Foreign Service Journal

JANUARY 1969
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Foreign Service Journal

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THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION is composed of active and retired personnel who are or have been serving at home or abroad under the authority of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended. It groups together people who have a common responsibility for the implementation of foreign policy. It seeks to encourage the development of a career service of maximum effectiveness, and to advance the welfare of its members.

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EDITORIALS

Farewell to Secretary Rusk

WHEN Dean Rusk surrenders the seals of his high office on the 20th of this month, he will have served longer as Secretary of State than any of his predecessors except Cordell Hull. Eight years ago he remarked that during his tenure the Foreign Service and the Department of State would be his "constituency." We are proud to have been both his constituents and his colleagues. He leaves with our best wishes for the peace and happiness he so richly deserves in the years ahead.

The Service will remember Secretary Rusk with admiration and respect. No chief could have set higher professional standards for those whose life work is the conduct of the nation's foreign affairs. The great personal qualities that have so distinguished his performance as Secretary of State are, after all, the qualities of the diplomat: patience, perseverance, composure, integrity, loyalty and courage under fire. As a true professional himself, he has been a superb representative, negotiator and spokesman for our country.

We will also remember Dean Rusk for the courtesy and consideration with which he treated those who worked with and for him. He has brought to his office the dignity it deserves—but dignity without pretension or affectation. With all the immense pressures on him, he has somehow been able to carry himself with calm steadiness and unfailing good spirit. Many in the Service, high and low, have been touched by the Secretary's kindness and warmth. For this he leaves with our gratitude and affection.

These sentiments apply equally to his wife. In the best tradition of our Service, Virginia Rusk has given unsparingly of herself to help her husband. No Service wife has ever worked harder or with more devotion—and none has made so many friends for the United States in the process.

We wish them both Godspeed. ■

. . . And to Administrator William C. Gaud

WE also would like to express our admiration for the contribution of William C. Gaud, departing Administrator of AID. Like Secretary Rusk, he served his agency for the full eight years of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. He entered AID as Assistant Administrator for the Near East and South Asia Bureau. From there he became Deputy Administrator under David Bell and on Mr. Bell's departure in July 1966 he was named Administrator. Mr. Gaud has been an effective and widely respected administrator. He was always willing to listen, and he had a remarkable ability to cut through verbiage to identify the essence of the problem being presented. He was a direct, down-to-earth, genuine human being with a great impatience for sham and bureaucratic obfuscation. His outspoken support of the aid program—to which he was firmly committed—and his support of his staff were greatly appreciated. His reputation for humorous and pertinent comments was widely known and well based. We will miss him. We wish him success in his new endeavors. ■

. . . With Congratulations to Recipients of Honor Awards

THE JOURNAL wishes to add its congratulations to the recipients of Departmental awards presented by the Secretary at the Sixteenth Honor Awards Ceremony of the Department of State on December 5. Awards were received by 250 individuals and 36 units for superior performance, dedicated service, and courageous deeds by employees of the Department, the Foreign Service, Agency for International Development, United States Information Agency, and the Peace Corps. The United States is indeed fortunate to have the services of these devoted men and women.

We wish to give special recognition to the four recipients of the Department's highest award, the Secretary's Award, all of which were presented posthumously. Messrs. Robert K. Franzblau (AID), John Gordon Mein (Ambassador to Guatemala), Stephen H. Miller (USIA), and Dwight Hall Owen, Jr. (AID) gave the fullest measure of themselves, their lives, in the service of their country.

In addition to these awards, we also salute those members of the Department who have received awards from private organizations. Included in this list are Secretary Rusk (Brian McMahon Memorial Award for Distinguished Public Service), Mr. Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary, (William Allen White Foundation's Award for Journalistic Merit), Mr. Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Advisor, (Rockefeller Public Service Award), the Office of News, Bureau of Public Affairs (Ruder and Finn-American University Public Information Award) and Mr. Frank J. Mrkva, Passport office, (George Washington Award for patriotic service). ■

And a Warm Welcome to Secretary-designate Rogers

WE congratulate William Pierce Rogers on his appointment by the President-elect to the senior position in the cabinet, that of Secretary of State. He will have awesome responsibilities, a fearful work load, and, no doubt, he will be serenaded by choruses of praise or condemnation, both here and abroad. But along with the burden of office goes the priceless opportunity for service in an enterprise of vast significance that must deal with nothing less than the vital question of how mankind, divided into separate, often clashing nation states, can avoid war, promote prosperity, and seek the general good. In assuming the direction of America's foreign policy, Mr. Rogers has not only the best wishes of members of the foreign service and of the Association which represents them. He also will have their energy and their talents as sources of strength and support during the challenging years ahead. ■

The Foreign Service JOURNAL welcomes contributions and will pay for accepted material on publication. Photos should be black and white glossies and should be protected by cardboard. Color transparencies (4 x 5) may be submitted for possible cover use.

Please include full name and address on all material submitted and a stamped, self-addressed envelope if return is desired.

The JOURNAL also welcomes letters to the editor. Pseudonyms may be used only if the original letter includes the writer's correct name. All letters are subject to condensation.

Address material to: Foreign Service Journal, 2101 E St., N.W., Washington, D. C. 20037.

Microfilm copies of current as well as of back issues of the Foreign Service JOURNAL will be available through the University Microfilm Library Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 under a contract signed October 30.

About this issue . . .

The January issue leads off with an article by Alan Carter, long a trenchant champion of the "packaged program" concept for the USIA. Here he gives a detailed analysis of the problem and an argument for his approach. The JOURNAL gives greatest emphasis in its pages to those articles which deal directly with matters of concern to its readers and to items that are not likely to be covered in other publications. Hence, we do not generally seek the "substantive" piece but when one is submitted that we consider to be particularly provocative, we are glad to publish it. Charles Maechling's report on "Our Internal Defense Policy" was one substantive submission that appeared to us to warrant careful attention by JOURNAL readers. Details of foreign service personnel to universities are not new but Fred Gerlach and Mark Beach submit new wrinkles in their approach to the problem. As Townsend Harris remains such a fascinating personality in American diplomacy, and as Carl Boehringer writes so well, we felt the article on the businessman-diplomat worthy of the attention of our readers. And if the JOURNAL has a basically serious purpose, there still is nothing wrong with some fun and whimsy. Alexandra Hill brings us some of both in her article on celebrating New Year's. Frank Snowden Hopkins does some expert speculating as he looks ahead to what the Year 2001 may mean to us. And finally, Idris Rossell has submitted an important report on the Negro in the foreign service, why there aren't more at this time, and what is being done about this.

About other activities . . .

The JOURNAL has prepared a book that should titillate all fans of "Life and Love in the Foreign Service." A collection of the photos and captions is being prepared at the time of this writing in hopes that it will be ready for FS personnel to give as off-beat Christmas presents. But if production plans prove to be too slow during the Christmas rush, then the booklet will still be good for smiles in 1969.

About future issues . . .

The next two editions of the JOURNAL will be specials. Archie Bolster and Virginia Schafer, both of the Editorial Board, have been working for several months with editor Shirley Newhall on a special issue devoted to women in the Foreign Service. And March will see a giant-size edition as the JOURNAL celebrates its 50th anniversary. We have asked a number of distinguished contributors to these pages to write for this edition. We hope to have some reviews of the JOURNAL over the years, and we are counting on a Wendell Blancke poem to grace the occasion. Finally, we are trying to get an exclusive interview with a world renowned figure to top the issue off.

John Bacon, executive director of ACDA, wrote us a letter with a very constructive idea. Why don't we, he suggestd, let our readers know what upcoming subjects for special editions will be well in advance so that they might either volunteer articles or submit letters to the editor in advance. This imposes certain difficult planning problems on the Board and the editor, but essentially Mr. Bacon's idea is a good one. Consequently, we hope to announce in an early issue a schedule of future "subject-editions" and contributions (meeting JOURNAL standards, of course) will be welcome.

About the cover . . .

BARRETT STEPHENS, wife of Bart N. Stephens, USIA, is making her second appearance as the JOURNAL'S cover artist. Mr. and Mrs. Stephens are now in Vienna. The cover painting is the property of Mr. and Mrs. Eldon Stephens (no relation) of Birmingham.

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Marriages

CARPENTER-LANE. Martha Erwin Carpenter, daughter of FSR and Mrs. Francis W. Carpenter, was married to Patrick Michael Lane, on November 23, in Morrill, Nebraska. Mr. Carpenter is Chief, Public Services Division, Vietnam Bureau, AID.

HORBERG-SHIRLEY. FSO Katherine Ann Horberg was married to FSIO John W. Shirley, on November 10, in Chicago.

SERVICE-PARSONS. Margaret Louise Service, daughter of FSO and Mrs. Richard Montgomery Service, was married to José Charles Parsons, on September 7, in Portola Valley, California.

VAN PELT-BENDER-FORD. Marijke van Pelt-Bender was married to John Henry Ford, son of FSO and Mrs. John W. Ford, on December 21, at The Hague, Netherlands. Mr. and Mrs. John H. Ford will make their home in the United States.

WOOTTON-BLACK. Cheryl Lynn Wootton, daughter of FSO and Mrs. Charles Greenwood Wootton, was married to David Martin Black, on October 12, in Plymouth, Mass. The bride is a student at Wellesley, the groom at Harvard.

Births

OTTO. A son, Mark Allan, born to FSO and Mrs. Allan W. Otto, on October 23, in Washington.

Deaths

DAVIS. Loyce E. Davis, wife of Ambassador Roy Tasco Davis, retired, died on December 3, in Washington. Mrs. Davis accompanied her husband when he was appointed Ambassador to Costa Rica in 1921 and headed several local educational and charitable organizations during the eight years he held that post. In 1929 Mr. Davis was appointed Ambassador to Panama and served there for four years, and in 1953 Ambassador to Haiti. He resigned in 1958. Mrs. Davis is survived by her husband of 3802 Thornapple St., Chevy Chase, Md., a daughter, Mrs. Robert L. Lowe, and a son, Consul General Roy Tasco Davis, Jr.

MAYER. Ernest de Wael, FSO-retired, died on December 16, in Lime Rock, Conn. Mr. Mayer entered the Foreign Service in 1931 and retired in 1963, after serving at Southampton, Havre, Paris, Casablanca, Rabat, London, Brussels, Baden Baden, Quebec and as consul at Tangiers. He is survived by his wife, at the Gate House, White Hollow Road, Lime Rock, Conn. 06039, and two children.

COOK'S TOUR

by Helen Kindler Behrens

Stuart Hannon was the Public Affairs Officer in Stuttgart many years ago when my husband was the Amerika Haus director. Stu and his wife, Marian, had just returned from home leave before our transfer to Washington came through, and they planned a farewell party for us. During our months of exile, Marian, who came from California, and I had extolled the virtues of the avocado, and had commiserated with each other about the lack of them in post-war Germany. She promised to eat enough for us both during her leave, but actually she did better than that; carefully wrapped in cotton wool in the middle of her suitcase were two avocados which were to be enjoyed in private by Hannons and Behrenses.

Unfortunately, the jack-of-all trades who helped out at parties in Stuttgart was a sophisticated one, and he knew exactly what to do with an avocado. When he found them in the kitchen (without checking with Marian) he immediately mashed them up with blue cheese into a somewhat unlovely dip. Our loss was the party's gain, but I have always felt that blue cheese has too distinctive a flavor to mix with the delicate avocado. Much more suitable is the Latin American Guacamole, which, when mixed with diced, fresh tomatoes, can be served on lettuce as a salad. Here is one version of it as a dip.

GUACAMOLE

Peel and mash or blend three avocados; add two tablespoons of lime juice right away to keep the pulp from turning brown. (Lemon juice may be substituted.) Mince or blend one medium onion and mix it with the following ingredients: 1 tablespoon chopped fresh chili pepper or 1 teaspoon chili powder; 1 tablespoon chopped fresh coriander (this is called *cilantro* in South America; you can obtain it at your nearest Chinatown by asking for "Chinese parsley."); one small diced tomato (optional); 1 tablespoon olive oil; 1 mashed garlic clove; 1 teaspoon salt; several twists of freshly ground pepper. Combine this mixture with the avocado and let stand in the refrigerator to blend the flavors before serving.

Crisp tortillas are filled with guacamole in Mexico, but corn chips make an ideal dipping agent.

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AHA! to ALPHABETIZERS

S. I. NADLER

DEATH *to* DIPLOMATS.

That is the title of the third volume of an encyclopedia on American Law. Look for yourself. It may be found in the library of the Foreign Service Institute. I noticed it a few years ago, quite by accident, and it struck me then as humorous coincidence. Not so any longer!

I am now convinced that coincidence had nothing to do with a volume of a specialized encyclopedia's being titled DEATH *to* DIPLOMATS. Chilling as the idea may be, it was—and is—an exhortation. It would, after all, require only a minimal amount of juggling and rearranging of printed matter to have the title of that particular volume work out to something like DEARTH *to* DIPLOMA.

Mounting evidence has compelled me to conclude that a sinister and most subtle plot has long been, and is still being, conducted subliminally to undermine our most hallowed institutions and destroy our most cherished values.

Those who produce the "Encyclopedia Americana," for example, suggest inequity under law with the title of Volume 6, which charges CASTE *to* CIVIL LAW. And they try to keep alive the Hiss-Chambers case, running the gamut in the title of Volume 22 from PHOTOGRAPHY *to* PUMPKIN. Those behind "Collier's Encyclopedia" seem to have responsibility for military aspects of the plot. Obviously sold on air power and determined that no more shall the caissons go rolling along, they write off the big guns—by way of the title of Volume 2—with an AMEN *to* ARTILLERY. Nor do they think the foot soldier is necessary in modern warfare, demanding, with Volume 12, that we turn on and apply the HEAT *to* INFANTRY.

If these plot indicators raised my eyebrows, a more recent (1968) publication caused them to climb up into my receding hairline. I refer to the "Dictionary of Quotations" (Selected and Arranged and with Comments by Bergen Evans), issued by Delcorte Press. The tome further leads me to suspect that the plotters, having so long escaped detection, have become over-confident and possibly careless. Consider the following sampling of judgments and exhortations, represented by the headings of various pages.

Prescribing the application of MODERATION *to* MODESTY (page 547), the "Dictionary of Quotations" asks the transformation of BLUSH *to* BOLDNESS (68) and recommends the taking of BEAUTY *to* BED (51). For men who are weak in the persuasiveness department, it bluntly suggests (27) GIFT (s) *to* GIRL (s). Oh, to be sure, it gives lip service (163), in passing, to DENIAL *to* DESIRE (s), but it reveals its true intent by admitting (492) an OBLIGATION *to* OBSCENITY.

This guile shows through in another area. Early speaking like a simple travel agent, the book extols JOURNEY(s) *to* JOY (360), but later makes its pitch to potential defectors to TRAVEL *to* TREACHERY (705).

While not transparently teetotalitarian, the "Dictionary" warns of the progression from RUE *to* RUM (601) and reminds the government (680) that there are always TAVERN(s) *to* TAX.

There are messages, too, for today's student dissidents. The relationship of STRIKE *to* STUDY(IES) is slyly recorded (663), and the path of REBELLION *to* REFORM is cited (577).

With uncommon foresight, the "Dictionary of Quotations" makes sure that the press will not closely scrutinize and call attention to it. Recognizing (233) that life offers FELICITY *to* FEW, it goes on to ascribe (25) FORTUNE *to* FOURTH ESTATE. That alone would obviously cause any journalist to write the book off as howlingly uninformed. Columnists and commentators are thrown off the scent by the device of frankly espousing (499) OPPOSITION *to* ORACLES. And to eliminate the last possibility of receiving unwelcome attention from newspapers or supplements, the book blithely equates (7) BOOK REVIEW *to* BOREDOM.

As might be expected, an air of pragmatism prevails throughout. The tie-in of IMMORTALITY *to* IMPOSSIBILITY is duly stated (342). That a man has little chance of being appreciated by his contemporaries is implied by the delineation (290) of the route via the GRAVEYARD *to* GREATNESS.

Mirroring the supreme confidence of the plotters, "Dictionary of Quotations" candidly admits (423) MALICE *to* MAN, as well as its role as a MENACE *to* MEN AND WOMEN (443).

There shines through, however, a single ray of hope—that perhaps the plotter may be having second thoughts and relenting. On page 605, the "Dictionary of Quotations" pleads for SALVATION *to* SANTA CLAUS. ■

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY— *Too Much Or Not Enough?*

IDRIS ROSSELL

A RETIRED Foreign Service officer dropped into my office during the annual Foreign Service meeting in November and said, "Do you really think we need any more of this? I read the last NEWSLETTER and they had a full page of pictures showing the new junior officer class. It looked to me like half of them were minority." Corridor conversations and cryptic comments such as, "You have to be a Negro these days to get hired," also confirm that employees in general, and Foreign Service officers in particular, know next to nothing about the difficulties of recruiting and hiring Negroes and other minorities for officer level positions in the Foreign Service. As a matter of fact in 1961 there were 17 Negro Foreign Service officers out of a corps of 3700 and in 1967 there were 19.

Yet today an annual sizable intake of representatives of minority groups into the Department of State is assured—at least until 1973—thanks to the success of a pilot program undertaken more than a year and a half ago. The program was approved at the highest levels of the Department and is the brainchild of Eddie Williams, former director of State's EEO program. It provides for an annual minimum intake of 20 minority representatives into junior officer training programs between FY 69 and FY 73. It is a temporary expedient which comes after seven years of discouragement and frustration in attempts to help Negroes, Spanish-surnamed persons and others to seek and to prepare themselves for careers in the Foreign Service.

The Situation in 1961

In 1961, with only 17 Negro Foreign Service officers in a corps of 3732 officers, studies were undertaken to find out why there were so few. One of the first studies showed that few Negro candidates were taking the written FSO examination, and, when they did, they were failing it almost to a man. No more than five or six of the estimated 300 Negro candidates who took the examinations between 1959 and 1961 passed it. Half of the 300 were from predominantly Negro colleges where 80 percent of all Negroes attended college. These institutions had and still have limited facilities and limited funds. Students attending them were and still are hampered even more by the poor quality of secondary school training which is typical generally of the segregated systems from which the great majority came. The educational deficiencies lie chiefly in the areas of reading, English usage, vocabulary and mathematics—the elements of two key sections of the Foreign Service officer examination.

At the same time, able Negro students were turning to traditional fields—medicine, law, the ministry, and teaching. State's image was such as to discourage them from considering careers in the Foreign Service. Stories of discrimination in selection procedures circulated freely. And, of course, the FSO written examination places a serious handicap on individuals from culturally deprived backgrounds, from rural areas, and from low socio-economic levels of our society regardless of their innate ability. Until 1961 recruiting teams did not even visit predominantly Negro campuses.

There has been some mitigation of these factors. But others have developed in the past five years which continue to make recruitment a problem. These range from more and varied opportunities in all fields, a desire to help with domestic urban problems and greater monetary rewards outside of Government to the attraction of politics as a means of achieving power and to disillusionment with Government policy in Vietnam.

According to Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, the social psychologist, the adverse psychological impact of failing the FSO examination is another factor why relatively few Negro and other minorities take the exam. Dr. Clark says minority individuals who have achieved college success are faced by psychological and cultural barriers when forced to prove themselves again by yet another test. As one young Negro put it, "Most young Negroes can choose jobs anywhere, so forget it! Who needs it."

Foreign Affairs Scholars Program

But for the 80 percent who attended Negro colleges, a deeper inquiry was needed.

In 1961 the presidents of eleven predominantly Negro colleges were approached for help and advice. In December, 1962 they reported, "The major obstacle that has to be faced and solved is the educational deficiency which a large number of Negro students bring to their college careers."

■ IDRIS ROSSELL, Deputy Director of OEO, has been associated with the program since it was so designated in June, 1963. She came to the Department in 1948 as a staff member of the Voice of America and resigned in 1954 to enter advertising. She worked as a copywriter and editor on Madison Avenue and returned to the Department in 1962. She has served under three Directors: Richard K. Fox, Jr., FSO-3, currently Counselor of Embassy at Madrid; Eddie N. Williams, who resigned in October to accept an assistant vice presidency at the University of Chicago; and now Frederick D. Pollard, Jr., who has had extensive experience in this field and served as Deputy Executive Director of the Chicago Commission on Human Relations.

The presidents also reported, "We cannot institute the needed corrective programs nor strengthen curricula in the all-important areas of the social sciences and humanities without major long-term financial assistance."

Several proposals were advanced for consideration by foundations. The first one envisioned the expenditure of $13.3 million over an eight year period. The final one, accepted by the Ford Foundation in October, 1963, was funded by a $600,000 grant to Howard University. This became known as the Foreign Affairs Scholars Program.

Each year approximately 40 students, mainly juniors in college, were selected for summer internships in Washington. Since 1964, 20 have served each year in State, and ten each in AID and USIA. Seminars during the summer were intended to help the Scholars in preparing for the FSO written examination. During their senior year in college up to 25 students a year could be selected for fellowships of approximately $4,000 a year for one year of graduate study "in an institution having a program of study especially helpful to persons preparing for careers in foreign affairs."

Altogether 154 young men and women participated in the four-year program. The last group interned in the summer of 1967 and for the most part these Scholars are in graduate school. The program ends officially in August, 1969.

In 4 years only 17 Foreign Affairs Scholars have passed the written examination. Two were graduates of predominantly Negro schools. For the rest, the program was not sufficient to overcome educational deficiencies. The 17 successful candidates have produced six additions to the Foreign Service in the State Department, one to USIA; six are still in graduate school; one failed the oral and three are no longer interested in the Foreign Service.

At least half of the 154 participants, however, have passed the Civil Service Commission's Federal Service Entrance Examination. Three are working in AID, five more in the Department of State, and one in USIA. An estimated 30 or more are employed in city, state, and Federal government positions. Ten are known to be teaching. Several are in military service. And a third are estimated to be in graduate or professional school. The full effect of the FASP will not be known for at least another three to five years. However, the intangible salutary results derived from the FASP are many:

- The very existence of the FASP has helped to focus the attention of minority students and minority communities in general on foreign affairs as possible career objectives,
- More than 87 different schools including 30 predominantly Negro schools have participated in the program,
- The FASP has served as evidence of the Department's genuine interest in attracting minority talent.

Thinking the Unthinkable

By the Spring of 1967 there were still only 19 Negro Foreign Service officers. Furthermore, in spite of intensive recruiting efforts, only 157 Negroes out of some 3900 candidates had taken the written examination in December, 1966 (see Chart I) and only five had passed. By then, too, experience with the Foreign Affairs Scholars Program clearly indicated that significant numbers of minority candidates would not be available from this source.

What if the Department were to select candidates who had not passed the written examination, but who had qualifications similar in every other respect to candidates who had been able to pass the written? There was already a body of literature indicating that written examinations might not be relevant to success on the job. There is, in fact, a general questioning by universities, labor unions, private businesses, and the Federal Government itself of the validity of all written examinations. As a result, many business organizations no longer give written examinations, some colleges and universities have stopped giving grades or rank ordering their

CHART I

Comparison of Total and Negro Applicants Taking The Foreign Service Officer Examination

	Examined		Passed Written		Passed Oral	
Year	Total	Negro*	Total	Negro	Total	Negro
1961	3,815	119	1,068	4	227	3
1962	2,773	110	1,079	8	826	2
1963	5,325	189	952	3	182	0
1964	6,294	209	1,184	4	276	2
1965	6,232	232	1,552	11†	505	8†
1966	3,904	157	1,004	6‡	339	6‡
1967	4,163	189	856	7	196**	6**

* Based on "head count" by Civil Service examiners at examination sites.
** A number of candidates still remain to be examined. Some of them may be minority, but this will not be known until they appear for the oral.
† 1 is USIA.
‡ 2 are for USIA.

students and the Civil Service Commission is giving "outstanding scholar" status and an automatic score of 95 per cent to certain candidates who are not taking the Federal Service Entrance Examination. What is more, it is possible to tutor candidates so that they can pass examinations—including the Foreign Service written examination. A successful "cram" course was given for many years at a local university with 75 to 80 per cent of its graduates being able to pass the written examination after taking it. Many of the graduates are successful FSOs today.

So far as the Foreign Service officer examination is concerned, one of the questions posed in a recent study is the extent to which existing written tests—clearly influenced by cultural background and educational opportunities—can measure and reflect the functional intelligence required for success in the Foreign Service. The same study indicated that some individuals in the study sample with exceptionally high scores on the written examination are less effective Foreign Service officers or had resigned from the service, while some individuals with low passing scores on the written examination are quite effective or even among the most successful Foreign Service officers. This apparent contradiction is to be understood in terms of the positive contribution of the oral examination. Another finding is that the performance on the oral examination bears a consistent positive relationship to success as a Foreign Service officer. Obviously then, candidates with high oral scores are more likely to be successful than those with lower scores.

Foreign Service Reserve Junior Officer Program

With the help of the Foreign Service Board of Examiners, the Department's Employment Office and others, the director of the EEO Program, using the reserve provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, devised a pilot program known as the Foreign Service Reserve Junior Officer (FSO/JR) Program. This initiative was discussed with members of both the Junior Foreign Service Officers Club and the American Foreign Service Association, who were warm in their understanding and support. Under the FSR/JO program, minority candidates submit applications and transcripts of undergraduate, graduate or other advanced training.

If they have taken the Graduate Record Examination, the FSEE, or the FSO examination, these scores are reviewed. An autobiographical statement and reports from five references make up the "file" on an FSR/JO candidate. It is then submitted to the Board of Examiners. The candidate appears for an oral examination designed to measure his personal qualities, resourcefulness, and versatility; breadth and depth of interests; ability to express and defend his views; potential for development; ability to work with people; and to gauge his general suitability as a representative of the United States abroad. If the oral panel recommends a candidate for employment, the usual background investigation and medical examinations are completed. When the candidate is employed he becomes a Reserve officer and enters the regular junior officer training programs.

Within three to four years, given satisfactory performance on the job, these reserve officers can enter the regular officer corps under lateral entry provisions of the Foreign Service Act.

Once the program was approved, it was fully publicized in minority communities across the country, in the Peace Corps GREEN SHEET and other newsletters, in mailings to Spanish-surnamed college graduates, and in many more ways. The help of Diplomats in Residence, FSOs in university training, and former FASP college representatives was sought. They did preliminary screening in many cases.

Between September 1, 1967 and June 30, 1968, the EEO staff responded to 234 inquiries about the program. About half became serious applicants who were qualified to apply for participation in the FSR/JO Program and who submitted complete applications. The oral examining panels of BEX were able to include FSR/JO candidates in their regular examining schedules as they traveled around the country.

Thirteen FSR/JOs entered junior officer classes in FY 68; eleven were Negroes, one was Puerto Rican, and one Mexican American. A typical officer is a male Negro, who has studied beyond the baccalaureate level and has traveled abroad—perhaps in the Peace Corps. He is 25.9 years of age. During FY 69 82 new officers will enter junior officer training. This number is less than half the average intake of junior officers for the past seven years (see Chart II). Twenty of the 82 will be representatives of minority groups—nine entered in September. Eleven more FSR/JOs will enter the January and June classes. Thirteen Negro FSOs entered junior officer classes between 1962 and 1968 out of a total of 1290.

Those associated with the EEO Program believe the FSR/JO Program is a success. It is facilitating the recruitment and employment of qualified minority group individuals who in many ways are competitive with their peers in the FSO Corps. It is selecting young men and women who are enthusiastic about securing a career in the field of foreign affairs and who are excited about the worldwide challenges and opportunities which such a career affords.

Success of the pilot program brought prompt approval for continuing the FSR/JO Program for the next five years with a goal of a minimum of 20 FSR/JOs per year for FY 69 through FY 73. By then it is hoped the program can be phased out because it will have generated sufficient impact among minorities as to perpetuate their interest in the Foreign Service as a career field. Within this period, too, intensive studies will have been completed on how best to structure the Service in view of the increasing need for specialization, the new management tools available, and the need for a Foreign Service "broadly representative of the American people." Finally, within the next five years, significant changes are expected in qualification examinations for the Foreign Service. The Board of Examiners has already undertaken recruit-

CHART II

Intake of Junior Officers FY '62 to FY '68

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Total FSOs	235	177	152	35	199	219	103
Negro FSOs	2	1	2	0	0	4	4

CHART III

Officer Employment
(All FSO, FSR, FSS 1–6, GS 9–18)
November 30, 1967

	Negro	Oriental	American Indian	Spanish American	Total Minority	Total Officer Employment
Overseas	60	28	2	58	148	4,457
United States	*185*	*30*	*2*	*36*	*253*	*4,802*
Grand Totals	245	58	4	94	401	9,259
% of Total Complement	2.64	0.63	0.04	1.01	4.3	

ment to meet some specialized functional needs such as economists, commercial officers, and administrative officers.

Problems Crop Up at Mid-Career Levels

No sooner was the junior officer intake "solved" when it became clear that attrition of Negro officers at the mid and senior levels was critical. On November 30, 1967 there were 51 Negro FSRs out of a total of 1788. Between June, 1967 and November, 1968 there has been a loss of 24 Negro FSRs—almost entirely due to the attraction of better pay or more prestigious jobs. Sixteen were in the mid and senior level ranks. Four held the personal rank of Ambassador. During the same period, the Department gained only 22 Negro FSRs—only three were at the mid-career level.

So successful was the FSR/JO Program, that a decision was taken in late November to launch a mid-career program, similar in some respects to the FSR/JO Program, to attract more minority candidates at the FSR 6-3 levels. In addition to the "needs of the service," criteria for selection include, among others, educational attainment at the baccalaureate level or higher with training and/or experience relevant to the Foreign Service, and availability for worldwide service. An oral examination is administered and the usual medical and background investigations conducted. A number of well-qualified candidates have already filed their papers and are under consideration.

EEO—Too Much or Not Enough

One of the chief objectives of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 is to develop and strengthen the Foreign Service of the United States so as "to insure that the officers and employees of the Foreign Service are broadly representative of the American people."

Responding to the question, "Equal Employment Opportunity—Too Much or Not Enough?" the answer is obvious. So long as the employment of minorities continues to be a mere fraction of the total, our efforts must continue. So long as the Department is called upon to send representatives to 126 nations of which two-thirds are in the Third World, our efforts must continue. So long as the Department is criticized by host countries because our missions are "lily white," our efforts must continue. So long as the President and other members of the White House staff continue to point to the dearth of minority representatives on Foreign Service lists, our efforts must continue. Clearly, to date the result has been "not enough."

Chief among the "Who's Who" of persons giving strong, personal, and affirmative leadership to the Department's Equal Employment Opportunity Program since 1961 are the following: Secretary Rusk; Under Secretary Katzenbach; Deputy Under Secretary Rimestad; former Deputy Under Secretaries Roger A. Jones and William J. Crockett; and Herman Pollack, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel from 1961 to 1963. The EEO Program is indebted to them and to many more both inside and outside the Department.

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an end to ANARCHY

A Few Chosen Words on USIA

ALAN CARTER

Most government agencies share a resentment of criticism from without with a resistance to reform from within.

The United States Information Agency is now sufficiently old that the disclaimer with which it has always deflected criticism—"but we're new, we're still learning"—is something of an embarrassment; yet young enough in the pantheon of bureaucracies to have retained flexibility for change from within.

It is not my purpose to suggest structural change. Form follows function, or should, and what is needed first is a better understanding of USIA's function and capability within that function; then, an institutionalization, if you will, of what we already know about the process of cross-cultural communications, for that—in support of foreign policy—is what we are all about.

I want to be very specific here. I am talking about the institutionalization of methods and means within the communications process, not about themes to be communicated.

But, in fact, the first of the two problems which threaten USIA's search for professionalism is not only the actual lack of a codified methodology it is what I have termed "institutionalized anarchy."

It comes in two flavors.

First, there is the absence of continuity in leadership at all key power levels. The eight years of 1961—1969 will more than suffice as an example. By 1969, there will have been four Directors, three Deputy Directors and three Deputy Directors for Policy and Plans.

The Assistant Directors for the geographic areas average two to three years (for which our colleagues in the field are usually grateful) and, finally, Public Affairs Officers are changed on the average of every two to four years.

All of these make up most of the essential power points in the Agency and yet not even at one critical point in this hierarchy is there continuity.

But more seriously, Institutionalized Anarchy includes anarchy of purpose, the power of each officer to move directly from the Agency's Statement of Mission to his own individual interpretation of what the statement means, how it is to be applied and the means by which the Agency's function can best be achieved.

It is this absence within USIA of a corporate discipline of both ends and means that accounts for old arguments that seemingly never die (mass audience versus elites), meaningless rhetoric ("telling America's story to the world") endless clichés ("wars of truth," "campaigns for the hearts and minds of . . .") and semantic games (remember "People's Capitalism?"). So the vacuum is filled by the individual views and philosophies of as many who want to participate in the game. This happens within the Agency and elsewhere—most importantly in the State Department where, too, each officer seems to have his own pet view of what USIA is meant to achieve.

If one accepts the premise that in any kind of communications, repetition and continuity are basic requirements—and this would be even more true in the most difficult communication process of all, cross-cultural communications—then the absence of both sustained leadership and philosophy ensures either repeated failures or constantly interrupted successes.

Within any given field operation, a change of PAOs means, or can mean, several things. If the new PAO comes up from the cultural affairs side of the program, it is probable that he will skew his program toward cultural programs. If the PAO emerges from the ranks of the information officers, the reverse would probably be true. In either case, he could bring his own pet philosophy. In *any* of these cases he would have honored the bureaucratic Law of Progression which states that one's progress is expedited by the extent to which he can prove his predecessor an idiot.

These same changes of personality and philosophy take place in Washington with approximately the same results, the difference being one of magnitude only.

It is important to note that I am talking about program philosophy rather than program activities per se. The former should govern the latter; but at present program philosophy doesn't really exist in any comprehensive form. For example, to make a film is one thing; to know how to use it and what the medium can or cannot be expected to do is quite another.

It is this lack, I would assert, that largely accounts for the second present danger to USIA's search for professionalism. For along with Institutionalized Anarchy goes Supermarket Programing.

Since there is neither an overall program rationale nor a rationale governing each of the various program activities, the Agency in effect gives each PAO a shopping cart, sets him loose in the market and the predictable happens: he orders six of practically everything available.

Once a full-blown program (read, in the words of one senior PAO, "the full arsenal of propaganda weaponry") has been instituted, the impossibility of reducing a program to sensible and tailored proportions should be apparent to anyone in the foreign affairs complex.

Any one bureaucracy resists reduction; place one agency within a complex of several (USIS at an Embassy) and bureaucratic resistance to reform and reduction is obviously enhanced.

