.m. the Soviets struck again. Budapest was awakened by thunderous fire—tanks shelling the city. Still dazed from sleep, on a double mattress in the corner of my husband's office, we jumped up: "O God, what is it?" "Quick!" said my husband. It took us but a minute to dress.

Before long all the staff was downstairs in the cellar—narrow corridors, a few chairs, and blankets. One by one the Legation door let in people who were seeking refuge: American correspondents—John MacCormac, Pulitzer Prize Winner Russell Jones, Seymour Freidin, Barrett McGurn, the American cameramen, a Hungarian journalist, his wife and two daughters; and of course our Legation's Hungarian employees, some of whom were released from prison in those few frantic days of liberty. Then came Cardinal Mindszenty with his secretary, Monsignor Turchani who, much later, was captured while trying to escape from Hungary and condemned to life imprisonment. He died in prison in 1963.

It was very crowded in the cellar. Some slept, some sat erect and stiff. Dogs were with us, trembling and terrified. By noon I had made sandwiches in the coffee shop and passed them around, The Cardinal never said a word. He sat motionlessly reading the breviary, his eyes cast down all the while.

"Please have some food, Your Eminence," I held the plate before him. He took very little and ate slowly, his face turned toward the wall. His imperturbable peacefulness, his loneliness was so great. He prayed most of the time. For his Hungary? For all of us? For his mother? I met his mother when she came to see him at Christmas from her home in Western Hungary, a small, old woman, dressed in a black peasant skirt and blouse, a black shawl over her shoulders, a black kerchief tied under her chin. She visited the Cardinal a few times later, but her visits gradually became more difficult. In 1964 she died.

Most of the men did not stay long in the cellar, they had work to do. We women, too, had to feed nearly seventy people. The following weeks we worked in shifts. We started shortly after seven in the morning, and were serving meals in the coffee shop till late in the evening. The paucity of our supplies would have horrified any American housewife trying to plan her husband's dinner—canned soups, but they didn't last long; frankfurters, bacon, and Spam. But soon the

Stalin's boots after the toppling of the statue

The handwriting on the windows

shelves of the commissary were barer still. We found ourselves dining on sardines, jello, peanut butter. We had very little flour, but sometimes we managed to serve hot biscuits. What a cheer the six Marine Guards gave us when bread was on the menu! The tea and coffee were thinning out; we were put on a diet of "coke" and cocoa. We were losing weight. The dogs were getting skinny.

On the 5th, Monday morning, Cardinal Mindszenty refused breakfast, which I had brought him on a tray, because he hoped to say Mass. And in spite of the shelling and the roar of planes above us in the sky, all the Americans, all the Hungarians, all the correspondents, all the cameramen climbed the stairs to the third floor where the Cardinal lived in the Minister's former office. It was a large corner room with venetian blinds closed day and night. There we heard Mass, praying with the Cardinal, kneeling with him. He had no cross with him; I gave him mine. I brought red chianti and bread from the coffee shop. The Minister's desk was his altar, a wine glass his chalice, two small pieces of dark, stale bread the Host. There were tears in the eyes of the Cardinal and the Monsignor, his secretary. Through a tremendous bursting of shells nearby, through the deafening noise from machine guns outside, slowly, slowly the Mass went on and the old thin hands of the Cardinal did not shake when he lifted his chalice, and his voice was even and serene when he blessed everyone with "Pax Vobiscum!"

The tension was great. Everyone did his best. We had few clothes with us. A couple of towels seemed to last forever. But we managed to look trim, and a small bottle of Shalimar perfume, left in the unattractive ladies' room by one of the wives, reminded me of the luxury and vanity of human existence.

All the correspondents lived in one large, long room, normally used for movies. They unrolled one big dusty carpet—it was their bed. They rolled up another one—it was their pillow. They typed, they talked, they discussed, thankful for every bowl of soup or whatever we could provide to stay hunger.

"Let's have a game of bridge in the afternoon," the Hungarians would say sometimes, while I was working behind the counter in the coffee shop. "With pleasure!" My last word would be lost in a blast of shells.

In the middle of all this the Cardinal lived in an atmosphere of comparative peace, after long years of incessant danger, the first time imprisoned by Nazis in 1944, five times by Hungarian Communists.

It took time for him to adjust to the days ahead. He expected to be in the Legation for a short while. Could he have known he would be there for over ten years?

During this period, a certain pattern was established in the life of the old Cardinal. Early in the morning one of our American officers would bring his breakfast. He would not touch it until his meditations were over. Afterwards he read newspapers, local and foreign, magazines, studied English. We conversed in German. The Cardinal was watching the local press closely for contradictions. His memory was phenomenal, and he had a good sense of humor. He pointed out once how the number of cattle given by some regional newspaper could not possibly have produced the amount of natural fertilizer reported by another source: " . . . Unless maybe Communist cows can do it."

From a Hungarian guide book he could retrace his whole life, remembering such details as the number of Protestant and Catholic churches, the location of railroad stations or schools. His interests were varied: agriculture, industry, transportation, education.

At noon his lunch was brought up, he always ate sparingly, and smoked half of a cigar, very particular about the brand. The other half he lighted after supper. Unfamiliar brands he did not enjoy: "What are they doing to these cigars?" he would say, looking closely at the cut.

Some months later, on St. Stephen's day, the sun was shining through half-closed blinds. The Cardinal was listening to the radio. He moved from his chair to the window and opened the blinds a bit. He was looking, in deep silence, towards St. Stephen's Cathedral. On the stone pavement of Szabadsag-ter was slowly walking an elderly, distinguished-looking man in a black suit which had seen better days. He stopped and looked at the third floor windows, he took his derby hat off, he bowed low, he looked up again and smiled faintly through his thick, grey moustache, lifted his derby again, and walked slowly away. The Cardinal closed the blinds, and began to read his breviary.

After a light supper with one glass of wine, at 10 p.m. the Cardinal listened to Radio Vatican, one of the few receptions that came through undisturbed—in Latin.

He did not like money to be spent on him. His cassock was worn out, but he refused to be measured for a new one. The Embassy officers used different stratagems to obtain his measurements, and order clothing for him. One of the Marines sent him high, soft shoes with elastic on the sides from Illinois.

One detail—for some reason he always carried a tan handkerchief in the sleeve of his cassock.

The Cardinal was never reconciled to the situation; he always hoped, but never deluded himself; maintained his sense of realism. There were days when he would be depressed, would

(*Continued on page* 52)

Its Opportunities and Responsibilities

The American Decade

"The coming decade is a decade of opportunity and responsibility for the United States. This is truly the American decade."

THIS was a salient point in a diagnosis of the world situation given November 30 at the Foreign Service Association luncheon by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State, on leave from Columbia University where he is Professor of Government and Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs.

Dr. Brzezinski defined the conventional view of today's political situation as "a world which is shifting in international affairs from bipolarity to polycentrism." Such an analysis, if right, would have very special and direct implications for the US role in world affairs. It would justify to an extent, a US policy of disengagement from world affairs. Dr. Brzezinski assumed that this is the principal objection of many of the critics today who maintain that US policy is mistakenly globalist in its character. If the analytical assumption is correct, if indeed we are shifting from bipolarity to polycentrism, then the policy criticism is also right. For, it is a fact that globalism today is our policy. We are globally engaged.

This conventional view—that the world is shifting in international affairs from bipolarity to polycentrism—was challenged vigorously by Dr. Brzezinski. He argued that the basic assumption is wrong, that the nature of our era does not involve a shift from the period in which the US was paramount, to a period of Soviet-American bipolarity, to an era of polycentrism. "I will argue instead," he said, "that in fact, if we look at the last 20 years there has been a shift from a period, first of all, of polycentrism in international affairs, to a period of bipolarity, to what is today a period of US paramountcy."

In his view 1945-1950 was essentially a polycentric period in international affairs. The United States was politically engaged in Europe but beyond that it had few global commitments. Its military power, essentially resting on nuclear monopoly, was basically of an apocalyptic character. It was usable only in an instance which everyone wished to avoid. This apocalyptic power was not suitable for effective political use. Russia was essentially a regional power, predominant in Europe, disinterested in Asia. The UK and France were global colonial powers but rapidly fading. Asia was in turmoil. This was indeed a polycentric period in international affairs, with no single power predominating; no single force imposing its will, no single nation or state capable of shaping international affairs.

Unwilling to be "too dogmatic about dates," Dr. Brzezinski opined that the polycentric period gave way to a phase of bipolarity and the bipolar phase lasted roughly from 1950 to 1962. The US became heavily involved in Europe. It was becoming involved in Asia. It was still essentially an apocalyptic power militarily, capable of fighting a total war which nobody wished, but probably no other kind of war. During this time some of our policies even cast doubt on our capacity to assert ourselves effectively as a regional power. Certainly from the Soviet point of view, the acquisition of Cuba for the communist world was a negation of "the principle of geographic fatalism"—of the notion that Communism cannot expand if it is too far from its home base.