Pre-BALPA, I had set out almost two years ago to reduce or close those program facilities within the Near East and South Asia that were, in terms of communication effectiveness, woefully weak. Although I had predicted mission resistance at a meeting with my colleagues in State, I had seriously underestimated the extent of that resistance.*

Given its own internal state of philosophic anarchy, USIA must assume much of the responsibility both for the various

■ ALAN CARTER declares vehemently, "I wrote this article because I grow no less angry each year at the rigidity and self-defensiveness of bureaucratic mechanisms which continue to perpetuate mistakes out of pure reflex. My role is that of 'Front Office Rebel,'" Mr. Carter is assistant director for Near East and South Asia.

*But I uncovered, at least, another bureaucratic law whose existence I had only dimly perceived. I call it the Mission Law of Discovered Importance: That USIS facility or program rarely before visited or heeded becomes, when threatened with extinction, the cutting edge of the Mission's efforts to attain foreign policy objectives.

views of USIA that prevail at State and for the uneasy state of grace it enjoys with the Department. Without a consistent view of itself, the Agency will be—and is—subject to external inconsistencies.

STILL, State cannot be absolved totally either for its inconsistencies or its spotty utilization of the USIA resource.

First, USIA cannot discharge its Presidentially-mandated responsibility for advising on the public impact of foreign policy unless it is regularly, indeed routinely, consulted by the Department.

The number of messages originating in the Department and involving public affairs, without the appropriate clearance much less consultation with USIA, is dismaying.

Second, State's concern with foreign public opinion, and attempts to influence it, varies directly with the degree of crisis; the greater the crisis, the more concerned is the Department. In fact, in cross-cultural communications, the ratio is inverse; the higher public emotion, the less chance there is of a foreign agency effectively communicating with that public.

Third, the Department's affinity for the safety of committees and the security of silence works counter to whatever legitimate capability the Agency does indeed have, for whether in a period of crisis or calm, speed and audibility are at the heart of effective communications.

Fourth, State continues to think almost exclusively in terms of traditional influences—military, economic and political. It is only when the power of public influences shows dramatically, as in the case of the recent student demonstrations at home and abroad, that State becomes involved or concerned. But crises usually result in the formation of committees (Rule Three) which can accomplish little of value because there *is* a crisis (Rule Two) but which gives at least the much coveted appearance of activity until calm is restored—at which time Rule One comes back into play.

BUT State can only be accused of contributing to the basic professional problems of USIA; it cannot be made to carry the primary burden. That remains very much within the Agency and it will be, finally, the Agency itself that determines its professional course.

With what would I replace Institutionalized Anarchy and Supermarket Programing? The program which I shall describe in some detail is based on what I believe we have learned in USIA about methods and means in cross-cultural communications.

To construct such a program, the three factors which must be considered in some detail are audience, objectives and resources as they relate to each other.

I start with a word about the audience, for it is here that so much has been claimed and so much accumulated wisdom ignored. The audience is basic to any program, governs what is said, how it is said, and the channels of communication.

My rationale on audience goes something like this:

1. The information program of any one government cannot communicate effectively with the masses of any other country, not even (perhaps *especially* not) in insurgent or counter-insurgent situations, if by communicate one means affecting attitudes and opinions and conceivably actions.

To claim otherwise is either to ignore the sociological, cultural, economic, political, and historical differences between peoples or to assert a capability against all available evidence.

There have been enough studies demonstrating the difficulty of the leadership of a country effectively using its own media to change the attitudes or values of its own people to make it obvious, one would have hoped, that the task of the foreign government's agency of information is extraordinarily more difficult.

2. Therefore, USIA's audience is far more restricted and is, indeed elite—but not elite in the traditional sense of the traditional diplomat.

3. The USIA audience can best be described as: (a) those who influence the foreign policies of their country; (b) those who influence public attitudes in their country; and (c) those who will probably do either or both of these in the relatively near future.

4. In moving from (a) to (c) we go along a path of both increasing magnitudes, in terms of size, and increasing openness to new attitudes, ideas and concepts; for we move from a traditional, relatively small elite with vested power and thus vested interest, to a larger audience that deals in the development, exchange and study of ideas and concepts.

If one talks about the responsibility for maintaining an essential dialogue with the three component groups in the definition, it quickly becomes clear that toward the first group, USIA has a supplementary responsibility and toward the last two groups primary responsibility.

Certainly those who directly influence the foreign and internal policies of their countries are so placed hierarchically (whether they are political, economic, military or bureaucratic leaders) that they must be the primary responsibility of the political and economic officers, the AID staff, the military attaches, and so on.

It is when we move to the second and third audience groupings (those who influence public attitudes; those who will influence policy or attitudes in the future) that we can identify USIA's primary responsibility toward an audience. It is the Agency, I assert, that has both the responsibility and the greatest capability of communicating effectively with these two groups. These are the audiences which should be most involved in our programs; and the other elements of the Mission take on a role that supplements ours.

Now to a brief exploration of the relationship between the audience I have described and the objectives which have been established by the Agency (their rank order is mine):

First, USIA supports US positions on international issues and US policies;

Second, we present relevant aspects of the US as a nation, to create understanding of its institutions, culture and ideals as the necessary basis for the respect, confidence and support of US policies;

Third, we support national development, the process by which developing countries build independent, modern states (and enlist the support of other developed countries in the effort).

The relationship of these objectives to the audience I described is evident. The foreign policy issues are of most immediate (admittedly not exclusive) concern to the first audience, policy-makers. The second and third audiences—communicators, educators, students and creative intellectuals are by definition more concerned with the ideas and concepts that would be inherent in the last two objectives.

An important note: there is no straight line in foreign

policy or in cross-cultural communications. There are certainly policy-makers interested in, open to and in need of ideas and concepts. Thus, the relationship I am describing is not preclusive. Nonetheless the basic correlation between audience and objective is clear.

There is also, and finally, the third factor of the relationship to be considered, that which deals with audience groups, Ageney objectives and the magnitude of resources devoted to each.

First, as I indicated earlier, *within* the audience definition there is a flow both from lesser to greater size and from lesser to greater attitudinal flexibility. This has an obvious effect on the magnitude of resources devoted to each of the audience groups. The second and third audiences, being larger and less dogmatic than the first, demand the major allocation.

Secondly, *within* the ordering of the objectives, there is a direct relationship to the levels of communications effectiveness.

These latter run from the least to the most difficult to achieve; i.e. from (a) awareness, to (b) understanding, to (c) acceptance, to (d) action.

Awareness and understanding are the levels most likely attainable for the first objective (policies and issues) while the second and third objectives offer the greater *possibility* of acceptance and action, so more of the resources should go here.

This three-way relationship of audience, objective and resources can be expressed in another way: That objective which can be advanced furthest along the four levels of communications effectiveness and which has as its most directly interested audience the one that is largest and most open gets the largest piece of the pie.

Try *that* on your PPBS. It works. (So does PPBS.)

THERE remains now only the question of the nature of the USIA programs that should arise from all I have said so far plus some primary assertions that need to be made at this point and that deal more with the qualitative aspects (as opposed to the philosophical ground rules) of USIA's programing.

Item one: It is only in the last few years that USIA's media product has stressed qualitative rather than quantitative material.

USIA has to become consistently exciting in the look and content of its product.

Item two: There must be room within USIA's programs for an honest dialogue. This may entail risks; they are minor.

Item three: We cannot continue to stock our libraries only with O'Neill and Arthur Miller when there is exciting theater ground being broken by Friedman and Kopit. We cannot summon the courage to stock Joseph Heller six years after he appears on the best-seller list.

USIA must become contemporary.

Item four: We must, above all, find ways to communicate not only with those whose political or economic interest lead them to us; but also with those with the questions, doubts, criticisms and indeed philosophical differences that would normally keep them apart.

USIA must become intellectually attractive.

All of this—these assertions and the relationships of audience to objectives to resources—all can be brought together under one program concept which I call packaged programing.

This is a concept that we have already introduced in the Near East and South Asia. My essential argument is that as a concept it should govern programing throughout the Agency.

The concept is tied to an established and growing body of knowledge on the sociology of communications that makes it unmistakably clear that, particularly but not exclusively in the realm of cross-cultural communications, the extent to which the various media are brought together determines the extent of the impact on the recipient. By media, we mean here the formal media—but also media in the form of the human resource—the individual specialist, the performing group, etc.

A basic and essential feature of the packaged program concept is the establishment of the American Center—either the USIS center or the binational center—as a medium in and of itself within which all of the other media are programed with the simultaneity we are proposing. There are two reasons for this. First, if the various media are to be brought together, they need a physical facility within which to be programed. Secondly, if we can create within the foreign communities an institution *known* for its excellence and excitement, that facility itself then contributes to delivering the message. Any packaged program need not be staged only at a USIS center; but they will originate at or emanate from the USIS center, which will remain at the heart of our program efforts.

The objective of packaged programing is to bring together not just the resources of USIA but the related resources of State/CU, HEW, the Smithsonian and cooperating private institutions.

Several factors argue strongly for this effort:

The US Government has diminishing resources that it can bring to bear on its diplomatic efforts abroad;

Largely through insufficient coordination, the cultural and informational resources available to the US Government have never been used overseas to their full effect;

We have not yet applied all that we already know about how best to communicate with those who are not committed to the status quo and who inevitably will shape the future of their respective countries;

In most countries we already have physical facilities whose potential is great but whose halls and auditoriums are full of the dull and predictable or whose facilities are used so sporadically as to make little impact on the community.

Packaged programing can contribute to but cannot by itself achieve substantive changes in important political differences between the US and the host country.

Packaged programing can and will do two basic things: It will help explain differences, at the least, or contribute to the understanding, at the most, of tough policy concerns; it will establish (or re-establish) an important and exciting dialogue on ideas and concepts that are intellectually exciting and/or necessary for development in the 20th century and which will further long-range US objectives.

Packaged programs will attract the traditional audiences we have always been able to reach. But they will add the young intelligentsia with whom we have not communicated successfully in the past. It will do this because, whatever the political differences involved, few of the young intelligentsia doubt the fact that the US is where "it is happening" and therefore must be looked to for the knowledge and ideas which make progress possible.

The specific packages will bring the various media resources together at one time and one place for the intended audience in each country. There will be not just a lecture, but a lecture accompanied by films and an exhibit, plus a special bibliography in the library, plus articles in the local newspapers and USIS publications—all on the same theme. It is a kind of Chautauqua, modified for export and enlisted in the pursuit of our objectives abroad.

There is nothing new about the general idea of packaged programing but it introduces some new ingredients:

1. *The primacy of the center*: The center is not new in itself, but it has rarely been this fully exploited as a program

(*Continued on page* 40)

Our Internal Defense Policy—A Reappraisal

CHARLES MAECHLING, JR.

SINCE 1962, American military and civilian agencies operating in friendly countries of the Third World have been governed by a counter-insurgency doctrine which at its highest level is styled the United States overseas internal defense policy. The broad outlines of this policy were first expounded by then Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson in the July, 1962 issue of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, and may again be briefly summarized: In certain parts of the world it is Communist and extreme left-wing strategy to aggravate tensions wherever they are found, to exploit local grievances, to divert peaceful movements for social change into extremist channels, and generally to take advantage of the stresses and strains inherent in the development process to take over local governments by means of subversion, violence and insurgency. Since the aim of US foreign policy is to foster the development of a community of independent nations, each one free to pursue its destinies in its own way, it is in the interest of the United States to frustrate this strategy by coming to the aid of friendly governments so threatened. We do this chiefly by means of assistance programs designed to enable a threatened government to defend itself and its territories—but if necessary through direct military intervention.

In their collective application such assistance programs constitute "counter-insurgency"—a term defined in the Joint Dictionary as "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency." As a strategy, counter-insurgency is intended to be preventive in character and temporary in application—a technique for tiding weak and unstable governments over periods of internal upheaval until the constructive forces of political and economic development are strong enough to control the situation without external assistance. Its immediate aim is to deny the environment of a friendly country to the insurgents by shoring up the weak sectors of the country's society, providing the local government with an internal security capability, and promoting internal reforms aimed at alleviating the social ills in which disaffection festers. An essential feature of the policy is the limited and selective character of military counter-measures: violence is to be kept at the lowest level possible and every effort made to spare and protect civilian life and property so as to detach the insurgents from the population and erode their base of support. Those familiar with counter-insurgency literature will observe how this part of the doctrine fits in with the Maoist aphorism that in a rural environment the peasants are the sea and those who would win their allegiance must behave like fish.

This policy, and the military counter-insurgency doctrines which stem from it, tacitly accept the Maoist assumption that internal conflicts falling within the category of "People's Revolutionary Warfare" are essentially struggles to obtain mastery over the environment. For the sake of convenience they accept the Maoist thesis of a three-step division of insurgency, wherein the lowest level (Phase I) comprises subversion, sabotage, underground political activity, and selective acts of violence; the middle level (Phase II) embraces terrorism and localized guerrilla action; while the third (Phase III) includes widespread guerrilla activity that may attain the level of mobile warfare when conducted by organized military units.

So much for theory, here stated in simplified form. As articulated in policy papers and manuals nothing could be more obvious and logical. Yet even under the best of conditions the policy has proved difficult to apply, while in situations of extreme violence or open internal warfare it breaks down completely. One weakness is that its prospects for success depend not on US efforts but on the will and capabilities of the society and government of the country concerned—in other words on proxies. Another is that in a deteriorating guerrilla situation or escalated insurgency it appears to be at cross-purposes with standard military doctrine and the somber imperatives of conventional warfare.

The internal contradictions and limitations of the policy are best illustrated by contrasting its theory with the circumstances under which it is likely to be applied—in other words with real life. The policy seems to presuppose a young, underdeveloped country, whose democratically oriented government is beset by a subversive insurgency movement that seeks to exploit discontents and grievances in order to overthrow the government and lead the country into the Communist camp. When this is a tropical country with an agricultural base, the insurgency struggle centers around the rural population or peasantry, which is assumed to be a malleable and essentially neutral force that has been "neglected" or "misunderstood" by the central government; otherwise, a discontented urban proletariat, led by left-wing students and intellectuals may be the focal point of the disturbance. In any event, when the local government calls on the United States for assistance we respond with a multi-faceted assistance program composed of a MAP element (mainly civic action, light weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and counter-guerrilla training); a police element (vehicles, communications gear, counter-espionage training, etc.); a public information element (equipment and training to bring the local government into communication with the people); and a special program of economic aid targeted on disaffected areas. This diet is supposed to be washed down with heavy

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drafts of advice and counsel on social, economic and political matters from the US Ambassador. Throughout the policy there is an unspoken bias in favor of social and ethnic uniformity and centralized government control, as opposed to diversity, decentralization, and non-interference.

But what if the reality is more complex. Suppose that this is a typical backward country with a low standard of living, a high incidence of disease and infant mortality, an uncertain economy, and a grossly inequitable distribution of the national wealth, particularly arable land. Suppose the country has a heritage of misgovernment or, alternatively, has just emerged from colonial rule. Suppose that it is divided by deep-seated ethnic or religious differences. Suppose that the civil service is hopelessly underpaid and corrupt, and that the ruling oligarchy is numerically so small that it has to keep the political opposition, which is radical to the core, divided and neutralized in order to prevent being blown sky high. Suppose that the insurgents consist not merely of dedicated left-wing fanatics but also of alienated workers and students who are fed up with the state of things as they are and will espouse any creed that promises social justice and participation in the political process. Suppose that the ranks of these hard-core activists have been supplemented by large numbers of ignorant peasant youths or urban laborers who have been half-conscripted and half-lured into the insurgent movement by promises of a better life. Finally, suppose that the less the average peasant or worker sees of his government the better for him—no taxes, no forced labor, no conscription, no eviction for debt.

Confronted with this picture of reality a host of dilemmas appears. If the insurgency is still in an incipient stage, the strategy dictated by both doctrine and common sense is for the United States to move in with an integrated emergency assistance program of the type just outlined while at the same time putting pressure on the government to improve conditions and alleviate grievances, the theory being to buy time until economic and social reform cuts away the foundations of the insurgents' support.

However, for this program to achieve satisfactory results—or indeed, to take effect at all—the United States has to rely on the local government. Actual military and police operations can only be planned and carried out by local security forces. As to redress of grievances and social reform, these are absolutely contingent on the willingness of the ruling oligarchy to parcel out its property and surrender its political power—in the latter instance to the very factions that seek to destroy it.

These contradictions are brought into sharper focus when one studies the practical application of the doctrine to counter-guerrilla operations—the military side of the program. If the object is to obtain control of the environment, or at least to deny it to actual or potential insurgents, then winning the allegiance of the population is of paramount importance. That means befriending them, protecting them, preventing them from willingly or unwillingly giving support to the insurgents, and giving them the benefit of the doubt even at the risk of endangering one's own forces. It entails the highly selective application of military counter-measures—not burning down the barn to get rid of the rats. Above all, it means keeping disruption of the local economy and society—already in enough turmoil—to an absolute minimum, in order to sustain the local economy and political structure and prevent an uprooted population from becoming an unmanageable burden to the central government.

The difficulty is how to apply these principles to tropical countries where life is cheap and war and internecine strife are typically conducted with a brutality that stultifies the whole rationale of the doctrine. Indigenous military forces, in constant danger from raids and ambuscades, can hardly be expected to act with restraint and consideration to peasants suspected of collusion with the enemy when the whole history of civil strife in the country is one of treachery, murder, and savage reprisal. Standards of discipline and restraint are only enforceable when their upholders have the authority and determination to carry them out, as was the case with the British in Malaya. They can hardly be imposed on half-civilized tropical levies by a handful of foreign advisers who have no command responsibility and are normally kept away from operations in the field. A counter-insurgency doctrine that relies for implementation on local nationals, and requires them to conduct military operations in a style at variance with their own customs, is unrealistic to say the least.

Official doctrine suggests a solution for this dilemma. The United States is to employ advice and persuasion, perhaps even disguised threats, to assure that doctrine is complied with, that equipment is utilized effectively, and that reforms are carried out, or at least initiated. Again, there is an unspoken assumption that a weak, unstable regime will be either so well-motivated or so dependent on its benefactor for support that it will swallow the unpalatable medicine prescribed for it.

But this comfortable answer discounts the lethal consequences of political defeat in most of these countries. It underestimates the propensity of a ruling faction that maintains itself by intrigue, coercion, and legalized terror, to employ the age-old tactics of evasion, delay, and token performance to postpone indefinitely any measure that will diminish its income or dilute its power. Moreover, the whole policy vastly overestimates US "leverage" once a commitment of assistance has been made. Governments of underdeveloped countries know to the last millimeter just how much we are "hooked" once we give even a qualified endorsement of a regime to Congress in the course of justifying an assistance program. They also have an uncanny knack of gauging the extent to which the United States depends on their support in the United Nations and other international forums.

Hence, a series of anomalies. US internal defense policy purports to govern the conduct of internal warfare in friendly countries—but without transgressing the sovereignty of those countries. It propounds a doctrine to enable another government to maintain control over its environment—but it provides no means for assuring that the totality of the doctrine is effectively carried out. Finally, the policy prescribes general principles of internal reform without ever translating these principles into specifics. It is the old horror of responsibility without authority, elevated to the plane of high strategy.

Of course these anomalies are not necessarily fatal. In countries where insurgency is still incipient, and where a reasonably decent and progressive administration is doing all it can to alleviate economic hardship and social injustice, the preventive aspects of the policy may be valid and capable of effective implementation. In some areas, the military side of the policy has been quite successful—as in Latin America, where the MAP program has succeeded in transforming clumsy, garrison-bound military establishments into reasonably effective mobile warfare forces. But once local insurgency gets out of hand, the problem becomes vastly more complicated. If the situation turns critical, both US involvement and US responsibility are likely to expand enormously. Yet our inability to exercise direct control remains unchanged. We will still have no command over local military forces, even though they use our equipment and associate us with their conduct. We will still have no way of accelerating internal political and social reform except through the feeble medium of the US Ambassador.

But the major consequence of escalation is to render our counter-insurgency doctrine a virtual nullity. The first casualty is the concept of a friendly civilian population. Where counter-insurgency doctrine stipulates that civilians must be

presumed friendly unless conclusively proven hostile, local security forces are likely to assume exactly the opposite. In the immediate theater of hostilities the civilian population becomes at best an encumbrance and at worst a cover for insurgent operations. Once the conflict heightens in intensity, military considerations become paramount and villages occupied by insurgents become "enemy" villages—legitimate targets for destruction. Selective, restrained use of firepower is deemed to imperil the safety of troops in the field. Disruption of community life, and dislocation of the population, are considered an acceptable price to pay for a temporary tactical "victory."

If the situation deteriorates further, the local government is likely to become desperate. Callous of human life to begin with, it now has little compunction about calling in air strikes and artillery bombardments on its own cities and villages. As to the wounded and refugees flowing in from the devastated areas, these have long exceeded the capacity of the government to care for them. Let the American aid program take the responsibility!

For the United States, the situation has now passed out of effective control. American prestige is now committed to a government victory. If we refuse to furnish ever-increasing quantities of military and economic aid to our tottering ally, we run the risk of seeing government forces defeated and the regime overthrown. On the other hand, if we intervene in strength with our own forces, we run the risk of taking over the military side of the conflict and being held responsible for the military consequences—but without any more voice in the management of the country's affairs than we had before.

The intervention of US military units also introduces US military doctrine—a fearsome prospect for any country, as Vietnam has found out to its cost. Again, the concept of an environment to be mastered, a population to be won over, give way to the stark imperatives of warfare, this time amplified and intensified by the full arsenal of modern technology and firepower. The term "enemy" is applied to any territory with a hostile coloration; towns are destroyed in order to "save" them; and the efficient conduct of military operations becomes the sole criterion for measuring success or failure, regardless of the havoc wrought on the hapless inhabitants

Moreover, US military doctrine does not even purport to cover the all-important political aspects of internal warfare, especially eradication of the enemy's infra-structure. This infra-structure may be conceived of as a multi-purpose, decentralized base of operations, that is at once an intelligence web, a communications channel, a personnel recruitment system, a finance and taxation system, and a service of supply. In areas under government control terrorist and guerrilla movements depend on the infra-structure for support and cannot be sustained without it; conversely no insurgency can be permanently defeated as long as the underground base remains intact. The infra-structure can never be rooted out in an atmosphere of political chaos, economic disruption, and hostility to the central government. And it cannot even be detected by uniformed foreigners, unfamiliar with local language and customs, and leading a life apart from the population.

Thus, in any serious kind of insurgency situation, the enemy has both the local government and the United States in something of a box. To the extent that he can force escalation, and bring military doctrine to the fore, he can, by a sort of strategic judo, turn our strongest asset—modern firepower—against the society we are supposed to be defending. Whenever a desperate local government flattens and devastates every city and hamlet that has been infiltrated by insurgents, it really enters into a state of hostilities with the environment it is trying to master. The resentment of the local population will focus on the immediate perpetrators of the destruction and on the authorities responsible for civilian welfare, thereby stoking the fires of disaffection anew.

What are the implications of these contradictions? Is US overseas internal defense policy inherently fallacious, or is it merely incomplete? Of what concern are these doctrinal inadequacies to the Foreign Service officer whose duties mainly relate to program and policy implementation overseas?

The first point to note is that while the policy purports to cover the full spectrum of counter-insurgency it in fact only fully addresses itself to the equipment and training aspects. All the requisite elements of a congruent, multi-pronged program are set forth, but little is said about how the programs are to be put into effect. In the military sector, the policy denies the United States any authority beyond an advisory role (except *in extremis*.) In the crucial political, economic and social sectors the policy eschews any effective direction of the client's internal affairs and smugly assumes that pious exhortations and tactfully phrased admonition conveyed once or twice monthly by the US Ambassador are the equivalent of detailed planning and administration.

Second, the doctrine overstates, or perhaps overassumes, both American influence and American ability to solve the internal difficulties of other countries. Our own social, economic, and political problems are sufficiently complex to defy easy solution; there is no reason to believe that those of unstable, economically backward countries are any simpler. Yet without a massive expenditure of funds and deep penetration of plans and programs into the political and social life of a country no outside influence can be expected to have much impact.

Third, the doctrine fails to take into account the serious consequences of escalation, particularly if accompanied by active US military intervention. It blindly ignores the catastrophic effect of modern military operations on fragile societies.

Finally, the policy seems to presuppose that the United States has a global mission to support "free" societies throughout the Third World regardless of whether a favorable political orientation in the countries concerned is essential to US interests. This poses the additional question of whether the policy is so unrelated to other premises of US strategy that it threatens to entangle us in controversies and predicaments that are entirely marginal to our true national interests, and may actually conflict with them.

Moreover, like other hastily contrived theories, the policy assumes a unanimity of purpose and an availability of resources that is wholly non-existent. If there is one overwhelming fact of contemporary political life, it is that there is no national consensus in favor of supporting unpopular local regimes against local insurgencies throughout the underdeveloped world. On the contrary, there seems to be a widespread determination on the part of Congress and the public not to get involved in any more Vietnams.

At this point in history, our national resources are also under strain. Pressure for the solution of pressing internal

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Academic Details

A NEW CONCEPT IN FS-UNIVERSITY RELATIONS

FREDERICK H. GERLACH and MARK BEACH

RELATIONS between the American university community and the Foreign Service have seldom been worse. Many of the most influential professors and students identify the Service with policies they oppose as both impractical and immoral. Equally significant in the long run, many potentially excellent FSOs refuse to associate themselves with what they consider to be an inbred club. Basing their stereotype on hearsay, journalistic polemics and quasi-scholarly analyses, they imagine the Service to be bureaucratic, conformist, and unimaginative. They contend it is closed to new ideas, absorbed in routine, and committed to the ideal of action for action's sake.

Many FSOs maintain an equally uninformed and biased view of academic life. They disdain "egg-heads," depreciate the pursuit of truth for its own sake and deplore criticism apparently based on ignorance of "reality." In short, both the academe and the Foreign Service are often encumbered by an inaccurate view of the other's life and interests. As a result, the vast potential each has to offer the other remains untapped. Each suffers, and therefore so does the national welfare. This article is to describe an "academic detail" program which we contend would do much to alleviate the deficiencies of the current situation.

The program we suggest is simple in concept. The Foreign Service, in concert with selected colleges and universities throughout the country, would create opportunities for mid-career officers to spend an academic year on a campus. These officers would be considered full-fledged members of the faculty. They would be expected to teach courses and direct student research in their areas of expertise; to give lectures and provide consulting service, and generally to participate fully in the academic and social life of their host institution and its community. They would, of course, be encouraged to pursue their own research and show evidence of their success at the conclusion of their detail. Normally, the host institution would pay half the officer's salary and provide the other perquisites of academic life—secretarial help, graduate assistance, research funds and facilities, and the like. The State Department would pay the other half of his salary and continue him in such fringe benefits as health, insurance and retirement programs.

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

There are two points essential to the success of the academic details we propose. First, the FSO who takes advantage of such an opportunity would not be going to a campus in search of an advanced degree. It is imperative that the faculty look upon him, not as a student, but as a professional peer seeking time to read, think, converse with colleagues and students, and generally refresh himself intellectually. Second, and equally important, an academic detail must be an integral part of the officer's career in the Foreign Service. He would be selected and evaluated according to criteria developed jointly by the Department of State and appropriate university personnel. Using these criteria, the promotion board would consider his academic performance in the context of his overall record of Foreign Service achievement and grant a promotion if his rating so warrants.

There are advantages in our proposal for a wide range of individual and institutional foreign affairs "actors." In the first place, as the new leadership of AFSA has continually pointed out, the environment in which US foreign policy is developed includes many persons other than professional diplomats. Scholars, journalists, consultants, teachers, FSRs in top bureau posts—all these and more have a profound impact (albeit sometimes indirect) on our foreign policy. This community of interest is best served by programs, such as academic details, offering the various constituents opportunities for increased understanding of common problems. More specifically, policies emerging from an environment of understanding will be both more enlightened and more acceptable to all parties involved. This is a particularly important point. Much of the current dissent from foreign policy in academic circles can be traced to violation of a simple yet fundamental canon of sound administration: persons involved in planning are more likely to be committed to the outcome of a policy than persons who are not. If academe is a prime source of dissent, it can also be an important source of support. Marshalling this support makes increasing sense as institutions of higher learning in this country take on more prestige, as an ever greater percentage of the population associates with them, and as more and more professors and students exploit their cosmopolitan experience in terms of increased political expression.

Beyond the understanding and empathy an officer might engender on a given campus, an academic detail program merits consideration for its value in the recruitment of FSOs. One often hears, particularly at universities, that the quality of the Foreign Service has declined substantially in recent years. While there are few hard data publicly available either to confirm or refute this contention, the mere existence of such attitudes can be harmful in the recruitment process. To put it quite bluntly, the Foreign Service does not have a monopoly in this country on jobs which require intelligence, courage and wit or which afford opportunities to travel and make important decisions. Far from boasting of its excellence, the Foreign Service ought to be doing everything within its power to attract and retain highly qualified individuals. Further, too many students who would make fine FSOs reject the Service because they falsely imagine that their early career must be limited to visa-stamping and self-effacing subordination. Interaction of college students and a bright, lively and experienced FSO on academic detail would help students see the advantages of the Foreign Service by introducing them to an FSO they can respect. In the end, State would have a larger pool of talent from which to recruit its diplomats, and the country would have more citizens who

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Association News

January, 1969

Two Responses to "Modern Diplomacy"

The Association has received the following letter from Professor Frederick C. Mosher of the University of Virginia. Professor Mosher, FSJ readers will recall, was a participant at the AFSA-sponsored Foreign Service Days Conference in November. We consider his message a particularly thought-provoking one.

First let me say that I appreciated the opportunity to attend your conference and learned a good deal there. I hope that I made some contribution in spite of my poor timing and the stern taskmaster who sat in the chair.

As I told you in Washington, I am writing to convey some of my reactions to the report "Toward a Modern Diplomacy." I don't know whether these will be of any interest or value to anybody, but for what they are worth, here they are. In the first place, what you and your colleagues have done seems to me remarkable. I know of no professional group which has so intensely and objectively examined itself and then turned around and asked the general public to look at its conclusions. Most of the subcommittee reports seemed to me excellent. I was most surprised and excited by the one on openness—and the demonstration of openness at the conference itself.

It is perhaps because of the excellence of the earlier Interim report and the subcommittee reports that I was somewhat disappointed with the covering report. My gut response to the first reading was critical of the general tone of the report on two grounds: first, it laid such heavy emphasis on hierarchy, status, titles, etc. Second, contrary to the claim made in the conclusion, it seemed to me parochial and self-serving. I had a little feeling that what it was saying was: "Give us more power, more prestige, more rewards and then let us alone." It seems to me quite unrealistic to imagine that in a society so dynamic as ours is and in a world so volatile and so important to us, the Foreign Service ever could—or should—be let alone for very long. This sounds like a request by the Service to retire into insulation, senescence, and irrelevance. In this day and age, all institutions and personnel systems have to change and change and change, just to keep somewhere near up to date. (This incidentally applies most importantly to academic faculties.)

The tendency to continue imitating the British and continental models disturbs me a bit. The titles Foreign Secretary and Permanent Under Secretary and Director General are foreign to the United States and its government. When we got started, we obviously had to ape the French, the British, and their antecedents back to the Grecks—with their Ambassadors Plenipotentiary and ministers and consuls and attaches. But we're big boys and girls now. Incidentally, as I mentioned last week, you should take a look at the British report on the civil service of last summer by the committee chaired by Lord Fulton, most of which has already been implemented, in form at least. In general, it seems to me that our Foreign Service structure imitated the British Foreign Service, which in turn imitated the British Civil Service which in turn imitated the Indian Civil Service as it was translated in the Northcote-Trevelyan report of 1855. The Indians and Pakistani are having a rough time modernizing that early model, but the Fulton report may do it for the British Civil Service. The British abolished the class system, set up an

independent ministry for Civil Service and, hopefully, ended the Oxbridge monopoly on the old Administrative Class positions—including eventually, their monopoly on the Permanent Secretaries and Under Secretaries. It seems strange at a time when the British are moving radically toward an open civil service system that our Foreign Service should want to look more like the old British pattern.

I personally don't care much about titles one way or the other, but I doubt that the terms Foreign Secretary and Permanent Under Secretary will get far with our politicos. I would suggest Deputy Secretary (as in Defense) and Executive Under Secretary (as in the Herter majority report). As for the Director General, which squeezed by little noticed in 1946, if it means so much to the Foreign Service, why not combine it in the latter job and provide the really impressive title of Executive Under Secretary and Director General of the Foreign Service? The Executive Under Secretary that I hope for could hardly fail to *be* the director general, with or without that title. Further, I think the first incumbent of this third-ranking job—if and when established—should definitely come from outside the service. He might be an alumnus and should have foreign affairs experience. But if he looks like a chip off the old guard, he will not be able to do the job with other agencies which I, and I think you, envisage, no matter what his capabilities are.

The logic by which the subcommittee reached its recommendation to restore the statutory authority and independence of the Board of the Foreign Service and the Director General and by which the basic report justifies it eludes me. First, the subcommittee says there are two alternatives: a Foreign Service Commission or full power in the Secretary of State. Then it proposes the BFS as an "interim" measure. The main report takes a slap at the Herter proposal for an advisory board and says that "wisely" it was never tried. Obviously it was never tried because, until this year, none of the other agency services were given career status. It then apparently defends the BFS idea because of the alleged success of the Civil Service Commission. A statutory BFS consisting of representatives of the agencies themselves is an entirely different animal from the CSC, obviously. In fact, when the CSC operated as an independent entity in the twenties and thirties, its sluggishness and lack of responsiveness to managerial needs became perhaps the principal obstacle to managerial improvement in the Federal bureaucracies. In the fifties and particularly the sixties the Commission has remarkably changed its colors. It has delegated a large share of power to the agencies and increasingly focused its efforts on the over-all improvement of management including personnel management. Recently this may be attributed to the person of the chairman, John Macy. But it may be due also to the very fact that Macy wears two hats. He is the principal adviser to the President on *political* appointments and has probably had a more influential voice with the President than any of his predecessors. I cannot imagine how any Director General who considers himself representative and protector of the service or any board consisting of members representing the interests of their agencies—set apart in the pristine purity of autonomy—could contribute any such dynamic leadership as Macy has with the immediate backing and understanding of the President.

And I don't understand why we should set up a Permanent (or Executive) Under Secretary to supervise foreign affairs operations and at the same time take away from him the policies, standards, and regulations of personnel. In foreign affairs, personnel is surely the most important resource we have. Further, somewhere in here is a proposal that the budgeting of personnel be put into the hands of the personnel people themselves—another deprivation for the new office. These proposals seem to me singularly bleak, and I hope that they get exactly nowhere.

The chapter about the home service seems to me very vulnerable. Two strawmen are set up to justify a single service and then torn down. You will find other arguments stated in just about every study and report about State and its Foreign Service since 1946, and I would suggest a look at chapter III of the Herter report. Maybe those arguments can be torn down too, but at least they should have been aired. And with regard to difficulty of administration, I flatly disagree with the contention, made in two or three different places in the report, that other departments are doing well in managing career systems along side of civil service. I know of no such agency where this has not been and is not a source of difficulty, of friction, of morale problems. It also often discourages effective recruitment. On this point, I suggest that you go down town and take a look at what has recently happened to the US Public Health Service and its commissioned corps. (I may note that essentially the same thing is a source of a lot of trouble on most university campuses between academic and "non-academic" personnel.) I am sorry that the report repudiated the powers so laboriously gained in the Hays amendment to the USIA bill.

The report speaks approvingly of the Manpower Act of the 40s and of the Wristonization of the 50s, suggesting that both were responsive to clear needs of the times. But its plain implication is that no such needs exist in the 60s or are likely to emerge in the 70s. What I find about recruitment is that a steady inflow of junior FSOs be maintained on the basis of the customary competitive examination. Yet elsewhere, the report says that a vastly expanded range of responsibilities—and accompanying skills—must be assumed by the Foreign Service. When the Service is expanded to include AID and USIA, it must also provide specialists in those fields as well. I submit that the colleges, even their graduate schools, cannot provide people with these skills—most of which require experience—and the Foreign Service cannot overnight provide that experience within. Even if it could, I find nothing in the report to suggest modifying the recruitment and selection targets to get people specialized in these relevant fields. It would have been a brave thing if the report had linked its manpower planning recommendations to the recruitment and entry policy; had endorsed the idea that, like most other institutions, it would seek the best people it could find to respond to its personnel needs, present and future, at middle and upper levels as well as at the bottom; that there should be a steady, though perhaps small, stream of lateral entrics rather than a major convulsion every decade or so.

My impression is that the most alert, action oriented, highly motivated, young adults ages (20-35) move about a good deal. They want to go where the action is. And they aren't ready to settle into a groove—or a single organization—for life. The idea of a career system repels a good many of them, though they are ready for a career in their professional field. They are in-and-outers (and some that I know have already been in and out of the Foreign Service). Openness, it seems to me and to your sub-committee, is a two-way proposition, not alone the location of good jobs in other agencies and in the universities for FSOs. The fear so frequently expressed that lateral entry will retard the advancement opportunities of those already on the inside and thus damage morale is most widely held, I suspect, among those who have reason to fear about their own advancement—i.e., the second-raters.

The fact is that I know of no institutions, public or private, where there is as much room at the top in proportion to the numbers of personnel as the Foreign Service—other than the universities where full professors like to think they are the top.

Your sub-committee recommended de-emphasis of the written examination in recruitment, but I find no mention of this in the full report. Again I would like to endorse the sub-committee view. Almost no progressive employers, public or private, are relying on written examinations any more for *professional* people. (The FSEE like the FS exam is a general, weeding-out exam for not yet professionals; the more appropriate comparison is with the Management Interne test which relies, once one has passed the FSEE, primarily upon the candidate's record and oral interview.) Examinations are gradually declining even in the universities. Most colleges, in their admission of graduate students, heavily discount the GRE, also conducted by ETS, and some pay no attention to it at all. So far as I know the FS exam (like the GRE) has never been validated against subsequent performance. All of these tests are of course culturally biased toward upper-middle class values and toward subject matter knowledge presumed to be acquired at the "best" colleges. Probably the Foreign Service needs some sort of screen because of the number of applicants. Why not use the FS exam (or even the FSEE) as a non-competitive screen, and then go out to get the people you need on the basis of their record, their performance, and their recommendations? And why not shift some, perhaps most, of your entering level recruitment to grades 5 and 6 rather than 7 and 8 and judge applicants primarily in terms of their performance in one or more other jobs. We all know that some of the work of junior officers is beneath their capability, their challenge threshold, even their dignity. Why not turn a good part of it over to the FS staff and bring your newcomers in at higher levels of both grade and responsibility?

Finally, I was disappointed to find in the report only passing mention, and no explicit recommendation, about programing and budgeting—after the lengthy and painstaking study of the sub-committee. Incidentally, you will no doubt see an essay on this subject by me which is to be issued within a few days by Senator Jackson's sub-committee.

And why nothing about representativeness and openness in connection with the black minority and the poverty program?

Sorry this has gone on so long and that it sounds so critical. I have mentioned only the things I question and neglected the many points in the report and in the sub-committee reports which seem to me good. Again, I am delighted that the study was made and congratulate you and your colleagues.

FREDERICK C. MOSHER
University of Virginia
Charlottesville

And from a West Coast "grove of academe":

And you are to be congratulated, also, for the monograph, "Toward a Modern Diplomacy,' not only for the content, but also for the lucidity and sparkle of the writing. Living close to the California Institute of Technology I particularly enjoyed the sly dig at some of the brethren contained in that marvelous sentence at the bottom of page 13: "The value of such comment on infinitely complex matters dealing with the life and death of nations has usually been in inverse ratio to the degree of expertise gained from a lifetime of devotion to enzymes or geology." Pin an orchid for me on the lapel of the person responsible for the writing. I hope your Report has wide circulation and discussion.

RAYMOND G. MCKELVEY
Occidental College
Los Angeles

The NEW YORK TIMES *weighed in on December 10 with a heartening editorial on "New Life in Old State," another one of the many press comments on AFSA efforts to improve the structure of the Foreign Service:*

One of the most pressing tasks facing the new Administration will be that of reforming the State Department, a cumbersome bureaucracy whose short-comings have exasperated a series of Presidents.

In addition to the largely unheeded recommendations of a number of blue-ribbon panels that have already studied the problems of State, Mr. Nixon will have before him as he takes office a new set of proposals for reform which have come, surprisingly, from within the State Department itself. The proposals are contained in a report prepared by the American Foreign Service Association, a sort of diplomatic trade union that was taken over recently by a band of Young Turks who are determined to breathe new life into the old Foreign Service.

What is most significant about the Foreign Service Association report is that it represents recognition of the need for change and a thoughful effort to stimulate reform within the bureaucracy itself. A bureaucracy that produces young men willing to stick their necks out for self-improvement can't be all bad.

Whether or not he accepts all of the Foreign Service Association proposals, the new President certainly should take heart from this evidence of vitality within the Service. It reflects a spirit worth encouraging.

Jack hammers, drills, cement mixers and their attendants; plumbers, electricians, bricklayers, plasterers and their equipment; AFSA staff and occasional brave or foolhardy visitors; all these made the scene at 2101 E Street, N.W. in the pre-holiday months. At various times, AFSA headquarters operated without air-conditioning (on a hot day), without running water, without outgoing phones, without lights, without heat (on a cold day) but always with workmen, noise and good humor.

The front view on page 1 of the Association News gives no idea of the organized chaos within but perhaps this interior shot, taken in early December, after the workmen had left for the day, affords an impression of what goes on here.

Commerce Chapter in Business

In February 1968, two members of the AFSA Board were invited to meet with some of the 30 Foreign Service officers serving in the Department of Commerce to discuss the desirability of forming a Commerce Chapter of AFSA. In May, Chairman of the Board Lannon Walker and Board Member Frank Wile participated in the organization meeting of the Chapter. The purpose of the Chapter is to further the goals of AFSA and the Commerce Chapter by bringing together Foreign Service officers and Civil Service professionals who are interested in foreign affairs.

The response to the announcement that a Chapter was being formed was gratifying. The initial membership list contained the names of over 60 individuals including all the Foreign Service officers and many Commerce Department professionals. Over 20 new AFSA members were recruited. In order to assure that the Chapter would be representative, the category of Affiliate Membership in the Commerce Chapter was established to allow for the participation of Commerce officials who were actively interested in foreign affairs but who had not served overseas.

The membership selected a Steering Committee to guide the Chapter and to plan its first activities. The members of the Steering Committee were: Donald S. Gilpatric, Director, OFCS; S. Stanley Katz, Director, OII; Charley M. Denton, Assistant Administrator for Industry Operations, BDSA; William C. Henschel, Director, CID/OITP; Richard Draves, FSO, OIRE/ARD; and James R. Matz, FSO, OIRE/FED.

Since the Chapter was formed, five speakers have addressed the group. Thomas Enders, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Monetary Affairs, spoke on the balance of payments and US overseas commitments. Congressman George Bush (R.-Texas) discussed the workings of the House Ways and Means Committee. Eugene A. Birnbaum, Senior Economist, Standard Oil of New Jersey, talked about international monetary developments. The "Economics of Welfare" was the subject of the presentation by Dr. George Wiley, Executive Secretary, National Welfare Rights Organization. The last speaker, Edwin Dale, Jr. veteran correspondent of the NEW YORK TIMES, spoke on dilemmas in domestic economic policy.

In addition to the speakers program, informal contact with Congressmen has been encouraged, study groups are being formed, and social activities are being planned.

In October the Steering Committee made recommendations for the permanent organization of the Commerce Chapter and elections were held. The Chapter will be governed by a six-man Board of Directors who will elect a chairman and select other officers as deemed appropriate. The Board will be generally representative of the membership and directly associated with AFSA. The following members were elected to the Board:

Charley Denton, Chairman of Commerce Chapter Board Business and Defense Services Administration (BDSA).

Malcolm Lawrence (FSO). Executive Secretary Office of International Trade Promotion (OITP).

Milton Berger, Office of Commercial and Financial Policy (OCFP).

Patrick O'Connor (FSO), Office of International Regional Economics (OIRE).

S. Stanley Katz, Office of International Investment (OII).

Harold Keatley, Office of Foreign Commercial Services (OFCS).

The Board in turn selected the following officers:

President Nick Lakas

Vice President Michel Smith

Circulation Manager of the Journal Has Really Circulated

Margaret B. Caton, Circulation Manager of the JOURNAL, has had a diversified career which began in Alexandria, Va. The daughter of a country doctor, she attended a one-room country school at Potters Hill, Va., Chatham Episcopal Institute (now Chatham Hall, Chatham, Va.) and took her A.B. in Arts and Science at George Washington University.

At our Parisian Embassy in 1929 Margaret served as Secretary to the Treasury Attache and in 1934 resigned that post to accept the challenge of editing and helping to develop educational documentary films to be projected for viewing by the public school children in New York City.

During World War II the Women's Army Corps beckoned and Margaret, heeding the call of distant drums, took her basic training at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga. Her first overseas post with the WAC was in London during the V-1 buzz bombing era when, she says, "I really admired not only the stoicism but also the inspiring courage of the British."

Her facility with French equipped her for the assignment in Paris where she assumed the duties of translator at G-2 headquarters in the Majestic Hotel in that city within hours after it had been hurriedly vacated by the German command. Margaret tells the cliff-hanger story of the safe at the Majestic which was locked by the fleeing Hun, and a source of frustration to our Army because of the apprehension that it might be booby trapped. After the decision by the C.O. that it must be opened, 'mid much sweat and tension, the heavy door finally swung open to reveal . . . nothing!

Three years after her mustering out from the WAC Margaret joined the Economic Cooperation Agency from which she transferred to the Foreign Service in 1952.

As a Foreign Service officer Margaret worked in Paris (1948-58) as biographic analyst (1954-58) for VIP's of the French Government; and in 1958 at State in Washington, D.C., she assumed similar duties for dignitaries of French African countries, most of which are now self-governed.

Bogota was the scene of her last two tours before retirement from the Foreign Service on November 1, 1965. A real live memento of her Columbian days, and her constant companion during her "at home" hours, is Cheri, a standard mahogany poodle acquired in Colombia when he was two months old. Cheri is bilingual in that he understands some words only in Spanish: "No" he does not understand in any language. Slippers, silver or otherwise, are his particular chewing joy and the booteries about town are grateful for the upgrade in sales due to his efforts.

Since September 1966 Margaret has been a member of the staff of AFSA and in February 1967 she became circulation manager of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL.

INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY (*Continued from page* 21)

problems is so great that unless large sums are diverted to welfare and renewal programs for the cities there will be such social turmoil that no foreign commitments can be honored. The United States economy is a delicate mechanism that can withstand prolonged fiscal or economic strain only up to a certain point without requiring stringent correctives. Unless we propose to live in a prolonged state of crisis and national mobilization we must husband our resources and apply them in the most effective way possible.

Fortunately the United States inhabits a continental island with a wide moat on either hand and as much distance from a potential enemy as any nation can reasonably expect on this crowded planet. In addition to our vast nuclear arsenal, we possess an unrivaled naval, air and airlift capability that permits us to deploy our military power in virtually every quarter of the globe with great celerity and concentration of force. But this priceless gift of strategic mobility is not unlimited. We should be wary of impairing it in situations where it cannot be employed swiftly and decisively, as in the Dominican Republic. We cannot afford to get bogged down in profitless military stalemates that impose unacceptable limitations on our freedom of action, and impede our capacity for swift reaction elsewhere.

Yet, by a curious paradox, this is precisely what our internal defense policy threatens to do. By propounding the thesis that the United States should involve itself in the internal affairs of other countries, without having the authority to guide the domestic policies of these countries, the policy positively invites indecisive entanglements and inconclusive results. By not imposing strict limitations on its applicability to remote areas and ambiguous situations, the policy positively invites recurrent involvement in foreign land wars that would drain our resources, estrange us from our allies, and tie up our most precious military asset, strategic mobility. In short, our overseas internal defense policy treats counter-insurgency as an end in itself, instead of as a delicate instrument to be sparingly employed in the service of specific foreign policy goals. ■

ACADEMIC DETAILS (*Continued from page* 24)

know something about the Foreign Service.

Another advantage of academic details relates to the individual participants. FSOs are commonly drawn from the same pool of talent relied upon to fill faculty positions in leading colleges and universities. Bright, articulate and well-educated, these officers committed themselves to a career marked by action and travel. Few regret the decision, but many retain the desire to spend some extended periods of time pursuing more academic interests. There are, of course, programs which meet these needs to some extent: diplomats-in-residence, senior seminars, long-term FSI training, university-based training, leaves without pay, and the proposed AFSA sabbatical leaves recently described in this JOURNAL. All, however, have severe disadvantages. The diplomats-in-residence generally are too senior either to enter effectively into campus life or to contribute to the Foriegn Service from their academic experience for more than a few years. Both the senior seminars and the FSI suffer from academic isolation which only life on a campus can correct. University-based training and the proposed AFSA sabbaticals greatly limit the opportunities of their participants by making no provision for teaching or other experiences associated with faculty status. Leave without pay is a severe financial hardship on most officers. Finally, and perhaps most important, no program effectively relates the officer's experience to the promotion process. Academic details, we believe, combine some of the best features of all these programs while filling the gap left by all.

But academic details would offer more benefits to FSOs than just renewed contact with university life whence they came. These officers would have time, milieu and facilities to consider the professional problems with which they must continually deal. They would see their work and that of their associates in a new perspective. They would be able to equip themselves to perform with renewed energy and competence. Their exposure to naive students (and often naive colleagues) would force them to consider some of the most fundamental questions surrounding the development and execution of foreign policy. Their conversation with faculty colleagues in a variety of fields would help clarify these questions and extend the search for answers. At the same time, they would establish new professional contacts, both at their host institution and among others engaged in their field of scholarship around the country. Surely this kind of experience would inevitably influence their work and attitudes for many years. New insights would lace their discussions and new perspectives would contribute to their judgments. Moreover, they would bring to their Foreign Service colleagues in social as well as professional discourse the fruits of their year on campus.

A full discussion of the merits of our proposal for the universities is beyond the scope of this article. Let us mention just one which we are convinced would by itself win the enthusiastic support and financial commitment of most institutions of higher education.

American higher education has recently been strongly criticized by student leaders for its lack of "relevance." Professors, it is claimed, are too involved in unimportant questions, too willing to suspend judgment in the name of scholarship, too anxious to avoid students to gain the serenity of the library or laboratory. A program such as we are urging here would provide one way of redressing this grievance. A visiting FSO, enlightened by both study and experience, would bring to most campuses a refuge from the sterility many students find characteristic of their classrooms. Furthermore, if he does his job well, the FSO could influence far more than only a generation of students: Ideally he could promote and help develop a more problem-oriented curriculum in such fields as political science, economics and public administration.

There are various problems involved in the implementation of an academic detail program, some political, some administrative. The most important prerequisite, however, is recognition, on the part of the Foreign Service, that closer relations with the academic world benefit both the Service and its officers. Our idea is far-reaching in the sense that it suggests making work at universities an integral part of an FSO's career. It is not far-reaching, though, in its assumption that FSOs aspiring to foreign affairs leadership have a valid need for exposure to the world of ideas and that universities, as competitive systems rewarding good thinkers, are the best places for forcing FSOs to exercise their intellectual capabilities. We believe academic details would dovetail nicely with AFSA's Foreign Service reform ideas and would go a long way toward restoring the fruitful interrelationship among institutions which clearly stand side by side within the overall American foreign affairs community. ■

CARL H. BOEHRINGER

Townsend HARRIS

BUSINESSMAN-DIPLOMAT

A Chronicle of Diplomacy, Shoguns, Samurai, Patience and Tact

THE opening of the long-sealed Empire of Japan to foreign trade and commerce was a decisive event in the history of Eastern Asia and of the world. For such a work, the American envoy was prepared as few men could have been . . . The American envoy . . . may in a large sense be called the real overthrower of 'Tycoonism,' the feudal system, and military rule, and the restorer of national unity. He ushered in Dai Nippon's new career. Of the powerful influence of his actions upon the development of the representative institutions now established in Japan, there can be no doubt whatever. In the making of that new kind of Asiatic state and man that surprised Europe, Townsend Harris was a potency acknowledged by none more than the Japanese themselves. He was the greatest of the foreign diplomatists. He was the recognized teacher of a sensitive people, who call him 'the nation's friend.' "*

TO get on with the job of trying to put Townsend Harris into proper perspective *vis-á-vis* Commodore Perry. In so doing, I have no intention whatever of detracting from the doughty Commodore but rather to bring Harris alongside him where he rightly belongs.

**From the foreword to "Townsend Harris: First American Envoy in Japan," by William Elliot Griffis (1895).*

■ CARL H. BOEHRINGER served overseas in China, at Singapore, Batavia, Manila and Tokyo before joining the Foreign Service in 1939. He saw many years of service in the Far East before his retirement from the Service. Since retiring Mr. Boehringer has been Executive Director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan. This article in slightly different form appeared in the August issue of the JOURNAL OF THE ACCJ.

"Since the two names are inseparably linked in history," wrote Carl Crow in the preface of his biography of Harris, "it is impossible to avoid a comparison of the resources and achievements of Commodore Perry and Harris. The former had gone to Japan (in 1853 and 1854) with a well-armed fleet, with interpreters, secretaries, a cargo of rich presents, several tons of coin for incidental expenses. Harris was landed (in 1856) on the inhospitable shore of the country, his status uncertain, without enough funds to meet his daily expenses. There he was forgotten by his government. He had no one to talk to but his Dutch interpreter. During a great part of the time he should have been in the hospital. He thought seriously of suicide. The mere fact that he kept alive was a triumph of willpower."

Crow then noted that the accomplishments of the two men had aptly been summed up by John W. Foster, a former US Secretary of State: "The genius of Perry had unbarred the gate of the island empire and left it ajar; but it was the skill of Harris which threw it open to the commercial enterprise of the world."

Foster Rhea Dulles, in his "Yankees and Samurai: America's Role in the Emergence of Modern Japan, 1791-1900," Harper & Row, New York, 1965, stated that Joseph H. Longford, British historian and one time consul at Nagasaki, paid Harris the most glowing of all tributes in "The Story of Old Japan," Longmans, Green, New York, 1910:

"The story of how, unbacked by any display of force under his country's flag, he succeeded by his own personal efforts in overcoming the traditional hatred of centuries to even the smallest association with foreigners, is one of marvelous tact and patience, of steady determination and courage, of straightforward uprightness in every respect that is not exceeded by any in the entire history of the international relations of the world."

Support for Longford's high praise for Harris was given by Tyler Dennett in his authoritative "Americans in Eastern Asia," The Macmillan Company, New York, 1922:

". . . The Townsend Harris commercial treaty with Japan in 1858 became easily the most brilliant achievement of the United States in Asia for the entire (nineteenth) century, a feat indeed which has never since been equalled . . ."

Both pertinent and trenchant, especially because they give the Japanese reaction to the accomplishments of Perry and Harris, are the following observations by Harry Emerson Wildes in "Aliens in the East," University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1937:

"Most Americans give Perry the glory of opening Japan to Western intercourse; Japan would much prefer to credit the achievement to Townsend Harris, first American civilian to sign a treaty with the Shogun. Perry used no actual violence and was scrupulously correct in all his dealings, but he lost no opportunity for stressing his potential strength. The threat of bombardment was never absent during his visit. His successor, Harris, used milder methods, and wielded no military might.

"Perry, moreover, paid but slight heed to Japanese desires; Harris was more conciliatory. By declining to observe the Japanese tabus, by refusing to accept the meeting place suggested by his hosts, by insisting on surveying the harbors, and by threatening to steam to Yedo (now Tokyo), Perry advertised his scorn; Harris was more cooperative. The Japanese disliked the haughty Commodore and succumbed only under protest to his implied threat of force. Having signed his treaty, they preferred to forget both Perry and the concessions which he wrested from Japan; the Harris agreements which followed were, because concluded between equals, more carefully observed."

To my way of thinking, the United States was fortunate in having both Perry and Harris available to carry out their own specific missions which they did superbly well.

What manner of man was Townsend Harris? How did he acquire those qualities of diplomacy and statesmanship which gave rise to panegyrics by both Western and Japanese historians? How to explain his dogged determination, endless tact and patience, and a sense of mission which sought only what was best for *both* Japan and the United States?

The ancestors of Townsend Harris were Welshmen who came to America with Roger Williams, and settled in Massachusetts. Later generations emigrated to Ulster County, in the State of New York. Both of the grandfathers of Townsend Harris, Gilbert Harris and John Watson, served as officers in the Continental Army under Gates. John Watson, his mother's father, was in the battle of Saratoga, in which his British cousin, General Fraser, fell.

Gilbert Harris married Thankful Townsend, whose maiden name the future envoy to Japan bore, and who was a woman of strong character. During the War of 1812 British forces set fire to the Harris home, an act that was never forgotten or forgiven by Thankful who taught her grandson, Townsend Harris, to tell the truth, fear God, and hate the British. Of the first two points there is little doubt that they provided the keystone of his life-long conduct. The third is open to question and all available evidence indicates that during his life in the Far East, and especially in Japan, he was not anti-British. He may have been so as a youth in upstate New York and again in his later years when northerners were bitter about British support for the South during the Civil War.

Jonathan Harris, son of Gilbert Harris, married and settled at Sandy Hill, a few miles south of Lake George, New York. He was a hatter, and the magistrate of the village. He introduced the grafting of fruit trees into his neighborhood. Of six children, Townsend, born in 1804, was the youngest of five boys. His education, except for the very competent instruction of his mother, another strong personality, was limited to that provided by a primary school and an academy. Harris regretted to the end of his life his lack of a university education, and it was the sense of this deficiency which stimulated his later interest in the educational institutions of his state. He became president of the Board of Education of New York City, and will always be remembered as the founder of the Free Academy which later became the City College of New York, now part of the City University.

Not born into a privileged class, Harris was essentially self-educated, having wrested his knowledge from books in the time he could spare from making a living, as noted by Emily Hahn in her article "A Yankee Barbarian at the Shogun's Court," published in the June 1964 issue of AMERICAN HERITAGE. Continuing, Miss Hahn added:

"He went to work in a New York drygoods shop at the age of thirteen, but when he left New York for the Orient in 1849, at the age of forty-five, he was a leading citizen—a member of the Chamber of Commerce and former president of the Board of Education. Harris managed to learn French, Spanish, and Italian, but he always regretted having missed formal schooling . . ." Be it noted that, when in the Orient, Harris also acquired a good working knowledge of Malay, a talent which he put to good use as a trader in southeast Asia.

According to Griffis, Harris laid the foundation of his success as a negotiator in the successful conduct of his business in New York. His business career, which revolved around the importation and sale of chinaware from England in partnership with his brother John, proved an excellent apprenticeship for the years of bargaining which were to come, since, especially in the Orient, noted Griffis, bargaining constitutes an important part of a diplomat's experience.

Townsend Harris's life as a man about town in New York, where he belonged to the *intelligentsia*, then a term known only in Russia, collapsed with the death of his mother at the age of 83 in 1847. For Harris, who had never married, the balance wheel of his life was gone—the incentive to accomplishment which would bring the approval of his mother. According to Carl Crow, Harris began to have what is now tactfully referred to as a "drinking problem" and, after more than a quarter century of careful attention to business he began to neglect it and, for the first time since it had been founded some 30 years previous, the partnership with his brother John began to show decreased sales and subsequently also losses. Exasperated John, living comfortably in London where he looked after purchase of stock, finally wrote demanding that the partnership be dissolved, adding that he would come back from London, take over the business, and run it himself.

This was a final blow to Townsend. He had lost his mother, his reputation, had abandoned his career as an educator (he having previously resigned from the Board of Education on John's insistence), and had now been branded by John as the black sheep of a hitherto wholly respectable family. But if, as noted by Miss Hahn, Townsend Harris was on the way to becoming an alcoholic, he seems to have snapped out of it; no trace of such a weakness appears in his later career.

Acting with decision, he cut loose from New York in 1849 by acquiring half interest in a sailing ship, and started on a trading expedition to the Far East. He sailed from New York in May 1849, on the long route around the Horn to San Francisco, and there became the sole owner of the ship and the trading enterprise. For several years Harris wandered about the Far East, trading is an easy-going manner. Little is known of his life in the Far East except that he was in Manila for Christmas the following year (1850), and in Penang the next year. He also visited India, Hong Kong, and such China ports as were open to foreigners, making many friends among Western merchants and diplomats as he went. At first Harris

THE HARPER'S WEEKLY *of April 7, 1860 carried this illustration of the residence of US Minister Townsend Harris at Shimoda.*

prospered, but he made some unlucky ventures in what was at best a very hazardous business and in about two years was compelled to sell the ship.

There are no records as to what Harris did after losing ownership of his ship except that he established a residence in Hong Kong where he appears to have won the confidence and friendship of Sir John Bowring, British plenipotentiary to China. In the journal which he began to keep several years later, Harris records the fact that, as previously noted, he spent Christmas of 1851 in Penang and the three successive years in Singapore, Hong Kong and Calcutta. Elsewhere he mentions visits to Ceylon, trips through the jungles of Java and extensive tours of North China. He must have traveled even farther afield than his journal indicates, for in his later years he told of experiences with head-hunters and cannibals of the South Seas. He made seven visits to Penang, and also visited Burma, Borneo and Siam.

Harris now wanted to do something more than wander idly through Asia and applied for a United States consular post. An appointment to Ningpo, in China, did not interest him, and learning of the Perry expedition to Japan when in Shanghai in 1853, he tried to join it. Rebuffed by Perry, Harris then conceived the idea of becoming the first consul general to Japan. He returned to the United States to make a formal application for the post. Secretary of State Marcy was an old friend, Commodore Perry approved and several other prominent New Yorkers (attesting that Harris was a good Democrat) came to his support. President Pierce was persuaded to make Harris consul general and, in officially notifying Harris of his appointment, stated that it was based upon "your knowledge of Eastern character and your general intelligence and experience in business."

Townsend Harris, 52 at this time (1855), was described by Foster Rhea Dulles as "a strikingly handsome man with a heavy mustache and sideburns. His manner was dignified and courtly."

When Harris first arrived at Shimoda on August 21, 1856, aboard the U.S.S. *San Jacinto*, under command of Commodore James Armstrong, the local Japanese authorities made it quite clear that they did not want to accept an American consul. As noted by George B. Sansom in "The Western World and Japan," The Cresset Press, London, 1950, "This unassuming, upright and sensible official might have been the Devil himself from the consternation which he caused. The Japanese authorities implored him to go away, urging that there was no need for his services. No difficulties had arisen, and if he stayed other foreign consuls would come and cause much trouble. But Mr. Harris stayed, though he must often have regretted it in moments of despondency."

Harris, alone except for his Dutch-born secretary and interpreter, Henry Heusken, an amiable young man only 24 years old, who had emigrated to America from Holland in 1853 and who was later (January 1861) to be murdered in Yedo, set up the consulate at the temple of Gyokusen-ji, determined to persuade the Japanese not only to accept rather more graciously his residence in Shimoda, but to allow him to proceed to Yedo and negotiate the commercial treaty that was his government's primary objective. Harris stayed in Shimoda for 15 months before he was permitted to set out for Yedo.

According to Dr. Richard Lane, writing on "Townsend Harris" in the May 1968 issue of ASIA SCENE, published monthly in Tokyo, during these 15 months Harris was to be constantly occupied with the vexing problems of (1) working out the terms of a commercial treaty with the Japanese; (2) forcing them to permit him an audience with the Shogun in Yedo; (3) persuading the local officials to assist in rendering his makeshift temple-quarters livable; (4) overcoming the several illnesses that at times came near to killing him; and (5) worrying about why the US State Department neglected sending him either communications or funds.

It is not within the purview of this article to become involved in Harris' prolonged, detailed, and often exasperating negotiations with the Japanese authorities which finally resulted in the signing on July 29, 1858, of the Commercial Treaty between the United States and Japan. For such information I recommend "The Complete Journal of Townsend Harris: First American Consul and Minister to Japan" edited by Dr. Mario E. Cosenza and published in 1959 in revised form as a second edition by the Charles E. Tuttle Company, Tokyo.

I have often wondered why the title of this book suggests that it covers the entire time Harris was in Japan. As a matter of fact, it is complete but only for the period covered, namely, from August 21, 1856, when the U.S.S. *San Jacinto* dropped anchor at Shimoda, to February 27, 1858, with four brief entries added as "fragments," the first dated May 15 and the last June 9, all in 1858. Harris did not leave Japan until May 8, 1862, more than four years later and it is quite certain that

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A Japanese book of accounts pertaining to Townsend Harris illustrates the Harris procession from Shimoda to Yedo in November 1857. Translation reveals that the placard (top middle) reads "from the American government," (presumably gifts); at left in top panel, above box being carried, is a placard that says, "the letter from the American Government," and a draft of Harris's treaty with the Shogunate.

Cheers!!!!!

ALEXANDRA HILL

All around the globe New Year's Day, the most universally celebrated of all holidays, carries the same sentiment: let us doff the outworn, the disappointing, the erroneous, and celebrate the moment of putting on the new, the hopeful, the purposeful, the creative, the joyous. It is the moment of man's eternal cyclic renewal; its celebration is a monument to his belief that he can toss off his mistakes and create a more perfect world for himself.

But though the sentiment is the same over the world, the methods of celebration are highly divergent, dependent always on differences in national character.

I remember one New Year's Eve in The Hague, its delight consisting only in its quietness, for the Dutch are always subdued in their deeply felt celebrations. At midnight we found ourselves on the way to an American colony party, and we were late, due to the complication of unexpected guests at home. We should have been hurrying, but could not, for mysterious moonlight was on the groves and fields as we drove to the suburb of Wassenaar. Just at twelve we rounded a bend and saw that here it had been snowing. The moonlight glinted off the frosted trees, and lay lightly on lawns and bushes. At the same moment that we saw it, a church bell sounded far away, then was echoed by another. That was all; the moon-drenched, snow-blessed landscape, and the far reminder that the moment of newness had arrived.

Of the party I remember nothing.

There was another New Year's Eve in Hong Kong, and the contrast with Holland could not have been more extreme. At exactly twelve o'clock the whole town exploded with firecrackers. The sound was not the peck-peck of separate crackers, separately thrown, but the concerted and continuous explosion of whole packs of crackers set off on the same wick. And these were not the innocent Fourth of July child-amusers that we are accustomed to in the States, but a far more potent explosive.

The buildings rocked. Pedestrians, rounding a corner just as an ignited packet was thrown at their feet, shrieked and ran for a doorway. Traffic became erratic as drivers swerved to miss the leaping, blasting, flaring, serially-exploding demons.

The din was unbelievable, and the throwers quite anonymous. Some of the crackers were hurled from apartment windows, or from balconies, others from the hands of small boys who disappeared immediately into dark alleys or darker doorways. But all were thrown with abandon, with no concern for the whereabouts of pedestrians or cars.

And through all this confusion, one small carry-over from Christmas persists. The ubiquitous urchins, hands extended, dodge with the dodging pedestrians, taking their chances along with anyone else fearless enough to be on the streets.

"Dack da haa' wi' bowza haw-we.
Fa-la-la-la-la—" they sing.

Their uncertain little voices compete with the crashing inferno. The urgency in their four- and five-year-old faces—children abroad in really perilous circumstances at midnight—is irresistible. Sing the tourists' Christmas song, and sing it far into the New Year, to touch a heart and gain a bowl of rice!

The people of Madrid celebrate silently, as do the Dutch. However their silence is not due to the circumstance that they are prayerfully employed in their homes. On the contrary, all of Madrid is gathered together in the great Puerta del Sol, standing silently, eyes turned to the clock on the town hall tower, hands clutching a little sack containing twelve grapes.

As the clock strikes the first chime of twelve, a great illuminated disk starts to descend the tower, and after half a minute turns to go back up again.

But at that first chime everybody begins to pop the twelve grapes into his mouth—one grape for luck in each month of the year. All the grapes must be in the mouth, with at least a tooth put through them, before the disk reaches the top again; otherwise the last of the year will prove disastrous. When the disk is at the top, it is one minute past twelve, and one may chew at leisure—even spit out the accumulated pips if he is in a fastidious mood.

So the thousands of silent people remain silently chewing. And when the grapes are swallowed, they turn as silently to wend their way home; no hilarity, no kissing, no greetings—only a great silent movement toward the streets of exit.

We noticed only two exceptions to this behavior. A five-year-old child managed a hoarse squeak on a whistle. And a group of four Americans began a ring-around-the-rosy dance to the tune of Auld Lang Syne. But they gave it up immediately; it was too outrageous in the face of that overwhelming gravity.

We found, however, on leaving the Puerta, that there had been some excitement which we had missed. Apparently a taxi had tried to make its way into the square during the solemnities, and the crowd had simply turned it over on its side. As we passed by we saw that the police were fishing the occupants out, because it was their duty, but with a disdainful air of you-had-it-coming-to-you about them which silenced the splutterings of the outraged passengers. Some things are sacred.