The Soviet Union, Dr. Brzezinski pointed out, was still a regional power in Europe and the proof of it was Hungary. Russia was beginning to develop an apocalyptic capacity on a global scale, meaning a capacity to fight a total war which nobody dared to risk—the kind of power that is not readily usable. France and Great Britain faded out; Suez was for them the end as major powers.

In Dr. Brzezinski's view, during the latter phase of the bipolar and highly unstable condition, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev mistakenly assumed that it had *already* become a global power. It began to apply pressure in Berlin and in Cuba, encouraged in part by our failure in Cuba as a regional power, by failure in 1960-61 in Laos as a globally involved power and by our—as the Soviets construed it—inactivity in Berlin which cast doubt on our capacity to act as a strategic power.

This period of Soviet assertiveness ended during the Cuban missile crisis. The Soviet leaders were forced, because of the energetic response by the United States, to the conclusion that their apocalyptic power was insufficient to make the Soviet Union a global power. Faced with a showdown, the Soviet Union didn't dare to respond even in an area of its regional predominance—in Berlin.

It was about that time in Dr. Brzezinski's diagnosis that the United States emerged as the only global power in the world. "Our superior apocalyptic power became strategic power." He cited the words of President Kennedy—that "a single missile fired from Cuba will bring upon the Soviet Union the full retaliatory response of the United States."

"Moreover," said Dr. Brzezinski "in addition to our strategic power which was no longer apocalyptic in the 1960's we find the United States developing and using conventional long range military capacity to assert effectively its interest, be it in the Congo or in Vietnam or for that matter in the Dominican Republic, thereby establishing ourselves effectively as a global as well as a regional power." But the Soviet Union's strategic power was still apocalyptic in character. It had no military capacity to fight in Cuba, or in Vietnam, or to protect its interests in the Congo. The other powers faded from the picture completely. China, however, seemed on the way to become a regional Asian power, a new force on the horizon.

And so, maintained Dr. Brzezinski, the US is today the only effective global military power in the world. "Moreover," he said, "our way of life is still the most appealing way of life to most people on earth. Most people crave the American way of life even though they may reject and condemn the United States. We are the only power with far-flung global economic investments, economic involvement and global trade, and there is no parallel to us in the role our science and technology plays around the world."

Dr. Brzezinski then pointed out the contrast with the Soviet Union which under Khrushchev thought of its ideology as a global resource but saw this asset fade away in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Today Communist ideology is no longer an effective lure. With the distrust of the Communist movement, the Soviet Union is no longer the kind of rival it was in the late 1950's and early 1960's.

Dr. Brzezinski interposed a warning. The present condition will not long endure. It would be rash to harbor such an illusion. The next phase in world politics will again be bipolarity. The Soviet Union is developing conventional long-range capability. It is developing its strategic forces and its shipping. It is expanding its economic presence around the world. In a decade it may have a Marine Corps and a mobile capacity to assert—or try to assert—its interests on a global scale. At that point we may have a strategic standoff. And if that standoff comes at a time when there are crises around the world, if revolutionary powers emerge, if there are major cataclysmic changes around the world, then, of course, great international instability could follow. "This," said Dr. Brzezinski, "is precisely why the coming decade is a decade of opportunity and responsibility for the United States. This is truly the American decade." What should be the role of the United States in this period? To use our power responsibly and constructively so that when the American paramountcy ends, the world will have been launched on a constructive pattern of development toward international stability.

The United States, Dr. Brzezinski warned, should not be mesmerized by ideological conflicts. The United States had not shared in the ideological legacy left behind by 19th Century European conflicts. It would seem that the world is beginning to emulate the American pragmatic freedom from doctrinal rigidities. It would therefore be highly ironic for the United States to become a late comer to ideological conflicts precisely at a time when ideological relevance to our contemporary and future problems is beginning to wane. Today there is no ideological system that is relevant to the kind of problems that man and society will be facing in the next decade. Thus it would be ironic if we began to view world change in terms of a conflict defined essentially in ideological terms—if we became doctrinally rigid; if we began to see the world as essentially involving a struggle with communism and nothing else.

Nationalism, said Dr. Brzezinski should not be underestimated. Nationalism should be channeled to constructive ends. The process, however, should not be too rapid for by so doing we might alienate many nations around the world.

In Dr. Brzezinski's view the highest priority ought to be accorded to the shaping of a new Europe. "Which means moving on with efforts to create European unity and to overcome the tragic legacy of the European civil war which has divided Europe in two. Hence our secondary task in Europe is to restore a larger Europe by improving East-West relations. It is here that the absence of the ideological perspective is especially desirable, for such a policy means efforts to develop contacts with the communist states."

This is the time, said Dr. Brzezinski, to capitalize on the present inward phase of Soviet development. His diagnosis of the current Soviet phase was, in brief: The Soviet leadership is a divided collective leadership but this stability is probably perpetuating internal political paralysis. There are mounting social tensions in the Soviet Union; not the least of these is the increasing nationality crisis in the Soviet Union. This in the next several decades may make the American racial issue look like a minor problem. In the Soviet Union 50 percent of the people are non-Russian; these are becoming increasingly nationality conscious.

While military power in the Soviet Union is growing, the political system is degenerating and incapable of transforming itself in terms of the needs of the times, and a system in which society is asserting itself more and more. The balance between the three is highly unstable.

Precisely because of this, in the view of Dr. Brzezinski, the time has come to take the initiative in shaping a new Europe, lest a new European crisis revive Soviet ambitions. It is therefore appropriate to try to end constructively the division of Europe. In President Johnson's speech of October 7, Dr. Brzezinski saw an encouraging step in the right direction.

Along with the attempt to shape a larger community of developed nations, there should be a move to fulfill a larger task: creating international stability elsewhere. The ultimate objective ought to be the shaping of a world of cooperative communities with cooperative regional communities or cooperative communities on the basis of developmental ties as, for example, a community of the developed nations. The thrust of history is in that direction, for social life has expanded from smaller to larger units and man's horizons have widened from family to village, to city, to nation and now to continents.

The start, said Dr. Brzezinski, has already been made in Asia where, on the basis of containing communist aggression, there are the beginnings of a community of cooperative nations which one day must include China as well. In a general way this is the task America faces in this decade of American opportunity. It may well be the last decade in which this country has such a unique opportunity to shape the future.

"Today," concluded Dr. Brzezinski, "for the first time in history, the world is united by a single emotion. But that emotion is fear. If we succeed in shaping a world of cooperative communities our children may one day live in a community that is truly human."

At the end of the speech, Dr. Brzezinski, in response to questions, contributed some supplementary observations on the world situation.

Fate of Doctrines

The history of mankind shows that no doctrinal theological system can endure unchanged over a long period of time. The Soviet Union, as it becomes absorbed increasingly in international cooperation will, in all probability, initially reassert and emphasize even more dogmatically its own doctrinal principles as they begin to undergo the process of internal decay. But after a time that fades too, and then the doctrinal principles begin to be essentially reflected in social attitudes, values and institutions. The process is probably already under way in the Soviet Union but much more slowly than in Eastern Europe—certainly more slowly than in Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, consider European history of 50 years ago. The Social Democratic parties were the most left-wing militant, radical parties in Europe. In the 1920's, because another more radical party arose—the communist party—these parties began to cooperate in bourgeois governments. In 1946 and 1947 it was Social Democrat Ministers of the Interior in France and in Italy who suppressed communist violence. Soviet ideology is corroding and eroding.

Soviet Future

It would seem probable that the Soviet Union is going to be faced with a domestic political crisis which may reduce its capacity for the effective utilization of its external powers. If this is the case, we will have a longer period of grace during which we should be shaping the kind of institution that will protect inner peace.

President Johnson's October 7 speech was heard extremely well and there are countless evidences of its being received with a great deal of curiosity and interest by the ruling elites. Comments on it have ranged from Brezhnev to Gomulka to Tito, and there is overwhelming evidence that the East European peoples and the Russian peoples have seen in it an indication of constructive US interest in the future, of the sort which perhaps has not been too apparent in years past, so on the whole it would seem that the speech got a good reception in Eastern Europe. It is true that speeches by themselves are not sufficient. Speeches can only define the general thrust of policy. Specific actions are needed to implement it and this is where the job of public education in this country is very important.

(*Continued on page 53*)

THE BOOKSHELF



Germany and Russia between World Wars

HARVEY L. DYCK, Assistant Professor of History at Columbia, has made good use of those archives of the German Foreign Office which fell into Western hands in 1945 to document the wavering course of relations between the Weimar Republic and the Soviet Union from 1926 to 1933. This "Study in Diplomatic Instability" has a surprising degree of applicability today. Germany is once again a democracy. She is once again, but much more violently, opposed to her eastern borders. The Soviet Union is still suspicious of German motives—as of the motives of all Western democracies. There, however, the comparison ends. Russia has gobbled up enough land and has subverted enough governments on her periphery to provide what in the pre-World War II days would have been adequate protection. On Germany's side things have also changed. There is no World War II Rapallo—or if there is it is Western—not Eastern—oriented.

Weimar Germany was dominated by a hatred of Versailles and those countries behind Versailles. She clung to Russia in a prickly embrace designed to keep Russia away from France and Britain and, above all, to keep Russia from coming to terms with Poland so as to prevent Germany from revising, in her own favor, Poland's western boundaries. Reviewing German efforts at revision of these borders, it is not hard to see the logical deterioration of those attempts under insanely adventurous leaders into the 1939 War which cost Germany so much more territory—and people—that today the post-Versailles German outlines seem like a never-to-be regained ideal.

As the author points out, this book, one of the "Studies of the Russian Institute," would have been more complete if the Wilhelmstrasse files in the hands of the Pankow regime had been available, or if more material could have been obtained from the Soviet Foreign Office files. However, historians must work with what they have and Mr. Dyck has carefully documented his study which should greatly assist future students of the period.

—ALBERT W. STOFFEL

WEIMAR GERMANY AND SOVIET RUSSIA, *1926-1933, by Harvey L. Dyck. Columbia University Press, $6.75.*

The Void Between the Elbe and the Oder

NBC Correspondent Welles Hangen has written a lively book on East Germany, (Middle Germany, the Soviet Zone, the German Democratic Republic—call it what you will). Told in a series of independent vignettes, his account nevertheless forms a whole and presents a reasonable picture of East Germany. Hangen believes that a country the industrial production of which ranks fifth or sixth in Europe cannot be ignored. To emphasize its durability, he points out that Ulbricht has ruled longer than Hitler and longer than all of the Weimar presidents put together.

Although his book is primarily devoted to East Germany, to put it in the whole German context, he spends some time on the Bonn Government and West Berlin. He effectively establishes that West Berlin is important in its own right; its gross national product of 4.5 billion dollars exceeding that of one quarter of the United Nations, including Ireland and Greece.

The book does contain some errors: i.e., referring to the slums of West Berlin, whereas in the shameful American sense these are not slums. He also accuses Bad Godesberg of refusing to integrate its telephone system with that of Bonn, whereas in fact that was done in 1965 when the responsible Federal authorities were ready to do so. Nevertheless the book in general is accurate, useful and readable.

—ALBERT W. STOFFEL

THE MUTED REVOLUTION—EAST GERMANY'S CHALLENGE TO RUSSIA AND THE WEST, *by Welles Hangen. Knopf, $5.95.*

The Year of the Blitz

THE current fashion in writing history is to focus on a narrow span of time—"A Thousand Days," "The Guns of August," "The Longest Day." Such close-ups unquestionably achieve dramatic intensity; they suffer, however, from some artificiality, because the human story rarely breaks up into such neat segments.

Laurence Thompson's "1940" does not entirely escape this difficulty. The real climax is the familiar but never stale story of the Battle of Britain, admirably retold. What happened after Hitler's discovery that he could not knock the R. A. F. out of the skies was mostly preparation and portent. Thompson deals with this problem by concentrating on Roosevelt's gingerly approach to belligerency through the destroyer-bases deal and that masterly invention, Lend-Lease (foreshadowed late that year, though not officially announced.) So the book ends on the upbeat: "But westward, look, the land is bright."

Along the Teltow Canal
by Maj. Thomas J. Hogan
View southeastward from the eastern end of the Ernst-Keller Bridge, which carried traffic between the American Sector borough of Neukölln and the Soviet Sector borough of Treptow, before the Communist barriers (visible at the left) were erected.

The author, an English journalist and editor, is mercilessly witty about the bumbling and bickering, political and military, during the "phoney war." He is not one of Churchill's idolaters, and he has a soft spot for Chamberlain. He finds it sadly unfair that Churchill should have entered No. 10 Downing Street on the issue of

the Norway fiasco, for which he bore a heavy portion of responsibility. His account of the greater fiasco leading to Dunkirk is equally pitiless, and makes one wonder uneasily why democracies always mess things up so lamentably in the carly stages of a war.

This is an immensely readable and generally sound book. In a few places the pace is so headlong one could wish for a little more documentation. And it needs more maps; there is only one, much too rudimentary to permit the reader to follow the German breakthrough and the Allied breakdown in Belgium and northern France.

—Ted Olson

1940, by Laurence Thompson. Morrow, $5.95

Democracy in Germany

This book, the published version of the Jodidi Lectures delivered at Harvard in March 1964, makes particularly interesting reading during a German election year. Written by the Vice Chairman of the Social Democratic Party, it gives a valuable insight into the philosophy of the German opposition.

It is clear that this is no wild-eyed Socialist but rather the responsible leader of a responsiblc opposition party. Mr. Erler's account of the attitudes and policies of the SPD clearly shows the evolution of the party. It is no longer a class party but has broadened its appeal to other sections of German society, the middle-class, professional people as well as some farmers. Erler is concerned about the long period of time that the CDU has been in power in the Federal Government. However, he does not expect a one-party system to develop in Germany in view of the strength of the SPD in *Laender* and city governments throughout Germany.

The reader concludes that there is, and will continue to be, democracy in Germany.

—Albert W. Stoffel

Democracy in Germany, *by Fritz Erler. Harvard, $3.75.*

The Legal Concept of West Berlin

If a high-ranking American statesman told me that, having had no previous experience with the Berlin problem he must within two hours represent the United States at a conference on the subject, I would recommend that he read the small book edited by Roland J. Stangcr on the legal aspects of Western Berlin. If he had only thirty minutes to prepare, I would recommend that he read only the second essay of the four which comprise the book, the one by J. W. Bishop on the Origin and Nature of the Rights of the Western Allies in Berlin.

The other three essays were written by Stanley Metzger, Hans Baade and Saul Mendlovitz and, as the title indicates, are almost wholly concerned with the legal situation in respect to Berlin. However, as Professor Bishop says, the present legal situation of Berlin was not planned by lawyers any more than it was planned by the four allies—"it just happened."

—Albert W. Stoffel

West Berlin: The Legal Context; *edited by Roland J. Stanger. Ohio State University Press, $4.75.*

Aggression Among the Beasts

The New York Times has characterized this work as "probably one of the most important books of our age." This reviewcr emphatically agrees. It remains to explain why a book by an eminent Austrian naturalist and ethnologist should be relevant to the practitioner of forcign affairs.

"On Aggression" is on the surface about the aggressive urge of animals against members of their own species—intra-specific aggression. as the author calls it—but actually it is far more. The book is important because, by explaining how animals check and limit the natural tendency toward intra-specific aggression. Konrad Lorenz teaches us a great deal ahout our own problems, personal as well as generic.

It is a fascinating book. because it instructs and entertains at the same time, and instructs on several levels at the same time.

We first lcarn, from many interesting examples, that intra-specific aggression is an urge as normal as the urge for food and procreation. and not the result of some perversion of nature. Hunting animals, especially those that stake out territories for themselves, but also many "peaceful" animals such as certain birds that live in rigidly organized communities, turn ferociously against members of their own species. The more individuality is developed, the more there seems to be an instinct to attack the rival—but not to destroy him. Geese. which live monogamously in "clans," will furiously fight neighboring clans but will unite with those familiar enemies to drive flocks of unfamiliar outside geese from their feeding grounds.

Up to a limit, intra-spccific aggression serves the requirements of natural selection. but it would long since have wiped out the respective species if they werc not also endowed with instinctive checks and limitations upon this urge. One of them is the capitulatory gesture, which instantly halts the aggression—when it can be observed. Another is "ritualized" aggression. Yet another is "redirected" aggression. For instance, the greylag gander will tolerate for a long time the goading and provocations of his mate until it will get to be too much and hc turns against her—going right past her and attacking another gander, for a "taboo" exists among many animals against attacking a female. Similar taboos exist against attacking young animals of the same species and sometimes—as in the case of the wolf, and thus also the dog—against the young ones of another species.

What does all this have to do with foreign affairs? Konrad Lorenz draws parallels, in two final chapters, between the species-preserving instincts that check and limit intra-specific aggression among animals, and the requiremcnts and possibilities of our human condition in which redirected aggression is sometimes ineffective and often ridiculous or pathetic. For human beings, the capitulatory gesture usually becomes impossible under conditions of mass struggle, and passions obtain the support of reason and organization; and of course there is now the danger of self-destructive aggression which might wipe out the species.