For sheer joyous abandon we would choose a New Year's Eve in Rome. It began for us a little before the new year, when we discovered one day in a kitchen closet a huge pile of broken crockery—a cracked chamber pot, broken mason jars, as well as casualties from our cherished crystal and dinner ware.

"Maria, what's all this rubbish?"

"Oh, Signora, you shouldn't have looked! I can't tell you yet. You will know later what it is for."

"Throw it out, Maria. It's an awful mess."

"Please, no." She was close to tears. "It's for a surprise."

So we left it there.

On New Year's Eve, shortly before midnight, we were ready with the champagne bottle in a bucket of ice, the glasses frosted and waiting, when Maria appeared at the living room door. In her arms was the paper carton full of broken crockery, and her face was flushed with excitement. "Now you shall see. Come with me."

We followed her out onto the terrace, starlit and cold. We stood shivering, listening as Maria seemed to be listening. What were we listening for?

Then the whistles began to blow and the rockets to ascend.

"Now quickly!" Maria cried. "The two of you take the box

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LOOKING AHEAD TO THE YEAR

THE time has come in a fast-moving world when Americans professionally engaged in foreign affairs must give more thought to the future of a generation hence. Many serious problems lie 10, 20, or 30 years ahead. To prepare adequately for these problems, we need all the lead-time we can get. We also need to exercise our imaginations, to try to visualize the conditions which will face us in the future, and to formulate some realistic hypotheses for planning purposes.

Some may argue it is rather futile to plan for the world of a generation from now when we don't even know what significant events may transpire in the next few months. To such skeptics there is an easy reply. What will it avail to solve today's crises if we have no definite longer-term objectives, no vision in our minds of the kind of world we are trying to bring about in the decades ahead, and no plan for getting from here to there?

Secretary Rusk used to indicate from time to time that longer-term considerations were very much on his mind as he pondered the broad problems of the age we live in. Let me quote from a speech which he made on March 24, 1967, to a group of university leaders meeting here:

> "Policy is, by and large, dealing with the future. Our chief function in the Department of State is to try to bring about one kind of future rather than another kind of future, but there are some problems in trying to pierce the fog of the future and make a little more sense rather than a little less sense out of unfolding events."

It is my contention, as one who has devoted a fair amount of research to futurist studies, that one can indeed make "a little more sense rather than a little less sense" out of what history holds for the American people and the world we live in. In this article I shall venture to lay down some planning postulates for the final third of the twentieth century—a century, by the way, which began on January 1, 1901—and to indicate what sort of world we should strive for, in one man's estimation, as we move on to the twenty-first.

Possibly some of the suspicion of studies of the future is justified. I find myself impatient with two kinds of futurists frequently encountered.

First, I am cool toward those who talk glibly of "alternative world futures," and construct a variety of scenarios, each of which has some plausibility, to show the various ways in which the world might develop in the next 10 or 20 or 50 years. I see nothing wrong with this kind of speculation as an academic exercise, but speculation alone gets us nowhere.

Secondly, I react adversely to those who think of the future purely in terms of the wonderful technology which they envisage. They advocate universal computerization, unlimited funds for space exploration, biomedical research to promote life expectancies of from 100 to 150 years, efforts to control genetic processes, all sorts of wonderful things. These people frighten me. Before introducing so much new technology, I would like to see us get our social and political world in better order.

So how would I go about preparing for the future, and trying to influence it in a favorable direction?

To begin with, I would, as I have just indicated, focus on the way the world is developing—socially, economically, politically—and try to envisage a valid and attainable future situation toward which it would make good sense to strive.

My conception is that it is impossible to predict the future, except in extremely general terms, but not impossible to plan for it. What one needs to do is to postulate for planning purposes an hypothetical future which will be difficult and challenging, but not unmanageable. Such a postulated future should, of course, be as closely in line with realistic probabilities as one can make it.

The next stage is to start preparing in deadly earnest for this imaginary postulated future. If the actual future turns out to be less difficult than the one we shall have planned for, fine and dandy; we can ease off and scale down our efforts if and when we are sure we are ahead of the game. This, by the way, is not very likely; almost surely we shall plan too little rather than too much.

More probably, the future will turn out to be more difficult than we have assumed for planning purposes. In that case, we shall have planned inadequately, but because of our preparations we shall have very much increased our capabilities for dealing with the actual future as it develops. We can then turn on more effort, being at least within striking distance of some of our objectives—which we certainly would not have been if we had taken no action at all.

But what if the future is neither more difficult nor less so, but simply altogether different? This is not too likely, since the general trends of historical development are not too difficult to foresee, at least for such a medium-range period as 32 years, from now to 2001. But planning should be a continuous process, constantly under revision; as events begin to take an unforeseen turn, the planner can begin to adjust his assumptions.

■ FRANK SNOWDEN HOPKINS, a frequent contributor to the JOURNAL in years past, retired in 1968 from a 23-year career in the Department and Foreign Service, during which he helped found the Foreign Service Institute, served at three posts abroad, and held Departmental positions in public and cultural affairs. He was on special detail to the Policy Planning Council at the time of his retirement. Long interested in planning for the future, he has written a number of essays in this field, and is presently working on a proposed book on the foreign policy problems of 1976-2001. He is also the Washington local chairman of the World Future Society, an organization of some 2,500 members which promotes futurist studies.

2001

FRANK SNOWDEN HOPKINS

Some readers may wish to question the phrase "medium-range." But surely 32 years is not a long time, for it is within the life expectancy of most persons now living. Two of my children will be living in the twenty-first century before they have reached my present age of 60. And if my youngest grandchild lives to the present age of my still-living mother, he will be around until the year 2056.

Or let us take the Foreign Service. A young FSO-8 starts out this year at 25. In the year 2001 he will be 57, still eligible for active duty if not actually in the Service. After that, assuming the improved medical care of the future, he may still have another 30 years or so in which to enjoy or endure the crowded world of the twenty-first century.

Let me make another point. Is it unduly fanciful to prepare for a future 32 years hence? Not at all. All of us in our personal lives make planning assumptions for the future. We save, we invest, we buy homes, we produce children, we pay for them to get expensive educations, all on the basis of assumptions as to the nature of the future. If there were no such assumptions, the farmer would plant no crops, the business man would order no goods, the industrialist would build no factories, the engineer would plan no public works, the scientist would do very little research, the scholar would not bother to write books, and so on ad infinitum.

Why, then, should many minds boggle at the idea of planning an American foreign policy for the years from now to 2001? There is no logical and reasonable answer, except to say that they shouldn't. Granted, the world may meet with nuclear catastrophe long before that date. But also you or I might be run over and killed next week at Twenty-first Street and Virginia Avenue by a dashing young lady in an MG or a Porsche. The possibility of disaster always lurks, in public events as in private lives. The only sensible thing to do is to postulate some reasonable assumptions and go ahead and plan.

These assumptions, as we said earlier, must not be too cheerful, or we should not be stimulated to undertake the tough work of planning. But neither should they be too discouraging. It makes no sense to assume a thermonuclear holocaust, destroying the industrial parts of the world, because there is no way really to plan in advance for a world in ruins. Our assumptions should be of such a nature that they generate planning requirements, and then we should go ahead and plan.

Let us then try to lay down some planning postulates for the next 32 years, and then attempt to work out their implications for American foreign policy from now to the year 2001.

Our first and most important assumption relates to world population and its distribution. Estimates on this point vary widely. The Hudson Institute projection is for the present world population of some 3.3 billion to increase by the end of the century to 6.4 billion. Professor Harrison Brown of the California Institute of Technology, depressed by the fact that population increase rates have steadily risen over the past ten years, thinks now that it could reach 7.5 billion.

Estimates on the population of the United States in the year 2000 vary from around 275 million to as high as 340 million. The increase rate has turned downward in recent years, and is now around one per cent per annum. It is expected to rise again, however, when the females born in the postwar "baby boom" reach their age period of greatest productivity, 20 to 29 years. The Hudson Institute projection for the year 2000 is 318 million Americans. Professor Brown thinks the figure will be at least 300 million, and probably 340 million. Everything depends on the attitudes of young people toward size of family in the years ahead.

Population trends in the world outside our borders indicate relatively slow population increases in the advanced countries, such as those of Europe plus Australia and Japan, but alarmingly rapid growth rates elsewhere, in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The most striking characteristic of world population at the end of the century will be its maldistribution; the greatest growth will be in countries already overpopulated, with inadequate economic expansion rates, which will be least able to support large numbers of additional people.

One can only speculate as to the effect which programs of family planning will have in those countries which are trying to limit population growth. There are signs of progress here and there, but the results will come slowly and only with great effort. My own estimate would be that birth rates in the less developed countries will be little affected for the next 20 years, and only slowly after that. I look for more effect from hunger and malnutrition than from planned programs. I will stick with a general assumption that world population will be between six and seven billion, of whom at least 300 million will be in the United States; for even if the American birth rate continues to drop, immigration may well tend to increase.

A second assumption relates to food supply. We do not need to be as alarmist as William and Paul Paddock in their recent book "Famine 1975," but they are certainly right in their general concern. World food production in recent years has increased less rapidly than world population, and malnutrition is now a grave problem for hundreds of millions of human beings. At one time the US Department of Agriculture thought that there might be widespread starvation in the world in the 1980s. The prospect has now brightened somewhat with the widespread plantings of improved new strains of rice and wheat in the belt of Asian countries running from Turkey to the Philippines, as reported by Lester R. Brown in an interesting article ("The Agricultural Revolution in Asia") in the July, 1968 FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

It is still early to evaluate the success of this latest development in world agriculture, which involves a number of economic and technical complexities. The new grains could yield well enough, if all goes smoothly, to lift the food increase rate temporarily beyond the population increase rate, not only in Asia but in many African and Latin American countries. I have talked with Dr. Brown, and he is cautiously optimistic; he hopes for at least a 3 per cent per annum increase in world food production over the next few years, and thinks that even a better increase is possible. But he also states that the new "agricultural revolution" is not an ultimate solution. What it does, he writes, is to "buy some much needed additional time in which to mount effective family planning programs."

To the extent that the less developed countries cannot meet their nutritional needs, they will have to import food grains

(*Continued on page* 41)

WASHINGTON LETTER

by TED OLSON

WRITING a letter that won't reach the addressee for a month or more creates problems, but there are compensating advantages. One feels no compulsion to pontificate about current happenings, as the daily columnist must do. By the time anybody reads this, that day of decision, November 5, 1968, will be sliding back into the perspective of history. Some if not all of the bumper stickers will have been scraped off (and mighty sticky they are; somebody ought to develop an adhesive that would evaporate after two months). Campaign buttons, campaign literature and campaign promises, always produced in prodigal excess, will be land-fill in waste disposal areas, or smog in the urban skies. If you listen sharply you may hear the clatter of a busy typewriter: Theodore H. White composing "The Making of the President—1968."

The two months after a Presidential election are, in Washington, a time of expectancy, foreboding, speculation, and the sound of desks being cleaned out and moving vans backing into driveways. This happens every four years, in a small way, but not since 1960 have so many Christmas greetings been accompanied by change-of-address cards.

Each Administration sets its stamp on the capital city. Washington under Kennedy was vastly different from Washington under Eisenhower, Lyndon Johnson's Washington vastly different from Kennedy's. The Nixon regime will inevitably have a flavor of its own. The pundits have been examining every Nixon utterance, every appointment, for clues not only to the new Administration's policies and modus operandi, but to its special aura, that indefinable something called style. It's too early for even the most sensitive antennae to analyze it with any degree of accuracy, but by mid-1969 even the lowly Washingtonian who never gets invited to the White House or the State Department's ceremonial rooms will have the feel of it.

One place to watch for hints is the society pages of the local newspapers, where so much news that anywhere else would be covered by political reporters bubbles up out of the froth. Who, for instance, is going to be the hostess with the mostes' for the next four years? What will the new Establishment peerage do for diversion? What restaurants will they favor with their patronage—especially those two-or-three-martini luncheons at which policies are forged and the destinies of underlings determined? If martinis, will they be gin or vodka, on the rocks or straight up? If whisky, will it be Scotch, bourbon, or perhaps even rye?

There'll Always Be a Washington

Party platforms and campaign speeches always resound with pledges to clean house, streamline operations, drastically prune the overgrown bureaucracy. It's easy to make such promises, not so easy to carry them out. How many RIFs have you old-timers witnessed and survived? And how many times has some curious reporter discovered a few months later that the federal payroll was bigger than ever?

That's one reason Washington keeps on growing, and seems unlikely ever to become a ghost town, with a few revenants wandering disconsolately among the Foggy Bottom ruins. Another reason is that people get to like the place and don't want to leave. Retired Congressmen join law firms and employ their acquired expertise and contacts in lobbying. Executive appointees find employment as consultants with non-governmental agencies or firms, or as lecturers at some university. "You Can't Go Home Again."

With all those new people looking for rooftree and hearthstone, you'd think this would be a busy time for real estate firms. The POST reported not long after the election that "the scavenging for clients" had already begun. (We'd think the FS wives in that business—there are quite a few of them—might legitimately resent that pejorative word.) We asked one of the bigger agencies how about it. Well, actually, we were told, up to our deadline time it was mostly a sellers' market—lots of owners calling in to list their houses, not many newcomers shopping around. Of course by now that will have changed. The influx will be in full flood.

We remarked that it seemed a little rash, considering the turnover in political jobs, elective and appointive, for anyone to put a lot of money into a house. That's right, our informant agreed, and freshmen Congressmen tend to rent rather than buy, at least for the first term. The rule-of-thumb used to be that House members didn't begin to feel and act like permanent residents until the third term, Senators until the second. Upper-level appointees are likely to take short-term rentals while they look around for a permanent—well, semi-permanent—base.

Remembering the gossip back in 1953 that the incoming Republicans were avoiding Georgetown because it was too closely identified with Roosevelt's New Dealers, we asked whether any particular area, urban or suburban, had been earmarked as the "in" place for Republicans to congregate. Not so far as he could detect.

One Congressman appealed to his colleagues to set an example by living within the District instead of joining that much-discussed white exodus to the suburbs. The chief response was an indignant retort from a Virginia member with large real-estate interests.

While we're on the subject, there still may be a few penthouses available in Watergate East—only five minutes from New State, a short walk from 1750 Pennsylvania. One was advertised recently at $119,700—only $42,500 down, $1,175 monthly.

Every Man His Own James Bond

Wonder how many FS wives temporarily domiciled in the Washington area found under the Christmas tree the latest novelty for the Woman Who Has Almost Everything: a lipstick-size tear-gas projector. Ten squirts on one loading, enough, one would imagine, to discourage any purse-snatcher or night prowler. For the family there's an economy model good for 30 shots, and for suburbanites anticipating an assault in force a super-economy howitzer with 60 charges. All perfectly legal, the sign assures the window-shopper, but better hurry; the supply is limited.

The Spy Shop, a new emporium in downtown Washington, also has "bugs" of assorted sizes for every imaginable eavesdropping need. There's even that ingenious device that the boys from U.N.C.L.E. were always surreptitiously attaching to THRUSH transportation—a mini-transmitter that laid down a spoor of b-e-e-eeeps to lead the good guys to the enemy's lair, just in time.

Of course the bad guys are pretty smart, too, at utilizing the marvels of snooper-duper science. The Washington papers reported recently that a holdup gang was using tear gas to subdue victims and repel pursuers.

Of Time and the Rover

The way government agencies have been pouring personnel into southeast Asia these last few years practically everybody can expect to cross the International Dateline sometime, if he hasn't crossed it already. It's a bit unsettling the first time: you doze off on Wednesday and wake up on Friday. Whatever happened to Thursday? And assuming you're not going back the same way, how does that missing day figure in payroll and per diem calculations?

Well, the GAO was confronted with that problem recently. Fellow being transferred left Honolulu on Thursday morning and landed in Tokyo on what to him was Thursday evening but what Tokyo calendars said was Friday. When he found he wasn't getting paid for that missing Friday he kicked. The hassle finally wound up on the Comptroller General's desk, and the ruling was: pay him.

It gets pretty complicated here, so perhaps Mike Causey of the Washington Post will permit us to quote his summation of the CG's reasoning. ". . . it was silly to say to Price that he had lost Friday by having two Thursdays, since he wasn't in the place where it was Friday (for pay purposes) because the Government had told him to go to a place where it was Friday to him, but still Thursday to his accounting department." Perfectly clear?

The GAO is reported to be waiting now, with some trepidation, for the converse problem: How do you figure it when somebody crosses the line flying east and has *two* Fridays?

Orchids for Our Mr. Cates

Perhaps inspired by John M. Cates's article in the October JOURNAL—perhaps not—Kathleen Teltsch of the NEW YORK TIMES did a piece on "The U.N. Lounge: Coffeehouse of the World." It pictures Mr. Cates circulating breezily among the delegates during coffee breaks, and quotes "a Latin diplomat not given to praise: 'The United States doesn't know how many votes it owes to Cates.' "

Oddments

Two November 5 items that American news media overseas may have missed: that subway moved a pace nearer realization when the remaining suburban districts authorized bond issues to finance their shares of the cost. It's up to the new Congress now to vote the big money. And at last you can have a cocktail before lunch or dinner at Virginia restaurants. The sale-of-liquor by-the-drink, illegal since 1916, was overwhelmingly approved by northern Virginia voters in a referendum.

Welcome and good luck to the WASHINGTON MONTHLY, which should be on the stands by the time you read this. The prospectus describes it as "a new kind of magazine to illumine the workings of government with disciplined fact-finding and analysis that will help you begin to control political tides and events." That's quite an order. But with Richard H. Rovere heading an editorial board also containing Russell Baker, Murray Kempton and Peter Lisagor, among others, the magazine is bound to be stimulating.

Things to see: The National Gallery's exhibit of the works of William Sidney Mount (1807-1868), originator of the American school of genre painting.

The eight-foot head from Easter Island temporarily on exhibit in front of the Pan-American Building.

Reader's Guide

THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, November, 1968—"Resources and Needs of American Diplomacy." Edited by Smith Simpson; contributions by Foy D. Kohler, Howard Furnas, Graham A. Martin, Fisher Howe, Elizabeth Bean, John C. Ausland and others.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October, 1968—"World Order and American Responsibility," by Charles W. Yost. "Should the U.S. Withdraw from Asia?" by Owen Harries. "Still the Search for Goals," by Edward G. Lansdale.

BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, October—"The Nuclear Arms Race: Diagnosis and Treatment," by J. P. Ruina. "The need to de-escalate the arms race should be clear to all . . . Congress, the public, and the press must accept the fact that superiority in nuclear weapons no longer has meaning. On the Soviet side, the system of secrecy . . . must be abandoned."

THE NEW YORKER, October 19—"Evolution of a Term," by Henry Fairlie. The "term" is "the Establishment," and Mr. Fairlie, who claims to have originated its contemporary application (in the SPECTATOR, Sept. 23, 1955), examines some of the abuses to which it has been subjected since. But guess who, so far as he can trace it back, said it first? Ralph Waldo Emerson. In a lecture in 1841, he identified the conservative as "an upholder of the establishment." Suggested collateral reading (for those with access to back issues of this JOURNAL): Si Nadler's "The Real Truth About the American Establishment," FSJ, January, 1963, and the Washington POST, Jan. 8, 1963.

THE NEW REPUBLIC, November 16—"No Shortage of Matches or Sparks in Korea," by Russell Warren Howe.

California News, 1850 by William Sidney Mount, from the Suffolk Museum and Carriage House, Stony Brook, L. I., Melville Collection.



Alternatives to Isolationism

THOMAS K. FINLETTER believes that the US has not yet discovered an alternative to isolationism. He is indeed concerned that it may lose the way in its search.

A former Secretary of the Air Force (during the Korean War) and former Ambassador to NATO (1961 to 1965), Mr. Finletter considers the North Atlantic Alliance the heart of American foreign policy. He expresses the view that US intervention in Vietnam was an aberration which—when added to De Gaulle's assault on NATO—has come close to wrecking the Alliance. His solution is to neutralize South Vietnam and to concentrate on repairing the damage to NATO. He would do the latter by pursuing two goals, defense of the Alliance "citadel" and political consultation on matters arising outside the treaty area "to determine what, *if anything*, the Alliance should do about them." He sees as the alternative a retreat by the members of the Alliance into isolation. Mr. Finletter sets forth this solution after a review of the history of NATO and US involvement in Vietnam.

While this is a worthwhile book, Mr. Finletter's basic outlook seems somewhat too Europe-oriented. Even if one agrees—as I do—that Europe should have first priority (whatever that means) in consideration of our foreign policy, this does not obliterate the global concerns of the US. While we should always consult our NATO allies, it does not seem to me that we can give them a veto on US actions—and I understand the book to come perilously close to saying this.

Mr. Finletter also shares a more general tendency to be overly preoccupied with Vietnam. While the course of events there could have a critical influence on events in Asia, even a favorable outcome will by no means erase the many complicated problems which will confront the US in the coming years in this part of the world.

—JOHN C. AUSLAND

INTERIM REPORT, *by Thomas K. Finletter. Norton, $4.95.*

United Nations: Cornerstone of American Foreign Policy

RUTH Russell concludes her extraordinarily complete study "The United Nations and United States Security Policy" with these words; "it is high time for the United States, if it is to warrant its position of world leadership, to mobilize its resources of imagination and political courage in the service of an international diplomatic breakthrough." Just what are the barriers, we must break through and what are the actions we might take are set forth in this remarkable book. Miss Russell, already well known for her previous Brookings Institutions study, "A History of The United Nations Charter: The Role of The United States 1940-1945," has ably researched and imaginatively commented upon the development of the United Nations since 1945. Although, as the title suggests, her attention is fixed primarily upon our security problems, she of necessity touches upon a score of related problems. Seemingly peripheral to the hard liners, these related problems bear directly upon the main issues: has the United Nations a vital role to play and, if so, how can it most effectively carry it off?

Miss Russell's treatment of the problems relating to peacekeeping; UN contributions and Article 19; universal membership and the mini-states; the limitations of arms control; the rule of law and the relationship to our domestic policy are an invaluable contribution to the diplomatic practitioner. Although experts in one of the many fields she covers will find cause to question and argue some of her conclusions (any one involved in the UN aspects of the Dominican crises could take issue with various statements), no one can doubt her scholarship or the validity of her arguments. Foreign Service officers should take heart from the opportunities she advances for imaginative diplomatic approaches to seemingly deadlocked issues. She both discounts the United Nations as a panacea for all the world's ills and, at the same time, points out the areas in which we could have made more effective use of it.

Although hard going, it is a unique source book and at the same time a spirited challenge to the United States to cut itself free from defensive shibboleths and have a go at the world's problems on a long term and realistic basis. Realizing the political vulnerability of programs which might be considered "too idealistic by nationally oriented realists," she nevertheless winds up by quoting a remark by UN Secretary General U Thant in 1966, "I put it to you that our present situation is unrealistic without even the benefit of being idealistic."

Policy makers and laborers in the international vineyard alike will find much that is useful and much to ponder over in this exemplary work of scholarship.

—JOHN M. CATES, JR.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY, *by Ruth B. Russell. The Brookings Institution, $10.00.*

As Mr. Krock Remembers Them

FOR quite a few years before his retirement in 1966, Arthur Krock's column had jutted up from the NEW YORK TIMES editorial page as a lonely rock of dissent in a landscape whose features he found increasingly distasteful. He didn't like most of what he saw going on around him: the drift toward the "welfare state"—always framed in pejorative quotes; the policies of "a 'liberalism' [those quotes again] both spurious of ancestry and destructive in practice;" the "seepage of editorial attitudes" into the news pages of the TIMES. (A long-time Krock reader recalls instances when his own reporting was not entirely water-tight against such seepage.)

His "Memoirs," fortunately, are much more than the querulous mutterings of an aging Cassandra. From the time of his arrival in Washington in 1909, as correspondent of the LOUISVILLE TIMES, he was close to the center of things. He came to know every President from Taft to Lyndon Johnson, most of them well; often he was called into counsel. He had the foresight to record the substance of these conversations while they were fresh in memory; reproduced now, they provide many fascinating insights and some that historians should find valuable.

Krock devotes a chapter to each President he met more than casually. His appraisals—where ideological heresy does not rouse his gorge—are shrewd and often sympathetic. There are glimpses or full-length studies also of many other personalities—Bernard Baruch, James V. Forrestal, John Foster Dulles, great editors like Henry

Watterson, Frank Cobb and Edwin L. James, great reporters like Herbert Bayard Swope.

The book has an appendix of special interest. It is a "top secret" memorandum prepared for President Truman in 1946 by Clark M. Clifford, then Special Counsel to the President, on "American Relations with the Soviet Union." Mr. Krock says it has never been published before.

—Ted Olson

Memoirs: *Sixty Years on the Firing Line, by Arthur Krock. Funk & Wagnalls, $10.00.*

A Federal Union in the Middle East?

Professor Khouri has written the most comprehensive and up-to-date survey of the Arab-Israeli conflict yet published. He undertook the task, he tells us, after years of work upon it, and travel, study and consultation in the area, because of his feeling that relatively few experts on the Middle East had attempted to investigate thoroughly and write dispassionately about the highly controversial, emotion-ridden problem.

"The Arab-Israeli Dilemma" opens with a discussion of the historical prologue to the Palestine problem, which the author rightly traces, leaving the more ancient roots and legends aside, to the development of two very secular and genuine nationalisms in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, political Zionism and Arab nationalism, which laid claim to Palestine and struggled to take or keep it. Then follow detailed analyses of the Palestine question in the United Nations (1947-48), the Palestine conflict of 1948 and the armistice agreements, the question of Jerusalem, the problem of the Arab refugees, the armistice complications and the Sinai war of 1956, the June 1967 *blitzkrieg*, and the problem of peace.

The discussion is calm, dispassionate and responsible throughout, and it is extremely well documented. Mr. Khouri's analysis of the June 1967 conflict, in contrast to the recent potboilers, is one of the best published accounts of what appears to have happened during the hectic and confused period of April-June 1967, and is based on the available published evidence. Similarly, his discussion of the problems and prospects of peace in the area is realistic and well-balanced, if not especially encouraging. There is, however, something of Matthew Arnold's "sweet reason and the will of God," despite the author's obvious skepticism concerning the prospects of a formal peace and formal solutions. He believes that the "ideal, long-term solution for the Arab-Israeli dilemma" lies "in the establishment of a federal union of the Arab states and Israel," since "peace treaties between sovereign states frequently leave many actual and potential problems and dangers." But he feels that, so long as ignorance and misunderstanding endure and becloud the issues, passions are inflamed and the two nationalisms continue to struggle, and determined and constructive efforts through the United Nations or quiet diplomacy fail to reduce the scope and intensity of the conflict, not only a federation, but the peace of the Middle East, with all its implications, will remain a forlorn dream.

This is a work which should command the attention of all serious students of the Arab-Israeli conflict, whatever their points of view. The volume contains useful maps, charts, a selected bibliography, and an appendix of 17 documents, ranging from 1915 to 1967. It is especially recommended to those who deal with the problem actively, because of the broad and convenient background which the book provides. Both the author and the Syracuse University Press are to be congratulated on bringing it out.

—Harry N. Howard

The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, *by Fred J. Khouri. Syracuse University Press, $10.00.*

> "I'm a great believer in hypocrisy. It's the nearest we ever get to virtue. It's a statement of what we ought to be. Like religion, like art, like the law, like marriage. I serve the appearance of things. It is the worst of systems; it is better than the others. That is my profession, and that is my philosophy. And unlike yourself," he added, "I did not contract to serve a powerful nation, least of all a virtuous one. All power corrupts. The loss of power corrupts even more. We thank an American for that advice. It's quite true. We are a corrupt nation, and we need all the help we can get. That is lamentable and, I confess, occasionally humiliating. However, I would rather fail as a power than survive by impotence. I would rather be vanquished than neutral. I would rather be English than Swiss. And unlike you, I expect nothing. I expect no more from institutions than I expect from people."—*A Small Town in Germany" by John Le Carré*

The Six-Day War

It would be more desirable to entitle Mr. Draper's latest book "World Politics and Israel" inasmuch as it is more precisely a review of Soviet machinations in the Middle East. From 1955 to 1967, the author states, the one new, disturbing element in the Arab world was the Soviet Union. All other elements present in the Arab-Israeli struggle receded into the background upon the entry of the Soviets to the scene. Indeed, if the area could have somehow been placed in some sort of vacuum some type of compromise might have been reached toward a peaceful settlement of the problems besetting the area. It was the Soviets operating through the Syrians and the pressure from Egyptian officers which was, to a large degree, responsible for the provoking of the six day war. It is also clear to the author that the Israelis felt that they had burnt their fingers during the Suez Crisis in 1956 and were far more willing and able to go it alone in 1967 than they had been before. Thus the stage was set for another bloody conflagration.

While Mr. Draper does not discuss the war in any detail this void is ably filled by Rapael Bashan who has produced an excellent piece of photographic journalism. "The Victory" follows closely the six days through 165 photographs and text. Bashan, a correspondent for Tel Aviv's *Maariv* is unabashedly effusive in his account of the campaign. Nevertheless this is an interesting book, many of the photographs are full or double page and the accompanying maps assist the reader in following the rapid progress of the war.

It is interesting to review American foreign policy from the perspective of others. Mr. Draper's judgment of US policy toward the Middle East is crystal clear. "For the United States, the third Arab-Israeli war was the final stage of bankruptcy of a Middle Eastern policy that went back to the Baghdad Pact of 1955." The author feels it an ironic twist of history that Secretary of State Dulles' use of economic and military assistance to underdeveloped or developing countries should be copied so adroitly by the Soviets in the Middle East.

The exchanges between Ambassador-designate Richard H. Nolte and Deputy Chief of Mission David G. Nes are painfully retold. Mr. Draper seems to accept the position that the Embassy in Cairo was faithfully reporting the events and that the mistakes which did occur originated in Washington or within the Department.

In Mr. Draper's book, as well as

in most of the growing literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East in general, there are criticisms which could be made. Little reference is given to the influence (or lack of influence) of the United Nations, the refugee question or other problems besetting the area. Often times omission of facts is as damaging as misinterpretation of fact.

Yet if one is to pass judgments on these two books both are well written, interesting and worthy to be placed on a reading list covering the Middle East. The appendices collected by Mr. Draper provide in one place most of the basic documents covering the period immediately leading to the conflict.

—THEODORE B. DOBBS

ISRAEL AND WORLD POLITICS, ROOTS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, *by Theodore Draper. Viking, $5.75.*
THE VICTORY, *by Raphael Bashan. Quadrangle, $10.00.*

The United States as a World Power

THESE two volumes are each concerned with the growth and development of the United States in the 20th century. Both are useful and thoughtful studies.

Mr. Adams's account is a broad, generally sympathetic history of the United States since 1917 aimed primarily at the non-professional reader. In chapters that alternately summarize foreign and domestic developments, he ties much of his coverage to the twin themes of the gradual change from isolation to world leadership and the growth of Federal initiative in improving social conditions. His presentation is clear and his conclusions, while predictable, are fairminded and balanced. The book includes an opening essay on forces in American history and an appendix containing the constitution, statistical charts, and a guide to further reading.

Mr. Levin's book on Woodrow Wilson is more specialized and scholarly but considerably less readable. His analysis of Wilson's "liberal capitalist internationalism," of the inevitable conflict between the president's goals and those of Lenin, and of the continuing influence of Wilsonian ideas in the conduct of American foreign policy is persuasive, provocative, and superbly documented. Especially valuable is the picture of Wilson not as a dreamy idealist but, in the broad scope of his ideas, as a practical statesman responding to the changing position of the United States in world affairs. One cannot help lamenting, however, that such a relatively straightforward thesis must be presented in such unleavened form. The requirements of academic scholarship seem to smother the least concession to popularization. Mr. Levin has something interesting to say, but he has addressed himself to a very select audience.

—HENRY LEE

AMERICA IN THE 20TH CENTURY—*A Study of the United States Since 1917, by D. K. Adams. Cambridge University Press, $5.50.*
WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD POLITICS *—America's Response to War and Revolution, by N. Gordon Levin, Jr. Oxford University Press, $7.50.*

Philiosophers: The New Breed

THE era of Development Diplomacy as a recognizable part of foreign affairs will be clearly distinguished for historians by the wealth of material written on the subject of Economic and Social Development between the post-World War II period and the present. The academician (economist or development scientist) has somewhat monopolized the field that is today a major focus of carrying out foreign affairs. Professor Mikesell, like a few other prominent American economists, has produced a mutated economist's theme which is in part structured on the dismal science but more importantly he is analytical of the growing foreign policy involvement of the foreign aid program.

This is a readable book for the FSO generalist and the foreign aid practitioner. When Dr. Mikesell talks about the need for structural change as a prerequisite to change and thus development, he is talking the language of the field man and his Washington backstopper who deal with political, economic, and attitudinal problems of change on a daily basis and in more minute detail.

What makes this book particularly timely is some of Dr. Mikesell's hidden nuances as to the future of bilateral US aid and whether, indeed, the US Congress will opt to make a foreign aid deposit to the multilateral aid agencies, thus decreasing the US bilateral role in the development process. Mikesell seems more inclined to cast his vote for the multilateral concept which may be at variance with views held by most foreign affairs officials who view aid more and more as an integral part of our contemporary foreign policy. What Mikesell thinks and expounds reflects a prevalent view in the Congress to whom he is an on-again-off-again consultant.

The book is somewhat mistitled. Although the book is called "The Economics of Foreign Aid," it has the distinct flavor of a policy paper, designed to influence foreign policy, written by a particularly well qualified and well connected author. See, for example, the author's efforts in providing foreign aid testimony in seminar style in the February-March 1968 hearings before the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

For the busy bureaucrat who fights the "in basket," it would be sufficient to read Part One, "The Objectives of Foreign Economic Assistance," and Professor Mikesell's conclusions. Doing this is bound to whet your appetite to read more. See how an academic observer views part of your daily decision-making for he reflects a prevalent view to which you may soon have to adjust.

—EDWARD MARASCIULO

THE ECONOMICS OF FOREIGN AID, *by Raymond F. Mikesell. Aldine Publishing Company, $7.95.*

The Sino-Soviet Split

IN "The Rift," David Levine seeks to present a succinct and simplified account of the highly complicated dispute between Communist China and Soviet Russia. Along with his own comments, he has included a plethora of lengthy excerpts from Chinese and Russian official statements, public speeches, inter-party correspondence and press reports. The turgid, ponderous character of these many quotations *in extenso* is relieved no little by the author's crisp, breezy style and his amusing turns of phrase.