Informative, entertaining, thought-provoking, sometimes humorous, and on occasion deeply philosophical, this book can be read with profit by anyone, but it should be read especially by persons whose work requires them to think about the problems of war and peace.

—M.F.H.

On Aggression, *by Konrad Lorenz. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., $5.75.*

Dialogue of the Deaf

In the whole history of literature I know of no criminal trial like this one," observed Andrei Sinyavskiy during his final plea before the RSFSR Supreme Court. The proceedings of major portions of the trial of the Soviet state versus the Soviet writers Andrei Sinyavskiy and Yuli Daniel were smuggled out of the Soviet Union and have now been published in English. The trial was indeed unique, even in the history of Russian regimes, which have not been noted for their gentle treatment of intellectuals. Sinyavskiy and Daniel were arrested in mid-September, 1965 for having written and published under pseudonyms abroad stories and essays that

allegedly slandered the Soviet Union. Sinyavskiy, a professor of literature and a talented Soviet critic, had published his fantasies and essay "On Socialist Realism" abroad under the pseudonym Abram Tertz. Yuli Daniel, Sinyavskiy's friend and literary associate, is a translator of poetry and teacher, who published several stories abroad under the name Nikolai Arzhak.

After nearly five months of interrogation, both writers were finally brought to trial in Moscow before the highest court in the Russian Republic. The fact that both pleaded "not guilty" and defended their positions vigorously in a semi-public trial is at least an indication of how much things have changed since Stalin's days. Sholokov, in defending the trial, later added a macabre touch by pointing out that they would have been shot without a trial in the old days. The trial was, nonetheless, a traumatic event for those Soviet intellectuals and citizenry who had been hoping that Soviet society had been "liberalized" to the extent that such bizarre demonstration trials were a phenomenon of the past. The trial also shocked the Western intelligentsia, particularly those writers on the Left who had put so much faith in the changes since Stalin.

Now that the text of the trial has been made available through the efforts of some interested Soviet citizens, it somehow seems anti-climactic. Sinyavskiy and Daniel are serving out their labor camp sentences of seven and five years, respectively, and the general international furor at their treatment has subsided. But this "dialogue of the deaf" between two intelligent non-conformists and the Soviet "establishment" stands alone as an authentic case study of how far "de-Stalinization" has *not* gone. It should be read by anyone who wants to know first hand the anxieties of the Soviet state about its own security—as Daniel said, "I cannot think that a couple of books by us, or even a score, could inflict substantial damage upon a country like this." It should also be interesting reading for those who view the dissonant voices in Soviet literature as "anti-Communist"—both Sinyavskiy and Daniel declare their devotion to Russia and to the Communist ideal. The document is almost a classic statement of the role of the artist—and the individual—in society and it is a pity it will not be read by Soviet citizens. The excellent introduction by Max Hayward plus his footnotes make the book a fully self-contained and meaningful document for the non-specialist. For those interested in the Communist world, the reading of the personal views of Sinyavskiy and Daniel is essential for an understanding of the quality of the intellectual dissidence in Soviet society.

—WILLIAM H. LUERS

ON TRIAL, *The Soviet State Versus "Abram Tertz" and "Nikolai Arzhak," translated, edited, and with an introduction by Max Hayward. Harper and Row, $4.95.*

"The Rosy Realm of Venus"

To bring historical understanding of the tortured Cyprus dispute to the general reader in the clear and incisive manner that Robert Stephens has achieved in his book "Cyprus: A Place of Arms" is no small accomplishment. This volume is one of a growing number of historical-political studies written by journalists—the author is Foreign Editor of the OBSERVER—which happily do not sacrifice scholarship in order to gain readability.

Disraeli is said to have described Cyprus variously as the "rosy realm of Venus" and "a place of arms." The latter appellation, while not denying the truth of the former, seems lamentably to be the more apt description as the Stephens' study demonstrates.

In seeking to provide perspective on the present and highly volatile Cyprus dispute. Stephens has chosen to focus on what he identifies as the three principal historical elements to which the Cyprus problem's sources can be traced. These are the rise of Hellenic nationalism, the collapse of the Ottoman empire succeeded by a modern and nationalistic Turkish state and the apogee and perigee of British imperial power in the Middle East.

Stephens chronicles the many lost opportunities to remove Cyprus from the list of contentious world problems. He points out that after World War I a defeated Turkey was in no position to forestall a Greco-British bilateral settlement of the Cyprus problem (presumably enosis: Cyprus' union with Greece). Again, after World War II Turkey's restricted support of the Allies would have limited her ability to raise objections to Greco-British agreement on the future of Cyprus.

In concluding that, whatever its origins, the Cyprus dispute is essentially a problem of Greco-Turkish relations, Stephens forecast the present-day secret dialogue on a Cyprus solution being conducted by Athens and Ankara.

The OBSERVER's Foreign Editor, however, seems to come a cropper (not surprisingly in view of the complexities of the Cyprus problem) when he suggests an approach to a solution. Stephens proposes conversion of one or both British Sovereign Base areas on the island to United Nations' sovereignty. Such a United Nations sovereign area, Stephens suggests, could be utilized as a base for international peace-keeping operations and presumably as "muscle" for a United Nations Commission on Cyprus to insure protection of the minority rights of the Turkish Cypriot community. On the actual substance of a political solution to the Cyprus dispute, however, editor-journalist Stephens remains silent.

—GLENN SMITH

CYPRUS: A PLACE OF ARMS, *by Robert Stephens. Praeger, $6.00.*

Compressed Kaleidoscope

THE author of "Poland and Czechoslovakia" faced a formidable task. He endeavored to compress into 160 pages the kaleidoscopic, 1500-year history of two nations located in the heartland of Europe. The extent to which he succeeded calls for admiration; but it carries with it an intrinsic weakness.

A brief introductory chapter sketches the position of these countries in the contemporary world. The succeeding seven chapters relate past history chronologically, from the fifth century A.D. to 1945. In so doing they deal with ethnic, dynastic, military, territorial and other fluctuations of rare complexity. Not only the internal gyrations of Poles and Czechs, but their interrelationships with each other and with neighboring Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Russians, Lithuanians and Teutonic Knights clamor for coverage. As a result, the book is crammed to bursting point with names, dates and places, succeeding each other in closely serried ranks and moving on the double. It is not uncommon to find single sentences describing the activities of three or four different individuals at several different times and places.

Inevitably, such treatment tends to obscure major trends in a wealth of detail. There is little room for comment or interpretation—though what there is seems sound and balanced. Nor does the concentration on political factors leave as much space for cultural and sociological developments as might be desired. Further, the compulsion to crowd facts is reflected in a tendency towards long and often involved sentences, which does not make for easy reading.

Nevertheless, the above should not obscure the fact that the author, who

spent several years in Czechoslovakia and is now Professor of History at the University of Alberta, is clearly a keen student and competent master of his subject, and that he draws on a vast store of knowledge. The reader who concentrates his attention and taxes his memory will emerge with a much fuller picture of the historical forces that shaped the destinies of two highly interesting countries and peoples, than the "first acquaintance" the author so modestly aspired to impart. part.

—N. Spencer Barnes

Poland and Czechoslovakia, *by Frederick J. Heymann. Prentice-Hall, $4.95.*

Imperial Image in Various Molds

When Mrs. Hisanaga Shimazu (Princess Suga), youngest daughter of the Emperor, left the United States this year to return to Japan upon the conclusion of her husband's assignment to Washington with the Japan Export-Import Bank, she commented to the press how difficult she found it was to really get to know her neighbors—she had deliberately lived in a suburban apartment in an effort to savor "typical American life." How much more difficult to get to know the Emperor of Japan!

Mr. Mosley has set his hand at what before the war would have been the worst sort of lèse majesté and what must still cause many older Japanese to shudder at the new ways. He has combined in this well-written volume an assessment of the Emperor's role in shaping the events leading to World War II, its execution, and conclusion with an account of his personal life. Admittedly the obstacles in finding first-hand sources for such an undertaking are formidable, and those willing to be helpful in many instances were not willing to be identified. The description of the Emperor's role in successive Imperial Conferences related to the war is dramatic, but not entirely convincing in bearing out the author's suggestion that with a little more initiative on his part and perhaps a little bit of luck there need not have been a Pearl Harbor. (Foreign Service officers can take pride in the extensive citation of perceptive reporting by Ambassador Grew and may be moved to read—again—that remarkable account of Japan in the 1930's, "Ten Years in Japan.")

For readers already acquainted with the rise and fall of the Japanese militarists the most fascinating sections are likely to be those concerned with the Emperor's early life and education. Mr. Mosley has done a commendable job of exploiting the limited resources available for this period. Unfortunately, he has treated only casually the Emperor's postwar role, a subject for which there is no dearth of material. Little or nothing is said about the Emperor's children and their upbringing, about the activities of his brothers, about the dismantling of the Japanese peerage, about the exhaustive debate over the Constitutional position of the Emperor and the various proposals for revision of the articles affecting the Imperial institution, or about the ups and downs (more accurately downs and ups) of the Emperor's popularity. Indeed, Mr. Mosley ends on a most inaccurate note, suggesting that a public appearance during the 1964 Olympics was a rare departure from a life as a virtual recluse. As part of a deliberate effort to cast the Imperial image in a new mold in keeping with the times, the Emperor for some years has undertaken a heavy schedule of attendance at public functions, regularly traveling to outlaying prefectures.

—Albert L. Seligmann

Hirohito, Emperor of Japan, *by Leonard Mosley. Prentice Hall, $7.95.*

Creation

Christopher Sykes states that he has attempted to outline the significant events in the creation of the Jewish State in an objective and impartial manner. This is a difficult task inasmuch as the subject is often clouded with emotion and bias, but in this instance the author has done a creditable job. His account covers the major events in Palestine from 1917-1948 as well as events in Great Britain pertaining to the administration of the area. Neither the British Administration nor the Jewish and Arab leaders are spared for their shortcomings.

Zionist propaganda, which emerges as the villain of this piece, has played a large part in the total estrangement of the Jews from the people of the Arab nations around them. Some of the distortions of fact by the Jewish Agency seem hard to believe, but in each instance Mr. Sykes provides references to substantiate his charges. The author may have subconsciously provided a partial explanation to these questionable acts when he stated "Men can rarely understand a nationalism that is not their own."

—Theodore B. Dobbs

Crossroads to Israel, *by Christopher Sykes. World, $7.95.*

DIPLOMAT

(*Continued from page* 30)

The rules for the married clergy of the Russian church seem to have fascinated the devout Roman Catholic, whose church had a celibate, if not always continent, clergy. He reported that a priest who was celebrating mass on Sunday or Tuesday could have intercourse on Monday, but not on the other two days. Herberstein quoted the Novgorod Bishop telling his parishioners that ikons had to be well hidden and covered if coitus was to be accomplished in a room containing these religious objects.

Herberstein was a relatively unbiased observer of a people with customs rather different from those prevailing in his homeland, although there is no doubt that he thought Germans, and Germanic culture, superior to Russians and Russian culture. He averred that Russians fighting against Germans, Poles, or Lithuanians were generally beaten, and disparaged Russian bravery. After making a first impetuous charge the Russians, according to Herberstein, would lose their valor and by their behavior suggest to the enemy that "if you do not flee, we must." Such military power as the Russians possessed was due to their hiring of German and Italian cannon-makers, but the Russians did not know how to use the artillery thus supplied. Endorsing an idea that has persisted to this day, Herberstein claimed that the Russians put their reliance on great numbers of men, rather than on the skill and bravery of their troops.

Russian impetuosity was matched by Russian unreadiness: They were always behindhand. Deceit was another vice Herberstein attributed to them. Whenever only half of Vasily's soldiers returned from an engagement "they still say that not a single man was lost in battle." Herberstein marveled, however, at the fact that the Russians could get along on very little, whether in the army or in civilian life.

In a period when the Church itself in Europe was notoriously corrupt, Herberstein still found much to criticize in the venality of Russian justice. Despite the severity with which the ruler meted out punishment, justice was for sale, and frequently the judge took money from both sides.

Advancing another idea which was to retain currency in the folklore of more recent times, Herberstein asserted that the Russian people enjoy slavery more than freedom. He speculated on the question of whether the brutality of the people made the ruling Prince a tyrant, or whether the tyrant made the people inhuman.

In view of sentiments such as these interspersed in the Herberstein work, it is no wonder that a more self-confident Russia of the present day takes a dim view of the book. The most recent edition of the "Large Soviet Encyclopedia" dismisses the work in the following words: "The tendentiously unfriendly work of Herberstein described the life of Russian society at the beginning of the 16th century in a distorted form." Present-day Soviet writers consider it especially galling to be told that Herberstein discovered Russia, and say that there is as much reason to speak of Ivan the Great's representatives "discovering" England as of Herberstein discovering Russia.

Herberstein was made a Baron a few years after his second trip to Russia, and continued to be active in Austrian diplomacy, once undertaking a hazardous assignment to visit the Ottoman ruler Suleiman. Though becoming more wealthy and living without scandal, Herberstein had no serenity in his private life. He had not got along well with his mother, nor did he with his wife. The childless and loveless marriage lasted for 44 years until Herberstein died in Vienna at the age of 80, his wife living on for nine more years. Herberstein got a certain revenge for his wife's longevity at his side by writing an autobiography in which his wife and marriage were allotted exactly four words. ■

DOI SAN

(*Continued from page* 34)

markers were ordered by telephone to indicate the results on the targets. Major Doi was present at the exercise, and whenever he approached one of the squadrons firing, word of his approach was immediately passed on to the markers by telephone, using a pre-arranged codeword. This meant that the results were not to be reported as they were in actuality, but were rather to be exaggerated twofold.

Major Doi, stopping at one of the squadrons firing, observed closely both the marksmen and the results, as indicated by the markers. The squadron fired its last rounds and gave way to the next and last shift. This last shift did not have a full complement of men, and only eighteen men instead of the usual twenty-four stepped up to the firing-line. They assumed the prone position and fired their rounds. When the results were indicated it appeared that all twenty-four targets had been pierced for a "very good" or "excellent."

Major Doi couldn't contain himself and began to guffaw. Pointing toward the targets and continuing to laugh, he repeated several times: "They shoot well, very well . . ." and without taking leave of anyone, he walked away from the firing.

At last, summer camp came to an end, the maneuvers too were completed, and the troops returned to their winter quarters in Moscow. Soldiers who had completed their period of service were mustered out, and new recruits took their place. Major Doi rarely visited the First Squadron.

The First Squadron, upon arrival of the new recruits, was complemented with so-called "yearlings," that is, recruits who had finished their secondary education. According to the law at that time, this category of recruit had only to serve one year, and not the usual two. They received instruction according to a special elevated program and upon completion of one year of service they were separated as reserve officers.

It was ordered to keep secret from Major Doi the fact that the First Squadron was training officers, and to present it as simply an ordinary squadron.

On one occasion the First Squadron was in formation on the drill ground in front of the barracks when Major Doi appeared. He politely exchanged salutes with the squadron commander, and walking down the front of the formation together with him, looked closely into the faces of the soldiers. As he took his leave of the squadron commander, Doi San remarked offhandedly: "What intelligent faces the soldiers in your squadron have."

On the very same day Major Doi appeared altogether unexpectedly in the barracks of the First Squadron. At the time the Squadron was being instructed in ballistics. Under consideration were firing and computation tables, mathematical details of calculation which could not possibly have been part of the training for private soldiers.

The squadron commander in an aside gave the order to signal the end of the activity, although there were still more than ten minutes remaining until the end of the lesson. In a few seconds at the other end of the barracks the bugler sounded his call.

Major Doi, accompanied by the squadron commander, went up to the schedule of activities tacked to the wall of the classroom, examined it, looked at his watch, and, turning to the squadron commander, ironically remarked, with his characteristic ambiguous smile: "My watch is apparently ten minutes slow," set the hands of the watch, took his leave and departed the barracks.

Doi San understood perfectly well the situation which had been created in the regiment for his benefit. It seemed that the forms and methods applied for his "disinformation" were of greater interest to him than the military instruction itself.

One incident, however, literally enraged him, and thereafter he drastically changed his conduct and attitude toward those about him. In this incident, he very nearly lost his life.

In Moscow, Major Doi lived in the "National" hotel, and once as he was leaving for home by car from the regiment, just as he was leaving the Caserne "October," his chauffeur, a Soviet soldier, ignored the guard's signal to stop at the gate and the automobile, without slowing down, drove past the guard. From behind, a shot rang out and a bullet pierced the rear seat and the windshield.

Doi San was furious. He sprang from the car, Popov right behind him. White as a sheet, Major Doi ran up to the armed guard, and began to beat himself on the chest with his fists, crying out: "Go on and shoot, go on and shoot! That's what you need, you red militarists!"

Major Doi immediately returned to the caserne, called on the brigade commander and brusquely registered his complaint in the most biting terms. An apology was conveyed to him, together with the assurance that the soldier would be tried by a military tribunal. A little later, Major Doi was informed that the soldier had been sentenced to three years in prison. Doi San initiated a petition that the soldier be pardoned. In fact, the soldier had simply been transferred to another unit.