He concludes his work with this observation: " . . . it looks as if the reason the two great Marxist-Leninist states hate each other is—Marxism-Leninism."

His view that the Sino-Soviet conflict is essentially a controversy over the correct interpretation of Marxism-Leninism is not shared, for instance, by William E. Griffith, author of "The Sino-Soviet Rift," who states: "The primary cause of the Sino-Soviet rift has been the determination of Mao and his associates that China should become a superpower and the determination of the Soviet leaders to prevent it."

The origin and meaning of the Sino-Soviet split has been variously seen by writers on this subject. Mr. Levine's interpretation might usefully be supplemented by reference to such works as Griffith's, Donald Zagoria's "The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961," Klaus Mehnert's "Peking and Moscow" and "The Sino-Soviet Dispute" by G. F. Hudson *et al,* to mention a few authoritative studies.

—ROBERT W. RINDEN

THE RIFT, *by David Levine. Harris-Wolfe & Co., $6.95.*

More on Law and the Balance of Power

EUGENE ROSTOW's gracefully written little book is a reworking of two lectures given at the University of Nebraska in 1966. The first half is taken up with a largely historical and analytical account of the traditional issues of international law and politics in the period from 1815 to date. The remainder of the volume is given over to a restatement of the case for the general foreign affairs stance of the Johnson administration in the years from 1963 to 1968. Taken together, the two parts of the book thus give a well-drawn sketch of the wider historical framework in which the author and other highly placed theoreticians of the outgoing administration's foreign involvements have considered themselves to be at work.

Conventional diplomatic wisdom comes off well at Mr. Rostow's hands. He has praise for the great figures of the earlier years of the diplomatic profession. "No statues or boulevards commemorate Talleyrand, Metternich, or Castlereagh," he tells us, and "When . . . remembered at all, they are dismissed as men to mistrust, trimmers and 'operators.' But they served the cause of man incomparably well."

Mr. Rostow goes on to suggest that the circumstances of our own times likewise call for a broad approach to foreign affairs problems not unlike that favored by Metternich and his great contemporaries. "The protection of our national interest," he writes, "requires not a sprint, a one-shot effort, followed by the relief of a withdrawal, but a permanent involvement in the politics of every part of the globe, based on a strategy of peace that seeks to achieve order and to make progress possible."

The plan of the book does not, of course, permit of an examination of the actual historical consequences of the particular policy steps taken by Metternich and his fellows at different times in their careers. Nor does it allow for a comparable examination of the reasons for and against our own present-day "global foreign policy." Suffice it to say here, therefore, that one hopes that Mr. Rostow, upon his return to Yale, will argue the case further—will show us, for example, how Austria's long-run national interests were served by Metternich's insistence on keeping military bases in Italy or by his resistance to Italian unification.

Readers will note with pleasure that Mr. Rostow has dedicated his book to the Foreign Service of the United States, "with affectionate appreciation and respect." The more reason to wish, then, that Mr. Rostow will also go on to write of the circumscribed but important role of the career diplomat and senior civil servant in the foreign policy making process. A candid, retrospective "View from the Seventh Floor," freed of the bombast and humbug which flawed the other Rostow's book of that title, could be a work of lasting interest.

—THOMAS A. DONOVAN

LAW, POWER, AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE, *by Eugene V. Rostow. Harper & Row, $1.60.*

Dead-Pan Defense of the Department

EANOR LANSING DULLES, sister of John Foster Dulles, has written a book about "American Foreign Policy in the Making." Although it was evidently not her intention, Eleanor Dulles has in fact written a dead-pan defense of the Department of State.

There is a steady stream of criticism and self-criticism of the State Department. And this criticism nearly always finds a responsive audience. Almost any sharp shaft tossed in the direction of the fudge factory evokes a sympathetic snicker.

Eleanor Dulles gives a straightforward account, for the student, of how foreign policy is made. Her account makes the process deceptively orderly. That's closer to the mark, however, than much of what is said about the State Department, and we can therefore welcome this contribution from a writer who had a distinguished career in the Department of State.

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MAKING, *by Eleanor Lansing Dulles. Harper & Row, $3.95.*

Communist Nation-Building in Yugoslavia

NATIONALISM has been a critical problem for the World Communist movement almost since its inception. In Yugoslavia the difficulties are especially acute. National rivalries among Serbs, Croats, and others continually frustrate the Yugoslav Communists in their efforts to forge a genuine Yugoslav identity among the people. To complicate matters, separatist tendencies in Yugoslavia, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, have frequently been encouraged by Moscow's policy of divide and rule. The current display of solidarity against the Soviets, though obviously encouraged by the regime for its own purposes, does show, however, that the people are capable of uniting effectively against a dramatic threat from abroad.

Professor Shoup points out, nevertheless, that President Tito and his comrades have not yet resolved the fundamental dilemma which confronts them at home: Relaxing central controls to stimulate the rapid economic progress so necessary to sustain the state merely sharpens the regional competition which threatens to destory it. Clearly, a resolution of this dilemma and a balancing of these internal forces remain crucial to the ultimate success of the Communist regime in Yugoslavia.

This authoritative study, then, is really in the nature of a progress report, but its comprehensive analysis of the complex factors involved in the Yugoslav national question is a valuable contribution to the field. As such it is especially recommended to students of Yugoslav Communism, but other readers will discover in the Yugoslav case intriguing parallels with problems of nation-building elsewhere in Eastern Europe and in developing states as well.

—JACK M. SEYMOUR, JR.

COMMUNISM AND THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL QUESTION, *by Paul Shoup. Columbia University Press, $9.50.*

No Need to Read

AN inconsequential book, "Among the Anti-Americans" relates conversations and random observations in six countries, with no particular conclusions—except perhaps the inadvertent one at the end of the last chapter where the author reports a conversation with Jean Monnet.

"You are saying [the author quotes himself] that anti-Americanism is not a real theme."

"*Mon Cher* [Monnet replies], it is a very nice excuse for traveling around the world."

"I have to write a book."

"A book! It can be a great success if it is *funny*! See the humor in an American, only an American, traveling around the world wanting to be loved. It is not natural for men even to love their wives, so why should they love Americans?"

"Jean!" my wife cried.

"Not you, my dear. Except for you."

Sad to report, "Among the Anti-Americans" is not a funny book. It is a grab-bag of observations, some relevant, some almost totally irrelevant, resulting from a world-wide fishing expedition with a very small-mesh net, and with nobody around who is even trying to sort out the catch.

—M.F.H.

AMONG THE ANTI-AMERICANS, *by Thomas B. Morgan. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, $5.95.*

END TO ANARCHY (*Continued from page* 18)

device. Our proposal establishes the center as the keystone of our field operations, focuses the activities of the center on priority Agency themes, and brings to it the necessary resources for successful programing.

2. *The regional emphasis*: The proper framework for coordination is the geographic region. The objectives of US foreign policy are for the most part applied regionally. But our media resources, by their nature, have little relation to geographic regions. The only effective way these resources can be brought together in support of our objectives is by combining them in programs tailored for the specific region.

3. *Continuity based on our objectives*: Each packaged program will be based not only on a specific regional theme, it will be part of a long-range effort in support of all the cultural and informational aspects of US objectives in the area.

4. *Concentration of resources*: American civilization is quantitatively well represented abroad by USIA, State Department and other agencies and private programs. We want to gather the pieces into identifiable compositions, and thereby suggest the quality of the complete picture.

5. *Reinforced personal contact*: If personal contact is important to cross-cultural communications, then thematic programs of specific interest to specific audiences will significantly enhance the personal relationships—and thus dialogue—of our officers with our key audiences.

Since the individual posts have neither sufficient manpower nor sufficient resources, nor the organizational scope to successfully conduct packaged programing on their own, the effort must be realized in Washington. However, the *concept* of packaged programing will become a basic operating principle at all our posts. In between each program coming from Washington, the centers must create their own packages from their own local resources. Every activity should be not only informative but exciting, various, and imaginative.

There is in all of this one slight paradox which needs a brief comment or two.

If USIA were to open any new post with a minimum input of resources (a PAO—no other staff—and, let us say, the wireless file) he would fill first the function of advising and assisting the Embassy in its dialogue with audiences for which it had primary responsibility. Essentially, this USIA function would support the first audience in my definition and the first of the three Agency-established objectives.

Only when additional resources became available would USIA move to support the other two objectives and to involve itself with the other two audience categories; but at that point it would make the "center" the very core of his operation.

Obviously, packaged programing could help support that first objective. But there would still exist, importantly, programs outside of the center which would contribute to an understanding of key tactical policies and issues.

But this function would command a small slice of the overall budget and precisely defined activities within that slice.

The center and the package program concept would be the mainstay of the USIA effort, a medium and a vehicle designed to bring the US Government into the realm of effective, meaningful communications in the last third of the twentieth century, an era we have so far successfully avoided by clinging to the myths, hyperbole and activities that have marked our role to date.

What we must do now is to bring to bear a continuing and contemporary American presence centered around a distinctively American institution to which our audiences will look for the clearest statements of US policy, the most exciting and relevant in American thought and the most dynamic in American culture. ■

on such terms as they can from the grain-exporting countries. The present world surplus of grain available for export was estimated in 1967 at 70,000,000 metric tons a year, of which some 60,000,000 is in the United States and Canada, along with 8,000,000 in Australia and 2,000,000 in Latin America (mostly Argentina). While production in these areas could be increased under pressure, we need to remember that this is the only important mobile food supply presently in existence, and that it is not indefinitely expandable.

Various suggestions have been made for increasing food supplies by turning to new sources. It has been pointed out that we are not efficiently using the oceans as a source of food, and this is true, but the possibilities are not unlimited. Another proposal is for large-scale desalination of sea water by means of huge nuclear power plants on arid coasts, and the use of the water for irrigation purposes. This idea would appear to have great promise. Also, we can synthesize foods, either by grinding up such vegetable substances as algae and turning them into protein meals, or possibly by converting some of the hydrocarbons we have in our forests and our oil and coal reserves into edible substances.

But all these ideas take time and money, and a great deal more planning and determination than any one so far has demonstrated in either the advanced or the developing countries. It would take a braver man than I to predict that we shall solve our food supply problems in this century; the most that I hope for is that we shall be able to make some significant progress in our food deficit areas and stave off crisis for a while longer

And what of the economic situation in the world of 32 years hence? Basically, the answer is quite simple; the rich and advanced countries, enjoying all the benefits of ample capital, massive public education, huge investments in research and development, experienced management, and highly sophisticated technology, will greatly increase their wealth and productivity. But the developing countries will have extremely tough sledding. Some may be able to reach the point of self-sustaining economic growth, but all will be handicapped by over-population and inadequate education and technology, and some will probably slide backward rather than move forward.

Many projections have been made to show the increasing economic gap between rich and advanced countries and those which are poor and lagging. I shall cite the Hudson Institute one, according to which the per capita Gross National Product of the advanced countries (North America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand) is today 12 times as great as that of the rest of the world, but by the year 2000 will be 18 times as great. According to any projection which has been made, we are heading for an increasingly unbalanced world—one in which the dichotomy between rich nations and poor nations will be very serious indeed, and will have serious implications for our quest for a peaceful world order.

Within the richer portion of this dichotomized world, the United States is advancing much more rapidly than the other industrialized countries. We are entering into a world increasingly dominated by the technology of automation, cybernetics, computerization, data processing, and all the other phenomena of what Zbigniew Brzezinski has called in a recent essay the "technetronic age," and what Daniel Bell has labeled the "post-industrial society." Thus Brzezinski sees a future world really split into three types of societies—agrarian or pre-industrial, industrial, and technetronic—the word technetronic referring to the technology of electronics. Sympathetic communication between Americans and others, even in industrial

societies, will become more difficult as the international community becomes more sharply differentiated into these three developmental stages.

What political assumptions should we make about the overpopulated, mostly underfed, sharply dichotomized world of the future? It would seem logical to presume that such a world would be characterized by deep-seated anxieties, by jealousies and resentments, by a good deal of social turbulence, and by frequent outbreaks of both internal and international violence. If one thinks of the pre-conditions of world peace as including some kind of tolerable balance between the fortunate and the unfortunate, the successful and the frustrated, the dichotomized world would appear to be a highly unstable one.

Our political assumption, then, should be for a world in a continuous state of tension, in which there are great stresses and strains, many local and regional wars, frequent revolutions, dictatorships by military leaders, violence first in one place and then another, always threatening to get out of control and to spread to the major powers. Quite deliberately, I avoid the assumption of a nuclear war between major powers, for this would take the future out of the realm of the manageable, and present us with a situation for which we could not profitably plan.

This brings us to the final question, which is, how should we plan American foreign policy in the kind of world situation which I have postulated?

The key problem, it seems to me, is to ameliorate the disparities of the unbalanced world by striving to reduce the growing gap between the advanced and the developing countries. We can do this by providing developmental economic aid to the less developed countries, by pursuing policies which bring greater political stability to the world community, and by sharing the educational and technological resources of the advanced countries with those of the less developed world. I would personally place by far the greatest emphasis on educational development, to train the peoples of the less developed countries to resolve their own problems.

What we need here is a valid image of the future which we would strive to realize. The one which I carry in my mind is that of a world community which is as highly integrated as we can make it, and in which the advanced nations, for their own protection and welfare, cooperate in many ways to aid the developing nations to make forward progress. I do not despair of having even the industrialized Communist nations of the future cooperate in such an effort, for their security, too, they may come to realize, will be promoted by ameliorating the economic imbalances and political turbulences of a dichotomized world. A world in which there is too much desperation will not be to any one's advantage; a minimum of stability is needed or civilization itself will not survive.

It is easy in our twentieth century world to conjure up visions of disaster. It is also easy to sit on our haunches and hope that somehow all our problems will work themselves out without our having to make any extraordinary effort. My plea is for an imaginative look at the future, to see what problems lie ahead, and then to buckle down to prepare for them. We shall need a vision of the objectives we wish to achieve, and practical plans for moving toward these objectives.

The best rationale of action is hope for the future. The point of view of this essay is that it also offers promise for a better life for mankind if we attack the world's problems with understanding and determination. There must be no complacency and no despair. We must be fully conscious of the difficulties and dangers ahead, but not afraid to tackle them. We should rather move forward with eyes wide open, keeping both the dangers and the distant vision always in view, prepared to do the things we ought to do and determined to do them effectively, in order that we may hope to pass on a safer and better world to the generations who come after us. ■

CHEERS! (*Continued from page* 31)

and hurl it into the street. It will bring luck."

"What!"

We looked over the balcony railing to the street five stories below, and had time only to notice that all pedestrians were moving in the center of it, that there were no cars at all abroad, and that an enormous crashing had begun. We heard our neighbor on the balcony below exclaim, "Over she goes! Happy New Year, Adrianna!"

"Quick!" Maria urged. "The moment will be gone."

The three of us grasped the box, and sailed it over the rail. It landed in the street with an extraordinarily satisfactory crash.

"Out with the old!" cried Maria. "Happy New Year, Signori."

All up and down the street the apartment dwellers were engaged in an identical pursuit. Cries of "Happy New Year" rang from a hundred balconies.

Maria was glowing. "All old things go," she said, "so that there will be room for the new."

For Maria it was over, and she took herself off to bed. But we ventured into the street to explore the mess. There was not an inch of sidewalk and little of the street that was not piled high with all the useless things that a household could accumulate in a year. Pots and pans with the enamel chipped off or a handle missing, tin cans, old clothing, broken toys, rusty hair curlers—and glass.

But we were not alone on the street. The scavengers had already moved in to sort and to salvage. An hour later the street sweeping crew began on the disaster, and by nine o'clock in the morning the streets were as clean as ever. ■

■ ALEXANDRA HILL is a writer—of fiction mainly. Married to an engineer she has lived on or traveled over five of the six continents, which she says "presented ample opportunity to experience the ever-enchanting vagaries of human self-expression."

25 YEARS AGO

JANUARY 1944 IN THE JOURNAL

On four successive Saturday evening broadcasts over the NBC network in January 1944 high officials of the State Department explained the Department's role in formulating and executing foreign policy. Richard Harkness, representing "the people" in the format, guided the discussion and asked the questions. In the final broadcast, the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, the Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, Senator Tom Connally, and Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg talked about Congress and the State Department. The relationship was illustrated in answers to the question of whether the State Department had left Congress and the country in the dark before the Pearl Harbor attack. How easy it was for the public to find it hard to understand policy sometimes was brought out in explanations of the decisions made after the landings in North Africa, including dealings with Admiral Darlan. Participants in the series included Under Secretary Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Assistant Secretaries Dean Acheson, Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Breckenridge Long, and G. Howland Shaw, Ambassadors John G. Winant and Robert D. Murphy, Leo Pasvolsky, Harry C. Hawkins, Charles P. Taft, and Michael McDermott. Afterwards many people wrote in. The comments indicated that the broadcasts had aroused wide interest and satisfied or mollified many critics.

Reorganization of the State Department

In preceding months much time had been given to studying ways to free Assistant Secretaries from administrative duties, establish clearer lines of authority, and improve coordination. The outcome was Departmental Order 1218 of January 15, 1944. For better coordination the principal creations were the Policy Committee of top officials and a Committee on Post War Programs. For this purpose, also, and for the other objectives, 12 Offices were inserted above the level of Divisions and below the Assistant Secretaries: four geographic, one for special political and one for wartime economic affairs, one for economic affairs, plain, one for public information, one for transportation and communication, one for Departmental and one for Foreign Service administration, and one for controls (passports, visas, war problems, foreign activity correlation). In May 1944 the Office of Foreign Service administration became the Office of the Foreign Service. Heads of Offices were given the title of Directors, Bureaus came later.

A detail in the reforms of this time was the revised procedure for Foreign Service transfer record cards. Keysort cards which had to be nibbled around the edges and punched in places came into use.

The Division of Foreign Service Personnel inaugurated a "preliminary" five-month training program for newly recruited women clerks. The first batch of 80 girls were rotated in six assignments of 30 days each, which included one month on a 4 p.m. to midnight shift and another month on a midnight to 8 a.m. shift. At the end they came up for decision as to whether they should be sent abroad or stay on duty in the Department.

Henry H. Balch, Thomasite

On October 18, 1968, President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines, at a ceremony in Manila which the American Ambassador attended, made Henry H. Balch a member of the Order of Sikatuna, rank of Datu. The doctor would not let Mr. Balch go to Manila so the award was conferred on him in absentia. He will be 92 years old on January 6, 1969. He received the award from the Philippine Ambassador in Washington at a ceremony on November 13. Mr. Balch is the only survivor of the group of 508 teachers who arrived in the Philippines on August 23, 1901, on the Army Transport ship *Thomas* and who helped set up a new and broader system of primary and secondary schools and taught English and other subjects in outlying areas under difficult conditions. The pioneer teachers came to be known as Thomasites.

After teaching in the Philippines for over 12 years, Mr. Balch took the week-long consular exams in January 1914, passed, and came into the Foreign Service. He served in Canada, Paraguay, Australia, Mexico, Ireland, and Italy. He has been a member of the Foreign Service Association since its very beginning in 1918 and by reason of this is now an Honorary Life Member. His home address is 512 Eustis Avenue, S.E., Huntsville, Alabama 35801.

A son, James Henry, was born to Mr. and Mrs. John C. Fuess on January 4, 1944, in Auckland, New Zealand, where his father was Vice Consul. He was with his parents in Cape Town and Milan, attending kindergarten and then the Montessori School, then in Madison. Wisconsin, and Washington, D. C., for elementary school days, and in Santiago, Chile, where he studied at the English language School. He was entered at the Fessenden School in Massachusetts but later rejoined his parents in Rome and finished high school at the Overseas School of Rome. After a year at Kalamazoo College in Michigan he transferred to Goddard College, Vermont. He graduated there last December. He plans to devote full time to a regular job for a year or so and then study for a Master's degree in English literature and later teach at prep school

level at home or overseas, preferably in Italy. His father, our Consul General in Trieste, writes that he continues to enjoy life in Trieste and finds the assignment stimulating from many points of view.



A son, Frederick William, was born to Mr. and Mrs. Ralph N. Clough on January 20, 1944, in Tegucigalpa, where his father was Third Secretary and Vice Consul. Frederick graduated from Stanford University in 1965 and from the Law School at UCLA in 1968. He passed the bar examinations in Los Angeles last summer. On September 9, 1968, he married Miss Linda Olson of Los Angeles, a UCLA graduate. They are living at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Frederick is a First Lieutenant in the Army. His father's most recent assignment is in the Department of State, where he has been a member of the Policy Planning Council since June 1966.

A son, Robert Graham, was born to Mr. and Mrs. Robert Means Winfree on November 29, 1943, in Buenos Aires, where his father was in the Embassy. Robert attended elementary schools in Belgium, Switzerland, and India and high school at Walter Johnson in Bethesda, Maryland. He graduated from Gettysburg College in 1965 after majoring in economics. He was in the ROTC. In February 1966 he married Miss Robin Schmitt. They have a daughter, Christine, born May 2, 1968. Robert is now a Captain in the Air Force Medical Service and has been stationed at the Chelsea Naval Hospital near Boston.

New Careers

Louis F. Thompson, who now lives in Silver Spring, Maryland, recently finished an assignment overseas for the International Executive Service Corps. As a fiscal expert, he volunteered to go to Singapore as a consultant to the Lee Wah Finance Company, Limited, a firm that finances installment buying. Among his duties was advising on loan techniques and on developing markets and promoting sales. The IESC is a non-profit organization with offices at 545 Madison Avenue in New York. It arranges with retired and mid-career executives for sharing managerial experience with enterprises in developing nations.



Training for the Foreign Service

THE September issue of the JOURNAL carried much of interest. At first, having noted articles about the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, SAIS, Fletcher, and the American Institute for Foreign Trade, I was tempted to ask for equal time for the School of International Affairs at Columbia. We too train people for foreign service, in business and government, and we too are concerned with the issues of relative attractiveness of a professional career as against an academic interest in the interdisciplinary field of international affairs. We have a rich University curriculum to draw upon, and eight regional institutes for geographic specialization. We make an effort to accommodate both those with definite professional interests and those who are more academic or more undecided. We usually have two or three FSOs assigned to us for mid-career training. But I am sure your readers know about Columbia and our school.

Mr. Crawford's article about university attitudes toward the Foreign Service is the most arresting and important one in your September issue. As a retired FSO, now at Columbia for a year, I have found precisely the attitudes and reactions reported by Mr. Crawford. Many young people are not much inclined toward a government career, and not much interested in the Foreign Service. There has been an enormous increase in the international emphasis of undergraduate programs in the past 20 years, and a corresponding decline in the uniqueness of special graduate training for international work. Government and foreign service, once the goal of many of our best young people, are now old hat or positively wrong in terms of today's 'New Left" ideology which demands such an extraordinarily non-intellectual act of faith from its adherents. An interest in the points of view of others, an interest in conciliation, and a willingness to seek mutual accommodation—all implicitly a part of the interest of the Foreign Service—are alien to many of our "intellectual" youth, who are anxious to impose their own views and who are sure that those who disagree are wrong.

The pendulum of American opinion swings over a long arc, and its inertia is substantial. We tend to overdo our isolationism or our internationalism, and to the Department and Foreign Service often falls the role of striving to hold back the pendulum. The US now seems in an isolationist, or detached phase, in which the unwillingness of Americans to take risks or to commit themselves to an active international role is in part induced by the fact that it has proved dangerous—scarcely a new discovery—and in part is evidence of the normal swing of the pendulum in the direction opposite to that of the past twenty-five years.

Furthermore, the facts of world politics today tend to inhibit exciting new political initiatives, and to put emphasis on holding the line in a bipolarized world. The style and posture of the present administration has not contributed to the feeling of challenge which should always be present.

Perhaps the best appeal of the Foreign Service is for those who are willing to be unpopular and unthanked, contrary to domestic opinion, unacademic and non-U in their patriotism and support of national interests, and prepared to take risks and undergo hardship simply because the job needs to be done. Would-be martyrs are not needed, but there are and will be people who will apply, and they will not lack talent. Somebody has to write the telegrams, do the staff work, fend off the enemies, represent the country, and be available to be blamed by the public and its political leaders. A good academic preparation will help them do their work, but the Service should find its recruits on the basis of their motivation, which may not be an intellectual or academic process, and may not be induced by a man's graduate training.

More professionalism in the Service, little or no abuse of the Reserve Officer Program, occasional public acknowledgment of the Service by Presidents and Secretaries of State, a more imaginative assignment policy for junior officers—who are often brilliant, although lacking explicit experience—and complete honesty in explaining to the potential officer what the Service is and does, will help assure good quality among the applicants. Sometimes a note to the effect that the task is tiresome, difficult, and often unappreciated will bring forth the type of person most qualified and suitable for it. This is better than having a batch of disappointed geniuses who expected to be Castlereagh in an afternoon. One of the problems of an affluent society is boredom. The Service can be boring, but it usually presents a diversified challenge, and this is appealing.

As a former AFSA Board member, I follow with interest the new spirit of the AFSA and the JOURNAL; keep it up.

WILLIS C. ARMSTRONG
Associate Dean School of
International Affairs
Columbia University
New York

More on Our Educational Consultant

I have only just received a copy of the August JOURNAL. On the last page of the ASSOCIATION NEWS there is an article on AFSA's Education Consultant, Clarke W. Slade. The article is appropriately laudatory of Mr. Slade and I am delighted to see him get such highly deserved recognition.

The article does not have, unfortunately, any reference to the events leading up to his joining the AFSA staff in 1958, which further testify to his great ability and deep devotion to public service.

Some time after I retired in 1948, partly to try to find some solution to the problems Foreign Service parents have with the education of their children, Mr. Slade had called on Barbara Chalmers, Executive Secretary at AFSA headquarters, to see about establishing a consulting service for Foreign Service parents. As Mrs. Chalmers knew of the efforts my wife and I had been making to find solutions in that field she put Clarke Slade and me in touch without delay.

The result was that early in 1950 Clarke Slade and I started planning. He said he was prepared to devote a year, without salary, to setting up an education consulting service for Foreign Service parents if I could join him. I gladly did this, and on May 6, 1950, my wife and I greeted at our house in Fairfax County a large number of retired officers and wives and widows. At this meeting both the Educational Consulting Service and the Retired Foreign Service Officers Association (later known as DACOR (Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired) were born.

Mr. Slade and I spent the next several months organizing Foreign Service personnel in the Department and overseas into units to collect funds and to spread the word about the new facility for their benefit. The list of Founder and Charter members of the Educational Consulting Service is a "Who's Who" of the active and retired service at that time. With one or two exceptions the same personnel served on both the Educational Consulting Service's Board of Trustees and on the DACOR Board of Governors.

Nevertheless, the idea of a consulting service was so new to members of the service that actual requests for Mr. Slade's services were slow in coming.

Meanwhile, he and I continued to write letters to service people and we advertised every month in the JOURNAL from then until he joined the AFSA staff in 1958.

Finally, in 1961, the Educational Consulting Service was absorbed into AFSA and a check for $517.72, the balance of the ECS funds, was donated to the AFSA Scholarship Fund, and AFSA changed the name of its Counseling service to "Educational Consulting Service."

All this is very much in tribute to Clarke Slade's unusual ability in his field, his competence and his splendid spirit of public service

RICHARD FYFE BOYCE

Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.

Against the "Spoils System"

I NOTED the very pertinent editorial in the August issue of the JOURNAL "Anybody Can Be an American Ambassador." The editorial expressed an interest in knowing "how the presidential candidates feel about these propositions." It seems to me timely now for the Foreign Service Association to take a more positive and aggressive step against the continuation of the "spoils system" in political appointments to ambassadorial posts.

In 1954 the Wriston Committee circularized all Foreign Service and Department officers requesting their views as to possible steps that might be taken to improve the quality of Foreign Service personnel. In response to this request I wrote a long letter setting forth the reasons why I believed that the abandonment of the traditional "spoils system" in political appointments was the most essential step needed to improve the Foreign Service personnel situation. I received, of course, a polite reply from the Wriston Committee. The argument was essentially simple. You know it as well as I, and the August JOURNAL editorial contains many pertinent points.

The Foreign Service as a career will never develop properly, if it is subject to intrusions at the top. Of course, the President must retain the right to appoint any man as his Ambassador in a special situation which warrants the appointment of a particular man who has a specially pertinent background for the position. Aside from such exceptional appointments, there should be no political appointments to Ambassadorships or other top level Foreign Service positions.

The "spoils system" in political appointments is an anachronism, one of those remnants of the past, so difficult for any president to cast aside. It certainly does not accord with the new international responsibilities of the US since the end of World War II. The need for professionals is recognized in all spheres of modern life; it should also be recognized in the conduct of international affairs.

HOWARD TRIVERS

Zurich

For a Diplomatic History

THERESA HEALY'S suggestion of a volume of paintings and prints depicting notable episodes of American diplomatic history strikes me as eminently worthwhile. I gather she has in mind the use of photographs as well and I would certainly agree with this.

If such a volume were utilized to depict not only diplomatic history but diplomatic methods and techniques both its value and market would be greatly enhanced. Some explanatory text could point out not only what the paintings, prints and photographs depict but what they illustrate as to the methods, techniques, problems and potentialities of diplomacy. A committee of scholars and practitioners could ensure this blend of history and political science, with a good editor guaranteeing popular appeal.

If this is not a possible project under official auspices, so as to be publishable by the Government Printing Office, as Miss Healy suggests, perhaps the American Heritage or Time-Life Books would find this a useful and profitable undertaking.

SMITH SIMPSON

Annandale

A Long Career

IN ruffling through some old copies of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, I was struck by the "musty 1927 vintage bouquet" attributed to the item in the August 1967 issue concerning certain American July 4 ceremonies in Paris in that long-gone year. It seems that "a *former* Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby" made the principal speech at a banquet on that occasion.

If it does not overwhelm you, it may interest you to know that the undersigned was personal secretary in the Department to Secretary of State Colby . . . and also to the Honorable Charles Evans Hughes . . . and is still doing a full day's work as a Consul in the Visa Section of the Paris Embassy. Needless to say, what with BALPA and all, I am on my way out—in March, with much regret.

MARGARET V. BARNI

Paris

P.S. I don't feel the least bit "musty!"

Can This Be True?

I RECENTLY renewed acquaintance with Marquand's "Melville Goodwin, USA" and there read that Army officers move books from post to post without charge against their weight allowance. War planning undoubtedly requires greater literacy than diplomacy.

WILLIAM HAMILTON

Thessaloniki

Life and Love in the Foreign Service — *S. I. Nadler*

"Because I happen to know they're thinking of abolishing our hardship differential. That's why I say it's time to rewrite the Post Report."

TOWNSEND HARRIS

(*Continued from page* 30)

he kept a journal during those momentous and, at times, tumultous years. To date, that part of his journal has not been found and it is feared the papers were lost or misplaced. "Let us hope," wrote Cosenza, "that somewhere someone may yet discover these precious 'lost books'—books that would throw such important light on the early history of friendly relations between the United States and the Empire of Japan—a history the shaping of which, providentially, lay so largely in the kindly hands of Townsend Harris!"

England, France, Russia and Holland almost immediately concluded similar commercial treaties with Japan, but the United States had pointed the way and its treaty was to be the basis of Japan's foreign relations for the next half century. As pointed out by Foster Rhea Dulles, "by negotiating without any threat of military action, and so clearly seeking to safeguard Japan's interests as well as promote those of his own country, Harris had continued to retain the goodwill of the Japanese. He was also to be acclaimed by the envoys of the European powers" although later on some of them were jealous of his special position with the Japanese.

Practically all the praise of Harris' career in Japan relates to his negotiation of the commercial treaty with the United States. Certainly, that was an outstanding achievement. But I would stress, as being of almost equal importance, his representation of United States interests in Japan as the first American Minister here to which position he had been promoted after the signing of the US-Japan treaty. It took courage, coupled with a profound sense of conviction, for him to remain in Yedo as the only Western diplomat following the killing of Heusken, his assistant. It took courage for him to insist with the envoys from other nations that the rights of Japan, then and in the future, had to be respected—for mutual benefit.

Townsend Harris left Japan in the spring of 1862. He had hoped to leave a year earlier. He had been in Japan for five and one-half years with one month's vacation in China. "Your long residence here must be wearisome," said the Shogun at Harris' last audience.

At home in New York, according to John McMaster, whose article titled "Alcock and Harris: Foreign Diplomacy in Bakumatsu Japan" appeared in Vol. XXII, Nos. 304, *Monumenta Nipponica,* Sophia University, Tokyo, Harris was swallowed up by the excitement of the Civil War. No one wanted to listen to an old man reminisce about Japan. A young man just back from Tokyo went to see Harris in 1874, four years before his death. He found him in a corner of the Union Club. As always he was alone. Harris' first question summed up his efforts in Japan: "What do the Japanese think of me?" he asked.

In his journal, on August 19, 1856, Harris had written: "I hope I may so conduct myself that I may have honorable mention in the histories which will be written on Japan and its future destiny."

"He so conducted himself," wrote Viscount Eiichi Shibusawa, in "The Record of Townsend Harris in Japan, 1927," "that his virtues are even now profoundly estecmed by the people of the country to which he was accredited. Truly can we say of him that he was a veritable model for diplomats of all nations and all ages." ■

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$2,900	$13.00
$3,100	$14.00
$3,300	$15.00
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Foreign Service Journal

JANUARY 15, 1969
60 CENTS

Foreign Affairs in the 1970's

A Conference

An Introductory Word from AFSA

The Association has had many requests for copies of the transcript of the conference it convened in mid-November, 1968. This special issue of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL is the result. Through it we hope to share with our far-flung membership, as well as all those invited to the conference, an edited version of two days of stimulating discussion.

It is much more difficult, unfortunately, to evoke the broader meaning of the conference. From the Association's point of view, it was an occasion—deliberately planned—to begin a continuing, intensive dialogue with men and women who, though not in public service, share a professional interest in foreign affairs. We are pleased that so many who attended the conference see this as an important goal, one to which they are willing to make their own contribution. We hope that these new lines of communication between the professionals on active duty and those in business, on the campus, and in the private foreign affairs community of organizations will remain open.

For its part, the Association is establishing a special committee to follow through on the opportunities for increasing exchanges of ideas and opinions that were generated by the conference. I know that the committee would welcome any suggestions to this end that you might have.

The conference itself was an example of what the Association has in mind. The speakers were not officers of the agencies in foreign affairs; they were from universities, the publishing world and the Congress. Indeed, officers of the Department of State found themselves in the unusual—but refreshingly comfortable—position not of talking, but of asking questions from the floor. Discussion was free and lengthy, more so than the edited text suggests; new insights were in good supply. Our one regret is that we cannot share the brilliant presentation by Professor Henry A. Kissinger with our readers. In view of his subsequent appointment to the new Administration, he has felt constrained to keep his remarks off the public record.

We hope that a large number of you who were invited to the conference, whether you were able to attend or not, will wish to become Associate Members of the Association. We would welcome this sign that you, too, are interested in improved communication between the professionals on active duty and the society they represent abroad. Your encouragement and support will be important to us as the Association looks to the future.

Finally, a word of gratitude to Joseph E. Johnson, who was a very gracious and distinguished conference chairman, and to the William H. Donner Foundation, Inc., which made it possible for the conference to take place. Their understanding and support have made many rough places smooth.

LANNON WALKER
Chairman of the Board

Foreign Service Journal

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THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION is composed of active and retired personnel who are or have been serving at home or abroad under the authority of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended. It groups together people who have a common responsibility for the implementation of foreign policy. It seeks to encourage the development of a career service of maximum effectiveness, and to advance the welfare of its members.

The dues for Active and Associate Members are either $15 or $12: For FSOs in Class V and above the rate is $15 and is the same for FSRs, Foreign Service Staff personnel and Civil Service personnel in corresponding grades. For active Members in lower grades the dues are $12. The annual dues for retired members and others who are not Active Members are $12. Each membership includes a subscription to the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL.

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AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION

50th Anniversary Program

Foreign Affairs in the 1970s

NOVEMBER 14-15, 1968

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14

8:30 AM Registration

9:30 AM **WELCOME.** Philip C. Habib, President, American Foreign Service Association
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS by Conference Chairman: Joseph E. Johnson, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

10:00 AM **DIMENSIONS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE 1970s.**
Panel Chairman: Mr. Habib
Panelists:
Herman Kahn, Director, Hudson Institute
Henry A. Kissinger, Professor Center for International Affairs, Harvard
Peter F. Krogh, Associate Dean, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

11:00 AM INTERMISSION (Coffee served in Lounge)

11:30 AM Discussion from the floor.

12:30 PM Buffet Luncheon, Benjamin Franklin Room, Eighth Floor

2:00 PM **FOREIGN AFFAIRS: ARE WE ORGANIZED FOR THE 1970s.**
Panel Chairman: Mr. Johnson
Panelists:
Ambassador Foy D. Kohler, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami; Former Deputy Under Secretary of State
Frederick C. Mosher, Visiting Professor, University of Virginia; former Staff Director of the Herter Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel

"TOWARD A MODERN DIPLOMACY"—RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Vice Chairman, Board of Directors, AFSA

3:30 PM INTERMISSION (Coffee served in Lounge)

4:00 PM Discussion from the floor

5:00 PM **RETIRED OFFICERS MEETING**
Chairman: Ambassador John M. Steeves, Director General of the Foreign Service

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14 (continued)

8:00 PM DACOR Lecture—**THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD**—Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. West Auditorium, Department of State. OFF THE RECORD. (All Conference participants invited.)

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15

10:00 AM **EUROPE AND AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS**
Panel Chairman: John E. Reinhardt, Vice-President, AFSA
Panelists:
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director, Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University.
David P. Calleo, Professor of European Studies, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

11:00 AM INTERMISSION (Coffee served in Lounge)

11:30 AM Discussion from the floor.

12:30 PM Luncheon period (Open)

2:30 PM **CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS**
Panel Chairman: Mr. Johnson
Panelists:
Representative F. Bradford Morse (R. Mass.)
Representative Donald J. Irwin (D. Conn.)
Representative-elect Allard K. Lowenstein (D. N.Y.)
Robert J. Manning, Editor, *The Atlantic Monthly;* former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

3:30 PM INTERMISSION (Coffee served in Lounge)

4:00 PM Discussion from the floor.

5:00 PM **SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE BY CHAIRMAN**

6:00 PM AFSA Reception in honor of the Secretary of State and Mrs. Dean Rusk

Welcome and Introductory Remarks

Philip Habib: The Association has convened this conference with three purposes in mind. First, we believe that exchanges such as we hope to have regarding the shape of foreign affairs problems of the 1970s will equip us and, we hope, you to meet the responsibilities we all face in foreign affairs.

Second, we are here today to talk about how the nation organizes one part of its public institutions to deal with the future. Many of the professionals in foreign affairs believe that the institutions within which they work can be improved. The report in your program kit represents our attempt to define a better way of conducting the nation's foreign affairs. We wanted to share this report and its recommendations with a larger group of those throughout the country who have an equal interest in foreign affairs and who might have useful comments on it.

There is a third reason for calling this conference. It is related to the need that many of us in the Association have felt to begin an intensive, continuing dialogue with people such as yourselves who represent an informed and concerned part of American society. We hope that this conference will be part of that dialogue. . . .

This might be a good point to acknowledge a generous grant from the William H. Donner Foundation which has enabled the Association to convene this conference. The Donner Foundation's support will permit workshops and seminars to be held in the future. These are being planned, and we hope they will provide the opportunity to continue the dialogue which we are launching today between the Association and its colleagues outside of government.

On that note, and because he has been a source of great encouragement and support, I would like to introduce Mr. Joseph E. Johnson, the distinguished President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His interest in the kind of problems we are here to discuss has been enduring and profound. We are grateful to him for agreeing to take the chair for these two days.

Joseph E. Johnson: . . . I am not here to make a speech but merely to say why I accepted, with pleasure, the invitation to chair this conference.

Since I left the Department over 21 years ago, I have had a continuing interest in it. I regard myself as a loyal alumnus but like all loyal alumni sometimes critical of the institution. I followed with interest, although not very closely, the work of the Wriston Committee, and when the opportunity came in 1961 to try to do something about the problems of organization and personnel in this institution, I accepted with alacrity and had a good deal to do with organizing and participating in the work of the Herter Committee. And I have since that time continued to be concerned with the kinds of problems we are going to be talking about here of an organizational character.

I'd like to make two observations, or conclusions I suppose I might call them, that came out of my experience particularly in the period since the Herter Committee.

The first one was—or is—about what I found to be the attitudes of the foreign service as an institution—I don't mean foreign service officers as individuals, all of them—toward proposed changes. I found in some cases resistance, in some cases despair. I can remember one foreign service officer whom I saw as the Herter Commission was beginning saying, "Oh God, not again!" And I had a certain sympathy for him. There was sometimes resentment, sometimes a stolid indifference, and, I must say, also on occasion a tendency to gripe privately but to do nothing publicly about proposals for change.

If I may illustrate: when the Hays Bill was up, I came down to testify in favor of it both before the House committee and the Senate committee. There were a number of other witnesses from the private sector, but there wasn't anybody there speaking as a foreign service officer either for or against it. There was no representative of this Association. There were representatives of unions, of veterans' organizations. The only people who spoke for the bill, as it turned out, were the

Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, the head of the Civil Service Commission, and a private citizen who spoke for nobody but himself, Joe Johnson. This, I thought, was terribly unfortunate.

The other observation that I have is that I have become increasingly aware of the separation of the foreign service and the foreign service officers from other members of the foreign affairs community. It is true that everybody in both groups knows somebody in the other group. It is true that when a foreign service officer comes home, particularly an ambassador or DCM or an economic counselor, he sees a lot of members of the business community who are concerned with economic relations with his country. But by and large the opportunities for the foreign service and members of the business, academic, international affairs community in general to sit down together, to understand the points of view of each other, are very few and very far between.

Inevitably, this is partly the result of the fact that most of you members of the Association spend a large part of your lives outside of the United States. Many of you are much more familiar with the foreign affairs communities of other parts of the world than you are with the private foreign affairs community in the United States because it is difficult to establish this contact. But this separation has existed. And when the new group of officers of the American Foreign Service Association came to me and asked me if I would help them in some of the things that they were doing and came eventually and asked me if I would be the Chairman for this conference, I accepted because it seemed to me that they were striking, or attempting to strike, at both of these conditions that I had found.

That is why I am here. I hope and believe that we are now at the end of the beginning and that we will go on, not always in large conferences but in smaller conferences of the kind that Mr. Habib just mentioned have been made possible by the Donner Foundation, to establish a dialogue between members of the American Foreign Service Association and those within the Department and other members of the foreign affairs community, many of whom are here today. I am very glad to see some of them who have come from as far away as California to be with us. I suspect that we will all leave tomorrow somewhat frustrated by the fact that we haven't had a chance to talk things out and talk them through, but I am assured and I assure you that once the channels of communication are open, the officers of the American Foreign Service Association are going to see to it that for their part they do not close again.

I would like to finish these remarks by reading to you a letter which comes from an individual whose name has not always been revered in this company. The letter reads as follows:

"effective reform must come from the thoughts and actions of members of the service itself."

—Henry M. Wriston

Dear Joe:

I am sorry not to be at the conference on November 14-15. Having been actively interested in the foreign service since 1920, I pushed for the enactment of the Rogers Act and applauded the Foreign Service Act of 1946. It would be pleasant to let some whose interest—not to say lives—began more recently observe that what once appeared like horns were in reality only a couple of warts unfortunately located on my head. This long observation has taught me that effective reform must come from the thought and actions of members of the service itself. Outsiders may help; occasionally a politician will lend a hand as Congressman Rogers did in the early 20s; a Secretary of State can give encouragement; but the root of the matter lies in the service itself.

The Foreign Service Act of 1946 was so initiated and so enacted. Selden Chapin, Andrew Foster, and others did the heft of the work. They were fortunate in finding three members of the House of Representatives—two Democrats and one Republican—who were ready to bend their energies to steering the bill through the House. As I recall, the Senate passed the Act almost absent-mindedly without serious debate. In theory it would have been better had the Senate given the matter deeper consideration. As a practical matter it would have meant long delay and might well have produced a weaker bill.

The statutes of 1924 and 1946 both suffered in their execution by resistance to reform within the service itself. In the 20s it was stubborn reluctance among some strategically placed FSOs to a union of the diplomatic and consular branches in fact as well as form. In the late 40s it was blockage of essential lateral entry by members of the service itself.

Therefore, two things seem essential: first, leadership from within the service; and second, willingness to subordinate differences and pull together after Congress has acted. These are two large orders. It is heartening to see the first is present again; I can only hope for the second.

With best regards, as always,

Henry M. Wriston

PANEL DISCUSSION

Dimensions of Foreign Affairs in the 1970s

Herman Kahn: In trying to give a 20-minute view of the world to come, I think the most important things to notice tend to be fairly trivial, but are worth making explicit. The first, and to me the most interesting, is that the normal ties which the average man and the man in government have with reality are being cut.

Let me misquote Freud: "For most people the primary ties with reality are the requirements of"—and in the original quote he says "earning a living." I'd like to change that to "earning a living, national security, requirements of success, the requirements of tradition, or the sheer stark biological fact of life." All of these requirements are disappearing.

If you were a young man and you got your information from looking around rather than asking your elders or reading books—history books in particular—you would get a very peculiar idea of the world. You notice the two most successful nations in the world economically are Germany and Japan, and they lost World War II. So the first rule is that it is good to lose wars. You notice that they are the second and fourth trading powers in the world and do not have a navy; *ipso facto,* military forces aren't particularly necessary. You notice that nobody is threatening their borders. No, I'll make that stronger. If you take the borders of Latin America, North America, Europe (with the exception of Germany's eastern borders), Russia, Japan, and even China, you find a series of countries which have no serious threat to their borders. . . .

Now if you would ask what is the biggest difference in the student radical movement, say between the generation represented in this room and the current generation, I would argue the biggest difference is that our generation had to go to work when they graduated. And the crucial issue was getting through school to go to work, of course. The current generation, the left, the radical, doesn't go to work. He lives off an aunt, goes to work in a bar; he works one month on and eleven months off, gets a fellowship; but he doesn't have to sell out, he doesn't have to compromise with the system.

Now increasingly around the world this shows up in a strange attitude toward government. If you look at it historically, people tend to fall into two categories in their attitude towards government. The first category is that of government as a potential source of oppression; the government must be watched. The second category is that of government as a potential source of benefit, of goodies; the government is your help, it defends you from the enemy, keeps you prosperous, and so on. There is a third attitude towards government which has become world-wide; this is the government as a major source of amusement in the world, a major source of idiocy.

Why did you get this third attitude? Not because governments have gotten any worse—I would argue on the whole they have gotten better—but simply because of the first two things I mentioned. The government no longer looks so potentially oppressive to these people. The young Czechs simply refuse to understand that they are going to lose in their argument with Russia. If you are not afraid of the government, the next thing you notice is that it is kind of a major source of amusement . . . I would argue that this is likely to be the most important foreign policy issue, in various forms, in the developed nations around the world.

Normally in a discussion like this you would expect a speaker to spend most of the time on political and economic matters. Now let me make a few comments about those, and here again I'd like to take issues which I think people have wrong and use them as examples of how we misformulate problems.

Let me start with the so-called gap theory of economic development. Formulations of economic development that make comparisons between the rich and the poor are wrong in two ways: they are looking at something which is basically irrelevant, at least as far as the underdeveloped world is concerned; and they are basically counterproductive.

Let me start with the counterproductive aspect. . . . The average American does not feel poor because he doesn't live as well as the Rockefellers, although if you are a Rockefeller, it looks that way to you. The average American compares himself with his peers, with his father, with himself ten years ago, with people next door, and so does the average peasant. He compares himself with the man in the city. He doesn't compare himself with the American who is out of his experience.

So you have formulated the development problem in such a way as to make it unsolvable. Now this tends to distort all kinds of programs. Let me give you a program for which I would be willing to fight in the barricades: We must dedicate ourselves to tripling the GNP per capita of Latin America between now and the end of this century. That is a perfectly practical program. The US GNP per capita might go up by four to five times during the same period, so you have not decreased the gap; but does anybody really care? Well, people seem to think they do. They make the following statement: Only a fool can believe that the world can live half rich and half poor. If that is true, then we are in serious trouble because the world is going to be half rich and half poor by that definition. . . .

Let me give you an example of a very successful US program, though I don't think the United States really has the right to take credit for it. Many people believe that unless we have extraordinarily good luck there will be major famine in the world in the mid or late 70s or the early 80s. The situation seems to be the exact opposite. Unless we have very bad luck, there will not be major famine in the world. There are a number of reasons for this. The most important has to do with the new strains of rice, new Mexican wheats, and so on.

This was clear to people last year when President Johnson decided not to increase production in the United States but to cut it back. It came as a shock to the people looking at it. The President's advisory committee had a study. They expected to come up with a statement that we must go full speed ahead on production; they came up with a statement that very likely there is going to be a glut of wheat and rice in the world market.

We refuse to take credit for successes. We define the problems so we can't be successful and then we succeed—and when we succeed, we hide it. As a result, you find decreasing

"Unless we have very bad luck, there will not be major famine in the world."
—Herman Kahn

support for these programs. Why shouldn't there be decreasing support if they don't work? . . .

I would expect the Soviet Union to turn inward, very much in the Slavophile tradition, Tolstoy tradition, of "the world doesn't understand us, we're too good for them." It will still remain a world power. The US, I think, will continue as "world's policeman." If you don't believe that, whenever you talk to an audience that asks what makes Americans become the world's policemen, ask the following question: Do you want each nation to take care of its own defense? Do you want each nation to fend for itself or its immediate allies for its defense? Almost everybody will say no. Who else are they going to depend on? It is startling to me how many people who claim to be very much against the United States being world policeman are even more against every nation depending on itself for its own defense. What people really object to is too quick, too automatic, too unthinking intervention, and here I think I would agree with them.

Nevertheless, I think the United States will also withdraw to some degree. I would expect that Japan is going to be the third largest power in the world (and knows it), and that by the mid-70s the Japanese are going to be in the following interesting position: They will have finished 25 years of incredibly rapid growth, roughly speaking doubling their economy every seven years; they will have a total economy of around $200 billion a year; they will be expecting approximately 25 more years of incredibly rapid growth, though at a maybe slightly slower scale; World War II will have been over 30 years, and they will have no sense of any World War II political deficits. I suspect that the so-called Japanese nuclear allergy will suddenly disappear. And I suspect that is going to be the most interesting nation of all in terms of what is going to happen.

Mr. Krogh: We have been summoned to imagine the future and to conjure a system that will give us maximum control over it. In imagining that future, there should be an assumption in favor of our ability to determine our destiny, to control the products of human ingenuity and to some degree the products of human irrationality. . . .

Applying this highly personal brand of futurism, I anticipate that the following dimensions of behavior may characterize interstate relations in the 1970s: First, in looking at the future of foreign affairs, Americans will be much more likely to look in a mirror than in a crystal ball. They will be more apt than in the past to examine their reflection for signs of weakness. They will not be as pleased with what they see. There will be an accompanying loss of confidence and less assurance that we can share our own future, let alone the future of other nations.

Foreign countries, on the other hand, will continue to look out their windows at the United States. Even as the United States becomes more self-conscious about itself foreign countries will become more conscious of America and will continue to look upon this country as a laboratory where the great experiments in socio-economic policies are being conducted on a grand scale. This means that the diplomacy of example may well be our most effective instrument of foreign policy in the decade ahead. Russia and China will also spend a good deal of time looking in the mirror. Like the United States they will be more inward-looking, seized if not obsessed with their domestic difficulties. Each of the great powers will be in an introspective cycle in their foreign affairs.

There will be much less great-power political and military involvement in the developing countries. After a decade or more of experience, the burden of involvement in the less developed world seems to outweigh any real or imagined advantages. Cooperation among the industrialized countries will increase as problems among them become more common and solutions accordingly more fungible. The problems created by human ingenuity know no boundaries and will have

"Each of the great powers will be in an introspective cycle." —Peter F. Krogh

to find solutions first in technological cooperation which transcends national and ideological divisions. As Richard Rovere has put it, "If we can say with any assurance that nationalism transcends ideology, we can say with complete assurance that breathing transcends both." There will be a common search and sharing of solutions for urban problems, transportation facilitation, resource conservation, and air pollution and others. . . .

Now apart from these debatable predictions, there will be, I think, three certain facts of international life in the 70s.

First, adapting to the future will be a serious problem for all countries. The differences in future foreign affairs will confound all the players of the game.

Second, there will be in the United States some disengagement, some reduction in the resources available for foreign affairs. If in these circumstances the foreign service is to compete effectively for scarce resources and maximize the return on what it can muster, the process of foreign policy will have to be improved.

Finally, it is widely agreed that we have reached a turning point in our foreign affairs, where the premises of US foreign policy should be debated anew and where very little of present policy should escape close inspection. For the future the need is to fashion a foreign policy process in which none of yesterday's assumptions go unchallenged.

To cope adequately with a future which portends declining foreign affairs budget curves and an accelerated pace of change, the official foreign policy process needs to be made more capable of the following: identifying, detailing and ranking the order of US international interests; distinguishing more adequately than in the past, as I think Dr. Kissinger was suggesting, between our vital stakes and our humanitarian concerns; clarifying the things that threaten our security and stability; confronting the decision-makers from the desk officers on up with the key questions in the form of adversary proceedings; considering the impact in diverse areas of policies presumably formulated and applied to a specific area; weighing the future consequences of present decisions; and finally, devising a system which is better able to consistently apply broad principles of policy, morally defensible, as guidelines for specific policies. . . .

The private foreign affairs community also must play a more enlightened part in preparing for and acting out the future. As never before the official foreign services need the assistance of this constituency to do the following: to help head off any incipient public rush to isolationism; to lobby on behalf of foreign affairs appropriations in an increasingly competitive budget process; to conduct a continuing debate of foreign policy premises, attempting in the process to identify areas of consensus and/or majority view and feeding these views into both the Congressional and the executive reviews of foreign policy; and also to distill the best academic and practical thinking on complex matters of foreign policy and impart it in usable form to the professionals.

Up to now it seems to me the private foreign affairs community has fulfilled these roles only intermittently. In the future I think it needs to be more consistently involved, better orchestrated, and more dependably related to the official sources of influence. . . .

Finally, in reforming the country's conduct of foreign affairs, it will be essential in both the official and private sectors to involve youth and to take careful account of their views. On this point the statement of a member of the American Academy's Commission on the Year 2000 is rele-

vant: "More and more people are suddenly flexing their muscles and are realizing maybe they would like to have a say. This may very well overturn all our predictions because these people would rather have what they want than what all the technologists and all the scientists want."

Now these people are most conspicuously the young people, and getting them involved in the decision-making process won't be easy; nor, I would like to add, will it invariably be desirable. . . .

Since more of the future belongs to the youth than it does to us, they at least have proprietary rights in helping for the planning of it. But because we have had more experience and because we occupy the existing institutions, they should and probably will have to work with us. That should not be difficult for either side. We might begin by seeing ourselves in a somewhat different relationship to time than we are accustomed to. We can agree that there is not much we can do to affect the past, and that the present is so fleeting as we experience it that it is transformed into the past as we touch it. It is only the future that is amenable to our plans and actions. Knowing this, we can draw a broad outline of the kind of world we feel we would like to experience, a tranquil world, a clean world, a personalized world, a relatively equalized world, and then simply work together to achieve it. . . .

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Mr. Michael Deutsch: I am not convinced by Dr. Kahn's prediction that the Soviet Union will withdraw into its borders and contemplate its success in building platforms in space and other things. We have heard so many lectures on polycentrism that this sounds unconvincing especially in the light of this new successful patented weapon that they have, the wars of national liberation. . . .

Mr. Kahn: I don't think that the national liberation war is so much an invention of the Soviets as a retreat. You

Philip Habib, AFSA's president, introduces Mrs. Dean Rusk

remember that it was really announced in 1961 when Khrushchev said, "General war is too dangerous; even limited war is too dangerous; it might escalate—this is all we have left." And I think it was that rather than an invention of a new way of getting ahead. . . .

Prof. Lincoln Bloomfield: Presumably there are a lot of countries that feel they would like to keep up their moral tone and have a piece of the action and be relevant and play an active role in the world. At the same time I heard both Herman and Henry say that in the years ahead the US would have to continue to play some kind of policing role. My question is: How can this general need for countries to play an active part, which I don't think is exclusively our problem—how can this be channeled into a sharing of the policing function so that the United States does not continue to act as though (a) it were the only policeman and (b) it were the only country that had to feel relevant?

Mr. Kahn: We are the largest power in the world. That gives us certain obligations. When the British stopped the slave trade in the 19th century, it wasn't because they had any special right to do it. They said, "We have the navy. If not us, then who?" There are very few nations which have to play a big role on the world stage in order to feel happy. One of the points which Henry made, in effect, was that under Stalin Russia was not a world power; it didn't feel badly that it didn't have anything to say about the Pacific Ocean or Africa or Latin America. Now it does.

The distinguishing feature of American foreign policy more than anything else is the need for what Henry referred to as legitimacy, a legitimate order of things. And then we ask, if there are 125 other nations in the world, don't they have the same rights? The answer is no. They don't, and there has never been any question that they do. The fact that these other nations cannot play the same role is to me not an important statement, at least not for the medium run. They can't. And nobody wants them to.

Harold R. Snyder of Georgetown University School of Foreign Service: Mr. Kahn, I'd like you to defend the intimation that Japan might lose its nuclear allergy . . .

Mr. Kahn: Japan changed from being the most militaristic nation in the world to being the most pacifistic in one day. Now you can't go back in one day, but it doesn't take any three years.

Roughly speaking, if you examine the nuclear allergy, it is 50 per cent antimilitarism; nobody wants the Japanese officer corps back, but that is not going to be the problem in another five, six years. It is 25 per cent anti-US. But nuclear weapons mean independence from the US. The Right and Left could agree on this. It is 15 per cent partisan politics. That could change also. That is to say, there is a ten per cent hard core of nuclear pacifism.

Are you familiar with the fact that in 1964 for the first time Japan had a revival of war songs? You had a revival of revisionist histories of World War II? And 65 was the first time you could discuss defense policy of Japan. In 66 you discussed nuclear defense policy. In 67 they had a tremendous animosity toward the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. In 68 they now have study groups where the Right and the Left study nuclear weapons together.

Now just let me spend a minute on the delivery capability. Today they have got a missile. This is a missile which was thought of by the Department of Education as a hobby for high-school students. As far as I can see, Japan is third in the world in solid-fuel technology.

By 1975 they will have a nuclear power industry which can produce about 500 to 1,000 small bombs per year without cutting back electricity, just raising the price a little bit.

I happen to think that the Japanese, more likely than not, are going to be a tower of strength for the kinds of policies we generally like, you know. On the other hand, I wouldn't push them into getting nuclear weapons. . . .

PANEL DISCUSSION

Foreign Affairs: Are We Organized for the 1970s?

Ambassador Kohler: We are talking about the problems of the 70s as though we were going to settle them here and now, whereas the focus of this conference is whether the youth of the next generation can really cope with these problems. My own first brush with students in this first semester, when I taught at the University of Miami, certainly left me with a feeling not of discouragement, but of encouragement; feeling that here was a young group much more alert than I remember being in our day, yet their basic values were not so different, and most of them were pretty earnest about life and the future.

This confirmed the feeling that I had when I had the pleasure of being associated with this bunch of Young Turks. Having been with them on the take-off and then jumped out, I've been amazed at how they've gone on and really produced and organized things. When I read this report, "Toward a Modern Diplomacy," I had a certain amount of awed surprise at how reasonable and how objective and how nationally oriented it was. There had been times when I had thought about the foreign service in terms of other political organizations I know that are supposed to carry within themselves the seeds of their own destruction. After reading this report, I felt that the foreign service still carries within itself the seeds of its own rebirth and renaissance. I think the letter you read from Mr. Wriston touched on the real truth: that if there is to be any real reform and reorganization of the foreign service it's not going to amount to a great deal unless it comes out of the leadership of that service.

The Act of 1924, as I understand its origins, did come out of the people deeply involved. And the amalgamation of the diplomatic and consular services created the basic concept of the Foreign Service of the United States.

Later, and most people don't remember this at all, there was a kind of scandal about the administration of that act along about 1927, when a group was supposed to have got control of the machinery, the diplomatic group that was using it for their own benefits and their own promotions. This led to some amendments of the Act in 1931. . .

The explosion of World War II multiplied our role and our activities. And I'm sorry to say the foreign service didn't play too much of a part in that. Some individuals played very noteworthy parts, indeed. But we were really too thin, and we hadn't had the broad experience that would have enabled us to man and to operate all the war-time agencies that were then needed. And this was complicated by a naïve tradition that war belonged to the soldiers and peace to the diplomats.

During these war years a group of foreign service officers realized that the world was never going to be like it was before. And we had a lot of discussions in those days that really remind me of the discussions that we had in the past year and a half here among the junior foreign service officers and then in the American Foreign Service Association, particularly after we were taken over by the activist group. All this talk and planning and ferment led to the establishment of an office to plan for a reform of the service. And I think great credit is due to the late Andy Foster and to Selden Chapin for the Foreign Service Act of 1946, which, for my money, was a farsighted and very flexible instrument which should have enabled the foreign service to cope with the problems. All the basic principles were there that I think experience had taught us were essential to the conduct of the foreign service: rank in the man so that you had mobility and flexibility in the use of manpower; strictly competitive examinations and merit promotions; and a protection for the first time in the concept of foreign service by a statutorily independent Director General and Board of the Foreign Service which gave to the foreign service some of the built-in statutory protections that the Civil Service had long had.

Here again the problem was implementation. And I must say that I think the text for today might almost be the title of the first chapter of the Career Principles Committee Report, "The Foreign Service of the United States: whatever Became of It?" because the legislation was not really implemented as it was intended to be. Some of the features were eroded, and I think we in the foreign service, the old foreign service of that time, have to take a good share of the blame. The manpower needs were enormous. But we resisted the intrusion of people from the outside to this elite service. The result was that agencies grew up outside.

Another factor was that in those postwar years we had a great turnover of Secretaries of State, so that we didn't have a top leadership. It's really only when Loy Henderson, a great career officer, took over this responsibility and held it for some seven years, that we began to get some stability. But by that time a lot had happened, and it was too late to repair the lack of implementation that had preceded it. The Marshall Plan had been set up outside the service. USIA, after first coming into the State Department, had again been made an independent agency with its own staff system. The Director General of the Foreign Service had been stripped of his legal authorities. The Department had been Wristonized—an inevitable operation, I think. . .

The next real change was the Hays Bill. Actually, being an integrationist from way back, I think it was a good bill; but it was a very complicated bill. And it had the great defect of not being sold to the foreign service of the United States. So there was not only resistance to it, but opposition to it, largely unvoiced, among the foreign service at that time. And I think one of the merits of the approach that has been taken by the new group and of their report is its simplicity, the fact that they have engaged the foreign service from all the agencies and at all age levels in the preparation of this report and that they have focused on the simple and fundamental problems rather than introducing new legislation like the Hays Bill, that nobody quite understood.

I think the Department of State and the foreign service really abdicated their responsibility by allowing vital functions of our foreign relations, aid, information, even some of the Treasury functions, certain aspects of CIA research, and so forth to develop outside of the foreign service. We did retain, what? We retained administration, including administrative services for these agencies. With the result that we have built up an administrative apparatus which is too big for the foreign service as such and possibly not big enough for a really amalgamated service. In the process the State Department

"a naive tradition that war belonged to the soldiers and peace to the diplomats."
—Ambassador Foy D. Kohler

budget has become dependent on these agency budgets for funds. . .

Dr. Mosher is going to talk about modern techniques and so forth, and I don't want to anticipate him or the content of the report itself. But certainly it is unacceptable that the Department and the foreign services in this age of the computer should not have an efficient retrieval system for information in the files. And the concept that after five years in foreign affairs you can bury your files out in the Midwest somewhere is crazy. There are all kinds of methods we could use to improve this.

Funds—if we're going to approach an over-all administration of foreign affairs on behalf of the President of the United States, then he has to be able to have some movement of funds. I would think there ought to be a ten per cent choice. I remember when the Middle East crisis arose last year. Suddenly we were out of the political business, and we were out of the direct aid business, but at the same time it was essential that USIA step up its program. It had no money, and it might have benefited by up to ten per cent of the savings of State and AID to carry on. So we have introduced bureaucratic rigidities into the administration and conduct of foreign policy—they're absolutely unnecessary.

My assignment was to say how we got where we are today and what were some of the mistakes we made along the way. I think one of the lessons is that whatever legislation we get, implementation is of the essence. So I would hope that the American Foreign Service Association wouldn't think it was out of business if it gets the legislation it's after.

Frederick Mosher: I understand that the report which provides the agenda for the meeting today was initially stimulated by a younger group of foreign service officers and officers of other foreign affairs agencies only a few years out of the university. I have the impression, having read the reports, that the subcommittee reports are pretty radical, in terms of the past, more so than the summary report.

This report, like the Herter Report, like the Wriston Report, like the study that preceded the Foreign Service Act of '46, takes for granted certain principles without, so far as I can see, very much active questioning about them: that the core of the foreign affairs of the United States should be conducted by a career service; that it should rely primarily upon the annual recruitment of young men and women on the basis of competitive examinations; that it should provide a lifetime expectation of career; that there should be minimal lateral entry; that the service should monopolize most of the key jobs below what we call the political level in the service; and that political influence should be eliminated from personnel action. I am not going to argue against these assumptions. I do suggest that someone probably will, within the next ten or twenty years, question some of them; if only because of some of the tremendous rapid changes in our posture and activities overseas, and because of the dramatic changes in our society at home.

For the premises of a career service are not necessarily or automatically attuned to the society in which and for which it operates. And all of us know that society is changing rapidly.

Usually, and I suspect inevitably, ferment for change as in the report we are going to consider today is likely to come from the younger members of the service, not from its older leaders. Indeed, I have a feeling that the basic trouble about our youth is they can't avoid the tendency to grow older. And I suspect this applies to the Young Turks of the foreign service. The danger of being out of tune with society in a career system is aggravated, particularly in a service of this kind, by insularity when a large proportion of its members are out of the country a large part of their lives.

I am going to devote my remarks to a few observations, most of which are not original, about changes in the society which I think should be considered in the evaluation of this report or any proposals for the foreign service in the future. I am not going to suggest abandonment of the career principle. But I think there are things going on which are affecting and will more greatly affect in the next ten or twenty years the kind of foreign service, the kind of foreign representation that America will need.

"the dominant institutions of the new society . . . will be the intellectual institutions."
—Frederick C. Mosher

The first point I will make is to refer to what others have described as the post-industrial society, which comprehends the scientific revolution, the professional revolution, and the knowledge explosion. I would like here to quote two highly esteemed authors who have written in this area. One is Don K. Price, Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard. He says this revolution "seems certain to have a more radical effect on our political institutions than did the industrial revolution for a good many reasons." Among these he noted three particularly: one, moving the public and private sectors closer together; two, bringing a new order or complexity in the administration of public affairs; and three, upsetting our system of checks and balances. The other is Professor Daniel Bell at Columbia. He wrote: "To speak rashly, if the dominant figures of the past 100 years have been the entrepreneur, the businessman and the industrial executive, the new men are the scientists, the mathematicians, the economists and the engineers with the new computer technology. And the dominant institutions of the new society, in the sense that they will provide the most creative challenges and enlist the richest talents, will be the intellectual institutions. The leadership of the new society will rest not with businessmen or corporations as we know them, but with research corporations, the industrial laboratories, experimental stations and the universities." . . . The best college students as measured by academic criteria are no longer going into business. They are no longer going into government. They are going into the universities themselves.

My observation of the college rebellions and the activism that is going on on the campuses today is that, except for a few of the leaders, they reflect a very, very high degree of idealism; much more so than when I graduated from college; much more so, certainly, than all through the 1950s. They haven't yet translated what they want to do in terms of the going institutions. I think that the foreign service is at this point losing a great opportunity. Because this is not what they see to be the place where the action is. And I think the foreign service itself suffers greatly from this image—it is not where the action is.

My next point has to do with one of the products of the tremendous increase of college education. Most of our college graduates are professionally trained in some field or other. Professionalism has a lot of connotations, but two or three I would like to emphasize. With it arises a high degree of individual identification with the values of the profession as against the values of the organization with which one works. Secondly, with professionalism comes a higher degree of mobility from job to job, from place to place, than we've ever had before. And I think one result of this is an increasing reliance upon temporary assignments to problems of interest, rather than the identification of oneself with an institution for a career. . .

I think our ideas about bureaucracy and government, as

well as private, organization are going to have to change. I think the orientation associated with politicalism, with status, with hierarchy is going to die before the demands of getting people to work on problems with a problem orientation. I think unquestionably there is going to be increasing emphasis on youth in all of our organizations, and rapid promotions for the best qualified, and probably earlier and earlier retirements as our society becomes more and more productive. I think that organizations are going to behave much more on a collegial basis where people with different interests, different knowledge are brought together on the basis of problems, rather than on the basis of hierarchy. And if there is one general thing I deplore about the report it is its emphasis on hierarchy. . .