Soon thereafter Major Doi returned to Japan . . .

IN CONCLUSION it is interesting to note that, after Major Doi's departure for Japan, Popov did not return to the regiment, but was assigned to the Lenin Military-Political Academy and upon graduation, already in the rank of colonel in the political service, occupied an important post.

The assignment of the Japanese officer had been in accordance with a bilateral agreement between the USSR and Japan, which provided for an exchange of officers from the armed forces of both signatories on a basis of one officer from each fundamental branch of service: navy, aviation, infantry, artillery, and cavalry. (At that time there were no significant armored formations in the Soviet Army.) Officers of each country were to spend a year in the armed forces of the other country to familiarize themselves with the methods and program of instruction and training of the troops.

According to the conditions of the agreement, the officers so assigned were not to be in a rank higher than that of captain and were obliged to be line officers. Five Japanese officers arrived in the Soviet Union, among them Captain Doi.

A Soviet cavalry officer, no higher in rank than captain, was to proceed to Japan on a similar mission. One of the ranking military personalities of the section for foreign affairs in the war commissariat, an officer of the eleventh category (which was at that time the equivalent of a lieutenant-general) was so designated.

This sham Soviet "captain," for a number of weeks before his departure for Japan, intensively applied himself to the equestrian arts and to marksmanship with both pistol and rifle.

He also attended, as an observer, a number of exercises of a cavalry brigade. At an earlier date, he had indeed been a line officer and had served in the cavalry.

Removing his general's insignia and putting on those of a captain, and having received documents appropriate to his new rank, the Soviet general departed for Japan to carry out his mission. ■

"Doi San in Soviet Russia" is the work of Vyacheslav P. Artemiev, former regular army officer in the Soviet Army, who after World War II elected to cast his lot with the West. He has written a number of books and articles. "Doi San" recounts his first extensive contact with a foreigner in the Soviet Union. It has never before been published.

The narrative was translated by Dabney Chapman of USIA.

ADDRESS CHANGE?

Our mailing list can only be as up to date as you make it by sending in changes of address promptly. When you change posts, please fill out and mail a change of address form. One is appended here for your convenience.

NAME .....

OLD ADDRESS .....

NEW ADDRESS .....

ZIP IMPERATIVE

RUSSIA AND FRANCE

(*Continued from page* 20)

Continent with designs on neighboring territory and a desire to perpetuate tension. In keeping with this line, the Soviets are producing a steady stream of virulent anti-West German propaganda which maintains, among other things, that the notion of a menace from the East is propagated by Bonn as a means of acquiring atomic weapons to satisfy its aggressive ambitions. In this manner, Moscow hopes to derive dual benefits from the security issue—a growing interest in detente with Russia and a growing impatience with West German intransigence as the obstacle to its achievement.

Moscow obviously is well aware of—and shares—the mistrust of Germany that motivates de Gaulle and that is just barely beneath the surface in other West European capitals. The Soviets, therefore, probably regard de Gaulle as less enigmatic than he apparently is to others. They undoubtedly remember the reason for his first visit to Russia more than two decades ago. De Gaulle recalls in his "Memoirs" the thoughts he carried with him on that trip in the winter of 1944:

> . . . Perhaps it would be possible to renew the old Franco-Russian solidarity which, though repeatedly betrayed and repudiated, remained no less a part of the natural order of things, as much in relation to the German menace as to the endeavors of Anglo-American hegemony. I even envisaged a pact by virtue of which France and Russia would commit themselves to act in common if Germany would ever become a threat again.

His visit produced a Franco-Soviet friendship treaty which called for both sides to take in common all measures intended to oppose a new German threat. Russia repudiated it ten years later when France and Germany joined forces in NATO. Moscow probably looks for de Gaulle's long-held fears to spur him and then others to act again to impose restraints on a resurgent Germany. Before long, however, Moscow may expect more concrete evidence of movement in this direction than de Gaulle so far has been willing or able to provide.

The Russians have been receptive to de Gaulle's early efforts to reduce the power and influence of NATO and to initiate a series of bilateral agreements among NATO and non-NATO countries, understanding that they are prerequisite to an independent role for France. They have helped give him the significance he seeks as the West's champion of detente. But Moscow may not long be content merely to create an aura that is itself fraught with risk. The Soviets are not yet confident that de Gaulle, in pursuing his expressed desire to build a bridge in their direction, is willing to burn others behind him. Even in the absence of adverse developments suggesting a stronger role for Bonn in the wake of de Gaulle's initiative, the Russians are not likely to place great faith in France unless de Gaulle proves himself on the subject of prime interest to them. They would regard as the best evidence a direct move that would constitute *de facto* recognition of East Germany, and thus undercut Bonn's most cherished foreign policy position.

Moscow's ultimate gain in the maneuvering with de Gaulle would lie in a further solidification of the status

quo and the application by the West of checks on Bonn. The relative power position of France does not permit de Gaulle to accomplish the latter. Paradoxically, he may produce the former, however, not by design but as a result of the reaction to his pressures on the West for change. With these hopes in mind, Moscow will continue to make political capital out of the French initiative until and unless it becomes clear that support for it is counter-productive.

Given this assessment of the prospects and problems of their rapprochement with France, the Russians will move warily. They have invested very little in their relationship with de Gaulle, but already have profited from it. In the months ahead, their efforts will be focused on clarifying its course and persuading de Gaulle to come closer to their views on the German problem. While encouraging France, Moscow will pursue a course of action calculated to present an image of reasonableness toward those governments showing similar signs of "independence." It will maintain its unbending opposition to Bonn, but will avoid provocative statements or actions in sensitive areas such as Berlin.

The German problem, of course, has long been the most contentious in East-West relations, and the central concern of Soviet European policy. Soviet preoccupation with it has been a basic reason for Moscow's wish to see NATO disrupted. The very primacy of the problem for Soviet strategic interests in Europe, however, argues against any entente with de Gaulle that would aggravate it.

It is unlikely that Moscow overestimates de Gaulle's value, or that it has more than a limited interest in him as a mediator. Russia recognizes that America is the real power, and would prefer to deal directly with Washington. But at a time when the Victnam situation prevents progress in relations with the United States, de Gaulle enables Moscow to maintain a continuing—albeit circuitous—dialogue with the West. Moreover, while Moscow also explores the possibilities that disunity in NATO presents, the dialogue can be used to put Bonn on the defensive, keep the German problem in the forefront of Western thinking, and exploit impatience in the West European public with the East-West deadlock.

Moscow and Paris each believes, of course, that it can control the development of the rapprochement. The uncertainties of a more fluid situation developing in both East and West European alliances, however, make possible an unfolding of events with a scope and momentum that can carry both partners farther than they want to go. The basic problems and the many inhibiting factors involved in the continuation of Franco-Russian rapport make an entente appear improbable in the foreseeable future. A dramatic, protracted period of maneuvering is ahead, however, which at each turn will raise the prospect of far-reaching change in European alignments. At this stage, the USSR will search for ways in which to dramatize its relations with de Gaulle and will probe for short-term gains. Soviet diplomacy will be most active with France, but its ultimate target is Germany. In keeping with its long-term and primary European interests, Moscow therefore must be especially sensitive to the developing reaction to de Gaulle from Bonn and Washington. For Russia this will form the crucial guide to the conduct of its rapprochement with France. ■

BUDAPEST

(*Continued from page* 40)

hardly talk, others—his attitude was benevolent. He was bitter, but only in the sense of being disappointed.

And outside in the cold November of 1956 the war persisted, hundreds of Hungarians killed and suffering, men, women and children. For days the shelling went on and on; it seemed as if it would never stop, that there never would be a minute of silence, a minute of rest. One night the flames of the burning Archives Building cast their red glow over the Old Var in Buda, where the remains of a once beautiful palace, destroyed in the last war, still stand. For days we could not go out because of machine gun fire, and there was a regime-imposed curfew from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m.

The greater part of the center of the city, the big avenues which once were the shopping center, lay in ruins. I so well remember one shelled house. On the wall of what was left of a room a picture was still hanging—two boys with their heads close together in a black oval frame, probably a grandfather and his brother or cousin—one picture, the only survivor in the third floor apartment.

The telephone rang in our Legation most of the time—Hungarians asking for help, which we could not give; Madame Paul-Boncour, the wife of the French Minister, seeking a certain medicine for a French correspondent critically wounded by a machine gun (it did not help, he died); a young Secretary from the Yugoslav Legation desperately in need of milk for his infant boy—we managed to send some powdered milk, one of the three cans we had.

In the middle of all this tragedy a small variation lightened our life. One morning I heard that our houseman wanted to talk to me. In spite of the danger, being both efficient and curious by nature, he had managed to visit our house in Buda. He was very angry.