Mr. Eliot: This is a landmark meeting in the history of this Association. I believe this is the first organized effort of the professionals to meet with those outside of the government who share our interests in the substance and process of American foreign policy. As Mr. Johnson indicated in his opening remarks, we believe it is of great importance to establish and maintain the contact we are beginning today. We in the Association also welcome the many retired members of the foreign service who are with us and are pleased to see so many old friends and teachers among you.

My purpose today is to discuss what many of us in the profession think about the foreign affairs process. This is not as exciting a subject as the substance of foreign affairs, but as my younger children would be the first to point out, the quality of snow has a great deal to do with the quality of the snowball. The Association Board owes a large debt of gratitude to the many people who have worked on the question of process over the years, both within and without the service. Most recently we are indebted to Ambassador Graham Martin and his committee who have produced what we think is a stimulating and valuable report. This report builds on its predecessor, a report presented to the Board a year ago by a committee under the chairmanship of Ambassador William Leonhart. We are proud of the commitment, the abilities and creativity of our colleagues who have worked on these reports.

It is not my intention to summarize Ambassador Martin's report in detail. Instead I wish to concentrate on two major related areas, people and organization. And let me begin with people. The kind of people our country needs in its foreign service is far different than those required 20 years ago. This is not to say that we do not and will not continue to need men and women of character and ability to carry on the traditional tasks of diplomacy, negotiating and contacts with foreign governments. But our present and future diplomacy require also men and women who have knowledge of and experience in the great variety of other activities which our government must carry on overseas: military, cultural, informational, commercial, scientific, financial and all the rest. To cite just one of the many possible examples, I would say that no matter what the future will be for the Agency for International Development, I cannot conceive of the day in the future when our foreign service will not require expertise in problems of economic and social development.

The foreign service requires not only specialists in all these fields, it also requires managers who can operate and direct programs in these fields and can coordinate a variety of programs to serve American interests and objectives in specific countries and areas of the world. These requirements of the foreign service have been recognized by virtually all students of the service for many years. Yet what do we find when we look at the service as it is now constituted? We find that we have made it difficult to develop either specialists or managers by dividing the foreign service into several parts on an agency basis. The State Department, USIA, and AID for all intents and purposes have their own foreign services. This division makes sensible personnel planning extremely difficult, causes jealousies, creates inefficiencies and duplications which come back to haunt you and me as taxpayers.

Many of us have concluded that the place to start to bring sense and order into this personnel picture is to unify the various pieces of foreign service into one coordinated whole. There are various ways to do this, and if you wish, we can discuss them later. But the essential point is that personnel recruitment, training, promotion policies and the like should be brought into conformity across agency lines and that a single board or commission, analogous to the Civil Service Commission, should be created to do the necessary coordinating, planning and directing. Such a board already exists in the Board of the Foreign Service. It could easily be given the power it now lacks to do the job we envisage for it. Its principal job should be ensuring that the foreign service develops the necessary talents to staff the major foreign affairs agencies and to perform the managerial and specialized tasks required by our present and future diplomacy.

There is another important aspect of the Board of Foreign Service. Like the Civil Service Commission, it should be independent and able to shield the foreign service from political influence and manipulation. As those of us know who are about to undergo a change of party leadership for the third time in 16 years, the foreign service is a disciplined, career, commissioned service and serves the President regardless of party. Yet it is strange and disturbing that so little has been done to protect the service, despite the fact that the importance of such protection has been increasingly recognized over the years.

Finally, the Board of Foreign Service should have a top-flight staff headed by a Director General who should be an experienced professional well-versed in the demands of our modern diplomacy. Especially if USIA is brought back within the State Department on the same basis as AID now is, which we hope will happen, it would be logical to have the Board located within the Department, where all the major foreign affairs agencies would then be located.

I have referred several times to the management responsibility of the foreign service. Let me now turn to those in greater detail and in the course of doing so get into the problem of the organization of the foreign affairs process. Senator Henry Jackson, one of the more perceptive students of government organization, has said, and I quote, "The plain fact is that good policy demands both good men and good machinery, and although it may be true that good men can triumph over poor machinery, it is also true that they are more effective when they work with good machinery."

Assuming that the ideas that I have advanced will move the government in the direction of good men, what can be said about machinery? The starting point is, of course, the President. What we are talking about is machinery that will serve him. It seems to us that he needs mechanisms at home and abroad for directing and coordinating the manifold aspects of our foreign relations and overseas operations. We believe that overseas our ambassadors should have, as they now have, the authority to direct all aspects of diplomatic missions they head, of course under policy guidance from Washington. I need scarcely add that to the extent we achieve the kind of

". . . division makes personnel planning extremely difficult . . ." —Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

foreign service we seek, our ambassadors will have better staffs to assist them in their managerial roles. And to the extent that the foreign services manage to produce better executives, the President will have a larger pool of potential ambassadors to choose from.

The situation in Washington is immensely more complex, largely because it is here that the policy decisions and resource allocations have to be made and also because many of the agencies involved in foreign affairs handle primarily domestic matters. Yet for those agencies, State, AID, USIA, Peace Corps, Disarmament Agency, which are exclusively involved in foreign policy or operations and for the strictly foreign operations of other agencies, it seems to us that the President needs a manager. We believe that this manager should be located in the Department of State, which is, of course, the principal source of counsel on foreign policy for the President. Ambassador Martin's report indicates that the logical place for this responsibility is the second Under Secretary.

What would this manager do? He would be responsible for planning on a global basis and for compelling planning on regional levels. He would participate with the Bureau of the Budget in reviewing budgets for all foreign affairs programs, requiring their consistence with policy and resolving problems of resource allocation between them. He would monitor and evaluate ongoing programs. He would be charged with the responsibility for seeing to it that the foreign affairs process would employ the best available techniques. As in the case of the establishment of an independent Board of the Foreign Service and the creation of one foreign service out of the many that now exist, no new legislative authority would be required to put this management system into operation. But, and this is a key point, it would be necessary for this new manager to have a top flight staff drawn from all the foreign affairs agencies. Here I come back again to my earlier thesis: that to provide the qualified people for this staff over the long haul, you will need a more systematic approach to the development of talent within the foreign service than we have today.

That in a nutshell is what we on the Board of the Association see as possibilities for providing better management and better people for foreign affairs in the years ahead. These are not revolutionary proposals. Neither have they been tailored to fit any philosophic frame. They are pragmatic, capable of implementation and, we believe, effective both from the President's point and the viewpoint of the nation as a whole in providing a better foreign affairs process and a better foreign service which will attract and hold the best possible men and women.

At this point it should be clear that the professionals are not recommending a grand redrawing of the organizational chart of foreign affairs. To be frank, we are somewhat cynical about the potency of such a remedy, at least in foreign affairs. We have been poked and prodded by high-level commissions on the average of once every two years since the end of World War II. The results have been meagre indeed. We are much more interested in altering the process than in creating new boxes and a table of organization; more interested in the marginal gain in efficiency than in the sweeping solution. I doubt that there are sweeping solutions to problems such as we confront in the world. But I do not doubt that we can improve the way in which we handle these problems.

We believe that the solutions which we have proposed will move us a giant if unspectacular step in that direction. Most of what we recommend has been recommended before. The difference, we believe, is that for the first time in many years, we professionals have our own proposals.

Let me close by stressing that a major purpose of this conference, in our view, is to get your ideas on the matters being presented to you. We do not have a monopoly of wisdom. If we had, we would not have arranged this conference. We want not just your questions, but also your ideas. In addition to Ambassador Kohler, Professor Mosher and myself, Mr. Habib is on this panel to join in our discussion, and so is Mr. Charles Bray, who is a member of our Board and has been devoting his full time on leave from the foreign service, to assist in the development of our ideas and of this conference. Thank you very much. . .

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

David Bronheim from the Center for Inter-American Relations: What concerns a lot of us is not so much Civil Service protection for the foreign service and making certain that merit is adhered to, but how does a career service stay in touch with the ferment, the domestic purpose, the real things that are going on in our country so that they may represent this abroad? I don't have a feel for this from your report.

Mr. Eliot: I just couldn't agree with you more that the foreign service needs to develop in a systematic way more contact than we have today with all the currents that we can possibly get into contact with in American society. This is very difficult to do for people in the foreign service who are hundreds or thousands of miles away from the United States. Any ideas that you would have that would contribute to that kind of contact we'd like to hear about.

Here at home the Association itself—its major program, I think looking ahead, in the next few years is going to be to develop that kind of contact. We are starting with this conference here today and tomorrow. The Donner Foundation gift to us was primarily for this purpose, and it was solicited for this purpose.

Some of the other panelists might like to add to this.

Dr. Mosher: I'd like to say in the first place that in three respects I think this report is revolutionary. I think the fact that the report was done at all by the Foreign Service is revolutionary. And I think it is very important. It is rather seldom that a professional group examines itself in a larger context.

The second thing about it that seemed to me revolutionary was the paragraphs in the report itself, and particularly the report of the subcommittee that dealt with openness which I think relates directly to the questions that were raised here. The holding of this conference demonstrates that they mean it. That is, to bring people in from the outside.

The third thing which strikes me as revolutionary is that the report contemplates a change in the role of the foreign service. It seems to me that this is the main thrust of this report. It is to create a Foreign Service of the United States. This, I think, in operating terms could be a revolutionary change.

I didn't agree with all the specific organizational proposals to bring this about. But I would say a couple of things about them. Changing the role of an organization is a lot harder than changing the law or changing the structure. One doesn't do it by fiat. President Johnson issued NSAM 341, and nothing happened for a year or so. The Foreign Service Act said certain things, and nothing happened. The President enunciated PPBS, and not very much happened for quite some time.

Changing the role means changing the expected behaviors and responses to situations of a whole lot of people, as they see themselves and as others see them. And I think in a long-established institution like the foreign service of the State Department, it is particularly difficult. In my own explorations the last two years I have talked with over 1,000 officers of the various foreign affairs agencies at home and abroad. I would say there is a high degree of congruence between the way the foreign service looks at itself and its role, and the way other people looked at the foreign service and its role. Essentially that role is the diplomatic and consu-

lar service, perhaps plus a little administration. It is not, as the report suggested it should be, it is not executive management.

I think that getting the bulk of the foreign service to adopt an entirely different stance than it has developed over the last 40 years, and getting other people to recognize that change in stance, is a very difficult job. I don't think it is going to be done by a law. I don't think it is going to be done by a directive. I think it is going to take a lot of hard work.

Mr. Bray: A large number of us in foreign service were concerned in 1965-66 that, with the Hays Bill not reported out of Committee in the Senate, there was no creative thinking going on in the Department or elsewhere at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue about what alternatives there might be. Our concern was heightened in early 1966 when President Johnson issued his now famous National Security Action Memorandum 341, which laid on the Secretary of State and his Department some responsibilities he had never formally had before. We saw a gap, I believe, between the traditional bilateral, multilateral, essentially diplomatic functions that the Department had always discharged and the new responsibilities which are best described as managerial in nature: what are we up to and why? It has to do with very systematic analysis, and there is clearly a role for tighter analysis in foreign affairs than we have enjoyed in the past. It certainly has to do with dealing effectively with large budgets, none of which the Department of State controls directly. Again, we saw no indication within the Department of State that it was rethinking its internal organizational structure.

Fundamentally, I think we are in the business of proving that you can turn a large organization—one that has never been known for its radical nature—around; that you can reorganize it from within. We are not finished; we are not close to the end of that process, but we are a lot closer to it than we were two and a half years ago. Whether you agree with the report and its recommendations or not, we represent something that is very exciting in the literature of organizational self-renewal. I don't know of another organization which has tried to do the kinds of things that are being attempted from within in the Department of State.

Ambassador Briggs: . . . No one, since we started this morning, has described what the objective of diplomacy is. I infer, however, from reading this document, that the writers of it believe that the objective of American diplomacy ought to be influencing the institutions of a foreign country. To the extent that that is an accurate reflection of the point of view of those writing the report, I am "agin it." To me the objective of United States diplomacy is to influence the policy of countries that are important to us, to influence the policy of those countries in ways that are helpful to the national interest of the United States. Influencing their institutions which may or may not result in influencing their policy seems to be not primarily our business. Therefore, I view a good deal of this conversation today about those engaged in foreign affairs as talk about what I would regard as the peripheral performers: the propagandists, the dispensers of aid, those operating the magic lantern of the spooks, those making martial music. They aren't the ones who are engaged in the government's business of influencing the policy of other governments. . . .

The other point that has been omitted in any discussion that I have heard today is the vast proliferation that goes on in the Foreign Service. . . .

Professor Adam Yarmolinsky: I find a fourth element in the report that strikes me, if not revolutionary, as quite novel and highly important and desirable. I find what is to me in the literature of diplomacy and the analysis of the foreign policy process a new way of talking and thinking about that process, a way that puts a novel emphasis on how do you get there from here? Because it has seemed to me that in the past the discussion of foreign policy has been too much confined to a discussion of what our attitude ought to be, what outcome we would like to see, rather than a discussion of what the process by which we get from the unhappy present to the highly desirable future might be.

Now it seems to me that in order to carry out this highly desirable aspect of the kind of change, it is important to put perhaps even more emphasis than Mr. Mosher put in his observation on the need to loosen up the structure of the foreign service. And I have in mind particularly the role that can be played, is being played already, but can be played, it seems to me, to a much larger extent by "in and out-ers" in the foreign service coming in for relatively brief periods—two, four, five years—people who have their intellectual center of gravity outside the foreign service, but who are able to make a significant contribution to it simply because in large part their point of view is a different point of view. . . .

Mr. Eliot: I completely agree with you, this "in and out-er" business is something we could do more of. I think it should go both ways. Not only should there be some from outside the service coming in for short periods of time and then going back again; there should be more Foreign Service people going outside for two to four years and coming back in again.

Mark Peacock, Assistant Director of the International Center in Macalester College: . . . It would seem to me that since an effort is being made and has been made—and I assume at meetings such as this and smaller meetings in the future will continue to be made—those of us such as myself and others who are outside have an obligation, through our own contacts and through organizations such as Town Hall in Los Angeles and others, to make these people aware that it is in their interest to let business go for a day, to come and to sound off and to get this kind of interaction. I think the effort has been made. I think that we ourselves should take on the additional obligation of getting this thing so it works.

David Hitchcock, American Foreign Service Association: My question is to Mr. Eliot, but to other members of the panel if they desire. It regards recommendation number four concerning the authority to place USIA within the Department of State. I think many USIA officers—perhaps a surprising number to some people in this room—would favor this recommendation. But I think that many of them would have perhaps one legitimate concern, one legitimate question to ask, and that is whether the Department itself and the American Foreign Service Association too are prepared to recognize that diplomacy includes the information and cultural and public affairs arm of the US government, that public information activity and cultural activity is a legitimate arm of diplomacy.

It seems to me that if USIA is to go back into the Department, it should only do so if the Department itself down at the desk level is organized to deal not only with both the political and economic issues of the United States overseas, but also with the public information and psychological arms as well. I think it is this kind of assurance and reassurance that we ought to receive and that the government itself needs to recognize if we are to be effective overseas. And I wonder whether Mr. Eliot feels that the Department and the Association are prepared to recognize this?

Mr. Eliot: I can't speak for the Department, but I can speak for the Association. The answer to your question is "yes."

Warren Kelsey, retired Foreign Service officer: I have a question for Mr. Eliot about his support of Mr. Yarmolinsky, which I gather is an encouragement of the "in and out"

". . . we are in the business of proving that you can turn a large organization . . . around . . ." —Charles W. Bray III

Panel Discussion of "Foreign Affairs: Are We Organized for the 1970s?"

concept of lateral entry. It seems to me that the foreign service does have difficulty in recruiting our bright young people from the colleges to adopt the foreign service as a career. How are we going to recruit them if they know people are going to be reeruited above their heads, people who perhaps have never passed the examinations that they have so painfully passed? How are we finally going to resolve the conflict between a career foreign service and what I think is excessive lateral entry?

Mr. Eliot: It seems to me we have to find some middle ground between bringing people in for longer periods of time on a more or less permanent basis, which would have an adverse effect on the morale of people who are learning the profession from the bottom up, and the kind of openness that several people here today, including ourselves in this report, havc been referring to. . . .

Teddy O'Toole, past Vice President of the National Student Association: There are two points I would like to address myself to that have come up just recently. One is the process of getting to foreign service officers or people in the State Department and communicating to them the crisis of dissent in this country. I am talking about college students and their dissent. . . .

You know, I don't know exactly what I am doing here except that I am vitally interested in trying to bridge this gap that exists between us, and it is not easy for me to be here. But just briefly, the State Department itself in the eyes of a lot of people in this country, and I would say very bright people, is the enemy. . . . So the gap is there and I as much as anyone would like to bridge it. I don't want to throw a wrench into a discussion here about the organization and reorganizing for the 1970s. I am saying that the crisis of dissent in this country is such that unless the government as a whole and the populace as a whole realize it, the government is going to fall and the government is going to be torn by dissent, strife and revolution of a kind that this country has never known before.

Mr. Johnson: Thank you very much indeed. One of the things I like out of what you said is the fact that you say that you are interested in and trying to bridge the gap. I feel fairly confident that on the other side of this chasm, or whatever it is, there are lots of others who will like to reach out to you and see if we can't do something about it.

Mr. Reddy from the Institute of Applied Behavioral Science: I'd like to explore the dimensions of this gap a little bit, and I wonder if Mr. Eliot could tell us a little bit about the kinds of proposals that you have considered that you rejected; what were some of the extremes that didn't get incorporated? I want to know a little bit about what the universe of possibilities was that this represents the art of.

Mr. Bray: Mr. Reddy, before you leave the mierophone, I am not sure I understood your question.

Mr. Reddy: I understand that this report represents the art of the possible, which I assume is some central position that you think can be achieved. I am wondering what the proposals were that you considered that you thought you could not achieve and so rejected.

Mr. Johnson: That is a rather large order. Could you give some of the answcr now?

Mr. Bray: One of the proposals that we did consider was that all of the agencies, or all of those parts of agencies having a substantial interest in foreign affairs, might be combined into a single Department of Foreign Affairs. This has had some support outside of the foreign service and perhaps some inside too. We rejected that solution on the grounds that there was a certain creativity in messiness, that by shoehorning everything into a single box you might destroy some legitimate interests. You might not, at the same time and in compensation, get at the real problem of coordination and management which is what we are after. You can rearrange the boxes in a chart, but you may not change anything.

John F. Harr: I think the report itself has some very strong points about it. But I see a weakness in that some of the major points, some of the perhaps controversial ones, don't come through too clearly. One of them, for example, is what do you mean by a single service? Does this include AID and how? I think another one has to do with programing and systems analysis. This doesn't come through too clearly, at least in terms of the recommendations.

. . . to the extent that the jobs in AID are a permanent part of the American diplomatic establishment, those jobs should be part of the permanent Foreign Service of the United States of America. —Eliot

And a third area that I am confused about is a certain tendency in the report which I think looks a little backward—I can't be specific about it, but it seems to me that there is a flavor there of seeing the foreign service as something unto itself, with its own powers, somewhat more divorced from the State Department and the Secretary and maybe even from the White House than it has been in the recent past. Maybe Charlie and Ted can comment on one or another of these three points.

Mr. Eliot: I might pick up on one or two. With respect to AID, it is certainly the intention in the report and certainly the intention of the Board that AID be part of the Foreign Service of the United States of America. Now another way of saying this is that, to the extent that the jobs in AID are a permanent part of the American diplomatic establishment, those jobs should be part of the permanent Foreign Service of the United States of America. . . .

Earl Packer, retired Foreign Service officer: I wonder if the group who prepared the report addressed themselves to the question, and if so, what their resolution of it was . . . do they consider the service should be an elite service or a representative service?

Mr. Eliot: Well, I think the service should be the kind of a service that will meet the needs of the foreign relations of the United States of America. I am not dodging the issue. The issue, it seems to me, is your definition of elite. I have just given you mine which is that it has got to be composed of the people who can meet the requirements of our modern diplomacy, including the managerial function about which I talked in my earlier remarks. . . .

I think the entire thrust of this report and of the remarks I made earlier is that we need a kind of foreign service that will do the jobs that confront the United States overseas. If we produce the kind of a foreign service that will do these jobs, you can call it elite or you can call it anything else. All I am interested in is a personnel system and a managerial system which will come out with the end product that I think all of us want.

I don't think the foreign service as it is structured today does perform this job in a systematic way, and therefore there are some changes that are necessary. I think these are very well indicated in this report. . . .

Fisher Howe: This report, as I read it, puts the executive responsibility for the foreign service, for leading the service, in a board. This seems a highly doubtful way to get effective leadership and overcome the management problems that we have. I'd like to ask Fritz Mosher, as well as those on the Association Board, whether they've given thought to placing with the Executive Under Secretary this responsibility for leadership in the service and how they really feel a board is going to function to bring this kind of leadership that we need.

Dr. Mosher: I'd like to respond to this by referring back to our common experiences on the Herter Committee. I don't think there was any recommendation that the Herter Committee worried more about and attached more importance to than the recommendation of a Permanent Under Secretary or an Executive Under Secretary. I think that the reason we wrote it into the report—and Joe can confirm or dis-confirm this—was precisely this: that we thought there ought to be a man of high stature with executive responsibility for managing the operation, including the personnel system, in the field of foreign affairs. Going beyond the State Department, the present report itself pumps for the title of Permanent Under Secretary, and I don't really particularly care about this except that I think the report makes a distinct mistake in suggesting that you have a Permanent Under Secretary with this kind of responsibility, but take away from him the responsibility of personnel and put it in a restructured Board of Foreign Service beyond the control of either the Secretary of State or the President. It seems to me that personnel is probably the first responsibility of executive management. And if you're going to have a Permanent Under Secretary or an Executive Under Secretary, or whatever you want to call him, the first thing you do is give him personnel, not take it away from him.

Mr. Eliot: I agree with you, Professor Mosher, that the Board of the Foreign Service and the Director General should be responsive to the Secretary of State and to the Permanent Under Secretary in these basic policy areas. . . .

Dr. Mosher: I may be wrong but I read that report to say specifically that all personnel policies would be generated and adopted by the Board of Foreign Service and that they would be carried out by the Director General of the Foreign Service.

Mr. Eliot: This is not my understanding.

Mr. Bray: Nor is it mine. It has always been my understanding that the Board of the Foreign Service would provide a point at which common personnel policies for all of the personnel systems in foreign affairs were set, common standards applied. It has always been my understanding, however, that an agency head should have the responsibility, the authority, to manage the people on his payroll within broad policy parameters, such as, for example, the Civil Service Commission provides for the domestic part of the government. Fisher, I think one of the things that this report does is to get precisely at your question of putting the finger on somebody who does lead. Clearly a board does not lead. A person does. I think that is what the Permanent or Executive Under Secretary provides that is now lacking in the system.

Mr. Johnson: I am going to call this the last question.

Roy Rubottom, at Southern Methodist University after about twenty years in the Foreign Service: I can associate myself with much of the critique of the afternoon about the report. Nevertheless, I think on balance it is a splendid one. I can think of nothing more difficult than a required self-study, which universities have to do from time to time, unless it is a voluntary self-study. That is what this is. I think those who have engaged in it have done a great service for the Foreign Service and for the United States as a whole . . . I think this study is very timely. If we of the Foreign Service are ready as a result of this study and other good points that can be brought to bear on it, I think we will be ready to tackle much better than we would otherwise have been the new approaches of the foreign policy of the United States, whatever they may be in this new Administration. . . .

Mr. Johnson: I think it is clear that we have got an answer to the question that is posed for us—are we organized for the 1970s?—and the answer is no. . . .

I think one interesting idea has come out—I use the phrase to try to combine the views of two people here—is what I think could be called fairly a representative elite. Now this may be a contradiction in terms, but I suspect that this is really in effect what we are seeking: a representative elite which is not chosen from one part of American life, which does indeed reflect this terribly complex society of ours.

PANEL DISCUSSION

Europe and America: Problems and Prospects

Professor Brzezinski: In my remarks I propose to advance six broad analytical propositions concerning the state of the US-Soviet or the East-West relationship in Europe, and on that basis I propose to put before you five policy-oriented recommendations.

My first general proposition concerns the nature, the mood and the general priorities of the Soviet political system. The Soviet Union is today beginning to undergo an internal political crisis. It manifests itself, I believe, in an increasingly mediocre collective leadership; it is not very imaginative leadership, and I believe it is internally paralyzed.

There is a growing gap between Soviet society and the political system. At one time the innovative, modernizing efforts of the Soviet political system closed that gap. In spite of the terror and the tensions, there was a homogeneous linkage between Soviet society and the political system, as well as broad consensus that the political system was changing for the better.

It was an innovating society. Today there is growing feeling among many intelligent Soviet citizens that the Soviet political system has become an impediment to further social growth in the Soviet Union. The youth is increasingly alienated; very important is the alienation, the growing tension in nationality relationships in the Soviet Union. Fifty per cent of the Soviet people are non-Russian. The tensions between the great Russians and the non-Russians are beginning to surface. In the years to come, this issue will become, in some respects, of more concern to the Soviet political system than race relations have become to us. But the Soviet system is less resilient to a crisis which involves pluralism and heterogeneity.

This leadership is internally divided. Its behavior, prior to and after the Czechoslovak events, indicates its internal division. I would not be surprised to see significant changes in the structure and character of the political leadership in the foreseeable future.

Because of these general conditions, the current elite attaches the highest value to internal political stability. This has led it to disregard the views of the international communist movement. Historically speaking, the Soviet Union has become, in recent years, the assassin of international Communism. It has opted quite deliberately for stability at home, for stability within its own sphere of influence, over the broad ideological revolutionary aspirations or political aspirations of the Communist parties abroad.

My second general proposition concerns the nature of détente and peaceful co-existence. I believe that Soviet leadership in recent years has been reassessing the scale, the scope and the character of peaceful co-existence. As defined in recent years, this meant an open-ended game in which we would try to improve relations with the East Europeans, to penetrate politically and ideologically the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union would flirt with West Europeans. I believe the Soviet leadership has now concluded that such a game is much more dangerous for them than for us. This is their evaluation of recent events in Czechoslovakia—that peaceful co-existence in which both sides play is much more dangerous to their stability than to ours. This has led them to a broadly gauged attack on the concepts of bridge-building and peaceful engagement.

The Soviets have reevaluated the significance of East-West ties. They wish to limit them. This is why the notion of peaceful co-existence has now been redefined by the Soviets into something which we can call limited co-existence: That is to say, a co-existence which does not exclude specific arrangements in sensitive and mutually necessary areas such as arms control. It precludes this broad fraternization into which Mr. Khrushchev was prepared to plunge.

My third general analytical proposition concerns the Soviet view of the division of Europe. I believe the Soviets are now determined to reconsolidate their position in the bloc more or less to the level that prevailed in the early 60s. Their new theory of intervention, concerning which Mr. Rusk has spoken so well several times, is designed to make it possible for them to assert this paramount objective. Accordingly, there is some danger to the political independence of Rumania and, to some extent, Yugoslavia.

My fourth general proposition is that the greater rigidity and cohesion in the East which the Soviets are now pursuing may not necessarily lead to greater reconsolidation in the West. On the contrary, in the longer run it might contribute to further dispersal of Western unity and perhaps even to lesser American involvement. It is possible, I fear, that some Western nations, uncertain of our own commitments and our willingness to stay, frustrated in efforts to create more integration in recent years, may move towards independently arrived at arrangements designed to guarantee their security and stability. Certainly underneath the surface of rallying around NATO, there are political currents in public opinion in Europe, which indicate that this is at least a high probability. And this is why our response to this threat and to this crisis is so important. Unless we formulate ourselves positive objectives, this process of dispersal of unity can move forward with debilitating consequences for the stability of the international system in general.

My fifth general proposition, is that a disillusionment with gradual liberalization in Eastern Europe, and even within the Soviet Union itself, could have an additional unsettling effect. It could lead to a general abandonment of the notion that there is an inevitable historical process pointing towards a gradual liberalization of Communist society. It could lead to the acceptance of a converse idea. If that happens, there is a danger that in the West, and even in the United States itself, there may be some revival of the rigidly anti-Communist sentiments of the 50s, which would then contribute to growing international polarization and perhaps even greater international stability.

My sixth analytical conclusion concerns the possible relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the light of the above I think it follows that it's going to be a mixture of both cooperation and conflict. The Soviet Union today is still too weak to be a global partner of the United States and too strong not to be a rival. It is ideologically too rigid not to be a revolutionary force, largely because of its conservative commitments. . Yet at the same time, its ruling elite is so status-quo-oriented that the Soviet Union can no

"the Soviet Union has become . . . the assassin of international Communism."
—Zbigniew Brzezinski

longer be truly a militant power. Because of these paradoxes competition will remain the central characteristic of the US-Soviet relationship, but will not preclude specific, limited arrangements. The long range danger, of course, is that both sides may be forced by the dynamic of events, by crises in the third world, by the still lingering revolutionary propensities of the Soviet Union into unforeseen and essentially unwanted conflicts.

In terms of some general policy recommendations I would make five broad propositions. I think it is important to reestablish momentum in Western unity to give the Europeans a new sense of movement towards large scale cooperation. This means not only revitalizing NATO, which is the major thrust of our present efforts, not only giving the Europeans a greater voice in the European caucus within NATO, perhaps even the appointment of a European as a NATO Commander, but also and perhaps more importantly, greater movement in such fields as education, technology, science communications. It has been suggested in the course of the recent campaign that perhaps a European-American common market in science and technology might be a desirable response. In any case we need for the 70s projects and aspirations which can exploit new technological advances and at the same time mobilize the emotion, the energy, the idealism of the younger generation of Europeans.

Secondly, it is important, without acting dramatically, to warn the Soviet Union concerning possible consequences of rash activities in Eastern Europe. Obviously there is very little we can do about existing spheres of preponderance. But we cannot watch with indifference a return to neo-Stalinism in Eastern Europe, because if there is such a return, world peace will be threatened. I believe at the very least it may be useful at the appropriate occasion to reaffirm the point made earlier by President Johnson that a Soviet attack on Rumania would bring about unpredictable and uncontrollable consequences, something which it might have been useful to say even before the events involving Czechoslovakia.

We must never forget that the division of Europe is fundamentally unstable. Acceptance of the notion that there are two coherent, cohesive spheres of influence is an illusion. The Soviets can never fully control Eastern Europe; we can never establish an American hegemony in Western Europe. Because the division is unstable, it feeds back negatively into the American-Soviet relationship and creates new tensions between the two superpowers. Hence it is not *realpolitik*, it is an illusion and a dangerous one at that.

Thirdly, we should maintain a generally positive attitude towards East-West relations. It is striking, as I have suggested earlier, that the people who advocate peaceful engagement have been attacked most strongly by Soviet spokesmen. The fact is that the more rigid, the more hostile communists would prefer a rigid, verbally hostile policy from the West. They fear imaginative bridgebuilding. They would rather have us adopt a policy of *political* passivity and *verbal* hostility, which makes it possible for them to reconsolidate their bloc. Indeed, Czechoslovakia has shown not the failure but the success of the policy of peaceful engagement. And this is why it would be useful now to make proposals with respect to discussion on East-West security arrangements, in order to deflect the single-minded concentration of the more rigid communist leaders on the reconsolidation of Eastern Europe.

My fourth recommendation involves a change of mind on my part. I believe that it would now be desirable for the United States to try to improve relations with China. It is now a mistake to appear to be implicitly a partner of the Soviet Union in the isolation of China. Our chances of accommodation with China and the Soviet Union increase with our willingness to accommodate separately with each. In the past, when the Soviet Union was more accommodating and more inclined to play this mixed game of peaceful coexistence and peaceful engagement, American flirtation with China would have harmed American-Soviet relations and would have appeared as a deliberate effort to exploit Sino-Soviet differences in a political warfare operation. But at a time when the Soviets themselves are becoming more conservative, more ideologically rigid, it is I think useful to remind them that we also have options, that we also have other avenues of accommodation, and that we no longer can be counted on as the implicit ally of the Soviet Union against China. I believe Soviet self-interest, in seeking accommodation with the West, may grow as they begin to attach greater significance to the dangers posed in the East.

Let me add that I have no illusion that our willingness to accommodate with China will lead to accommodation. But a change of posture on our part would be an important signal.

My last general recommendation concerns arms control. I think this is an issue in which the Europeans have to realize that there is a specific American-Soviet responsibility. At the same time we should not have excessive expectations. This is going to be an extraordinarily difficult thing to arrange.

And such concepts as superiority, or parity, are essentially meaningless ideas which confuse public discussion. I think it is important to realize that until tight, mutually satisfactory arms control arrangements are possible, it will be necessary to maintain what I would call asymmetrical ambiguity in the nuclear relationship. That is to say, a situation of qualitative advantage in deliverable weapons—qualitative advantage—but not a clearly calculable superiority in survivability which was a condition of the early 60s. We must, however, develop new weapons systems so that the Soviet leaders are not tempted to take calculated gambles based on what erroneously may appear to be a measurable equilibrium.

The history of international affairs in the last 150 years is the history of civil war among the most advanced nations of the world. This is now beginning to fade, and I think it is the task of the United States very steadily, very gradually, to transform that fading civil war into more workable arrangements. I see no other power in the world scene capable of taking initiative and leadership in this broad and important humane task.

David Calleo: My task is to discuss the current state of Western Europe. It is extremely difficult to talk about Western Europe without discussing Eastern Europe as well. In many respects the policy, not only of the United States but of most of the principal Western European countries, has in recent years been oriented towards the East in one version or another of detente. I remind you of the Gaullist idea of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, the *ostpolitik* of the Great Coalition, as well as the efforts in NATO for mutual force reductions. All of these policies have been blighted by the crisis in Czechoslovakia and the Russian intervention. So when we talk about arrangements for the future of Western Europe, we must keep in mind the important dimension of the rest of Europe and what effect arrangements in the West might have upon some ultimate settling with the East.

Most of the policies pursued by Western governments in the past few years have, as I suggest, been blighted by the intervention in Czechoslovakia. This has certain advantages.

"The American position in Europe has become a divisive issue among the Europeans."
—David P. Calleo

There is a certain danger in the policy of détente which we all understand: it is the tendency to believe that a policy of seeking accommodation with the East is somehow mutually exclusive of the policy of strengthening Western Europe and, possibly, the Atlantic community as well.

This blighting of the hopes of détente has created new opportunities for American diplomacy: the opportunity to foster the new growth of Western European power and responsibility, and possibly to bring America's own world commitments more into line with her resources and her urgent domestic needs.

So far this effort to strengthen the West seems to have been concentrated on rejuvenating NATO, conceived, more or less, in its present form. This is all very well, but these efforts tend to be somewhat cosmetic. This moment provides us with the opportunity to do something far more fundamental and effective—to strike out for some new pattern of transatlantic relationships.

It is time indeed that the Western Europeans themselves began to assume the primary responsibility in defending their vital interests. I would suggest that NATO in its present form tends to impede the assumption of that responsibility. In this respect NATO should be changed.

It would be useful to remind ourselves of NATO's original intention and the conditions under which it was formed. It was devised at a time when Europe was unnaturally weak. Like our whole grand alliance strategy throughout the world, it was informed not by the desire to establish some permanent American military hegemony in Europe, but to provide a shield behind which Europeans could restore their society and regain the strength to carry their own burdens. If this formula, which is meant to be the informing principle of American alliances throughout the world, is ever going to apply anywhere, it must be made to prevail in Western Europe.

Why should we take the initiative in ending our own leading position in Europe? I would suggest that our present hegemonic position is no longer in our own or Europe's best interests. The cost of our military role in Western Europe is familiar. It has constituted a heavy portion of our financial and our administrative burden in the outside world. Our attempts to lighten these costs through offset purchases, through monetary policy, have tended increasingly to distort the structure of world finance and trade. They have got in the way of European attempts at technological cooperation, especially in the military field. Above all they have tended to divide the Europeans into pro- and anti-Americans, and hence impeded the evolution towards unity. The American position in Europe has itself become a major divisive issue among the Europeans.

In short, America's position is self-defeating. It is self-defeating militarily—for by driving the French out, we have greatly weakened the military effectiveness of NATO. To say that NATO is stronger than ever without France is not politics, but theology.

What about our quarrel with de Gaulle?

It is perfectly true, looking back over the past decade, France has been the best candidate for political leadership in Western Europe. We have helped to frustrate France's attempt to exercise that leadership. The French, of course, have themselves contributed a great deal to their own frustration. Nevertheless, this frustrating of French ambition, in retrospect, is a dubious accomplishment, one for which we should not flatter ourselves. We have, in our Western European relations, been bemused by the support of small states without wondering if their support for us was in some way tied to their lack of serious interest in European unity. We have thought of ourselves as better Europeans than the Europeans themselves. Thus we have managed to convince ourselves that support for Europe and support for US leadership in Europe were really the same thing. And thus, we have perpetuated our leadership and Europe's dependence. The shield has become a wall.

Turning to the future, it seems to me that if we are serious about building a self-sustaining Western European grouping, we must realize that it will have to be based on an entente led by existing great powers in Western Europe, an entente of France, Germany and Britain. If we began to think in these terms, in terms of a great power entente in Western Europe as the nucleus of a grouping in Western Europe, we would notice that the two principal powers on the Continent, France and Germany, have appeared to reach fundamental agreement with each other in many significant respects. Entente is perhaps a better word, and this entente is perhaps the single most promising development in post-war Europe. In many respects the Common Market, for example, is far less the result of some magical federalist technocracy than the institutional expression of a fundamental agreement between France and Germany. That entente is the reality of what political unity has been achieved in Western Europe, of the most dramatic and obvious form of European integration, the European communities.

Rather than welcoming this Franco-German entente, our reaction has been hostility, fear, jealousy.

No doubt a Franco-German entente is an insufficient foundation for a New Europe. It seems very likely that no stable European political grouping can be built until Britain joins this Franco-German entente. In this respect it is interesting to note that within the past several months the Germans have taken the initiative in trying to reconcile Britain and France, to achieve some kind of an arrangement that would begin the difficult process of integrating the British economy into the Common Market. And the French have made a not altogether unpromising response. Instead of welcoming these initiatives, whose success is absolutely vital to the development of a self-sustaining Europe, our reaction apparently has been negative —on the specious grounds that we can imagine no beneficial political consequences unless and until Britain is a full voting member of the Common Market.

This is not a serious reaction for a country which would make it a prime goal of its foreign policy to achieve a real political grouping in Western Europe.

The net result of these policies of ours has been to encourage the Europeans in their division, as well as to provide a comfortable margin for their own irresponsibility. It is time, for Europe's sake and for our own, to break this round by some conscious act of policy, by some call for a "new deal" in trans-Atlantic relations.

We will have to be prepared to gamble that the Europeans will rise to the occasion, and some people, here and in Europe, are afraid to do so. But the notion of Europe acquiescing in the role of a gigantic Finland, which one hears often—France preferring to live on Russian sufferance rather than coming to terms with Britain—seems a most improbable outcome of any such challenge to the Europeans. They have shown remarkable institutional inventiveness in the years since the war, and it seems somewhat presumptuous to assume it beyond their power to figure out the arrangements which would make possible some kind of strong European grouping within the Atlantic Alliance.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Question: I'd like to ask what is the difference between the campaign dictum of Mr. Nixon of "superiority rather than parity" and the Brzezinski theorem produced this morning of a "qualitative advantage in deliverable weapons"; and if there is a difference, how are we poor fellows in the press supposed to clarify it for the public?

Brzezinski: Well, first of all I am not prepared to explain what Mr. Nixon means by superiority.

As to what I mean by a qualitative advantage, what I mean by asymmetrical ambiguity—and the two go hand in hand—is

that it is essential that we have a certain advantage in technological development, in sophistication, in complexity, precision of weapons systems. The MIRVs are an example of such a development. And until there is a hard, binding arms control arrangement, I think it behooves us, in the interest of world stability, to maintain that qualitative advantage. It must become extremely difficult for the Soviets to calculate the exact nature of the military balance between them and us, and thereby reduce their temptation to undertake a challenge, calculating that the mutual non-survivability which today exists will so inhibit us that we will not react.

I think this is particularly important because there are some parts of the world in which our political interests and the political interests of our allies depend almost entirely on our strategic capacities, not on our tactical capacities. And we'll not be able to safeguard certain very politically key places in the world unless we have the Soviets at the very least ambivalent as to the nature of our strategic power. I think a relationship of formally contrived parity, in the context of intense ideological and political instability and conflict, could create a condition in which the Soviets would be tempted in certain places to exploit their local advantage for major political objectives. It is the strategic ambiguity—asymmetrical ambiguity—derived from our qualitative lead that I think protects world peace.

Question: I am intrigued by Professor Brzezinski's comment that the United States ought to change its attitude toward China. Would he care to comment on possible Kremlin reactions to such a move on our part?

Brzezinski: I think it is a mistake for us to give the Soviet Union a blank check in the East, particularly in the face of increased Soviet hostility and rigidity in the West.

I think the Sino-Soviet relationship has now become so embittered that a slightly different posture on our part towards China would not stampede the Chinese nor the Soviets into an arrangement. Moreover, I do not believe that a slightly more open-minded attitude on our part is going to alter the American-Chinese relationship. The Chinese would absolutely reject any approaches by us.

But it is the signals that we want to emit that are important, rather than the immediate consequences in the Chinese-American relationship. It is the signals we want to emit, vis-a-vis the Soviets, that in the long run the Soviets can not count on implicit American support in the relationship with China—unless they are also willing to move toward a more accommodating posture on the other crucial and critical issues in world affairs. The present Soviet mood is such that I think there would be some major utility in communicating such a signal to them.

Question: Would I be interpreting you correctly that per-

AFSA vice president John Reinhart chairing Friday morning session.

haps the United States should consider, in the interest of promoting harmony in Europe, withdrawal from NATO?

Professor Calleo: The point is to create a situation in which the Europeans assume the primary responsibility for Western defense. We could perfectly well say, it is up to you to come up with some set of arrangements. When you have come up with some kind of arrangement we are perfectly willing to attach some American troops to this whole structure, assuming that we find the arrangements satisfactory—this is a bargaining, diplomatic situation.

In the nuclear field Western European nuclear defense will for any foreseeable future depend to a considerable extent upon being backed up by the American nuclear deterrent. Still, there is room, I would think, for an independent European nuclear force. Now there are all kinds of problems about how that should be organized. These turn chiefly around the question of the Germans, and to what extent the Germans can be folded into some kind of European arrangement.The point is the primary responsibility for developing these arrangements should lie with the Europeans. The French and the British, for example, know perfectly well that if they don't want Germany to have nuclear weapons they have to arrive at some arrangements in the long run which satisfy the perfectly natural German desire to have some kind of nuclear protection. There is something to be said for creating a framework that encourages people to believe rationally, rather than subsidizes their irresponsibility.

Question: My question is to Professor Brzezinski. It has been said that the logic of the Czech reform was leading to a dissolution of the system and therefore the Russians didn't have much choice but to intervene. My question is, do you accept that and if so, do you see similar signs of disintegration in Rumania and Yugoslavia that might similarly propel the Soviets to interfere there?

Brzezinski: The question raises the critical issue of the levels of tolerance of the Soviet system for other Communist systems. If the level of tolerance is low, then changes such as took place in Czechoslovakia pose a direct threat to what the Soviets consider to be their primary interest. I would argue that what was likely to happen in Czechoslovakia, if the Soviets had not intervened, would have been a continuation of the Communist Party type system, but one which would have increasing analogies with democratic political systems—freedom of expression, increasing freedom to organize on a limited scale although not on a national scale, contacts with the West, freedom to travel, and so forth. That kind of a development, if your level of tolerance is low, poses a threat to a political system which is rigid, dogmatic, conservative, totalitarian.

But this is also a measure of Soviet intellectual and political underdevelopment in the second half of the Twentieth Century. We live in urban industrial societies in which people crave greater expression, greater mobility, greater inter-action with other cultures.

The thrust of history is such that over time the Soviet leadership will begin to accommodate and adjust to this point of view. I would therefore not lean over backwards in excusing the Soviets for what they did, in saying that they had overriding interests. Because if one does that, one really slows down the process of evolution in their own outlook. This is why it is so terribly important for us in the years to come to continue our efforts to establish links with the East.

Now as far as Rumania and Yugoslavia are concerned, I would differentiate between the two. Rumania posed a specific challenge of national independence. Yugoslavia poses a combined challenge of national independence and internal liberalization and democratization. In the long run Yugoslavia is more dangerous. In the short run, however, Rumania is more vulnerable.

The situation, however, will become profoundly different once Tito passes from the scene because Tito provides continuity and stability for this extraordinarily difficult process of democratizing and liberalizing a one-party Communist system. It is the absence of anyone with such authority, and a close coterie of devoted friends, that transforms a relatively stable process into a potentially dynamic and unstable process in other Communist countries, most recently in Czechoslovakia.

. . . There is room, I would think, for an independent European nuclear force.

—Calleo

Question: My name is Rockwood Foster. I would like to ask about the nature of the US-UK relationship in the future and particularly the role of the UK in Europe during the 70s.

Calleo: The French objection to Britain going immediately into the Common Market has a very solid economic case behind it which has been developed not so much by the French, I hasten to say, but by many of the most distinguished economists in Britain. If you tick off the major British economists, you find a very large number of them, on purely economic grounds, argue that it would be catastrophic in the short run for Britain to go into the Common Market. They then say, well, politically it is worth it.

That is why it seems to me these recent German initiatives to create a free trade area, which would provide the transition the British economy will need, seem to me so terribly significant. And that is why my feeling about our apparent lack of enthusiasm for this idea is that we really haven't thought it over very seriously.

Now in a larger political sense, there is the basic question which de Gaulle always raises: are the British really committed to the creation of a great power in Europe which is not unfriendly to the United States but which is very definitely distinct from the United States? If you look over the whole range of issues in which this has any practical meaning—relations in the Third World, monetary policy, military policy you frequently find the British siding with the United States for a kind of Atlanticist solution which ends up giving us a kind of hegemony in all of these fields, rather than what might be called a European solution which tends to look toward parity between the two.

The point is that in all of these things it is not that one solution is wicked and the other is good. It is fair to say that one solution appeals to the Europeans' vision of what Europe will be and one appeals to another kind of vision. The British really haven't made up their minds; until they make up their minds, they are going to remain in this ambiguous position and it will always be possible to argue that it would be a mistake to have the British in the institutions of the Europeon community, because there isn't room for a power as large as Britain which isn't committed to the enterprise.

In the long run the British have much more to gain from joining in this European enterprise than they do from what will inevitably be a junior partnership with the United States. Nevertheless, the issues involved are profoundly difficult for the British. It really does involve a profound reshaping of their own national image.

Brzezinski: The historical relationship between Britain and America, this special relationship, has certain well-founded historical roots and was globally expedient in recent years when Britain was playing a world role. That role has ceased; the British have withdrawn. And in that sense I think the utility as well as the historical validity of the special relationship is not only coming to an end, but in some respects is becoming counter-productive to our other objectives and perhaps British interests.

PANEL DISCUSSION

Congress and Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs

Congressman Morse: Congress and public opinion—I think that we first ought to dissect the conccpt of public opinion.

The President has principal responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs in our society. He, as an elected politician, must be alert throughout the discharge of that constitutional responsibility to the impression, to the attitudes, to the opinion of the public. The way he molds this, whether he follows, whether he leads, will determine in large measure the success he will have in the discharge of his responsibility.

Those of you who are in the policy formulation establishment, who are not elected officials, who are appointed, are nccessarily not going to have the same sensitivity to public impressions, public attitudes, opinion, and so forth. They're going to be factors in your thinking; but they're not going to be the major force as they are in the case of your boss, the President.

The Congress does respond immediately to impressions or attitudes, and frequently they will pander to attitudes, to impressions. This is one of the real tragedies, I guess, of the whole foreign policy making business, of the abrasions that exist between the Executive and the Legislative branch.

Now let's look at the kinds of public opinion that do have relevance to the foreign policy making proeess. The President of the United States seeks to establish a generalized public opinion, to mold a broad fecling among the people of the United States in support of his policies. If he is successful in doing this, it gives him a high degree of flexibility.

The Congress, on the other hand, doesn't have the opportunity to mold this kind of generalized public opinion and hence must be more alert to specialized public opinion of various sorts. And all too frequently you will find spceialized public opinion motivated by emotionalism. I think we can be disdainful of the efforts of the John Birch Society to prevent trade with some of the Eastern European nations. And I think that the New Left in the last year or two has introduced an element of specialized public opinion based, in my view at least on a fairly emotional posture.

Foreign public opinion is something we don't frequently think enough about, at least elective politicians don't think enough about it. Fortunately we do have the foreign policy establishment being sensitive to this most of the time. I think it's sad that more elective politicians don't have the sensitivity, the alertness to public opinion throughout the world.

The media necessarily have a massive effect on the Congress in its discharge of its foreign policy responsibiilties. Certainly the television networks have had a massive impact. We covered the Middle East War of 1967 almost as though it were a football game. And I think we can understand the fact that television brought the horror and terror of Vietnam into every American home over the last several years.

Congressman Irwin: I come from a district that frankly is perhaps as well-equipped to understand foreign policy problems as any in America, outside of New York City, Fairfield County, high income area, where people have all the best ways of keeping up with information and what's going on in America and the world. And yet I think what we know and what we've seen in the last year or two or three is an America confused and reeling under the impact of its involvement in Vietnam: an America that doesn't exactly know what it's committed to and what it isn't committed to. And I don't think there are very effective ways of analyzing how you deal with this kind of thing. It's my own view for example that our experience in Vietnam is causing us to go back to a past that might even be before World War II. A lot of us assumed that the great debates of the late 30s about America's role in the world were finished forever. And yet, I think, if you take off a couple of layers of American opinion, you find that Americans are still confused about what their role in the world should be. We've seen evidence of this in the last year or two.

One thing that I think is important to say to a group like this is something that I felt often. I was lucky enough to work at USIA for a time so that I was on the other side of the fence for a while. And one of the things that has always bothered me is the real lack of capacity you as professionals and we as politicians have had to get together and discuss what really are common problems. When I was at USIA, I had the impression that everyone throught that all on the Hill were mad, reckless men that you couldn't do anything with at all. And on the Hill, I've always found that politicians tend to be very superficial in their judgment of our professional foreign service people. I think that this is really the result of people not getting together and knowing each other.

I have always felt that there is a tremendous community of techniques and disciplines in the work of a diplomat and the work of a politician. It seems to me devastating that we don't understand this better.

Allard Lowenstein: When we talk about American opinion on foreign policy we confront the fact that, as a democracy, we want to believe that the people have a great deal to say about our foreign policy. Yet we know that the way they have to say it is very indirect. So that I think there is really no honest way you can say that the American people endorse or support most of what the American government does in most of the world.

Now there are very broad generalities that are true, very broad strokes where public opinion has an influence and where the issue becomes acute enough so that many Americans arise out of their normal indifference or lack of information and take a direct interest. I think the clearest from my perspective would be the issue of Vietnam. We can agree that there is almost no way that the people can be heard from on the details of foreign policy.

And then we get to the heart of the problem, which is "Should American foreign policy be dictated by a kind of elitism, determined by one or two people running the Executive Branch and then implemented by you as faithful servants of the country and criticized by some of us who feel that things are being done that are not in the interests of the country or are inconsistent with our view of what's right." Is that the way that the foreign policy of America, as the greatest democracy in the world, should be conducted? The answer is that no one has come up with any other way to conduct it, and that troubles me.

Mr. Manning: Almost all the innovations in communications (that even goes for the relatively new one of television), have been technological.

One of my favorite subjects when I was in the State Department remains one of my favorite subjects. And that is

the game of trying to contrast the resources that are provided for informing the public about foreign affairs, as against the resources that are applied to informing the public about military affairs. I've been doing a bit of research, and I couldn't get a straight answer to what the budget for public information, in the broadest sense of that term, was in the Department of Defense. I'm arriving at a figure that I think is going to approach something like 300 million dollars. And I think that's conservative.

The budget for public affairs when I was in the State Department was a little over 2 million, but probably not much more than that now, perhaps 2.5, 2.7 million. The budget for the school of information for military officers and enlisted men at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, run by the Army but open to all the services, is $1,700,000 for payroll alone this year. This is strict congressional responsibility.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Question: I am Richard Brown of the World Affairs Council in Philadelphia. Last year we tried an experiment of putting on specific programs dealing with what Mr. Lowenstein would call the details of foreign policy, at the end of which we had questionnaires distributed to the members of the audiences and asked for their opinion on specific choices in foreign policy. We sent the results of those questionnaires to the State Department and to the appropriate committees of both Houses of Congress. We got very nice thank-you letters from everybody saying they appreciated our interest.

My question is, would it really make any difference?

Morse: I think it will make a lot of difference depending on how you did it. I think the kind of technique you used perhaps isn't very effective, you know to send somebody the result of questionnaires or this sort of thing. But I think a personal confrontation between an elected politician and a thoughtful, informed citizen can have a massive impact.

Question: Jack McFall, Foreign Service, retired.

I think Congressman Lowenstein has raised as important an issue as we will have confronting us here.

How do we proceed to get some form of a constituency that will bring into realization State Department hopes in foreign policy?

Morse: I'd like to comment. I really would because I think this demonstrates one of the reasons the State Department isn't successful: this extraordinary apprehension and fear of the Congress of the United States. It verges on paranoia, and until you get over it we are not going to improve the situation.

You do have a constituency, believe me, in the House and in the Senate, which is deeply interested in State Department and foreign policy problems; it is an influential and it is a vigorous constituency.

Sure, you've got some bad guys up there, and I am just as aware as you are of it. But your job is not as insurmountable as you sometimes make it.

Question: My name is Joe Walt, I am from Simpson College. In this matter of dialogue many of us feel that it is an unequal contest at best because in our correspondence and conversation with Congressmen and Senators, usually there is a kind of retreat on the part of the official into saying "you realize my opinion is based on information which is vital to the national security and you can't possibly know about these things."

Is real dialogue between thoughtful and articulate people who are concerned and their elected public officials, not to speak of the State Department—is this kind of a dialogue possible?

Irwin: If you let any public official get away with that kind of a response, you have been had, and you shouldn't do it. The President himself couldn't hide behind that kind of a line, and if you are letting Senators or Congressmen do that, then it is your fault.

Question: My question has to do with who is public opinion from the point of view of the Congress. As you watch surveys and opinion polls, you quickly conclude that public opinion, at least mass opinion, has virtually nothing to do with public policy. You see foreign aid much more popular than liberalized trade, yet we get more and more liberalized trade and less and less foreign aid; vast majorities against aid to Yugoslavia, yet we get aid to Yugoslavia.

So those of us that are interested in practical action are constantly faced with the question, who are the target audiences we ought to bother with?

How many people are we talking about in most Congressmen's constituencies and what sorts of folks are they?

Manning: It's a relatively small number of people and, depending on the issue, it is an entirely different set of people.

On foreign affairs there is no getting away from the fact that the conduct of foreign relations is relatively unpopular as an activity. That is why I think it has been possible for people in government, in journalism and in the Congress to build up a kind of enthusiasm for certain things like foreign aid.

I'd say that public opinion is made up to a great extent of people who put out newspapers and magazines and run the broadcasting industry, the people who are in public office, and maybe ten to 15 per cent of the people who read those journals, listen to those broadcasts, and listen to the speeches of those Congressmen and public officials.

Question: Robert Wedby, Colorado State University. I am disturbed at the equating of foreign policy with the results of a popularity poll. We can't all be informed on all foreign policy issues. We can't have a referendum on all foreign policy issues, and I am disturbed that our Congress has not moved more in the direction of setting up some kinds of guidelines under which our Foreign Service can carry out the detailed guidance as professionals, the way you would expect an engineer or a person who is an expert in many other areas of national public interest.

Morse: I think it would be officious of the Congress to undertake to write the kind of guidelines that you suggest, sir. It seems to me the Constitution clearly gives the Executive Branch the responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs.

On the other hand, I think that the country should have a definition of American foreign policy objectives. And if you ever want to break up a meeting someplace just get a group of men who are knowledgeable to try to define what US foreign policy objectives are on a regional basis, a country basis, or even a world-wide basis.

Summary by the Chairman

Mr. Johnson: This is to me different from all conferenees that I have attended. I think we owe a great debt of gratitude to the Association for bringing us all together here for these two days. They have brought together people who haven't had, or "haven't made" is the better phrase, as much opportunity as they might to talk to eaeh other. We've used a phrase here several times: the "forcign affairs community." One of the things that I think we all have to remember is that all of us here are members of the foreign affairs community.

It seems to me that the conference has been divided as far as subjeet matter is eoncerned into three topics. The first was some discussion of substance and of policy. The seeond was a discussion of organization for the 1970s, with partieular referenee to the document that has been produced for the American Foreign Service Association by a number of its members. And the third is the perennial problem of communication.

Let me say a few words about each of these three aspects of the conference.

We had put before us yesterday morning some views of the shape of the world of the 1970s that I at least shall be pondering for some time. An awareness that if you're going to look at the shape of the world of the 1970s, you better not focus too closely on issues that we have always called issues of foreign affairs or foreign policy. You've got to look, for example, at the issue of the generation gap, at technological change.

Somebody said that the United States is now undergoing a whole new immigration. The inhabitants of the present world are the younger generation who were born into it. We older people are immigrants trying to adjust to a new world.

One of the remarks in yesterday morning's session was made by three speakers in one form or another: The kind of world we will have in the 1970s depends to a very considerable degree on our vision of it. This to me was a hopeful remark.

Peter Krogh wasn't sure whether the private foreign affairs community was going to be able to live up to its responsibilities for the decade ahead. And I think that this is something that all of us in that outside community have to recognize. It is we perhaps who have to shape some sense of what it is that the United States is going to seek—what its vision is and how it goes about trying to transmit, translate that vision into reality. This conferenee has driven home to me, I think, more than ever the responsibility and the possibilities of those of us outside for the formulation of long range, realistie, imaginative foreign affairs goals.

With respeet to the second topic, "Organization for the 70s," the question was "Are we organized for our responsibilities in the 70s?" I said, without hearing a large dissenting voiee, that my sense of yesterday afternoon's discussion was "no." We now have an opportunity, and our hosts have given us a basis for seizing that opportunity, to see if we ean't organize more effectively at least the official foreign affairs community and its relations with the rest of us.

There is a President-elect. There will be a new administration two months from next week. There will be a new Congress even before that. There is a doeument here whieh I think is a unique document. I'm not going to suggest that I agree with all of what is in it, but I do think I agree with a very substantial part of what is in this report. The willingness of the group to take a hard look at their own role and to make recommendations about their own role is a rare thing in American life. Businessmen here will know, and so will some others, that it is much easier to get an outside organization (management consultants are quite a popular group of people in this country) to come in and look at what's wrong with you. This document was written by members of the group in their own spare time. I'd say three cheers for the American Foreign Serviee Association for having prepared this report and given it as a basis for discussion.

I know that I speak on behalf of our hosts when I say that they hope and expect many of you will express in writing your views to them on this report. I know that they are prepared and interested to hold conversations with members of the private foreign affairs community, and also that community whieh is on the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, with respect to the report. I know they're giving serious consideration to the question of how one can move forward along lines whieh they think desirable to bring about better organization within the Department of State and the official foreign affairs community of the Executive branch, for the 70s. I couldn't refrain from mentioning the role of Graham Martin. He is a busy man with broad experience in the Department and in the field. I think we all owe him a real debt of thanks.

The third topic—the problem of communication. We've had the question raised as to whether there is a constituency for the official foreign affairs community. I don't think anyone has really answered that. But we've begun communieation. I referred yesterday morning to my belief that this was the end of the beginning. And one of the things that encourages me is that there is a determination on the part of the Association and on the part of some of the others to continue the dialogue.

One thing has developed since the planning of this conferenee took place. The International Studies Association attempts to bring together students of foreign relations throughout the country. The President and the Executive Director of that Associeation have been here. They are now talking with the leaders of the American Foreign Serviee Association about ways in which they ean continue the dialogue between those academics and the professionals in this building.

I think we have to explore ways in which the conversation can continue with members of the business community, and I hope that an effort will be made to make use of the Public Members Association for continuing conversation with businessmen.

I believe that our hosts are planning to keep in touch with us and I believe that there are many of us here who want to respond. I do now think we're past the end of the beginning and moving on to something new, something very worthwhile.

Thank you very much indeed.

Panelists at Foreign Service Days Conference

■ Born in Warsaw, Poland, in 1928, Zbigniew Brzezinski settled in North America in 1938 and is a US citizen. He obtained his BA from McGill and his Ph.D. from Harvard, where he taught at the Russian Research Center. In 1960 he became professor of government at Columbia and director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs.

On leave from Columbia during 1966-1968, Professor Brzezinski served as a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State. Currently a member of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, he has participated in many international conferences.

Author of numerous publications, he has contributed articles on comparative government and international affairs to American and foreign journals, newspapers, and popular magazines as well as often being interviewed on television.

■ David P. Calleo is 34 years old and was born in Binghamton, New York. He graduated from Yale University in 1955, became a Ph.D. four years later and taught at Yale from 1960 to 1967. He has also held fellowships for research in England and France from the Guggenheim Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Social Science Research Council, and was in 1966-67 a Research Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford.

He returned from England to serve as Consultant to the United States Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (1967-68) and is currently a member of the Johns Hopkins Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research and Associate Professor of European Studies at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies as well as author of several books.

■ Former Congressman Donald J. Irwin was born in 1926 in Argentina of American parents. He received his B.A. degree from Yale University in 1951 and his Ll.B. from Yale Law School in 1954.

Mr. Irwin served with the Joint Brazil-United States Military Commission in Rio de Janerio. After serving in the 86th Congress, he was appointed general counsel of the United States Information Agency in 1961 by Edward R. Murrow and, subsequently, treasurer of the State of Connecticut by Governor John N. Dempsey.

Elected to the 89th Congress on November 3, 1964, Mr. Irwin represented Connecticut's fourth district. He was a member of the Armed Services Committee and the Select Committee on Small Business.

■ Joseph E. Johnson was born in Longdale, Virginia in 1906. After taking undergraduate and graduate degrees at Harvard, he taught history at Bowdoin and Williams Colleges. In 1950 he became president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

In 1942, Mr. Johnson took five years' leave from academic life to serve the State Department. He played major advisory roles at the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks conference and the 1945 United Nations conference on international organization. Mr. Johnson was an advisor to American delegates to the first General Assembly and to this country's first representatives at the Security Council. In 1947 he was named to the Department's policy planning staff.

Currently Mr. Johnson is trustee for the World Peace Foundation, a director of the Council on Foreign Relations, a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and director of the United Nations Association.

■ Herman Kahn was born 46 years ago in Bayonne, New Jersey. Following three years of war-time service in the US Army, he studied at three universities in California winning a masters of science degree at the California Institute of Technology in 1948. He was employed as a mathemetician by two aircraft corporations before becoming a senior physicist and military analyst for the RAND Corporation in 1948. In 1961, together with associates, Mr. Kahn established the Hudson Institute in White Plains, New York, where he is currently the director.

He has been consultant to the Atomic Energy Commission, the Gaither Committee on Strategic Warfare and the Sanford Research Institute for Non-military Defense.

Author of several books, Mr. Kahn also writes frequently for scientific journals and popular magazines.

■ Born in Fuerth, Germany in 1923, Henry Kissinger emigrated to this country in 1938. He won three degrees at Harvard and has held faculty positions at the same university ever since 1951 when he became executive director of Harvard's International Seminar. A full professor since 1967, he has until recently taught at Harvard's Center for International Affairs.

For several years Mr. Kissinger has been associated with the Council on Foreign Relations, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and numerous organizations concerned with defense questions. He was a consultant to the National Security Council during the Kennedy Administration, and to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the State Department.

Author of many publications, Mr. Kissinger was appointed principal national security advisor to President-elect Nixon shortly after the conference.

■ Foy Kohler was born 60 years ago in Oakwood, Ohio. After graduation from Ohio State University, he entered the foreign service.

In the mid-1940's Mr. Kohler was a member of various American delegations to United Nations agencies. In 1949 he was appointed director of the Voice of America and three years later he became a member of the Department's policy planning staff. From 1959 to 1962 he was Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and was then named ambassador to the USSR. In 1966 he became Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Mr. Kohler was twice given superior performance awards. In December 1967 he left the government for a teaching position at the Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami.

■ Peter Krogh is Associate Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He recently served in the Department of State as White House fellow assigned to the office of the Secretary.

Born in Ross, California in 1937, Mr. Krogh received his AB degree from Harvard College in economics and his master of arts and master of arts in law and

diplomacy degrees from the Fletcher School. In 1966 Mr. Krogh spent three months at the Brookings Institution as visiting scholar and received his Ph.D. degree from Fletcher. In January, 1967, he was selected one of greater Boston's outstanding men.

■ Congressman Allard K. Lowenstein, born 39 years ago in Newark, New Jersey, is a graduate of the University of North Carolina and Yale Law School. In 1950 he was elected president of the National Student Association.

In 1952 he was chairman of Students for Stevenson and later an aide to the late Eleanor Roosevelt at the United Nations. An early leader of civil rights movements in the south, he helped organize the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

After a bid for Congress in 1960, he taught politics at Stanford, North Carolina University and the City University of New York. In 1967 Mr. Lowenstein organized "Conferences for Concerned Democrats" aimed at blocking President Johnson's renomination. He formed a coalition for an open Democratic convention.

A victor in New York's fifth Congressional district, Mr. Lowenstein has joined the 91st Congress.

■ Born in Binghamton, New York in 1919, Robert Manning became the State Department and White House correspondent for the United Press from 1944 to 1946 and then headed UP's United Nations Bureau. From 1949 to 1961 he worked for TIME as writer, senior editor and eventually chief of the London Bureau for TIME, LIFE and FORTUNE.

Mr. Manning was Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from 1962 to 1964. He then joined the ATLANTIC MONTHLY, becoming Editor-in-Chief in 1966.

A Nieman Fellow at Harvard at the end of World War II, he is a member of the visiting committees of Harvard's Board of Overseers and the School of International Studies at Stanford. He is also a director of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy at Tufts University, which awarded him an honorary doctoral degree in 1966.

■ Congressman F. Bradford Morse was born 47 years ago in Lowell, Massachusetts. After four years in the US Army, he received a bachelor of science degree in 1948 from Boston University where the following year he also obtained a law degree. For the next four years, Mr. Morse was a private attorney, served as a law clerk to the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court and taught at the Boston University School of Law.

He came to Washington in 1953 as an attorney for the Senate Armed Services Committee. From 1955 to 1958 he served as executive secretary and chief assistant to the late Senator Leverett Saltonstall. For the next two years he was a deputy administrator for the Veterans Administration.

Mr. Morse was first elected to Congress in 1960 and begins his fifth consecutive term this January.

■ Dr. Frederick C. Mosher was born in Oberlin, Ohio, in 1913. He won degrees at Dartmouth College and Syracuse University before beginning a 15-year career as a civil servant with various federal, state and local government agencies. His last government position was with the former Office of Foreign Service in the Department of State.

In 1949 Dr. Mosher became a teacher of political science, first at Syracuse, later at the University of California and presently the University of Virginia. In 1953 he was awarded a doctorate in public administration by Harvard University. He interrupted his teaching career in 1961 to 1962 when he became staff director for the Herter Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel.

Dr. Mosher is former editor-in-chief of the PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW and author of many publications.

AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION

1918-1968

AFSA is celebrating its 50th year of service as the private, non-profit organization of the professionals in foreign affairs. With chapters around the world, it is dedicated to advancing the professional capabilities and taking a combative interest in the welfare of almost 8,000 members at home and abroad. Men and women from the Foreign Service of the Department of State, Agency for International Development, United States Information Agency and Peace Corps constitute the greater part of AFSA's membership.

AFSA traces its origins back half a century to 1918, when a few consular officers stationed in the Department of State organized the American Consular Association. In March, 1919, the first issue of the **American Consular Bulletin** appeared. When the Diplomatic and Consular Services were consolidated into a single Foreign Service of the United States in 1924, the Consular Association was reorganized as the American Foreign Service Association, and the **American Consular Bulletin** became the **Foreign Service Journal.**

AFSA is now looking to the future. It has developed a new vision of the way in which the nation should organize itself to conduct its foreign policies. Its report, entitled "Toward a Modern Diplomacy," has received wide attention. AFSA has established awards to encourage greater creativity, intellectual courage and reasoned dissent among its members. It is exploring new ways to build an **effective** constituency for foreign affairs, enlarging the definition of the "professional in foreign affairs" to include the teacher, businessman and reporter.

AFSA is a vigorous and growing organization. It takes great pride in its past record of service to the profession and to the nation. Its potential for future service has been recognized by a number of foundations and individuals who, in the past year, have made available more than $125,000 in grants and gifts to support its new programs.

AFSA has new and exciting ideas. It would welcome yours.