"Madame, I must report that your cook and your maid poured all the supply of wine and whiskey into the sink."

"What!"

"They were afraid of looting."

I did not know whether to cry or to laugh.

Our maid, a nice looking, plump nun (her monastery had been closed by the regime), was "brave as a lion" but scared to death of soldiers and most fearful of losing her virtue. She also mistrusted the gardener and his wife. Our cook, an unusually strong character of a woman, despised the maid and mistrusted the houseman. And the houseman did not like either of them. It was a wonderful situation! When we returned home later and I was ready to give the cook a piece of my mind, her eyes began to twinkle. "Madame, you must have known me; I carried the bottles to the furnace room and buried them in the coal. You will have them back before Christmas."

Later in December a regular delivery of coal was brought and a ton of it dumped on top of the pile. It was not until after the heating season that I saw rows of black, grimy bottles being washed in the kitchen. Under cover of night the cook had dug them out of their black grave.

On November 17th we went home —so quiet, so light, so green in the garden. Asters were still blooming. I filled the vases. How wonderful to sleep in a bed, to relax in my bathtub, to change clothes, to eat a decent hot meal.

For months we lived with a heavy heart. There were so many women in mourning; there was the unending curfew; there was still shooting at night. Those were the 21 days we shall never forget. ■

AMERICAN DECADE

(*Continued from page* 42)

Fundamental Revolution

If ideology is not going to be important, what will be the basis for power in the future? Ideology is a peculiar phenomenon politically. It came at a time of the mass popular awakening of hitherto dormant people, at a time of great social and ideological turmoil brought on by the industrial revolution. Its greatest impact was on the peasantry and the peasantry has really been the revolutionary force in our age, not the proletariat. In such a setting, it was very easy to ideologize politics, because in order to give the masses a sense of direction, you had to reduce political problems, human problems, to simple easy propositions and this is the function ideology performs. But we are now moving into a phase in which the basic human dilemmas are going to involve the relationship of science and technology to social organization and the human personality.

This is, perhaps, the last generation of the instinctive, mysterious human being. Another generation will see the inception of a capacity to program man, to determine his sex, to determine his intelligence, to determine his personality. This is going to be a fundamental revolution in the character of our society and individual human beings. In such a situation there are no ideological answers. Nor are the answers to be found in American 19th Century and 18th Century liberalism.

The new era will have to evolve new concepts of freedom for men. Ideological answers, rooted in a particular social experience are not going to be relevant. So much for the domestic aspects.

Internationally, will Europe or Japan be a threat to us? Of course the game of international politics will continue as long as there are large entities. But in all likelihood the concepts which have governed international conflicts hitherto are going to wane. With the age of nationalism—a peasant movement above all—land, territory and space became terribly important concepts, determining the behavior of nations. Most wars of the nationalist era have been fought over land—territorial issues. With the coming of ideology, ideological issues became very important.

As both of these fade we may find a situation in which these kinds of emotionalizing factors in international politics become less important, and nations will be able to adjust much more easily to each other on the basis of their common interests in survival, in well-being, in the development of science and its useful peaceful applications.

Changed Appraisal

There are signs that the Soviet Union has realized that Cuba is not the springboard for continental revolution as it had assumed at an earlier period. The Soviet Union, in all likelihood, now realizes that the principle of geographic fatalism is operative on this continent and that this hampers the notion that the drama of Cuba can be repeated. The Soviet must certainly have seen by now that Castro is a very peculiar kind of Marxist or Leninist; he is not amenable to "inspirational" direction from the Kremlin, all of which has soured the Soviets quite a bit.

Still, the Soviet Union doubtless feels it cannot afford to permit what we might call, in their jargon, a counter-revolution in Cuba because to them it's terribly important that there be no sudden change, that no communist power cease to be a communist power. But it is doubtful if the Soviet Union is going to make the kind of investment it did in Cuba at a time under Khruschev when it really thought it was the eve of Soviet paramountcy in the world. Cuba was being used as a springboard for completing the job. Considerable disillusionment has set in on the subject of native or nativistic revolutionaries, not only in Cuba but in China and elsewhere.

Germany's Future

The problem of Germany involves the necessity of keeping alive in Germany the sense of movement toward German reunification. It is inconceivable that in the age of nationalism, a large European nation should remain divided. But it is terribly important for us to convince the Germans (more and more Germans seem to be coming around to this point of view) that there is going to be no reunification of Germany in any context but the context of a larger European solution. In a divided Europe, there can be a divided Germany; in a Europe which is no longer divided there cannot be an artificially divided Germany. Hence, the Germans, as well as we, have a common interest in shaping a Europe in which the East Europeans and the Russians can participate.

China's Future

It seems unlikely that China will emerge as major global power in the next decade. It might, however, become an apocalyptic power but apocalyptic power is not effectively usable power unless you allow yourself to be terrified by it. And it does not seem likely that the Americans will become terrified. In China's present period of turmoil it seems quite likely that a new leadership will arise which will be much more anti-Soviet than anti-American. One should note the fact that the fight in China today is between a political faction which is ideologically militant and therefore emphasizes that the Soviet Union is China's number one enemy and a faction which is more moderate, composed of the party's bureaucracy and the military establishment which wants more weapons, which says that the United States is the number one enemy of China and feels that a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union is in its interest. Paradoxically this means that—contrary to the popular assumption in this country—it may be in our interest if the militants win. ■

Cairo. Ambassador Lucius D. Battle, right, looks on as Calvin McCormick, center, chairman of the board of the Cairo American College, shows a model of the future school complex to UAR Secretary of Education Ahmed Khakki.

Mogadiscio. Ambassador Raymond L. Thurston presents a braille watch to Issa Abdi Mussa, a blind Somali student. At Mr. Mussa's right is Miss Lois James, an American resident of Somalia, who has long been interested in Issa's case. The watches were donated by the Zale Jewelry Company through arrangements made by the then Deputy Assistant Secretary for Community Advisory Services, Katie Louchheim.

SERVICE GLIMPSES

LaPaz. Ambassador Douglas Henderson presents the wife ot the Bolivian Vice President, Sra. Clemencia de Siles Salinas, to Miss Armenta Adams, an American pianist. Vice President Salinas is at the right. Miss Adams played nine concerts in four cities in Bolivia.

Lubumbashi. On the afternoon of October 5, the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of the Congo announced that diplomatic relations with Portugal were severed and that "the existence of all consulates in the interior is suspended." Accordingly American Consulates and Cultural Centers at Lubumbashi, Bukavu and Luluabourg did not open their doors on Thursday. Photograph shows the closed gates of the Lubumbashi Consultate with sign reading, "The Consular Services of this office will be suspended until further notice." The ban was lifted before the day was over.

Washington. Former President Eisenhower visited the Eighth Floor of the Stae Department for the first time on September 13. Here he looks at a portrait of Thomas Jefferson, painted in 1813. Thus the two ex-presidents are looking at each other across 150 years of history. President Eisenhower showed particular interest in the table on which the Treaty of Paris was signed, the Louisiana Purchase desk and the other objects of historic importance.



LETTERS to the EDITOR

He Was Human, Modest, Witty and Magnetic

Some eloquent words about Elim O'Shaughnessy, who died in Budapest on September 24, 1966 were spoken by Ambassador Cecil Lyon at a requiem mass held in Washington on November 16.

WE have gathered here today to pay respectful tribute to Elim O'Shaughnessy. As we his friends know, Elim was someone very special. One might say there could be only one Elim. But again as we his friends know there were two Elims. The polished, well tailored, old world-gentlemanly Elim which he showed to the world at large, and the warm, very human, modest, witty and magnetic Elim, whose company we all enjoyed. Both these Elims had great charm and style. Both made friends easily, both were gracious, had good manners, were kindly and much sought after.

While we tend to associate Elim with the pleasant things of life he nonetheless looked at the world through dark glasses and was basically a serious man, deeply interested in international affairs and in the Foreign Service, to which he contributed so greatly, and was so deeply loyal.

Elim had finesse in diplomacy. His was a distinguished career in which his Service spirit was paramount. Where and when the Department willed he went. Moreover, as we recall, he had the courage and determination to overcome the many obstacles which were placed in his way when he wanted above all else to join the Foreign Service; the same Service in which his parents had preceded him. Actually Elim was very much a bridge between our parents and us, for he possessed many of the finer qualities of the last generation, yet he was totally of ours.

Orphaned (as long as most of us recall) and without any close relatives, in spite of countless friends Elim was basically a lonely man until that fortuitous day in Bonn when he met Mary. His whole life thereafter changed, taking on new meaning, purpose and depth.

I recall distinctly the Elim I met a quarter of a century ago in Rio. We last saw him and Mary a few years ago in Paris. It's remarkable how little he'd changed during the intervening years. In fact, one of his endearing qualities was his ability to remain the same, good humored friend —whatever the circumstances. Whether one met him here at home, or in Moscow or Natal, whether he was well or ill, wherever he was he bore with him a fillip of dash and glamour and few people possessed his ability of being warm hearted and witty in so many languages, yet always with his own touch, his own flair, uniquely Elim's. It is probably that gift of being totally himeslf and true to his character that we shall miss most, when we think of him, and think of him we shall and cherish his memory until the day when we too follow him to his new post.

It would seem fitting to have these words appear in the JOURNAL.

JOHN STUTESMAN

Washington

Comforting Words

IN his letter in the September JOURNAL Edward Howatt criticized the new rules on "profit" from the sale of personal property abroad. I agree with much of what he said, but some comfort can perhaps be taken from this little tale.

Having recently sold a car for a little more than I paid for it, I dutifully gave a tax-deductible contribution of $250 to my daughter's college. By an ingenious and providential lottery system, my name was drawn from among 400 who had similarly contributed, and, as the winner of the fifth prize, I can now designate the recipient of a four-year scholarship of $300 a year at that college at any time during the next 20 years.

OUTERBRIDGE HORSEY

Washington

Pages from the Past

WHILE classifying donated books for the St. Vincent de Paul Society's book store I came upon some mementoes of the family of Emil Sauer, Consul-General in Toronto in 1935 which may be of interest to his family. They consist of newspaper cuttings, memberships in the Rio de Janeiro golf club, a personal note and three charming Victorian type photographs of young girls. These may have a sentimental value to Mr. Sauer, if he is still alive, or to his descendants. Can you ask your readers about it?

I can be reached by telephone at my home, 336-6641 or between 11 a.m. and 3 p.m. at the St. Vincent de Paul book store, 1436 U St., N.W.

MRS. M. P. MURPHY

Washington

Wants More "Provocative" Articles

I LISTENED with particular interest to the remarks about the JOURNAL and the Association at the Foreign Service luncheon meeting in September. As I remember, U. Alexis Johnson stated that within limits the JOURNAL might well be an organ of opinion, one of its appropriate roles being that of debate. On the same occasion the Chairman of the Board of Directors mentioned the difficulty of obtaining original articles for the JOURNAL as well as the need to increase Association membership.

The whole question of the function and content of the JOURNAL is a pertinent one and one about which most of its readers will have some thoughts. Should it be an organ of debate? Should it be a combination of both? Many readers appear satisfied, even enthusiastic, with the present contents of the JOURNAL. Some readers, and I must admit I am among them, would like to see a publication with more emphasis on articles discussing controversial foreign policy issues. As I think back over many years of devoted JOURNAL reading, I wonder how much debate or opinion it has presented. Without the benefit of research, I can remember many articles of anecdotal interest, others of a personnel and administrative nature—but relatively few which examined dispassionately a controversial question of foreign policy. One of these appeared in the October issue—on US China policy—and the JOURNAL is to be commended for printing it.

Getting back to the other subjects brought up at the September luncheon of the Association—the need for increased membership and the difficulty of obtaining articles for the JOURNAL —I wonder if there may not be a connection between these two, and if indeed both may not be related to the kind of JOURNAL we now have. In other words, might not a more stimulating JOURNAL increase membership in the Association? Also, might not a JOURNAL which showed itself ready to print controversial articles attract from its readers more material than at present? The disclaimer which prefaces each issue of the JOURNAL ("Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writer and is not intended to indicate the official views of the Department of State —") seems to have little relevance to the kind of publication we now have. Might it not be healthy to have a few more articles that did *not* represent the official views of the Department?

ERIC KOCHER

Washington

Burning Questions

SEVERAL QUESTIONS:

a) Was the September issue sent out late so that none of us could argue with the editors or letter writers until December or January?

b) Can we discuss Foreign Service problems "within the family" in the JOURNAL as indicated by Ed Howatt's letter about car sales?

c) Will our various non-Foreign Service readers understand that we need kitchen conversation as much as foreign policy discussion?

If the JOURNAL answers correctly (a-no; b-yes; c-yes), I would like to answer Ed Howatt's letter in your September issue.

Ed Howatt is dead right in criticizing the Department for pretending that there are few complaints about the ban on profitable sales of personal effects by Foreign Service personnel. By rule of ear I estimate that at least 67 per cent (a presidential election landslide) think this rule unfair. By rule of 16 years service I estimate that the tradition of profiting by overseasmanship, which was firmly established by the time I entered the Service, should last at least 30 years. Why should the Department pretend that Foreign Service personnel are too altruistic to grab a legal extra buck when it's available.

Friend Howatt may also be right in saying any American has the constitutional right to dispose of his personal property as he sees fit. The courts will decide this and the Department may then have to seek other means of regulating the household sales of American Government employees abroad.

But back to the basic question—why didn't the Department tell us the reason for the administrative ruling? Easy, because the Department of State, like the Foreign Service JOURNAL, is too anxious to search out and print those nice things our friends find to say about us. Let's admit it, our best friends won't tell us some unpleasant truths.

But others will, and here's what they'll say:

(1) At (a few) (some) (many) posts, the average American employee can sell his car at double the original price, and can double his profit again by judicious selection of household effects.

(2) The Americans who so profit and calculate are not only low—but high-paid personnel, who may be wounded but are not stricken by the ordinary breakage and loss of Foreign Service life.

(3) The sight of hundreds of Americans at a single post all importing the single most profitable brand and model of automobiles, appliances, furniture, etc. for future re-sale value is visible proof of individual enterprise at its rampant, rapacious worst, and

(4) If Americans' salaries and shipping and housing allowances are so low as to require private, individual profit-making, why don't these Americans use their liberty to correct by ordinary means their unhappy wage, salary and living conditions.

So let me add one vote in favor of the regulation but also one vote against the sanctimonious treatment which aroused Ed Howatt.

And so one more question: why doesn't the Department, in the JOURNAL, or at least in the privacy of an official circular, explain the reasons for the ban on personal profits in car sales?

MAL CONTENT

APO New York

More on Kraftsmanship

A PLAGUE on both your houses (as President Roosevelt said, I believe to John L. Lewis and to the coal mine owners about a strike in the 1930's).

Mr. Joseph Kraft has attacked (Washington POST, September 30, 1966) and the FSJ has defended the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

Neither the attack nor the defense seem to me to be of any great relevance or interest.

The attack, in a loose-jointed piece of prose, seems to be against the unimaginative and self-serving comportment of the Department of State. This comportment, Mr. Kraft asserts, is what it is because the Department is staffed by career officers who are mainly interested in promotion.

The FSJ, in an inelegant rebuttal, says that the Department and the Service have large numbers of senior officials from "civilian life," that the demand for FSOs is greater than the Department can provide for, and that FSOs are courageous (in Vietnam), and have played meaningful roles in the birth of policy (citing names).

Now the Department of State doesn't make policy. The President makes policy. His advisors help him.

Sometimes his advisors are in Departments. Advisors or advice about foreign policy may come from the Department of State, or from Treasury, DOD, Agriculture or Commerce, but his advisors are more often than not men holding Presidential appointments—those who are members of what Harlan Cleveland called the political executive in a brilliant essay he wrote in the 1950's.

In any case, the existence of a career service in State (or at the Post Office) whose principal business is to conduct the business of the US Government, seems to me to be irrelevant to the quality or origins of ideas about foreign policy. And it seems to me absurd to deny that members of a career service are interested in promotion or to attack them for this reason. If there is a subject worth discussing in this area, neither Mr. Kraft nor the FSJ has identified it. Let me try. How does one use a corps of career officers who, at their best are very good, and who at their worst are somewhat knowledgeable about "abroad and foreigners" (characterized, not without reason as "bloody and hell" respectively by an anonymous Victorian lady) in the difficult and complex business of analyzing and resolving the innumerable elements, domestic and foreign, of what is still called foreign policy. A grand design isn't nearly enough. Neither is an able body of professional diplomats.

JO W. SAXE

Washington

Who's Zoo?

HERE is a poem I wrote that I thought you might like to use.

Llamas

One of these creatures might make a good pet,

but I'm told they're quite hard to get.

They shed lots of hair and scratch floors with their feet.

and I haven't a guess as to what they will eat.

But I certainly don't want to discourage

owning a pet of such loyalty and courage.

They easily learn tricks, and never will bite,

and they love to warm you up on a cold winter's night.

I haven't a clue, though, what to do

in case one's llama becomes a mama.

But, if you think it would be fun I'll try

and Quetchuan.

DAVID HUTCHISON

Lima